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Abstract 
The incidence of unintentional childlessness in women who have, as popular comment puts it, 
‘left it too late’, is rising markedly in many western nations, yet the experience is not well 
understood. This thesis focuses on issues of fantasy, loss, and grieving in the experience of 26 
New Zealand women in their 30s and 40s who are what Cannold (2005) has termed 
‘circumstantially childless’; that is women who expected to have children but find themselves 
at the end of their natural fertility without having done so for—at least initially—social rather 
than biological reasons.  
I explore the conscious and unconscious dimensions of the fantasies that many of the women 
interviewed have about themselves as mothers in relation to a child or children. I argue that 
these fantasies have their origins in these women’s trans-subjective relationship with their 
mothers before birth, the intersubjective relationship after birth, and the mutual overlapping of 
their unique psychobiography and the social worlds in which they have become adults. 
Circumstantial childlessness entails a loss of the potential to embody their fantasies about 
themselves as mothers. The thesis uses psychoanalytic and contemporary grief theories to 
explore their experience of loss and grieving, and their adaptation of their fantasies when the 
potential to embody them has passed. It calls for a reconceptualization of maternal 
subjectivity to encompass the creative and satisfying alternative ways that women who do not 
have children embody ‘mother’ in their lives.  
The study’s psychoanalytically-informed psychosocial methodology entailed the innovative 
use of participant-produced drawings, and the development of a method of recording 
protocols—based on Bollas’ (2007) notion of a symphonic score—to systematically record 
non-linguistic elements of the texts (such as sighs, hesitations, laughter, repetitions, and tears) 
across the range of the semi-structured individual and group interview transcripts. In this 
respect, the thesis contributes to investigations of social life that move beyond the limits of 
conventional text-based methods of inquiry and interpretation. 
 
1 
Chapter 1: “A sense of myself as a mother” 
(Much) of our so-called mental life is about the lives we are not living, the lives we are missing out 
on, the lives we could be leading but for some reason are not. What we fantasize about, what we 
long for, are the experiences, the things and the people that are absent.  
(Phillips 2012, p.xi) 
Children are never simply themselves, co-extensive with their own bodies, becoming alive to us 
when they turn in the womb, or with their first unaided breath. Their lives start long before birth, 
long before conception, and if they are aborted or miscarried or simply fail to materialize at all, 
they become ghosts within our lives. 
(Mantell 2003, p.228) 
1.1 Circumstantial childlessness 
This thesis explores aspects of a particular form of childlessness in women, which, like 
Cannold (2000), I am describing as ‘circumstantial childlessness’.1 Circumstantially childless 
women are those who have seen themselves as having a biological child or children at some 
point in their lives and who—as far as they know—are physically capable of conceiving and 
bearing a child, but have come to or are approaching the end of their reproductive years 
without giving birth. They are in the unusual—but not uncommon—position of being neither 
‘voluntarily childless’ (since they would like to have a child), nor ‘involuntarily childless’ 
(since they were as far as they knew, at least initially, biologically capable of doing so).2 
In an article in which she addressed public criticism of Australia’s then Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard for being “childless”, journalist Gillian Guthrie (2012) discussed her own 
childlessness and commented that she was “not in the right relationship at the right time and 
just kept working”.3 Her ‘explanation’ is a reiteration of a circulating social narrative (Somers 
1994) whereby circumstantially childless women are understood as not having become                                                         
1 Cannold developed the term ‘circumstantial childlessness’ in her doctoral thesis, which I discuss later in this 
chapter. Initially I referred to this phenomenon as ‘contingent childlessness’ (Tonkin 2010), since for me that 
emphasized the sense in which having a child was about women managing a set of contingent factors, rather than 
simply getting the circumstances ‘right’. The women in one of the group interviews, however, were very 
resistant to the idea of ‘contingency’. They felt it suggested they had “poor risk management”; that it carried 
some judgment, some sense of  “why didn’t you see that coming?” Their sensitivity may have been related to 
issues of ‘choice’ and their perception of other peoples’ responses to their not having children. These are issues I 
address throughout the thesis.  
2 The phenomenon of circumstantial childlessness is not new. For example, Nicholson (2007) writes that during 
the First World War nearly three-quarters of a million British soldiers—many of them unmarried—died. Forty 
years later two-thirds of older unmarried women surveyed in Britain in the 1960s felt that they had missed out on 
having children, and commented on the gaps that childlessness had left in their lives. These women might also 
be understood to be circumstantially childless, albeit in very different social and historical circumstances.  
3 March 6, 2012 Sydney Morning Herald. The article was written by Gillian Guthrie and preceded the launch of 
her book Childlessness: Reflections on life’s longing for itself (Short Stop Press, 2012). 
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biological mothers because they have not found a suitable partner. In the same week in New 
Zealand, in a ‘Sunday’ magazine article that explored the experience of women who find 
themselves in this predicament through the narrative of journalist Abbey Stirling (2012), Dr 
Richard Fisher of Fertility Associates is quoted as saying it is “a little bit about organizing 
your life, it’s a little bit about organizing your career, but mostly it’s about not having the 
right partner. It is certainly the most common reason. They just haven’t happened to have met 
the person they want to have a family with”. Although there were other reasons, not having a 
partner or having one who was unwilling to have children with them was the main reason 
women in my study gave for not having had children. Over and over again women talked of 
not being able to find someone who would be both a good parent and “life partner” at the time 
they wanted a baby or to become a mother. Connie, for example, said, “that whole period in 
my 30s when I felt very maternal there wasn’t anyone to have a relationship to start a family 
with”.  
1.2 Conceiving the project 
An analysis that reduces this phenomenon to a problem of organization and chance does not 
take account of the psychosocial complexities of the construction of both ‘the right 
relationship’ and ‘the right time’. Nor does it provide a framework for reflection on what 
Connie might mean when she talks of feeling “maternal”. Circumstantial childlessness is 
produced in the way these notions—along with others about motherhood and femininity—are 
constructed and entangled with women’s conscious and unconscious fantasies, desires, 
anxieties, and ambivalence about becoming mothers, and with the limits and possibilities both 
of female embodiment and of agency around reproductive decision-making in their lives. This 
psychosocial tangle is at the heart of this thesis, and an awareness of these complexities 
shaped my framing of it, and the methodologies I saw as being most effective in researching 
it. 
My interest in the topic initially arose out of my professional experience as a counsellor (with 
a particular expertise in issues of loss and grief) working with several women who were 
circumstantially childless. These women came to counselling with a range of issues related to 
their feelings of loss, but a common theme was a sense that what they described as their 
‘childlessness’—and their grief response to it—was misunderstood, criticized or 
unacknowledged. At times they felt harshly judged by others in their social worlds, and they 
often spoke of a distressing and lonely sense of inauthenticity in their lives; a jarring 
disjuncture between the ‘mask’ they were required to wear socially and the hidden face of 
3 
their painful feelings about not having had a child (Tonkin forthcoming). Many invoked the 
popular metaphor of a ‘biological clock running out’, talked about their ‘window of 
opportunity’ for having a baby closing in terms of their natural fertility, and expressed a sense 
of anxious urgency about having a child while it was still possible for them biologically to do 
so.4 Almost all talked about how difficult it was to speak about this experience to others 
around them.  
Given that these women sought my professional help as a counsellor because they were 
struggling with aspects of not having become a biological mother, it was important for me to 
distinguish the overlaps and differences between my work as a counsellor and my task as a 
researcher at every step of this thesis project; conceiving and framing it, interviewing 
participants, and analyzing the research materials. It was crucial, for example, that I planned 
elements of the project such as recruiting participants and the interview structure carefully in 
a way that did not presume that circumstantial childlessness necessarily involves a sense of 
loss or grief, since these might not be part of the experience for women who did not choose to 
see a grief counsellor. I discuss this and other implications of my shift from counsellor to 
researcher in a consideration of methodology in Chapter 3.  
The spectre of essentialism 
At this point it is important to raise a key issue relating to biology and reproductive decision-
making that has been part of my work as a counsellor with circumstantially childless women, 
and of my research in this field. One of the difficulties of this project has been finding ways to 
talk about these issues in a way that avoids pathologizing women’s experiences of 
circumstantial childlessness. I want to make it clear from the outset that I am not suggesting 
that all women should have children, are ‘meant’ to have children, or will be unhappy at some 
level if they do not have children or become mothers, biological or otherwise. Rather I want 
to acknowledge that women’s reproductive decisions are made in the context of extremely 
complex social messages around mothering, changing social trends related to economic and 
career trajectories and delayed marriage or partnering, and of the conscious and unconscious 
psychological imperatives, desires and fears unique to the individual biography of every 
woman.                                                          
4 The phenomenon of ‘circumstantial childlessness’ is one experienced in a context of delayed parenthood by 
both men and women. There are different implications for women however, who are more likely to be defined in 
terms of their parental identities, and whose period of biological fertility is more limited than men’s. For this 
reason, I focus on women’s experiences of the phenomenon in this thesis, but that is not to suggest that men 
might not also struggle at times with painful feelings of loss about their not having had a child when they 
expected to do so (see also Letherby 2012).  
4 
Infertility in all its forms poses a particular problem for feminist researchers. Thompson 
(2002, p.52) identifies this difficulty when she writes,  
On the one hand, even in an age of decreasing birthrates, voluntary childlessness, and increasing 
rates of infertility, involuntary childlessness is recognized as one of the greatest forms of 
unhappiness and loss an adult woman might endure (…) and prominent feminists have long called 
for it to be taken seriously as a feminist issue (Birke, Himmelweit, & Vines, 1990; Pfeffer & 
Woollet, 1983; Stolcke, 1986). On the other hand feminists are also interested in disrupting the 
gendered role expectations and the essentialist connection between motherhood and women’s 
identity that greatly intensify infertile women’s suffering. 
As I worked with the research material I found myself confronting the spectre of essentialism 
and the related issue of women’s difference, which Patrice DiQuinzio (2012) describes as an 
“intractable problem” in feminist thinking about motherhood. The false universal that women 
generally—and mothers in particular—are inherently nurturing in an essential sense has long 
been the focus of feminist critique. Such generalized notions of women and of the maternal do 
not take account of the huge diversity of women’s lives (Stephens 2011). As a feminist there 
are particular tensions in research in this field (see Thompson 2002) and I often felt very 
uncomfortable with the direction my analysis took me in.  However, many of the participants 
identified very strongly as feminist and several commented about feeling conflicted between 
some of their feminist ideals and the complexities of their lived experience. Julia, for 
example, who described herself as being “very influenced” by feminist thought, said, “I grew 
up in the seventies and [second wave] feminism was just starting and I remember at some 
point—I don’t know when it was, in my mid to late 30s—thinking, ‘oh, bloody feminism! It 
never did me any good! Look! I’m childless. Bugger!’ You know?”   
Her “you know” was an entreaty to me to understand and recognise that, although she 
continued to position herself as feminist, she perceived that something in that feminist 
thinking had contributed to her being “childless” now. This recognition sometimes created a 
painful tension for participants, and in turn for me as researcher. Reading these narratives 
through a particular feminist lens, many of these women could be construed as advocates for 
versions of maternalism.5 It was important to me to think through that tension as part of the 
experience of circumstantial childlessness for some women. At times I found it challenging to 
create a space for attention to the difficulties in these women’s experience and at the same 
wanting to understand, explain, and critique them. There is a range of ways in which feminists 
have theorized the links between women, mothers, bodies and nurturing, some of which might 
                                                        
5 Stephens (2011, p.ix) defines maternalism as “the application of values, usually associated with mothering, to 
the society as a whole”, and notes that maternalist ideas “often provoke unease and antagonism” when raised in a 
feminist context.  
5 
foreclose my thinking around the issues these women raised. I was committed to being as 
open as I could in my interpretation and analysis of the research materials, even when I felt 
politically uncomfortable in doing so. I explore these issues further in various ways 
throughout the thesis. 
1.3 Developing the project 
This study investigates the issues that arose in the narratives and drawings of 26 
circumstantially childless New Zealand women aged between 32 and 45, and in the 
encounters I had with them. In planning the research project I initially kept my frame wide 
and exploratory. A review of the academic literature had suggested that there was very little 
work on this topic, so potentially there were many areas on which to focus.  
The topic provides an obvious opportunity to explore the broader social implications of this 
growing phenomenon at a particular conjunction of social, historical and economic 
circumstances. It is important to consider the part that social class, education and ethnicity 
play in women’s experience of circumstantial childlessness, for example, since both early and 
late motherhood are patterned by these factors. How might the experience of ‘too late’ be 
understood in the context of a vilification of ‘too early’ motherhood for many women, and an 
emphasis on the importance of further education and the development of a career? Related to 
this are issues concerning the commodification of new reproductive technologies, which 
arguably are more accessible to middle class older women, and which disrupt the relationship 
between women’s sexed bodies and traditional patterns of reproduction. These are compelling 
and important implications of this topic that require serious engagement. 
As I began to interview participants however, the aspects that intrigued and puzzled me were 
the ongoing emotional intensity for the women I talked to, and the social misrecognition and 
silence that appeared to surround it. I wondered why the choice of whether or not to become a 
mother seemed to be much more loaded than other choices in their lives. After all, the lives of 
individuals are inevitably strewn with “ghostly lives, destinies that could have been but do not 
come to pass” (Thomson & McLeod 2009, p.114). Why was it that these women’s fantasies 
of motherhood and a child appeared to be of a different order from the other possible 
subjectivities that they might have taken up? And what was happening in their social worlds 
that they felt such a strong sense of isolation, misunderstanding and judgment?  
I made a decision to step aside from discussion about why biological childlessness occurs in 
circumstantially childless women’s lives, and focused on why being—or not being—a mother 
6 
matters to these participants. I became interested in the meaning that having a child and being 
a mother has for a woman, and hence, what (if anything) is perceived to be lost—or gained—
when becoming pregnant, giving birth, and being a parent has not come about. I shifted my 
focus in this way from a full engagement with the broader social implications of the topic and 
foregrounded the personal psychic dimensions of participants’ experience as they related to 
issues of fantasy, loss, grieving and adaptation for a number of reasons. These aspects seemed 
to be key to their experience of circumstantial childlessness and I wanted to research in a way 
that was experience-near. Secondly, their narratives suggested that these are aspects that are 
not well recognized or explored socially, and this lack of recognition seemed to be central to 
the sense of isolation that so many participants spoke about. Lastly, I have worked in the field 
of loss and grief for almost 30 years. I am particularly interested in understanding the 
psychosocial experience of non-death losses better. I was excited by the potential for 
psychoanalytic theory to be brought to bear on that understanding. Choosing this focus built 
on my existing knowledge and experience, and I felt that I was in a position to make a 
contribution to new knowledge about both the topic of circumstantial childlessness, and to the 
field of loss and grief. 
Engaging with both the research material I generated and the theoretical literature, I realized 
that the sense many of these women had of themselves as a mother (and of their potential 
child or children) developed prior to the considerations they made as young adults about 
whether and when to have children. Taking that as my starting point, I began to ask how these 
circumstantially childless women responded when they find themselves approaching or at the 
end of their fertile years without having had a biological child. Since notions of what it is to 
be a woman and a mother, and concepts such as loss and grieving, are both social constructs 
and life experiences that are products of an individual’s personal history and biography, I 
considered what the “mutual imbrications” (Roseneil 2009, p.416) of the psychic and the 
social in this aspect of these circumstantially childless women’s lives might be.6  Shifting the 
focus from the present to a much broader temporal frame, and from reasons to meanings, 
revealed aspects that potentially added more nuanced detail to my understanding of 
circumstantial childlessness.  
                                                        
6 Exploring the psychosocial dimensions of circumstantial childlessness means that the narratives and drawings 
generated through this research are analyzed at a conceptual level in a way that would not be possible within a 
conventional sociological approach that does not take account of unconscious dynamics. I develop my 
discussion of the psychosocial approach I take in Chapter 3. 
7 
1.4 Questions that guide the project 
Out of the psychosocial methods I had chosen and the encounters I had with participants, I 
developed a focus on fantasy and loss, because analysis of these theoretical concepts seemed 
together to give most insights into this apparently socially unrecognised phenomenon. A brief 
excerpt from my interview with Deborah illustrates how this shift in focus shaped the 
direction and commitment of the thesis.  
A “sense of myself as a mother”  
Deborah had spoken articulately and strongly until the point in the interview at which I asked 
her to talk about how she felt about the decision she and her husband (whom she met in her 
mid 30s) made not to have a baby, because of concerns about potential disability: 
[It was] incredibly difficult. And is still difficult. […] It was difficult because [pause] um [pause] I 
think it was difficult because [pause], I think it was difficult because [long pause] I had never 
[pause], and in a way still haven’t, um, relinquished a, sort of [pause] sense of myself as a mother 
[trembling, quiet voice, crying]. Um [pause], [it’s] very hard to describe. 
How I might make meaning of this “a sense of myself as a mother” in psychosocial terms is 
the starting point for this project. Baraitser (2006, p.22) reflects on being a mother when she 
writes, 
(M)aternity is an experience that I maintain is impossible to anticipate in advance, one that 
unravels, as it proceeds, and that one is always chasing the tail of, never become expert at, or even 
competent, and that always eludes our attempts to fully understand it. 
If Baraitser is right, and maternity can only be experienced as it is lived, then what is this 
sense of herself as a mother that Deborah experienced before becoming a mother, that she 
struggled to find words for, and that could be identified throughout these women’s narratives 
and drawings? How might this puzzle of a set of women who see themselves as childless, and 
yet also see themselves in some “sense” as mothers, be explained in terms of feminist 
research in a rationalist age, without recourse to biological, spiritual or essentialist discourses 
of the ‘natural’ function of women? What might be its social and psychological origins? And, 
given that a woman becomes a biological mother by virtue of having a child, do these women 
also have a sense of their potential child or children? If so, in what ways do they ‘know’ that 
child? How might their “sense” of themselves as a mother be implicated in experiences of 
other forms of mothering such as adoption or step parenting? 
Socially, mothering is still understood to some degree as a norm and a highly desirable ‘rite of 
passage’ for women, but motherhood has also been understood as a form of patriarchal 
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oppression; an institution and set of practices that limits women in social, emotional and 
financial terms. How do these women understand and negotiate the dominant contradictory 
narratives of female identity in relation to mothering and motherhood?7 Throughout the thesis 
I will predominantly use Melanie Klein’s (1935, 1940, 1959) and Donald Winnicott’s (1950, 
1958, 1963, 1965, 1971) intersubjective  theorising in the object relations tradition of 
psychoanalytic thought, and the radical trans-subjective psychoanalytic work of Bracha 
Ettinger (1993; 2006; 2006a; 2007; 2010; Pollock 2006) to help me tease out how these 
circumstantially childless women’s sense of themselves as mothers might be understood to 
originate and develop in the context of a dominant individualism that valorizes notions of 
autonomy and rational ‘choice’.  
‘Relinquishing’ 
Deborah’s use of the word “relinquish” raised many further questions for this study. What 
personal and social forces suggest that a circumstantially childless woman should attempt to 
“relinquish” her “sense of herself as a mother”? What might such a relinquishment entail? Is 
it possible? That is, what do these women do when their fantasy of mothering is not realized 
in the birth of a biological child? Why might it be “incredibly difficult” to “relinquish” this 
sense when a woman is circumstantially childless; what is invested in this fantasy and/or 
potential subjectivity? How might it be transformed, suspended, defended against, or denied? 
For some women the process of adjustment to a different-than-expected reality may entail a 
recognition that biological procreation is not the only way to become a mother or to ‘do 
mothering’, for example, or a realization that other subjectivities and possibilities are opened 
up or remain open to them when they do not bear a child.  
‘Very hard to describe’ 
What social and psychic forces might render aspects of the experience of circumstantial 
childlessness so difficult to make meaning of and talk about? Hollway (2012a, p.23) uses the 
term ‘ineffable’ to describe something that is “not readily explicable through language” and 
“consequently perhaps it feels like it cannot be understood”. How might I explain the 
“ineffable” quality of these women’s experience of circumstantial childlessness? 
                                                        
7 Since the publication of Rich’s (1976) Of Woman Born the study of motherhood has been divided into three 
interconnected themes: as ‘institution’, ‘experience’, and ‘identity’ or ‘subjectivity’. In the past ten years 
however, there has been an increase in mothering literature that discusses motherhood as a site of empowerment 
and political activism. Recently motherhood as a basis for ‘agency’ has emerged as a further theme (O’Reilly 
2010).  
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This topic is increasingly explored in a range of ways in the popular media in terms of women 
‘leaving it too late’, but these women did not appear to find these ways of articulating their 
experience adequate or useful in addressing how they feel about being in this position.8 9 It is 
difficult to imagine serious media treatment of their sense of themselves as mothers and the 
children they did not have. The narratives and drawings of the participants in this research 
describe the ways that they had difficulties in talking about these issues with others and often 
felt isolated and excluded, echoing empirical research that suggests that, in societies that 
privilege parenthood, women (and men) who have not had children represent the ‘other’ 
(Letherby 2012; Nicholson 2007; Allison, 2010). When women are not readily able to access 
social support, how might the outcomes of a perceived social silence manifest themselves in 
the lives of these participants? How is the process of grieving or meaning-making in the 
context of loss distorted when that loss is not socially acknowledged or validated by others? 
What part do circumstantially childless women themselves play in constructing and 
maintaining the silence that they perceived surrounds this topic?  
1.5 Theoretical resources and methodological approach 
A range of theoretical resources are brought to bear on this analysis. The main structural 
framework is an object relations one, made primarily through reference to Klein, Winnicott, 
and Ettinger. Within this overarching object relations framework I also draw on some forms 
of middle range theory as I discuss particular dimensions of circumstantial childlessness. For 
example, in Chapter 6 I draw on a range of broader psychosocial theories of loss and grieving, 
such Doka’s (1989, 2002) concept of ‘disenfranchised grief’, and Neimeyer’s (2001, 2002) 
work on meaning-making in grieving. While these theories do not constitute a single 
theoretical framework, they are not inconsistent, and are commensurate with an object 
relations approach.   
                                                        
8 For example, see Orr 2010, Lang 2009, and Barnett 2010. The difficulties in conceiving a child because of age-
related infertility that is a common experience for circumstantially childless women who are trying to become 
pregnant is reflected in a wide range of media, outside of articles in newspapers and magazines. In November 
2010 ASB (one of New Zealand’s four major banks) ran a national advertising campaign that featured an image 
of a pink plastic hospital identification bracelet with the words “Hope 14/09/11” in the name area. The main text 
read “I’m ASB special IVF assistance. What better way to help create a future?” Such a campaign reflects the 
idea that age-related infertility for women who have ‘left it too late’ is an issue that will be commonly 
recognised and responded to (and one that has financial implications). 
9 ‘gateway-women.com’, a website developed in the U.K. in the latter stages of my work on this thesis, is a 
notable exception to more usual media representation of this phenomenon. It was established by Jody Day, 
herself a circumstantially childless woman, with the aim of “supporting, inspiring and empowering childless-by-
circumstance women”.  
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‘Loss’ and grieving 
Considering the experience of circumstantial childlessness as one that entails a loss has 
ethical, social and political dimensions. I approach circumstantial childlessness as an 
experience of loss, but do not assume that this loss is necessarily experienced in a 
predominantly negative way. My aim is to conceptualize this experience in a way that takes 
account of the wide range of responses women have to not having had a biological child, and 
that acknowledges that something is lost—and that women may grieve—without collapsing it 
into a loss that entails being “pathologically bereft” (Eng & Kazanjian 2003 p.5). I do this by 
conceiving of ‘loss’ in a way that does not have at its core a judgment that it is, in its very 
nature, adverse. Throughout this thesis I hold an understanding of it that takes account of the 
inevitable changes and transitions in life and frames them in positive and productive ways, yet 
still acknowledges an often painful and difficult grieving that is implicit in these transitions 
(Craib 1994).  
Historically literatures in the field of loss and grief have focused almost exclusively on the 
grief responses of individuals to the loss of a person—or people—associated with death 
(Thompson 2002), and loss itself is little theorized except as a triggering event for grieving.10 
There is little discussion of non-death losses and, where there is, the findings around 
bereavement loss are often uncritically applied in a very different circumstance. Within this 
primarily psychological frame, grief has been constructed as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in 
relation to grieving people’s responses to their loss by creating a narrow view of what might 
be considered acceptable or ‘healthy’ grieving. Throughout the twentieth century medical 
metaphors of health, illness, healing and recovery became a dominant way of describing the 
experiences of grieving people. A quote from Parkes exemplifies this: 
Of all the functional mental disorders almost the only one whose cause is known, whose 
symptomatology is stereotyped and whose outcome is predictable is grief. That grief is a mental 
disorder there can be no doubt, since it is associated with all the discomfort and loss of function 
which characterizes such disorders.  
(1965, p.1, cited in Marris 1974, p. 27) 
                                                        
10 In the US, for example, a major review of research into grief and bereavement (Centre for the Advancement of 
Health 2004, p.498) noted that definitions are debated but in simple terms “bereavement refers to the loss of a 
loved one by death and grief refers to the distress resulting from bereavement”. 
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Conceptualising grief as an illness in this way infers the possibility of ‘treatment’ and a 
‘cure’, and places it within the sphere of health professionals with specific privileged 
expertise to ‘heal’, shifting power and autonomy away from grieving people.11  
The continued dominance of this cultural framing of grief has important implications for this 
project. Not surprisingly, women may be reluctant to conceptualize their experience of 
childlessness as a ‘loss’ and their responses as ‘grief’ (or to tolerate others doing so) if doing 
so implicates them in a discourse of ‘illness’ or pathology. To do so also formulates their 
responses to loss as reactive ‘coping’ strategies, limiting their potential to be seen as creative 
means of adaptation to an unexpectedly changed life trajectory. In Chapter 5 I discuss some 
theoretical conceptualizations of loss and grieving that entail understandings more productive 
for this study.12  
A ‘psychoanalytically-informed’ psychosocial approach (Hollway & Jefferson 
2013)  
The thesis is grounded methodologically in a growing body of empirical work in the 
psychosocial tradition that recognizes the contribution made by psychoanalytic concepts to 
sociological analyzes of intimacy and personal life (Clarke 2006).13 Psychosocial research 
using a primarily object relational approach began in the U.K., and continues to develop there 
as well as elsewhere (Hollway & Jefferson 2013; Roseneil 2012; Walkerdine 2008). It draws 
on a variety of sometimes conflicting theoretical bases, and comprises a diverse set of 
methods, but all are premised on a recognition that the motivations that shape individuals’ 
behaviour are often unconscious, and that there is a complex interrelatedness between social 
structures and the psychodynamics of biography.  
Critiques made of this approach are based on its ontology, and on the epistemologies and 
ethical dimensions that underpin its methods. Frosh and Baraitser (2008) identified an object                                                         
11 While Parkes’ statement may seem extreme and out of touch with contemporary understandings of grief, 
current debates about how grief is understood and ‘treated’ in the DSM V bring this into question.  
12 Although academic research is slowly changing understandings of grief, my work as a counsellor and grief 
educator suggests that there is a lag between theoretical work and public perceptions of grieving and the ‘grief 
process’. Many people still conceive of grief as a linear stage process (Kubler Ross 1969), associated with 
bereavement following the death of someone close, and ending in ‘acceptance’ and resolution. This dominant 
view of grieving is not a good ‘fit’ with the very different experience, content and time-frame of the losses 
associated with circumstantial childlessness, and it is not surprising that some participants did not use the 
language of grief to describe their experience. It was notable that all of the participants in this study who had 
undertaken grief education in the course of training (for counselling or psychotherapy for example) and therefore 
had a wider view of it did frame their experience as a ‘loss’ and their responses as ‘grieving’.   
13 For a useful overview of the development of psychosocial studies in the U.K. which contextualizes the 
primarily object relations approach I adopt see Walkerdine (2008) “Contextualizing debates about psychosocial 
studies”. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society 13, pp. 341-345).   
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relations approach as one of two main approaches to psychosocial research informed by 
psychoanalysis in the U.K., and contrasted it with a deconstructive Lacanian approach. The 
differences between these two approaches have often been expressed in polarising terms 
(Hollway 2008b; Walkerdine 2008) that tend to mask their complexities and usefulness 
behind their differences. A polarized account of them also masks their internal complexities. 
Within the object relations tradition itself there are differences between a Kleinian and a 
British Independent object relations approach, as exemplified by Winnicott, for example. I 
find taking a polarized position unhelpful, and attempt instead to take a more productive 
‘both-and’—rather than ‘either-or’—position of theoretical synthesizing (Chodorow 1999) in 
response to these contradictions and tensions. While situating the work primarily within an 
object relations paradigm, I draw at times on a broader range of psychoanalytic theory in 
service of my analysis. There are many examples of scholars who choose to position their 
work in this way; in her exploration of motherhood that theorizes anecdotes and themes from 
her own experience of being a mother, for example, Baraitser (2009) positions herself 
primarily within a Lacanian frame, and also draws on a broad range of theory that is not 
Lacanian.14 
Roseneil (2009, p.412) writes that an object relations-informed psychosocial analysis is 
concerned “with ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds, personal biography and socio-historical 
conditions, internal, unconscious conflict and social power relations, and the complex, 
multitudinous ways in which these are intertwined”. In giving a psychosocial account of these 
women’s experience of circumstantial childlessness, I am interested in the aspects of 
participants’ current and historical biographies (both in their families and their wider social 
worlds), as well as the broader social structures and settings in which they are immersed, and 
the discourses of femininity and mothering that are available to them as they make sense of 
their childlessness.  
1.6 Research into circumstantial childlessness 
Academic research into circumstantial childlessness is surprisingly sparse. It is impossible to 
establish statistically how many women fall into this specific category of childlessness, but it 
does appear to be a growing phenomenon in Western countries (Hadfield et al. 2007, 
McAllister & Clarke 1998). In New Zealand, quantitative data from the 2006 census shows 
that “voluntary childlessness” in women aged 40 (when they have largely completed 
childbearing) has increased from less than 1 percent of women born in 1936 to almost 10 per                                                         
14 I discuss the strengths, limitations and critiques of an object relations approach further in Chapter 3. 
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cent of women born in 1965, and indicate that this figure will rise to 25 % for those born in 
1975 (Boddington & Didham 2007).15 This figure includes those who are biologically 
infertile (presumed ‘involuntarily childless’, though this may itself be inaccurate in some 
cases) and those who are ‘voluntarily childless’.16 Within the latter category however, there is 
no distinction made between those who are childless by decision, and those who feel the 
“decision was taken for them” (McAllister & Clarke 1998, p.59). McAllister and Clarke have 
suggested that few women make an early and irrevocable decision to remain childless; rather 
that choice is an ongoing process that takes place over time, in the context of life events and 
within relationships. Boddington and Didham’s report on demographic trends in New Zealand 
suggests that the presumption that these women are voluntarily childless may be  “a 
misnomer”; they may in fact be childless not because they have made a deliberate decision 
not to have a child, but “as a consequence of other life events” (2007, p.3). In this suggestion 
there is an implicit acknowledgement of the phenomenon of circumstantial childlessness, but 
the statistical invisibility of it remains. 
Van Balen and Inhorn (2002) suggest that qualitative research into infertility generally has 
been neglected in social science research for several reasons.17 Firstly, they note that in 
Western societies it has often been viewed as a medical issue rather than a social one, thereby 
limiting the domains in which it is studied. Secondly, they suggest that infertility is a “taboo 
subject” (2002, p.5), both because of its possible connotations of sensitive issues of sexual 
‘problems’ that are difficult to address in the research context, and also because issues 
surrounding feminist critiques of essentializing notions of motherhood as a woman’s sole 
purpose in life mean that feminist researchers are unwilling to appear committed to research 
that may appear to be grounded in these notions (clearly, other researchers have had the same 
concerns that I have at times around these issues).  They also argue that, since the 1980s, 
infertility has most often been discussed in philosophical rather than empirical terms as a 
critique of new reproductive technologies, and that as a result, much of it is “highly 
                                                        
15 It is striking that in these official data related to demographic trends ‘childlessness’ is synonymous with 
‘biological childlessness’; that is social motherhood such as adoption or step-parenting is not acknowledged, and 
such women are statistically considered to be ‘childless’. Several of the participants in this research who cared 
for step-children called attention to this social invisibility of their mothering work. 
16 Estimates of natural fertility vary but Boddington and Didham (2007, p.1) cite Australian statistics that claim 
it is “generally accepted” that around seven per cent of women remain childless because of (biological) infertility 
problems.  
17 Definitions of the terms ‘infertility’ and ‘voluntary childlessness’ are debated (Letherby 1999). I use these 
terms in the sense that Van Balen and Inhorn (2002, p.11, italics in original) describe, where ‘infertility’ is “the 
process of not being able to have children” and ‘involuntary childlessness’ is “the final state or condition 
resulting from infertility”.  
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speculative, polemical, and even somewhat dismissive of an individual’s legitimate desires 
and experiences” (2002, p.6). 
Their explanations for the “scholarly lacuna” (2002, p.4) in this field make sense of the 
limited amount of qualitative research in the specific area of circumstantial childlessness, 
given its growing occurrence. Two studies however—both PhD theses—are exceptions. 
Leslie Cannold (2000), who appears to be the first to use the term ‘circumstantial 
childlessness’, addresses it specifically from a sociological perspective in both her thesis and 
a later book (Cannold 2005).  
Cannold argues that a complete understanding of the phenomenon of fertile childlessness 
requires the recognition of circumstantial as well as chosen childlessness. In her small-scale 
qualitative study she interviewed 31 Australian and four North American women aged 
between 28 and 43 who had not had children.18 A key area of concern for Cannold was 
whether participants in her study described their childlessness as “chosen” and, if so, whether 
their description of their path was a good fit with everyday understandings of ‘choice’.  
The circumstantially childless women in Cannold’s study were divided into three sub-
categories: those who were “childless by relationship”, who wanted to have children but 
whose partners were unwilling to do so;  “thwarted mothers” who had not found a partner or 
who were “struggling” with (often age-related) infertility; and  “waiters and watchers” who 
were ambivalent and undecided and so were particularly susceptible to the choices of partners 
or the childbearing experiences of friends.19  
Cannold conceptualizes women’s reproductive decisions in terms of their “freedom to 
mother” being curtailed by three issues: an “inability to partner successfully”; the 
incompatibility of women’s employment needs and desires with their motherhood ideals; and 
a prevailing discourse of childrearing being an “irrational choice” in a context where “self-
directed libertarian/consumer values” are dominant. Focussing mainly on the last of these 
points in her thesis, she writes: 
                                                        
18 Cannold notes that she had initially planned to interview more women who were circumstantially childless, 
but was unable to recruit such participants because they found the subject “too raw”. Eventually she was able to 
recruit only two women of the 36 in her sample for whom childlessness was a “sensitive issue”. As a result, she 
resorted to interviewing younger women who were willing to talk about their childlessness because there was 
still hope for them to go on to have a child. Though I had more success in finding women who were willing to 
talk to me about their childlessness, I too became aware of this difficulty, as I discuss in Chapter 3. It speaks 
both to the intensity of the grief many circumstantially childless women feel, and the disenfranchised nature of 
that grief, which I explore in Chapter 5. 
19 By ‘age-related infertility’ I refer to infertility that is an outcome of fertility postponement (Swewczuk 2011). 
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Reasons for becoming a mother, to express and confirm adult feminine identity, to hold a 
relationship together and/or to create or strengthen family bonds, have lost their social currency and 
new normative reasons for parenting have failed to take their place. Instead, the data suggest that in 
the face of women’s increasing realisation that their values and identity as modern-day women are 
in direct conflict with the maternal values and identity, some women are concluding that 
motherhood is an irrational choice to make.  
(Cannold 2000, p.449) 
Despite their belief that motherhood was an irrational choice, many of Cannold’s participants 
“still felt a desire to mother and intended to act on that desire”, but she argues (2000, p.454) 
that “the absence of socially endorsed ‘rational’ reasons to choose parenthood may contribute 
to some women’s decisions to delay or avoid motherhood”.  
Cannold (2000, pp.449-50) writes that “the content, durability and stability of their imagined 
futures and identities—as mothers or childless women determines both the existence and 
strength of their desire to mother”, but she does not explore the content or construction of 
these “imagined” futures and identities in great depth. I understand them to be the conscious 
aspect of what Deborah called her “sense of myself as a mother”; their fantasies of maternity, 
which I explore in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
On the basis of her data, Cannold challenges assertions that Australia and North American 
societies are ‘pro-natalist’. Rather, her subjects saw childlessness and motherhood as options 
with equivalent social standing, and she attributes this to the influence of second-wave 
feminism. She argues however that “it is imperative that feminists recognise the phenomenon 
of circumstantial childlessness, differentiating it from childlessness resulting from choice and 
from infertility”. She is concerned that constraints on women’s reproductive freedom to have 
children should be of equal concern to the feminist agenda as the constraints on them so do 
so, “regardless of whether the outcomes of such constraints are forced motherhood or forced 
childlessness” (2002, p.468). While I consider her rhetoric here a little dramatic, I see her 
work as contributing to contemporary feminist dialogue on motherhood. 
Cannold’s work is useful for this study in identifying the phenomenon of circumstantial 
childlessness and distinguishing it as a category of fertile childlessness that is different from 
chosen childlessness, but her aims and methods were very different from mine. Zanobini’s 
(2009) doctoral thesis is closer to the themes I address. She looked at the experience of six 
childless American women in their early/mid 50s through the lens of Levinson’s (1996) 
concept of a ‘Dream’. Her aim was to ascertain whether young adult women’s having a 
‘Dream’ of having children had any impact on whether or not they remained childless.  
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Levinson’s concept of a ‘Dream’ is a theory of adult development based on the idea that 
people in their late adolescence and young adulthood usually create an image of themselves 
projected into the future (Zanobini 2009). Conceptually it appears to be somewhat outdated in 
its notion of gender roles, but Zanobini’s study, while limited in scope, nevertheless makes a 
useful contribution to the field of circumstantial childlessness. She found that participants’ 
ambivalence about having children had resulted in only two participants having had a 
‘Dream’ of having children. All six women in her study had come from families whose 
mothers (or fathers) were conflicted about having children, and several participants had been 
responsible for siblings as children themselves.  
Loss and a sense of abandonment was a dominant feature in the lives of all of Zanobini’s 
participants. Although it was not the focus of her work, she concluded that family of origin 
issues may have contributed to participants’ ambivalence, and that they may have made “an 
unconscious choice not to have children” (2009, p.118). Her close focus on the concept of a 
‘Dream’, framed in Levinson’s terms constrained Zanobini in exploring these themes further, 
and the very small scale and theoretical scope of her work limited its usefulness. Using a 
psychosocial framework that extends beyond the conventional psychological one that 
Zanobini used, I have greater theoretical resources to explore these issues. 
Although not specifically addressing ‘circumstantial childlessness’ the phenomenon is also 
partially approached in research that looks at the experience of medical infertility (e.g. Becker 
& Nachtigall 1994; Cussins 1998; Greil et al 2010; Inhorn & Van Balen 2002; Letherby 
2012; Thompson 2002; Whiteford & Gonzales 1994). There are important overlaps with the 
experience of women who are biologically incapable of bearing a child, particularly in terms 
of their grief in not becoming parents. The key difference is that, for the participants in this 
study, as far as they knew they were (or had been) biologically capable of conceiving 
children. This raised important different issues of ‘choice’, since medically infertile women 
are more likely to feel that the choice has been taken from them. Literatures that address 
voluntary childlessness (e.g. Kelly 2009; Bartlett 1994; Cameron 1997; Gillespie 2000; 
Majumdar 1999) also have an oblique overlap with this research. For example, some women 
in this study drew on discourses of the advantages of childlessness when they found 
themselves in that situation, but they appeared to do so as compensation for their regret at not 
being mothers, rather than a reason.  
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1.7 Aims of the study 
This aspect of childlessness is little researched and there appear to be limited social narratives 
about the experience of apparently fertile women who experience childlessness for social 
reasons, at a time when their biological fertility is declining or it is no longer possible for 
them to conceive. The overall intention of this thesis is to explore the contours of these 
women’s experience of circumstantial childlessness as a psychosocial phenomenon, through a 
close analysis of the ways they co-construct it in their talk with me and others and their 
drawings about it. I aim to increase understanding of the experience of circumstantial 
childlessness and in doing so to contribute to the possibility of a more diverse set of maternal 
narratives for women.  
Within that, arising out of my focus on fantasy and loss the research has three aims: 
1. To explore how these women articulate their experience of circumstantial 
childlessness in words and drawings. 
2. To theorize the relationship between fantasies of motherhood and a child (or children) 
and their impact on the day-to-day lives of these women. 
3. To conceptualize the relationships between fantasy, loss, grieving, and agency in their 
experience of circumstantial childlessness. 
1.8 The structure of the thesis 
In this chapter I have used an extract from Deborah’s interview to introduce the questions that 
guide the aims of the thesis. I carry this through as a structural device, to sustain attention to 
the narratives of the women I interviewed and to link different elements of the thesis together. 
Extracts from her research materials are used to introduce the analytical chapters and the 
concluding chapter. My intention in analyzing the data and writing the thesis has been to stay 
very close to the research materials, and to foreground women’s narratives and drawings. I 
have tried to achieve a balance between a descriptive and compassionate account of the data 
and an experience-near theorization (Hollway 2009) that does not detract from their personal 
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significance for individuals, but provides means for developing more nuanced understandings 
about women’s circumstantial childlessness.20 
In this introduction I have described how my initial broad interest in this topic gradually 
narrowed to a concern with the meanings that becoming a mother has for the participants in 
this study. I have introduced the idea that many of these circumstantially childless women 
articulate a “sense” of themselves as a mother in various ways; a fantasy of themselves in 
relation with a child or children that begins long before their reproductive decision-making as 
young women. I have signaled my interest in exploring what the roots of that “sense” might 
be, and what happens to it when the maternal subjectivity they have envisaged does not 
eventuate.  
Chapter 2: Contextualizing fantasy, loss and grieving 
In Chapter 2 I develop this idea of “the sense of myself as a mother”, and set it within a 
framework of a set of first and second order theoretical structures. I begin with a discussion of 
the ontological bases of the object relations psychoanalytically-informed psychosocial 
approach I adopt. I focus on participants’ fantasies of maternity and a child and explore how 
fantasy is understood within this approach; at ‘where’, and ‘how’—psychically speaking—
circumstantially childless women’s fantasies of maternity and a child, and the meanings that 
becoming a mother holds for them, might be understood to develop. I consider this primarily 
through the work of the psychoanalyst and paediatrician Donald Winnicott, and that of 
feminist psychoanalyst and artist, Bracha Ettinger. 
These participants’ conscious and unconscious reproductive decisions are or were made in the 
context of the broad changes in expectations for women’s lives in Western countries brought 
about in part by the impact of second wave feminism. Their individual fantasies of maternity 
and a child are also constructed and maintained through their interactions with the broad 
social and cultural context in which they have been immersed as they grew into adulthood. I 
introduce the concept of individualization and the ways it relates to the desirable “success-
story narrative” (Thomson et al. 2011) of contemporary young women’s lives. 
When Deborah spoke of her “sense of myself as a mother”, and other participants talked 
about the ways they ‘saw’ themselves in relationship with a child, the dominant quality of this 
                                                        
20 Hollway (2009, p.2) describes an ‘experience-near’ theorization as one that focuses on “the experiences of 
subjects who suffer and who care, and on psychological resilience and damage, in the particularities of the 
settings, past, present and anticipated future, as people engage with and make meaning out of their situations and 
actions”.  
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“sense” in their fantasies of maternity and a child was ‘nurturing’. In Chapter 2 I discuss the 
notion of ‘nurturing’ and the ways it has been conflated in essentialising ways with 
understandings of what it is to be a woman. I explore ways of theorizing these participants’ 
fantasies of nurturing that avoid this. 
Lastly in this chapter I outline the ways of theoretically framing the experience of grief and 
adaptation that I explore and illustrate in the analytical chapters that follow. 
Chapter 3: “(T)hings that slip and slide” 
Methodology is an important aspect of this thesis, and one in which it makes a contribution to 
the tools available for qualitative researchers. The psychosocial methodology I have chosen 
informs its ontology, its epistemology and its methods and is also related to the ethical 
decisions I have made in it (Hollway 2008a). In Chapter 3 I discuss some of the key debates 
around this methodology and the methods associated with it. I outline what I understand to be 
the nature of the human subject of this kind of research and explore issues of “what can be 
known and how?” (Doucet & Mauthner 2008).  
As someone who came to the research process via a career in counselling I have a particular 
interest in the limitations of text-based methods to ‘capture’ what John Law (2004, p.2) 
describes as “the things that slip and slide”. This is particularly pertinent with a topic like this, 
where ephemeral and potentially unspeakable issues of fantasy and loss are central. In my 
work as a counsellor I am accustomed to paying attention to different ways of ‘knowing’—to 
silences, laughs, unexpected links, tears, and sighs for example—and to my own responses to 
the person speaking to me. Conventional research provides me with a wide range of tools to 
analyze the words that participants speak in an interview setting, but I consider the aspects of 
these women’s experience that seem to evade available discourses and make themselves 
known through non-linguistic expressions such as these to be equally important, although 
more difficult to address in a research context. I used two strategies to address these difficult 
elements of ‘voice’ in the research materials: a notation system based in Bollas’s (2007) idea 
of speech as a symphonic score, and a participant-produced drawing method designed to 
access a different means of expression. In this chapter, I further describe the combination of 
approaches I developed and used to collect and analyze these research materials. I conclude 
the chapter by illustrating these themes and methods through attention to some aspects of the 
research materials associated with Lynn, one of the circumstantially childless women who 
both spoke and drew about her experiences and their meanings for her.  
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Chapter 4: Maternal fantasies and the ‘absent presence’ of unborn children 
Chapter 4 is the first of three analytical chapters in the thesis. I discuss how these women’s 
fantasies of themselves as a mother—and the children they envisaged themselves having—
were evident in their talk and drawings. My analysis of the research materials will show that 
they had very detailed, complex, ambivalent and sometimes contradictory fantasies that were 
often tangled in turn with their own mothers’ fantasies. Participants’ fantasies were 
idiosyncratic, but revolved around some common themes. I will explore how they talked 
about maternity as being a transformative way to ‘unselfishly’ nurture others, and a means to 
belonging in a uniquely durable relationship.  
I will further illustrate the key themes of the chapter with a close focus on the research 
materials associated with Maree. Her story was one of perceived conflict between living an 
autonomous individualized life in pursuit of her “life purpose”, and her—at times intense—
longing to have a child. Her drawing captured this vividly. Her interview was threaded 
through with a sense of mystery for her; she found it difficult to articulate the inexplicable, 
apparently irrational “maternal thing” that she perceived to have come to her after she became 
unexpectedly pregnant and had an abortion. Her narrative also emphasizes the importance of 
‘nurturing’, and the part it plays in her maternal fantasies. 
Chapter 5: Loss and grieving in the experience of circumstantial childlessness 
Writing in the context of the loss of home, family and community experienced by children 
who had been evacuated to Oxfordshire during World War II, Clare Winnicott noted, “(t)o 
feel a sense of loss implies that something of value, something loved, is lost, otherwise there 
would be no loss” (cited in Kantner, J.(Ed.) 2004, p. 71). Her suggestion that the ‘lost’ thing 
may be a loved “something” rather than a ‘someone’ is helpful for my purposes, as is the 
possibility (given her context) that it may be lost by some means other than death. But 
embedded within it—and indeed within the broad range of literatures on loss—is a strong 
sense of the material implicit in the consideration of what is ‘lost’; the idea that loss inevitably 
entails one not now ‘having’ something one once ‘had’.21  
It is against this background that I will discuss how these women talked and drew about what 
they experienced to be lost when they did not go on to become biological mothers as they had                                                         
21 This is implied even in work that encompasses the loss of an ideal such as ‘freedom’ or ‘hope’. In her 
consideration of the violence that has emerged in response to loss post-September 11, 2001 for example, Judith 
Butler (2004, p.20) writes, “(I)f we have lost, then it follows that we have had”. 
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expected. For them the material outcome of the loss is not that life changes, but that it 
potentially stays the same; the loss is not of the past, but of a possible future, and there is no 
loss event, nor lost object in a material sense. Temporally, the usual conception of grief is 
from a standpoint of the present, imagining (and grieving for) aspects of the past. Here I shift 
the temporal dimension of loss; women who experience circumstantial childlessness as a loss, 
and grieve for it, might be understood to be grieving for the loss of the embodiment of their 
maternal fantasies in a potential future, but actively experiencing and responding to this loss 
as part of their lived experience in the present. 
I understand loss as having a quality of folding in on itself, creating a loss-within-a-loss. 
Although the loss of their realization of maternal fantasies may exist for all of these women, 
the meaning they ascribe to that loss is idiosyncratic. Envisaging loss in this way makes it 
possible to take account of the range of responses women have to not having had a biological 
child because their experience lies in the particular meanings that being a mother has for each 
woman. I conclude the chapter with a close study of the research materials associated with 
Julia, who was explicit about her losses and chose very active ways to respond to them. 
Chapter 6: Being ‘maternal’ 
It might be expected that these women’s fantasies of maternity and a child would peter out as 
time passed. For many of the circumstantially childless women in this study however, this is 
not what happened. In this final analytic chapter I will consider ‘what remains’; what 
becomes of these women’s fantasies of maternity when the opportunity to embody them has 
passed. I use women’s stories to illustrate the varied ways in which many of these participants 
talked about adapting the aspects of their maternal fantasies that carry particular meaning for 
them, and embodying them in different ways in their lives. For many participants, there was a 
felt sense that others judged them for not being mothers.  
Many of the older participants spoke of how adapting their maternal fantasies in this way was 
fulfilling for them. At the same time, as I illustrate in this chapter, there remained something; 
a yearning that participants found difficult to articulate. I will draw further on Ettinger’s 
matrixial theory to theorize about this sense of yearning. 
Chapter 7: A “narratable” life 
The psychosocial methodology I have chosen pushes me to encouraging certain forms of talk 
and representation of experience that has provided insights—both for the women I 
interviewed and for me as a researcher. These insights tend to be linked to ways of being and 
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thinking that are sometimes not immediately accessible in everyday talk. In using these 
methods I have co-produced, with the participants of the study, research materials that are 
rich, varied, complex and nuanced. In the concluding chapter, I explore the relationships 
between the three central themes of fantasy, loss/grief and adaptation in the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness, as they are articulated in these materials. I reflect on the methods 
I used and bring together my analysis in the light of my aims for the study, as discussed in 
this introductory chapter.   
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Chapter 2: Contextualizing fantasy, loss and grief 
Motherhood begins internally in the conflictual, intense cauldron of childhood sexuality and object 
relations, and is overdetermined, filled with fantasy, and complex: any woman’s desire for 
children, whether immediately fulfilled, fulfilled belatedly, or never fulfilled, contains layers of 
affect and meaning.  
(Chodorow 2003, p.1184) 
2.1 Introduction 
In my introductory chapter I described how my initial interest in the topic of circumstantial 
childlessness became progressively refined to crystallize into a consideration of what “the 
sense of myself as a mother” and the fantasies of a child (or children) might mean to 
circumstantially childless women. I indicated my intention to explore the relationship between 
these maternal fantasies and what happens when an expected, hoped-for, and presumed 
possible biological maternity does not ensue.  
An essentialist evolutionary ‘natural’ stance is often presumed in popular contexts when the 
question of why women desire children arises. There is often a naturalized assumption—
implied in the term ‘body/biological clock’ for example—that women want to have children 
because they are designed by evolution to do so in order to assure the continuation of the 
species (Franklin 1990; Irvine 2007). At other times, or in other places, essentialist 
assumptions or a religious basis would be invoked. In this thesis I move beyond these to draw 
on a range of theoretical literatures that explore the place of maternity in contemporary 
women’s lives. Feminist literatures have explored this field in many and diverse ways 
(Baraitser 2009), but my focus is narrowed to a consideration—through the experience of its 
absence—of the meanings that the anticipation of being a mother holds for the women I 
interviewed.  
There are particular difficulties inherent in researching and articulating an absence. Frers 
(2013, p.434) writes: 
When I orient myself towards a person that is not there, then I feel that this person does not fill the 
space that I want or expect them to fill. Since they are not there, I experience a void, a lack of 
presence, a lack of sensual connection or resistance. It is this void that I myself then fill with my 
own emotions and imaginations. 
In mapping the contours of a relationship between the women in this study and both their 
maternal subjectivity (which exists in potential rather than in embodied reality) and their 
fantasy of a child(ren) (which is not embodied, but has been or is anticipated), I find the fine 
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arts concept of ‘negative space’ to be a useful way to encapsulate both these difficulties and 
their potential. Negative space is the space that is created around or between the subjects of an 
image or shape. Sculptor Henry Moore described the holes in his work as being as 
important—as a shape—as the material that surrounded it. Rather than being understood as 
the empty absence of something, ‘negative space’ is potently full of meaning. One participant, 
Kim, alluded to this idea when she described motherhood as “present as an absence” for 
childless women. The metaphor of negative space is useful as a way of focusing my attention 
on what meaning-presence might fill the space of apparent absence in these circumstantially 
childless women’s lives.  This is the “void” that Frers refers to, and it may be filled with 
particular fantasies of a child and of being a mother; with what Deborah described as her 
“sense of myself as a mother”.  
In this chapter I will outline the theoretical framework that I use as I build my argument about 
these fantasies in subsequent chapters. The structure of the chapter foreshadows the structure 
of the thesis as a whole. I begin with a discussion of the ontological basis of the psychosocial 
methodology I employ, the implementation of which I will further explain in Chapter 3. Next 
I outline the theoretical underpinnings of the development, presence and potency of fantasies 
of maternity that I will discuss in Chapter 4. Finally, I address theories of mourning that 
underpin my discussion of the loss of the embodiment of these fantasies and the grieving 
women do for that loss that I address in Chapter 5, and the adaptations these women make to 
those losses that I explore in Chapter 6. 
2.2 A ‘psychoanalytically-informed’ psychosocial approach 
(Hollway & Jefferson 2013) 
In this thesis I draw ontologically on a range of theoretical resources, many of which are 
explicitly informed by object relations psychoanalytic theories (which I discuss further 
below), and others that I consider to be commensurate with these. The psychosocial approach 
that I adopt emphasises the part that the effects of psychic conflict and unconscious dynamics 
play in the day-to-day lives of individuals, and situates their relations with others (in both 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ worlds) in the social settings in which they live (Hollway 2008a). 
Psychosocial research disrupts the presumed dualism between ‘social’ and ‘psychic’ in 
individuals’ lives; these are understood to be inseparable, but not reducible to one another. 
Roseneil (2006, p.866) writes that a psychosocial approach addresses “emotions which are 
hard to articulate in discourse”, and explores “tensions, contradictions and unconscious 
meanings within the context of individual biography”. These factors make this approach 
particularly well suited to the aims of this project.  
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Employing psychoanalytic theory in social science research 
A key reason for choosing a psychosocial approach for this project is that psychoanalytic 
theory has the capacity to inform and enhance analysis of empirical data because of its 
emphasis on the importance of the dynamic unconscious (Wengraf & Froggett 2004).22 Given 
my aim of better understanding the part that the fantasy of themselves as a mother plays in 
these participants’ experience of circumstantial childlessness, it was important that I 
employed a methodology that has the capacity to account for these aspects of individuals’ 
lives. Clarke (2006, p.1166) writes that this approach: 
(r)ecognizes the role of the human imagination in the construction of identity in those notions that 
are so important to us, notions of home and community. It recognizes that it matters little if these 
things are more often imagined than real because people attach meaning to what they believe to 
make sense of their lives. 
There is, however, critical concern about the legitimacy of using psychoanalytic theories and 
methods outside the clinical setting (Frosh 2010). Frosh and Baraitser (2008, p.363), for 
example, write that when it is “mined for its technology” there is a danger that psychoanalysis 
will be “used as an ungrounded expert system of knowledge”. Reflecting on this concern, 
Hollway and Jefferson (2013, p.150) developed the term ‘psychoanalytically-informed’ 
methods and concepts to distinguish their use of terms such as interpretation and 
transference—which were originally developed in a psychoanalytic clinical context—outside 
the clinical setting in social science research.  
I consider the use of these ‘technologies’, to use Frosh and Baraitser’s term, to be valid in the 
research context. I argue that the idea of an unconscious dimension to our lives, and concepts 
such as identification, projection and introjection, transference and countertransference (albeit 
not always named as such) are part of both popular understanding and the ways that 
psychoanalytic concepts have migrated out of the clinic into popular culture and use.23 Parker 
(2010, p.17) described this “surreptitious infiltration” as a problem. The question for me is not 
whether or not it is appropriate to engage such concepts in empirical research, but rather how 
to do so consistently and ethically. Baraitser (2008, p.426) writes that  “(t)he task is to find a 
‘kinship’ between what is specific to the clinic and what is produced ‘not everywhere’ but in                                                         
22 Redman (2005, p.34) describes the ‘dynamic unconscious’ as “an inherent aspect of human being [which] 
accompanies the individual’s every interaction with the external world and is the medium through which this is 
experienced”.  
23 Bondi (2003, p.325) argues similarly, noting that psychoanalytic theory has developed outside as well as 
inside the clinic. She cites Mulvey’s (1988) work in film theory, and “theoretical-and-popular-and-practical” 
books that offer a psychoanalytic perspective on everyday life. Orbach’s Bodies (2009) and Phillips’ (2005) 
Going Sane, are good examples of this kind of work, and his Missing Out: In praise of the unlived life (2012) is 
one that has particular salience for this project. 
26 
some specific places beyond”. She advocates that the researcher develops “a ‘psychoanalytic 
sensibility’; a way of working with human participants that instigates a constant re-working of 
the knowledge bases that we come with”. 
2.3 Conceptualising the ‘self’ 
Concepts of ‘the self’ are complex and variously understood within psychoanalytically- 
informed psychosocial ontologies. Consistent with the object relations approach I take, I use it 
in the sense of an historical, psychic and social construct that is not conceptualized as a stable, 
consistent and unitary entity which exists within a person, but which rather exists in and 
through relationships with other people. While I understand this subject to be in part 
constituted socially through discourse, I also consider a prediscursive dimension to its 
constitution. I agree with Hoggett (2008, p.381), who writes:  
(F)ar from being constituted by discourse, the subject is first and foremost a site of sensuous 
experiences originating from both within and outside the body, experiences that are first manifested 
affectively and that only later may (or may not be) registered discursively. 
This prediscursive dimension forms one of the ways in which I will theorize how the women 
in this study develop “the sense of myself as a mother”, and I discuss it further in relation to 
Ettinger’s theory of the ‘matrixial’ in section 2.5 of this chapter.24 
From a psychosocial perspective the subjects of this research are understood to be “messily 
complex human subjects shot through with anxiety and self-doubt, conflictual feelings and 
unruly desires” (Gadd & Jefferson 2007, p.1), whose multiple selves and identities develop 
and exist interactively in relationship with ‘others’ who are both conscious and unconscious. I 
understand these women’s lives to be a product both of their idiosyncratic psychic 
development through those relationships, and of the structures, phenomena, constraints and 
opportunities of their shared social world. Seen in this way, these individuals are necessarily 
conflicted subjects who are motivated to defend themselves against knowledge of painful 
aspects of themselves. From this perspective, the accounts these participants give of their 
lives are not understood to be a transparent window into some kind of ‘truth’ of who they are. 
Rather, I see both the interviews I co-constructed with each of these women and the drawings 
they made to be two of many possible accounts of a life, and the way each participant 
constructed that account in relationship with me and the other participants to tell me 
                                                        
24 It also has important implications for research methods, since social science research has conventionally 
primarily analyzed spoken language. I discuss the methods I have adopted and developed to attend to this pre-
verbal, or in-addition-to-verbal dimension, in Chapter 3. 
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something about her idiosyncratic experience of circumstantial childlessness (Hollway & 
Jefferson 2013).  
Narrative construction of the self 
Within the overarching psychosocial approach I adopt in this study I have used narrative 
methods to elicit and analyze the research materials, as I discuss in Chapter 3. Narrative 
theorists take a range of ontological positions vis a vis the extent to which the individual is 
given primacy over the social in the development of the self, and these have given rise to a 
corresponding range of understandings of what narrative identities and selves are and how 
they should be studied (Smith & Sparkes, 2008). Related to this is a debate around the 
construction of identity. Redman (2005, pp.27-28) writes that this debate concerns:  
(t)he extent to which we are ‘spoken’ by narratives (the claim that identities are in some sense 
fabricated by and in narratives); and the extent to which we ‘speak’ them (the claim that we have 
inherent capacities, such as a dynamic unconscious, that precede any identity-building work that 
narrative might do). 
Contemporary thinking around narrativity assumes the production of subjectivities through 
narrative that is not inconsistent with the psychosocial theorising I employ. I understand the 
narratives people tell to have both conscious and unconscious features and meanings, and the 
presentation, structure and form of these stories to be vehicles through which these meanings 
are expressed. The position I take is that these stories are one means that people have of 
constructing their identities for themselves and others, and of making meaning in their lives 
(Berger & Quinney, 2005). In parallel with the ontological status of the psychosocial subject I 
see these “private constructions of identity” (Riessman 2008, p.10) as products of the 
intersection of individuals, who bring to their unique psychobiography to this construction, 
the constraints and possibilities of the social spaces they inhabit, and the societies they live in 
(Laslett, 1998). Thinking of their narratives in this way makes it possible to consider the ways 
in which these women take an active role in appropriating, resisting and extending personal 
and public narratives of femininity and motherhood, and also the ways in which their “anxiety 
and self-doubt, conflictual feelings and unruly desires” (Gadd & Jefferson 2007, p.1) might be 
entangled in these processes.  
2.4 Theorising ‘the unconscious’ 
The theoretical resources from the object relations tradition of psychoanalytic thought that 
frame the thesis originated in the work of Melanie Klein (1935/1986, 1940/1986), whose 
work explored the complex relationship between fantasy and Freud’s earlier concept of inner 
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reality. Unlike Freud, Klein worked with very young children using play therapy, and through 
her fascination with the contents of their anxieties—revealed both in their play and spoken 
language—she developed a systematic theory of the structure of the unconscious, as an 
internal world of fantasy objects (Ogden 2002; Winnicott 1958). 
The ‘unconscious’ is conceptualized in varying ways depending on the psychoanalytic 
tradition in which it is grounded. 25 Hinshelwood (1991, p.467) describes a Kleinian view of 
the unconscious as “structured like a small society” in the sense that it is a “mesh of 
relationships between objects”. Fakhry Davids (2002, p.67) describes these fantasy objects as 
being made up of “the self and other internal objects—persons, things, ideas and values that 
matter to us”. This conceptualization of the unconscious foregrounds the part that fantasy 
plays in the ways individuals perceive and interact with the world and the people in their 
lives.  Klein conceptualized ‘phantasy’ as a complex interaction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
experience in which the baby in fantasy takes in—in-corporates—people and objects in her or 
his world .26 She described this interaction in this way:  
(t)he baby, having incorporated his parents, feels them to be live people inside his body in the 
concrete way in which deep unconsious phantasies are experienced—they are, in his mind, 
‘internal’ or ‘inner’ objects, as I have termed them. Thus an inner world is being built up in the 
child’s unconsious mind, corresponding to his actual experiences and the impression he gains from 
people and the external world, and yet altered by his own phantasies and impulses.  
(Klein 1940/1986, p.148) 
As well as these objects relating to one another, there is a constant interplay between the 
internal object world and the individual’s experience of the world of external objects and 
experiences. These processes, through which a baby first creates and then maintains this inner 
world, begin in infancy but continue as that individual’s way of relating to the world 
throughout life. Klein (1959/1975, p.249) wrote that even in adults “the judgement of 
[external] reality is never quite free from the influence of his internal world”. The mechanism 
of this linkage between the individual’s ‘outer’ world and the fantasies of her ‘inner’ world is                                                         
25 Critics of the object relations approach suggest that researchers who draw on a Kleinian paradigm assume “the 
presence of a permanent real unconscious” which is sought by the analyst in order “to make sense of otherwise 
meaningless activity” (Frosh & Baraitser 2008, p.355); a “pre-existing grid that can be drawn on to find the 
defended subject and trace his or her manoeuvres when faced with the anxiety that undoubtedly pervades 
everything” (2008, p.358). From a Lacanian perspective the unconscious is not understood as an ‘inner world’, 
but rather something that is ‘left over’ in language. This difference has important implications for the use of 
psychoanalytic insights in the research context. 
26 The spelling of phantasy/fantasy is variable. As I go on to explain, Klein used the different forms of spelling to 
differentiate between two meanings of the word. Winnicott spelled both forms with an ‘f’, without explanation. I 
have found it difficult to know how to handle the issue of the spelling of phantasy/fantasy in this work, since the 
fantasies/phantasies of maternity that I discuss have both conscious and conscious dimensions and I have found 
the distinction difficult to maintain in practice when my discussion moves between these. For ease of reading, I 
have decided to use fantasy spelled with an ‘f’ throughout. In doing so it is not my intention to gloss over the 
distinction Klein made between them. 
29 
important, but it is sometimes difficult to conceptualize. Hinshelwood (1991, pp. 467-8) 
described how ‘inner’ fantasies develop in relation to somatic experiences originating outside 
the body for a baby in this way: 
(A) somatic sensation tugs along with it a mental experience of a relationship with an object that 
causes the sensation, is believed to be motivated to cause the sensation and is loved or hated by the 
ego according to whether the sensation is pleasant or unpleasant. In this way a sensation that hurts 
becomes a mental representation of a relationship with a ‘bad’ object that is intending to hurt or 
damage the ego. 
This linkage is an important aspect of the theoretical framework for my argument because it 
creates a way to think about how a woman’s experiences of being mothered when she was a 
baby, the unconscious “mesh” of fantasies that developed out of those experiences, and the 
psychic defence mechanisms and desires that she creates in response to them might be 
inextricably bound together with her later development of a fantasy of being a mother in 
relationship with a baby or older child, and with her conscious and unconscious responses and 
actions as an adult making reproductive choices. An object relations approach is particularly 
useful in this respect because it articulates how the mutual influence of intra-psychic and 
social worlds, which is key to a psychosocial account, operates in the lives of individuals.  
As Hinshelwood suggests, Klein understood these fantasy objects to be unconsciously felt by 
a child as benign or malevolent. From this perspective the ‘malevolent’ contents of the 
unconscious—or the fear of the loss of the ‘good’ objects—are often painful and frightening. 
Klein theorized that in what she termed the ‘paranoid schizoid’ position an individual creates 
a range of defences which she termed ‘manic defences’ to avoid feeling that pain—denial, 
splitting, repression, rejection, and projective identification for example—and that as a child 
grows into an adult he or she develops sophisticated defence mechanisms that are based on 
these early responses. Taking these concepts into the research context this creates the notion 
of the ‘defended’ subject and researcher, whose interactions in the research context are 
inevitably filtered through the idiosyncratic defences that they have developed throughout 
their lifetimes.  
Conceptualising phantasy/fantasy psychoanalytically 
Fantasy is central to the object relations structuring of the unconscious and hence to the 
defences against the conflicts that arise in it. Balint (1987, p.95) writes that Klein 
distinguished between ‘phantasy’ as an unconscious structure and ‘fantasy’ as a conscious one 
in her written work in this way: “(F)antasy spelt with an ‘f’ and imagination arise out of the 
ability to perceive external reality and identify with it, and play with it; and unconscious 
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phantasy arises out of the instinctual life which needs to become conscious before it can be 
played with”.  
Winnicott, whose theoretical work I draw on extensively in this thesis, used the concept of 
fantasy slightly differently.27 For him fantasy was “more primary than reality” (Winnicott 
1955/1964, p.153). Rather than setting ‘fantasy’ in opposition to ‘reality’ he theorized fantasy 
or “illusion” to be an essential route to reality; for him, fantasy was not a substitute for reality 
but the first method of finding it (Phillips, 2007, p.84). He described, for example, how a 
hungry infant fantasizes a satisfying breast and her mother, who is sensitive to her needs, 
supplies it, giving the infant the illusion that she has created it. This Winnicottian 
understanding of fantasy relates to Klein’s notion of internal reality; he described it as “the 
fantasy that is personal and organized, and related historically to the physical experiences, 
excitements, pleasures and pains of infancy” (Winnicott 1958, p.130). These are the elements 
of fantasy that are involved in the intersubjective and trans-subjective processes between a 
baby and her mother that I discuss further below. 
Winnicott also distinguished a second type of fantasy, which he described as ‘fantasying’. 
Fantasying—which he related to daydreaming in childhood—was a way in which both 
children and adults insulate themselves from the pain of their internal reality; from real 
contact with themselves and others. Fantasying, for Winnicott, is a form of disassociation 
which has a stultifying effect, “absorbing energy but not contributing-in either to dreaming or 
to living” (Winnicott 1971, p.27). Phillips (2007, p.59) describes Winnicott’s view of 
fantasying as “a solution at the cost of personal integrity”.  
Winnicott’s ‘Transitional Space’ 
A further aspect of Winnicott’s theorization of fantasy which has particular salience for this 
project are his concepts of ‘transitional phenomena’ and the ‘transitional space’, which 
developed out of his observation of children playing. He conceived an infant at birth as being 
totally undifferentiated from his or her mother psychically.28 The baby moves from a position 
of understanding her or his mother (and the food and comfort she provides) as subjectively 
conceived to a gradual awareness that she is separate from her or him, and, with this, a 
growing perception of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ realities develops. When the mother proves to be                                                         
27 Donald Winnicott was a British object relations psychoanalyst and paediatrician whose psychoanalytic 
theorising was initially based in Klein and Freud’s theories, but who radically revised some aspects of them 
(Phillips 2007).   
28 Since the infant cannot differentiate between her mother’s body and her own in the very early months of life, 
they are also undifferentiated physically, from the infant’s perspective. 
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reliably responsive to the child, she or he begins to have confidence in the durability of the 
‘outer’ reality.  
Winnicott wrote that from infancy, and all through life, “no human being is free from the 
strain of relating inner and outer reality”. He theorized that relief from this strain is provided 
by “an intermediate area of experience, to which inner reality and external life both 
contribute” (Winnicott 1971, p.2, italics in original), which he called a ‘transitional space’. 
Writing about this ‘transitional space’, Hollway (2011a, p.50) notes that “(r)eality and 
imagination are often treated as binary terms, with connotations of external and internal 
worlds, characterised by objectivity and subjectivity respectively”. For Winnicott (1971, 
p.103),  
(t)he potential space between baby and mother, between child and family, between individual and 
society or the world, depends on experience which leads to trust. It can be looked upon as sacred to 
the individual in that it is here that the individual experiences creative living. 
Winnicott’s transitional space provides a kind of bridge between imagination and reality, and 
is a useful way of thinking about how women might perceive their fantasies of maternity and 
a child—their “sense of myself as a mother”— as a different kind of reality that is difficult to 
articulate. 
Winnicott considered that for children, play— which he understood as childrens’ way of 
“finding and becoming a self” (Phillips 2007, p.119)—happens ‘in’ this transitional space, but 
he understood it as a space that continues to play a part in adults’ lives too, because it is here 
that ‘cultural experience’ takes place.29 He also saw the analytic setting to be a transitional 
space for collaborative exchange (Phillips 2007, p.118). He appears to have conceptualized 
this intermediate space as a psychic space that forms an ongoing part of our lives as humans; 
he located it as the space in which we ‘are’  “when we are doing what in fact we do a great 
deal of our time, namely, enjoying ourselves” (Winnicott 1971, p.106). For the purposes of 
this thesis then, the ‘transitional space’ provides a way of conceptualizing ‘where’ women’s 
ongoing fantasies might happen psychically.  
2.5 The bases of maternal fantasies 
I turn now to consider how, psychosocially, these fantasies might be understood to develop. I 
look first at work that theorizes the psychic aspects of how a woman who has had a baby 
develops her “sense of herself as a mother” before discussing what the implications might be 
for those who expected to have a child, but have not done so. I extend this further through an                                                         
29 Winnicott wrote of ‘culture’ as “something that is in the common pool of humanity” (Winnicott 1971, p.99). 
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engagement with Ettinger’s concept of the trans-subjective matrixial borderspace. Finally, I 
pay attention to the social context through a focus on theories of individualization. 
Intersubjectivity, and archaic re-membering 
While psychoanalytic theory had typically focused on the psychological development of the 
baby through an ongoing processes of individuation, in his work Winnicott developed a 
relational emphasis on the dynamic interplay between mothers and their children, and the 
mutual identity development that occurred through this. As I have suggested, he theorized that 
the infant first begins to develop and organize its sense of self within the psyche-soma of its 
mother intersubjectively (Winnicott 1958).30  
Drawing from this in her psychosocial study of identity development in new mothers Hollway 
(2006, p.65) argues that a new mother identifies both with her baby and her mother through 
the “vestigial experience” (Hollway 2006, p.65) of her own infantile and child state in 
relationship with her mother, even though as an adult she has separated to a greater or lesser 
extent and developed differentiation from her as she grew.31 She writes that becoming a 
mother positions women as a “generational pivot” because they are able to draw on 
‘memories’ of this process in their own infanthood and in this identification, “both with their 
mothers (as babies) and their babies (as mothers)” (Hollway 2009a, p.4). Of this process Stern 
(1999, p.181) writes: 
(T)he mother’s stored memories or memorial fragments (...) include both sides of her interaction 
(…) with her own mother when she was young: the parts that she experienced directly as a baby, 
while interacting with her mother, and the part of her mother’s experience of interacting with her 
that she experienced empathically (via imitation and primary identification). 
Raphael-Leff (2009, p.2) provides a clue to the some of the possible mechanisms of this 
process when she writes that as a mother of a new baby a woman is pulled back in memory 
and fantasy because of her prolonged exposure to her baby’s “raw feelings” and her  
unremitting contact with the smell and feel of primal substances (amniotic fluid, lochia, colostrum, 
urine, faeces, breast milk, mucus, posset etc) implicitly absorbed from the mother’s own archaic 
carer’s childbearing body.                                                          
30 The concept of unconscious intersubjectivity is premised on the sense that the individual subject is 
“constituted relationally, right through to the deepest most hidden part of their subjectivity” (Diamond & 
Marrone 2003, p.17). Hollway (2006, p.50) describes it as the “unconscious flowing of mental states between 
one person and another that constantly modifies them”.  
31 The concept of identification is understood differently in various strands of psychoanalytic thought. I use it 
here in the sense of the formation of identity (Hird 2003); “a mechanism through which what is outside comes to 
be registered within” (Frosh 2002, p.62), where there is “no firm division between inside and out, but rather a 
fluid interchange in which each penetrates the other” (Frosh 2002, p.56). From Benjamin (1998), who 
distinguishes between identification and incorporation, I take the idea that this process is intersubjective in the 
sense that aspects of the other are accepted and used by an individual without destroying the other in doing so.  
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I use the word ‘memory’ in a particular sense here. Stone (2012, p.6) distinguishes between 
“explicit” remembering which is “mediated by language and the categories it encodes, and by 
the publicly shared map of time and space”, and the “bodily, habitual, emotional 
remembering” that is archaic and preverbal; what Klein (1959/1975, p.180) called “having 
memories in feelings”. The latter are not experienced as memories but rather “consist of 
schemata for behaviour or for certain patterns of emotional reaction to given kinds of 
situation”, and are re-membered and reproduced in the corporeality of relationships with 
others; through the “raw and visceral” experience of a mother’s constant bodily closeness to 
her baby as Raphael-Leff has suggested, for example (Stone 2012, p.5). Stone writes that in 
this re-membering as a mother in relation to her baby, a woman is “drawn back to re-inhabit 
her earlier position as one who reciprocates, mimics, and reproduces her own mother’s 
behaviour” (2012, p. 11, italics in original). In this way, she writes, she reproduces her own 
mother’s ‘idiom of care’ (Bollas 1987, p.32).   
In this light, I propose the possibility that women who have not yet had children are also 
positioned as a generational pivot in the way Hollway discusses, although perhaps not as 
vividly, since they are not immersed in the living viscerality in the same way. Nevertheless, it 
may be that, in the ‘transitional space’ between imagination and reality, they too have the 
capacity to identify with their mothers in fantasizing their own potential motherhood, and 
with their infantile state in fantasizing their potential child(ren). This is perhaps part of what 
Chodorow (2003) was referring to in the epigraph to this chapter, when she placed the 
beginnings of motherhood “internally in the conflictual, intense cauldron of childhood 
sexuality and object relations”. In the subsequent analytic chapters of the thesis I will present 
research materials to support this proposal.  
Stone argues that in the usual course of their adult lives today—as opposed to a former time 
or in other places where people might have more ongoing contact with babies as part of their 
everyday lives in families and communities—the relational and corporeal aspect of these early 
‘memories’ are usually dormant because our adult contexts seldom evoke it.  Based on my 
research materials, I will suggest that, while the intensity of these ‘memories’ evoked by the 
embodied relationship that a mother has to her newborn baby may not have been experienced 
by a woman who has not yet had a child or cared intensively for one, other experiences in her 
life may quicken the archaic memories of her early time with her own mother. In my data, this 
was indicated in several instances where women had terminated a pregnancy. For example, 
Maree’s comment that becoming pregnant “did something to me.  Um, it was quite, it, it, it 
kind of, that maternal thing that wasn’t there before came”, which I discuss further in Chapter 
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4, illustrated this. Although Maree found it hard to articulate what changed for her when she 
had become pregnant, she was unequivocal that something had happened. For other women 
who had not become pregnant, the ‘re-membering’ was not always as explicit, but was rather 
voiced as Deborah did, in some version of “a sense of myself as a mother”.  
Trans-subjectivity and the matrixial borderspace 
The theoretical basis for my proposal is taken a step further with the notion of trans-
subjectivity and Ettinger’s (2006a, 2006b) concept of the ‘matrixial borderspace’; a 
conceptual ‘space’ which Ettinger (Lichtenberg-Ettinger 1997, p. 392) sees as a “prototype” 
of Winnicott’s concept of the ‘transitional space’.   
Building on Klein’s theorization of the series of relationships between the baby and the 
maternal body as part-objects, Winnicott and other post-Kleinian object relations theorists had 
pushed the origins and development of subjectivity back to the archaic field of intersubjective 
relations and events between infants and their carers (usually understood to be the mother) in 
the early months of a baby’s life. These accounts generally begin with the rupture of the 
baby’s separation from its mother at the trauma of birth (Pollock 2009, p.16), followed by 
further individualization via weaning, motor development, language acquisition and so forth. 
This is the binary ‘phallic mode’ that underpins dominant psychoanalytic (and popular) 
assumptions of human subjectivity and relationships. Here the mother is considered primarily 
through her impact on the development and experience of the child, rather than 
acknowledging that mothers have their own lived experience of their relationships with their 
children, and their own process of development as mothers, which is not necessarily in step 
with their children’s (Stone 2011). In these accounts the maternal body is primarily 
interpreted as a background or container that an individual is required to leave in order to 
become a self (Stone 2012). 
In her concept of the ‘matrixial borderspace’ Bracha Ettinger extends this existing 
psychoanalytic paradigm back further still, to a prenatal, prematernal “trans-subjectivity” 
(Pollock 2006, p.14) between a mother and her child; that is, to gestation and the psychic and 
bodily experience of pregnancy (Boyne, 2004). Here subjectivity is conceived of as a stratum 
of primordial encounter between subjectivities-to-be that are unknown to one another, and yet 
‘recognize’ each other and develop in relation to one another.32 Ettinger (1996, p.125) refers 
to this  “psychic creative borderspace of encounter” as the ‘matrix’, and she looks to this                                                         
32 Hollway (2012a, p.550) writes that the metaphor of a stratum that Ettinger engages “provides the insight that 
the trans-subjective is overlaid but also that it remains the bedrock of subjectivity. It is the original stratum, 
speaking ontogenetically”. 
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encounter of pregnancy as the “basic pattern” for an alternative mode of relationship which 
precedes and runs alongside (rather than instead of) the phallic mode in individuals’ day-to-
day lives; a prototype for other human situations and processes in which the non-I is not an 
intruder but a partner in difference, a dimension of subjectivity that is from its emergence 
“several, joint-in-separateness, distant-in-proximity” (Pollock 2006, p.28).  
Ettinger’s proposal that aspects of the uterine experience continue to weave together with 
those that come about through a subject’s experience after birth is grounded in feminist 
critiques of the notion that separation from the mother is necessary in order for a subject to 
become an independent and autonomous subject. The understanding of an ongoing porosity 
between individuals on which this trans-subjective ‘memory’ might be based is in marked 
contrast to the binaries implicit in the phallic mode, and has radical implications for 
considerations of human subjectivity. Her trans-subjective concepts of matrixial border 
linking and border spacing moves beyond notions of ‘identification’ and ‘disidentification’ to 
one of a shared matrixial space in which the subject-becoming-a-mother and the subject-
becoming-a-child modify one another.  Hollway (2012a, p.551) writes: 
Such processes continue throughout life, albeit overlaid by other, more individualized strata. In this 
view, separation no longer appears as a process of formation of autonomous individual subjects, 
but more like an ongoing choreography whose flow is not reducible to such units. In this sense, 
separation can be understood as always accompanied by trans-subjectivity, however buried, 
however conflicted. 
Pollock has written extensively about Ettinger’s work, and while commenting that it “invites 
us to recognise, to re-cognise, a subjectivising partnership that is primordially 
feminine”(2009, p.11) she anticipates feminist criticism of the idea of the ‘feminine’ being 
mobilized in this way. She writes that the matrix is “about a model for human situations and 
processes, psychically, imaginatively and symbolically built upon a primordial, 
ethical/aesthetical situation of human becoming” (2009, p.5).  It is not, she says, “about cosy 
mothers and babies, symbiosis and fusion, nor fantasies to return to oceanic self-loss” (2009, 
p.5). Neither is it about the physical organs of the penis or the womb. Just as the penis is 
understood to support the conceptualization of the phallic/Oedipal field, but the phallus is not 
identified with the penis, so the womb, pregnancy and gestation supports the theorization of 
the matrixial field (Ettinger 2004, p.78). The matrix is not identified with the organ of the 
womb, but rather “a complex apparatus modeled on this site of feminine/prenatal encounter—
not fusion—that places any human becoming-subject-to-be, male or female, in relation with 
female bodily specificity” (Ettinger 2006a, p.141).  
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Since the matrixial stratum is originary, and is not extinguished after birth, the dimensions of 
subjectivity within the matrixial stratum are available to all after birth and throughout life; to 
both men and women, to mothers and non-mothers, and to fathers. Female subjects however, 
are understood to have “double access” to the matrixial because they experience the womb 
both as an archaic site in their past—as males also do—and also as a potential “future site” 
(Ettinger 2006a, p.143). Pollock writes: 
Those of us born into, and housing our subjectivities in bodies which have the potential to generate, 
to repeat the process of our own becoming in the matrixial severality that marks human sexual 
procreation, are already border linked to the sexual-feminine, maternal at the level of 
unremembered memory and imaginative projection that may be fore-closed under phallocentrism 
(Pollock 2009, p.15).  
The concept of the matrixial borderspace takes account of another dimension of human 
experience in a way that has particular salience for this topic. In addition to the intersubjective 
‘memory’ of the relationship between a mother and her infant that contact with mothers and 
babies in their day-to-day lives may trigger—as discussed in the previous section—the 
concept of the matrixial has the potential to provide insight into a further mechanism by 
which circumstantially childless women might have access to a “sense of myself as a mother” 
and the fantasies of maternity and a child that it entails.  
Problems with use of the matrixial 
There are, however, immense difficulties in identifying and engaging with this dimension in 
empirical terms in a social science research project such as this. These processes are difficult 
to articulate because the language and discourses available to describe them are structured 
within phallic principles. Ettinger (2009, p.371) argues that “(d)iscourse, conducted by 
speech, repressed in the Other, carries principles of language and society that dwell in the 
Symbolic; the symbolic Other restructures/constructs archaic processes, modes, and materials 
as no longer accessible”. The effect of this inaccessibility is that the language to express and 
to think about a potential pre-birth/pre-language dimension of this experience is also 
unavailable. This may be one of the reasons that many participants struggled to articulate their 
“sense of myself as a mother” and resorted to language and metaphors associated with the 
body in talking about their experience.  
Further to the lack of an available language, the prenatal/ feminine encounters are “affect-
laden time-space-body experiences” (Ettinger 2009, p.379) that “induce archaic-past but also 
elusive present-psychic traces” in individuals. The field of the study of affect as registers of 
experience is developing across a range of disciplines. ‘Affect’ in that field refers to 
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“processes of life and vitality which circulate and pass between bodies” that “cannot easily be 
seen, and which might variously be described as non-cognitive, trans-subjective, non-
conscious, non-representational, incorporeal and immaterial” (Blackman 2012, p.4). 
Blackman notes that these processes too are “difficult to capture or study in any conventional 
methodological sense”. Ettinger (2009, p.393) writes:  
(t)races of the encounters are transmitted between the  I and the non-I in what is experienced by a 
whole range of matrixial border feelings like uncanniness, compassion, empathy,[…] which, 
because of the foreclosure of the matrix from the symbolic network, we mainly have a poetic 
vocabulary to describe, and we tend to think of as mysterious, reasonless and mystical sensations.  
Hollway (2012a, p.21) found participants’ repeated use of the word “weird” in their attempts 
to describe their experience of new motherhood to be an indicator of a matrixial dimension 
that exceeded the language available to them. In the research materials generated in this 
project I glimpse what might be interpreted to be aspects of the matrixial dimension occurring 
most often in the moments when the narrative falters; in the spaces where words are 
unavailable, or the words used are a space filler for something the narrator experiences, but 
seems unable to articulate. Such spaces are potent and full of meaning, and are themselves 
available for analysis. Work such as this, however, is inevitably open to critique that the 
interpretation of the ‘space’ (or space-filler word/term) is unverifiable in conventional terms.  
A matrixial perspective adds a further dimension to my discussion of intersubjective 
‘memory’ triggered by contact with the demands of a newborn baby, by suggesting that the 
origins of a woman’s maternal fantasies might be traced to a time and condition prior to birth 
as well as after it. The significance of the matrixial for this thesis is in its capacity to theorize 
a further dimension of subjectivity and experience that circumstantially childless women may 
unconsciously draw on in the development of their maternal thoughts and fantasies.33 It may 
be that it relates to an inexpressible ‘knowing’ that later “becomes the affective underside of 
certain aspects and dimensions of our relational modes with the world, our others, living or 
dead, alive and not-yet-alive, human and non-human, past and present” (Pollock, 2009, p.8). 
For these reasons, it adds an important dimension for my inquiry that warrants my using it, 
though I acknowledge my treatment of it is necessarily brief and partial.  
If my matrixial reading of the data in the analytical chapters that follow is somewhat tentative, 
it is because I am aware of the potential for such an analysis to be overstated, its claims 
outreaching the scope of the material. The use of matrixial theory empirically rests on the                                                         
33 This is different from work that explores the social, biological and technological complexities of what 
constitutes a ‘mother’ (eg Letherby 1994) In this work I am extending beyond the practices of mothering to 
different dimension of a maternal subjectivity and a baby/child that exists ‘only’ in fantasy. 
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researcher’s/reader’s openness to and awareness of the possibility of a matrixial dimension in 
their own lives, and to see its traces in the lives of others. It is a willingness to shift to another 
dimension of ‘knowing’ that makes a matrixial reading of the meaning of “mysterious, 
reasonless and mystical” experiences expressed in these research materials possible. 
The Individualization Thesis 
Along with their experiences in relation to their mothers and other carers throughout their 
lives, women’s fantasies of maternity and a child are created out of their conscious and 
unconscious interactions with the social and cultural worlds in which they are immersed as 
they grow up. Young women’s lives are saturated from birth to adulthood with media and 
experiences that present them with a limitless range of understandings of who ‘should’ or 
‘should not’ become a mother, when and under what circumstances they might do so, how 
they might go about mothering, and what it is to be a mother.  Writing about the experience of 
new mothers in the U.K. Thomson et al (2011, p.2) note: 
(W)hat it means to be a mother is shape-shifting in line with women’s increased participation in 
work and education. The general trend is towards later motherhood, delaying the birth of a first 
child until education is completed and the career is well established. Emotional stability, financial 
security and the ‘right’ relationship are expected to fall in line with this life trajectory, making birth 
the apex of achievement for grown-up girls living the success-story narrative of contemporary 
times.  
Contemporary social theory articulates the “success-story narrative” in Western societies as 
one of  ‘individualization’, where traditional ties to social structures such as family and 
church have been loosened, and individuals are required to develop their own ‘reflexive 
project of the self’ (Giddens 1991); to be “artists” of their own lives who produce structured 
lives through a process of rational choice-making (Bauman 2008). Beck-Gernsheim (2002) 
suggests that, for young women, this post-traditional order is in part an outcome of greater 
educational opportunities for women and changes in educational systems that have created a 
growing pressure to perform, compete and succeed. Similarly, she argues that changes in the 
workplace and in women’s relationship to paid work have resulted in increased geographical 
and social mobility, and to new occupational possibilities for women. These huge social shifts 
have resulted in young women’s life plans, circumstances, and expectations being very 
different from their mothers’ at a similar age. As a consequence, they need to develop 
solutions and ways of behaving that are not guided or structured by the choices their mothers 
made. 
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For most young women, the “‘right’ relationship” is, as Thomson et al. imply, still an 
essential part of the “success-story narrative”. As I noted in Chapter 1, finding the ‘right’ 
relationship was generally understood to be a necessary prerequisite to having a child for most 
of the participants in this project. Beck-Gernsheim suggests this is part of the “push-pull” of 
individualization (Smart 2007) whereby individuals are drawn to love and stable relationships 
at the same time as processes of social transformation—such as improved contraception, a 
greater acceptance and rate of divorce, and changed sexual norms—have resulted in women 
claiming greater autonomy in all aspects of their lives. She argues that, as a result, 
individualization in the context of romantic relationships means “the newly emerging form of 
the couple always has behind it a claim of one’s own on life” (2002, p.72, italics in original). 
Women, she suggests, “must increasingly come forward as individuals with their own 
interests and rights, plans and choices” (2002, p.90). Economically, for example, they 
understand themselves as being required to plan ahead for their own financial security, rather 
than presuming that their husband will take care of them within the protection of their 
marriage. A sense of this personal responsibility for themselves and their life trajectory was 
evident in the narratives of many of the participants in this research, and was often discussed 
in terms of competing choices to be made. In talking about the conflict between her desire to 
have a child and her perceived need to make plans and provisions for her future Maree, for 
example, said, “I need to plan for my own future security, and I want to own my home and 
land, so [pause] just feeling really torn”. 
Amongst the key theorists whose work has come to exemplify the individualization approach, 
Beck-Gernsheim’s (2002) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s (1995) work stands out as most 
salient to this project because they have paid particular attention to theorizing the ways 
individuals, couples and families function under conditions of individualization. They posit 
contemporary families—or, as Beck-Gernsheim has it, the “post-familial family”—as an 
“elective relationship” (2002, p.97) between individual persons who necessarily go about the 
“staging of everyday life” (2002, p.90), attempting to hold together personal biographies that 
constantly tend to pull apart. They describe families of people with scattered lives and 
working conditions that produce “irregular and fluctuating tempos that do not correspond to 
such requirements of living together as continuity, stability and co-ordination” (2002, p.91). 
Throughout their work, they seem very pessimistic about the potential for ‘the family’ to 
withstand the individualizing pressures of contemporary social conditions (Smart 2007). In 
this context of inevitably disintegrating families and romantic relationships, they argue that 
women’s desire to have a child is for something that provides “an anchor”. A child, they 
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suggest, is “what remains” when traditional bonds and a confidence in the possibility of an 
enduring love between couples has eroded:  
(A child) promises a tie which is more elemental, profound and durable than any other in this 
society. The more other relationships become interchangeable and revocable, the more a child can 
become the focus of new hopes—it is the ultimate guarantee of permanence. 
(Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1995, pp.72-3) 
Entering into a bond with a child is highly attractive, they write, because this relationship is 
“of a quite different kind than that to another adult”; it is “all-encompassing, lasting, 
unbreachable, in a sense superior to other liaisons in our barter and throw-away culture” 
(1995, p.76). This claim is one I heard over and again in the narratives of participants. 
Describing the mother/child relationship as “as close to unconditional love I think you’re 
going to get” Elena commented, “I haven’t really had anything close to it with a partner—OK 
I’ll say I’ve been in love and you know—but it’s different”.  
In one sense, these claims seem idealized and unrealistic (Gatrell 2005). They describe an 
ideal of an unbreakable bond between parents and children which is often not borne out in life 
experience; although many people remain close to their parents as adults, many others live 
very different lives to those their parents lived, and become geographically and emotionally 
distant from them over time. A biological connection may make for a more durable ‘tie’, but 
does not necessarily result in a relationship of enduring love, or even a strong social 
connection. In another sense though, perhaps what both theorists and participants are pointing 
to is a quality of the relationship between a parent and her or his child that is not readily 
captured in the language of neo-liberalism that is the available lexicon of theorists of 
individualization.  
Smart (2007, p.17) writes that one of the main adverse criticisms of individualization theories 
is the “lack of congruence” between the ways family life is discussed in the work of these 
theorists and “the kinds of lives being represented in local and more closely specified 
studies”. Gross (2005, p.286) argues that “striking changes have occurred in intimacy and 
family life over the last half-century, but the notion of detraditionalization as currently 
formulated does not capture them very well”. He distinguishes between “regulative” 
traditions, which have declined in strength in recent times and “meaning-constitutive 
traditions”, referring to the “patterns of sense-making” that families pass on through 
generations, and which embed individuals in a family culture and history. This is an important 
distinction for me, because while individualization theories might explain the differences 
between the lives of these young women and their mothers, they struggle to account for the 
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similarities, recurring patterns, and ways in which a daughter’s life—and reproductive 
choices—are influenced by those of her mother’s.  
Agency and choice 
Social sciences have long been mired in the problem of a dualism between agency and 
structure, and the voluntarist/determinist bipolarity associated with it (Spears 2005). Related 
to this is the idea of ‘choice’, which is understood as a fundamental and inescapable element 
of daily life within the notion of the reflexively organized biography of the self (Budgeon 
2003). For Baumann (2008, p.53), 
Human life consists of a perpetual confrontation between ‘external conditions’ (perceived as 
‘reality’, by definition a matter always resistant to, and all too often defying, the agent’s will) and 
the designs of its ‘auctors’ (authors/actors): their aim to overcome the active or passive resistance, 
defiance and/or inertia of matter and to remould reality in accordance with their chosen vision of 
the ‘good life’. 
As Baumann’s words suggest, while the necessity for choice is understood to be a given, the 
question for individualization theorists is one of how rational individuals exercise agency—
within social constraints—in negotiating their way through a complex diversity of choices 
about how they will live their lives (Giddens 1991). Understanding ‘choice’ in this way, the 
narratives and drawings of participants in this study can be read as examples of the tensions 
created by a perceived need to live as an autonomous individual who makes choices amongst 
competing demands about how she constructs her life. It is illustrated with the data associated 
with Maree’s “feeling really torn” between pursuing her career and having a child, for 
example.34 Analysing the issues of age-related infertility through this lens, Bute et al.(2010) 
argue for an acknowledgement of the impact of broader social factors in the lives of women 
who are circumstantially childless as a result of age-related infertility. They write that public 
discourses about age-related infertility have failed to address these organizational and 
structural forces that shape and constrain women’s reproductive decision-making, because 
this infertility has been largely framed in the media through the personal painful narratives of 
the choices made by individual women. 
This analysis is useful, but it leaves aside another key dimension in the issue of ‘choice’. 
Salecl (2010, p.97) addressed it when she questioned the applicability of the notion of rational 
‘choice’ in the reproductive decision-making women do. She asked,  
                                                        
34 For a developed discussion of Maree’s narrative see Chapter 4, pp.104-114 
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(H)ow much is reproduction a matter of rational choice, and how much does it involve unconscious 
mechanisms? How much can we be in charge of our desire or our partner’s desire, as well as that of 
our parents and of society at large, when we decide whether or not to have children?35  
Hollway and Jefferson (2005, p.147) provide a psychosocial discussion of agency that takes 
account of both these unconscious fluid dynamics as well as the conscious choices people 
make by defining the individual as a “divided psychosocial subject of unconscious conflict; a 
subject located in social realities mediated not only by social discourses but by psychic 
defences”. Such a subject’s agency is not understood as a series of single decision-making 
moments but rather “a continuous flow of social practices”(2005, p.149). Both her psychic 
‘inner world’ and the social structures of her ‘outer world’ constitute her capacity for agency 
and the forms of agency that are possible and available to her (Frost & Hoggett 2008). 
2.6 Fantasies of nurturing 
In the previous sections I have discussed ‘where’ fantasies of maternity and a child might be 
understood to stand in the psychic life of these participants, and aspects of ‘how’ they might 
be understood to develop. In this section I pay attention to the theoretical underpinnings of the 
main content of those fantasies. I will discuss and illustrate this content further, through 
reference to the research materials, in Chapter 4.   
The dominant quality that threaded through the maternal fantasies of many of these 
participants in this project revolved around the idea of ‘nurturing’. This notion carries 
connotations of providing the circumstances and attention in which someone or something 
might thrive—through fostering, encouraging, feeding and nourishing—of training, and 
perhaps above all, of caring and cherishing.  
In focusing on this quality of nurturing and linking it with a longing to be a mother I am on 
difficult ground politically; the same treacherous ground that Van Balen and Inhorn (2002) 
suggest has made research into aspects of infertility a “taboo subject” for many feminist 
researchers. The linkage between notions of ‘nurturing’, the ‘maternal’, and female 
subjectivity is a site of extensive theorizing, contention, and debate around the idea that 
women are in some way inherently, and essentially, nurturing, and hence ‘natural’ mothers.                                                          
35 She might also have asked how much we can be in charge of our bodies. Williams (2013, p.2) writes,  
“because abortion is framed in terms of choice, and because the pill allows us not to get pregnant, we think in 
terms of choice and control—if I can stop myself getting pregnant, I can stop stopping myself. If I can choose an 
abortion, I can choose a baby”. Williams writes in the context of “the taboos and myths surrounding infertility 
and science’s ability to ‘cure’ it”. Her concerns is that the fertility industry “overclaims” its success rates and 
that the majority of women who have delayed pregnancy in the expectation that they will be able to have a 
biological child through new reproductive technologies are not in fact successful in doing so. Zoll (2013) 
addresses similar issues in her memoir Cracked open: Liberty, fertility, and the pursuit of high-tech babies. 
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Stephens (2011, p.11) notes that “many feminists would insist that the primary focus of the 
second-wave feminist movement has been one long struggle against essentialism, whether this 
be biological, cultural or ideological”.36 On the other hand, Daphne De Marneffe (2004, p.25) 
writes that the desire to care for one’s children is often posited as a “correctable condition” 
rather than a “core issue” that feminism needs to explore. 
‘Feminism’ has never taken a singular position on mothering however (DiQuinzio 1999), or 
on its relationship to nurturing, and some feminists challenge dominant representations of 
feminism as having repudiated motherhood (Stephens 2011). As a result, there is a tendency 
for a polarizing binary to have been created, whereby an alternative feminist strategy of 
celebrating women’s difference is positioned in relation to these representations, which are 
often considered to be promaternal and essentialized as biologically based. The participants in 
this research generally appeared to align themselves with the dominant feminist gender 
discourse of equality that posits both men and women as autonomous human beings, with a 
right to freedom and a career and life of their choosing. This stance sometimes created a 
tension for them, as I will discuss in the chapters that follow.  
My aim is to conceptualize ‘nurture’ in such a way that does not conflate ‘woman’ and 
‘nurture’ is an essentialist way. I attempt to do this theoretically by tracing the roots of 
nurturing through Winnicott and Hollway to the intersubjective experience of a baby and 
child after birth, and through Ettinger to the trans-subjective experience before it. In the 
section that follows I argue that the capacity to be ‘maternal’, and in particular to express this 
maternality through the nurture and care of others, is potentially available to both men and 
women, and to mothers and non-mothers.  
The capacity for concern and to care 
From an object relations perspective I relate the notion of nurturing most closely within the 
work of Winnicott to what he theorized as “the capacity for concern”.37 For him, “the fact that 
the individual cares, or minds, and both feels and accepts responsibility” (1963/1965, p.73, 
italics in original) was the essence of this capacity. He understood it to be part of the healthy 
emotional development of the child in relationship with its mother (and/or father) in very                                                         
36 Stephens (2011, p.10) uses the term essentialism in the sense of “the view that any generalized conceptions of 
the maternal risk ignoring the great diversity in the lives of individual women who may or may not be mothers”; 
a view based in a false universal that women have a “special or incontrovertible relationship to care and 
nurture”. 
37 Phillips (2007, p.58) notes that Winnicott tends to write of capacities rather than positions or stages, and this 
emphasis allows for individual differences: “ ‘Capacity’ with its implication of stored possibility, and its 
combination of the receptive and the generative, blurs the boundary between activity and passivity”. 
44 
early infancy, where a baby moves from a position of “ruthlessly” and narcissistically 
exploiting his mother (or other caregiver), to a capacity to feel concern for her or him. 
Winnicott conceptualized the development of this capacity as being contingent on a “good 
enough” emotional environment having been sustained over a period of time. Developing 
Winnicott’s theorizing, Hollway (2006) wrote about the origins of nurturing as the ‘capacity 
to care’. This capacity, she argued (2006, p.50), is made possible by the principle of 
unconscious intersubjectivity that is central to an object relations approach; that is “the idea 
that the carer can unconsciously receive emotional communications from a person in need and 
respond in the service of that other person”.  
From this perspective then, the capacity to care and nurture others evolves as part of the 
development of the self for children and adults of both sexes in relation to maternal care. It is 
an outcome of being cared for, and as such is a product of both internal psychological 
processes and the relational settings that are mediated by the social structures, resources, 
social and historical settings, practices of child care and so forth, in which they are embedded. 
Both Winnicott and Hollway agree that although being ‘mothered’ in this way finds a 
particular expression in the care of her child by a biological mother, this maternal subjectivity 
is available to men and women, biological mothers and others. Hollway wrote that maternal 
subjectivity is  “a set of capabilities precipitated by others’ dependence and need for care and 
modifying both subjectivities through a third space, it does not reside solely in natural 
mothers or in those who parent children” (Hollway 2006, p.82).38  
Hollway makes two qualifications to her argument that maternal subjectivity is available to 
all. Firstly, she writes (2006, pp.80-81) that “there are specific conditions, biological and 
historical, structural and psychological, that render actual mothers the most susceptible to the 
intersubjective dynamics within which maternal subjectivity is constituted”. The psychosocial 
account I make of the development of a fantasy of maternity being the product of a 
girl/woman’s ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds, including their identifications with their mothers and 
other adult women around them is related to this.  Secondly, she suggests, “it seems likely 
that there is a systematic difference in the extent of ruthlessness to which young children 
subject their real mothers, other women and fathers as primary carers” because “in the child’s 
phantasy, forged out of the earliest combined psyche-soma, any other person—a third term—
represents difference from that original”.  
                                                        
38 Hollway draws here on Ogden’s model of the ‘third’ space which is “a creation of the first two who are also 
created by it” (Ogden 1994/1999, p. 462, cited in Hollway 2006, p.125). She clarifies that this is different from 
the psychoanalytic notion of the third term, understood to be that which breaks the mother/child dyad.  
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The idea that maternal care might also be undertaken by people other than a birth mother was 
also proposed by Ruddick (1989, p.17) who argued that maternal care requires mothers to 
provide “works of preservative love, nurturance and training” to children. Ruddick 
distinguished between birthgiving and mothering, taking the position that mothering is a 
practice or work, rather than the outcome of “fixed biological or legal relationship to 
children” (1995, p.xi), and as such “anyone who commits her or himself to responding to 
children’s demands and makes the work of response a considerable part of her or his life, is a 
mother” (1995 p.xii). Conceptualising ‘maternal’ subjectivity in this way is different from 
‘fathering’ or the notion of ‘parenting’ (see Hollway 2006, ch.5). Baraitser (2009) importantly 
distinguishes between the idea of maternal work as a set of specific social practices (which 
Ruddick’s writing addresses), maternal ethics, and maternal subjectivity or identity, 
suggesting that a more complex picture of the maternal than a set of practices is necessary.  
Ribbens McCarthy and Edwards (2002, p.210) contest the concept of mothering as ‘work’ 
from a different perspective. They suggest that ‘work’ is a gendered and historically situated 
concept, and that conceptualizing mothering in this way risks “imposing a publically based 
male vision” on women’s lives with their children in private settings. They write, “(w)hat 
room is left for mothering as centred on emotion, moral identity and a particularist 
relationship that does not constitute a purposive project with clearly identifiable outcomes?” 
They give the example of the notion of “being there” for children as one that is not readily 
encompassed within the concept of ‘work’ and that depends on a “sense of interconnectedness 
in the world”.  
This critique of the notion of maternal work in this way does not change my key point here 
however, which is that both men and women, biological mothers and others can ‘do 
mothering’, or embody a ‘maternal subjectivity’ when it is understood in this way. That is, I 
want to emphasise that in arguing for the potential development of a capacity to care through 
the experience of caring for an infant I am not correlating nurturing with femininity or with 
maternity. Although the identity of ‘mother’ is closely identified with nurturing (Letherby 
2012), just as some people who are nurturing are not mothers, some mothers are not 
nurturing. Hollway also emphasizes this; she wrote (2006, p.80) that “the development of the 
capacities to care that I am collecting under the term ‘maternal subjectivity’ is not guaranteed 
by becoming a mother, but the infant does communicate a demand for them and good-enough 
conditions (external and internal) make their development likely in those who are positioned 
to receive them”.  
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Just as ‘maternal subjectivity’ might be understood to be available to women who are not 
biological mothers, and to men, it is also available in other relationships beyond the 
mother/baby dyad. Hollway (2006) understands the capacity to care to be in constant dynamic 
tension with the individual’s need for self differentiation. In maternal subjectivity, and its 
potential for a mother (or other caregiver) to transcend the often conflictual coexistence of the 
demands of intersubjectivity and individuality, she sees a “prototype” for other caring 
relationships. Responding to the ruthless ongoing demands of a baby, she writes, “alters 
mothers’ subjectivities” (Hollway 2006, p.67) in a way that can also “permeate” other 
relationships. In Chapter 4 (p.100) I discuss the ways an unconscious awareness of this 
potential change might be interpreted to underlie the comments Julia made of being “required 
to love in a particular way” or, as Gina put it, “to have that experience of really existing for 
another being”. In Chapter 6 I draw on the research materials to illustrate the ways that the 
participants in this research project understood themselves to be embodying aspects of a 
‘maternal’ subjectivity in other nurturing relationships in their lives. 
Kristeva (2005, p.2) also theorizes motherhood as a “learning process in how to relate to the 
other”. She argues that motherhood is “not an instinct” and “cannot be reduced to the desire to 
have a child”. In terms that are very close to Hollway’s she describes what she terms 
‘maternal passion’ as a “prototype of the love relation”.39 For her, this relation entails 
“narcissistic withdrawal, then a bond with the object through projective identification 
sublimated as tenderness”. Speaking of  ‘maternal passion’ in a structural rather than 
biological sense she said,  
(i)t is not impossible that through psychoanalysis, self-analysis or sublimating work a woman can 
also live out her maternal passion without gestation and giving birth (through adoption, surrogate 
mothers and other fertility techniques to come, or on another level through care-taking, teaching, 
long-term relationships or in communal/community work). 
(Kristeva 2005, p.3)  
Ettinger’s matrixial theory adds a further dimension to my consideration of the fantasies of 
nurturing that are such a feature of many of these circumstantially childless women’s versions 
of “a sense of myself as a mother”. Matrixial theory is complex and I am reluctant to appear 
to sentimentalize aspects of it. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense of what Ettinger (2006b,                                                         
39 The idea that motherhood is a “learning process in how to relate to the other” (Kristeva 2005) is not 
unchallenged in feminist thought. For example, in a conversation with Lisa Baraitser in the first issue of Studies 
in the Maternal Lynne Segal commented “I’m not sure that mothers really do have this ethical capacity that 
they’re developing and learning from their relations with their child […]. I can also see the mother giving up 
herself in order to allow the child certain things, you know, as a narcissistic gratification as well.  This child is 
also a part of her and will take her forward into eternity and so on. It’s not just a question of abjection and 
altruism and death of the self, it’s also that you will live through this great little creature that you’re allowing to 
be free, marching forward into the future” (Segal 2009, p.12). 
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p.218) calls “com-passionate hospitality” in this theory that resonates with my themes. 
Pollock (2009, p.17) writes about the ways in which matrixial fantasies of the mother’s body, 
perhaps offer access to other sensations that will later line psychic processes with (…) the co-
emergence of affects associated with partial and shifting sense of connection/connectivity, for 
which we later, retrospectively yearn. Even if such yearnings for partial connectivity with an other 
cause pain, they also may solace something profound in us that undoes the absolute binary of 
pleasure/pain and forms the basis of our being able to share the suffering of another, or feel with 
another’s trauma.  
I link Ettinger’s theorizing about the roots of this ability to be “sharing the suffering of 
another”, with Hollway’s ‘capacity to care’ and Winnicott’s ‘capacity for concern’. Ettinger 
(2009, p.391) suggests that this “connection/connectivity”, which is integral to the matrixial 
borderspace, is available to both men and women (because all have experienced it as a foetus 
in their mother’s womb) but is particularly accessible to women because,  
the woman doubly experiences the matrixial borderspace; first, in the last period of prenatal life 
(here she could be of either sex), and second, as someone who has a womb, at various levels of 
development and awareness, whether she is a mother or not.  
Roseneil (2009, p.412) describes the traces that relationships leave in our lives as “residues” 
that shape the way our lives develop; she writes that we are “inhabited by our histories of past 
relationships, and (…) past experiences, our own and those of others, structure our inner 
experience and relational possibilities in the present”.  To think about how women might 
develop a “sense” of themselves as a mother and of their fantasy child or children I have 
suggested that the “residues” from their very early relationships with their mothers—before 
and after birth—and others in their broader social worlds, and their multitudinous and varied 
experiences of what it is to be a mother as they grew up all ‘inhabit’ them through fantasy, 
shaping their present lives as adults and indeed their future lives as they grow older. I have 
conceptualized fantasy as having a weight and consequences for events and relationships in 
the ‘real’ world. As Frosh writes, “fantasy is not ‘just’ something that occupies an internal 
space as a kind of mediation of reality, but (…) it also has material effects, directing the 
activities of people and investing the social world with meaning” (2003, p.1554).  
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2.7 Theorizing ‘loss’ and ‘grief’40 
Throughout this thesis I draw on historical and contemporary psychological and 
psychoanalytic literatures about loss and grieving to construct a theorization of loss and 
grieving that takes account of the ways in which fantasy invests the social world with 
meaning, and that can accommodate the particular condition of circumstantial childlessness. I 
posit loss here as an inevitable part of being human that is inherently neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ 
but exists in the meanings individuals attribute to life events. As such, events—or in the case 
of circumstantial childlessness, the absence of the event of biological childbearing—may or 
may not be experienced as a loss and if they are, may or may not elicit a grieving response. I 
understand grieving to be a dynamic and active process (Attig 1996) that may simultaneously 
incorporate both pain and productivity, in tension with one another. It is a psychosocial 
phenomenon in the sense that it is structured and maintained socially, but it is primarily 
experienced personally.  
In this section, I discuss theorizations of grief that I draw on in the analytic chapters that 
follow. Although I predominantly take an object relations approach, throughout the thesis I 
also engage with other theorists whose work is commensurate with this approach. 
Freud and “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) 
The predominantly psychological discourses of grief which dominated Western 
understandings of grieving over the past century originated in Freud’s 1917 paper Mourning 
and Melancholia. In it he described the ‘work’ of mourning in this way: 
The testing of reality, having shown that the loved object no longer exists, requires forthwith that 
all the libido shall be withdrawn from its attachment to this object.(…)The task is now carried 
through, bit by bit, under great cathetic energy (until) each single one of the memories and hopes 
which bound the libido to the object is brought up and hypercathected, and the detachmentment of 
the libido from it accomplished. 
(1917/1954, p. 243) 
For Freud, “mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of 
some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, liberty, and ideal,                                                         
40 In the broad and multidisciplinary field of loss and grief writers have little consensus about the definitions of 
key words, and terms such as ‘grieving’ or ‘mourning’, and ‘loss’ or ‘bereavement’ are often used 
interchangeably. In psychoanalytic literatures the term ‘mourning’ is employed more frequently than ‘grieving’. 
When a distinction is drawn, ‘mourning’ is sometimes understood to be the process an individual goes through 
in relation to a loss, and ‘grief’/ ‘grieving’ the response he or she makes to that loss. In practice, this distinction 
is not clear however, and is very difficult to maintain in a discussion of these issues. In contemporary popular 
use outside psychoanalytic discourse, ‘grieving’ is more common. Since my participants were much more likely 
to conceptualize and describe their experience as ‘grief’ and their responses as ‘grieving’ I use those terms, 
except when I am engaged in a theoretical discussion; of Klein’s theories of mourning, for example. 
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and so on” (1917/1954 p.243). Freud’s work generated a “world view” (Klass & Silverman, 
1996, p.6) for others who followed him. In particular, the concept of ‘grief work’ that this 
quote refers to has been reworked in a variety of ways by subsequent theorists, and continues 
to be debated. It includes the understanding that grieving is a process (rather than an event) of 
coming to terms with a loss, and that this is a difficult and often ambivalent process which 
takes time and considerable emotional and psychic energy. Central to it is the idea that relief 
from the pain of bereavement cannot be achieved without the painful effort of severing the 
bonds of connection; the process Freud termed hypercathexis.  
Freud’s work around mourning is widely quoted by later scholars and theorists who have 
usually interpreted (and later in the century, criticized) his words as an injunction to 
systematically disengage all connections from the dead person. Athough psychoanalysts 
developed the concept of internalization from his work, many saw this as a preliminary to the 
‘letting go’ they understood to be part of grief work. In time, the presumption of the necessity 
of letting go came to be understood in such a way that a reluctance or inability to do so was 
understood to be symptomatic of a pathological attempt to deny the reality of the death (Klass 
& Silverman 1996).  
Towards the end of the twentieth century the notion of ‘letting go’ and other aspects of grief 
work came under serious critique (Bonanno 2009; Wortman and Silver 1989; Stroebe 1993). 
Revisiting their critique in 2001, Wortman and Silver noted that the grief research community 
was “revising its views on these issues”, however they considered that the “myths” about the 
necessity for grief work are still prevalent among clinicians and the general public (2001 
p.424). It is in the context of this dominant discourse of the necessity to ‘let go’ that women’s 
response to not realizing their fantasy is enacted.41 On the face of it, Freud’s theorizing would 
appear to have little relevance to the loss issues that circumstantially childless women face. 
However, although I take a predominantly object relations approach theoretically in this 
thesis, the presumption that ‘grief work’ is necessary, and the dominance of the Freudian 
theorizing of grieving in theoretical (and popular) understandings of what grieving entails 
have a particular salience for this study.                                                          
41 ‘Stage’ theories, in which grief theorists posited the idea that grieving was a process of working through a 
series of stages towards an eventual ‘acceptance’, are linked to this notion of ‘letting go’. The most popularly 
recognized paradigm was a stage model of grieving that was developed by Kubler Ross (1969) out of her work 
with dying people. She proposed a series of five stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. 
Her model was later adapted to grieving more generally (although Kubler Ross herself did not support this 
adaptation) and was—and frequently still is—an influential training and practice tool widely used in Western 
nations. While this has been criticized (Corr et al. 1997) it has relevance to this study because the idea that grief 
is a linear process that consists of a series of stages ending in acceptance has become naturalized in popular 
understanding of grief.  
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An object relations approach to mourning 
From an object relations perspective, grieving is a process whereby the individual regains a 
sense of security by rebuilding her or his inner world that feels threatened by loss.  In 
theorizing mourning through an object relations lens Klein started with Freud’s Mourning and 
Melancholia and linked the “testing of reality” in normal mourning with the processes that 
she proposed takes place in an infant’s mind in relation to anxiety, caused by the fear of the 
loss of the good object of the mother.42 For  Klein, loss was considered to be especially 
significant because of its impact upon this internal fantasy ‘good object’. She theorized that 
the early mourning an infant does in relation to this threatened loss is “revived” whenever 
grief is experienced in later life (Klein 1940/1986, p.147). She understood mourning, at any 
age, to be a process of reinstating the lost object internally, and also reinstating the first loved 
objects—the ‘good’ parents—at the same time. From an object relations perspective, the 
losses these circumstanially childless women experience can be understood to be 
reverberating back to that originary loss.  
Klein theorized that where a baby initially perceives her or his mother to be a set of 
differentiated objects which have been ‘split’ in the paranoid schizoid position into ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ objects, as physical maturity (in eyesight for example) develops and the baby is 
exposed to external reality more, the realization begins to grow that the the loved ‘good’ 
objects and the hated and persecutory ‘bad’ objects are part of the same mother, and that her 
or his ambivalent feelings of love and hate are directed at the same whole object. This marks 
what she termed the ‘depressive position’.43 Although Klein theorized that the paranoid-
schizoid position precedes the depressive position, individuals are understood to move 
between these two positions in response to loss and stresses throughout their lives.  
Although Klein’s theorization of mourning is discussed in the context of the death of a loved 
person, as Freud’s was, she was more explicit in extending the process she describes to 
include experiences beyond bereavement. She wrote: 
                                                        
42 Hinshelwood (1991, p.142) explains Klein’s conceptualization of the ‘good’ object as, “(A) sense of there 
being a good, helpful figure inside the personality felt to reside there, and so closely loved as to constitute the 
basic primary identification around which the whole of an identity is formed. The good internal object provides 
the continual dialogue of encouragement and self-esteem on which confidence and psychological security are 
based”. 
43 This approach moves from Freud’s notion of ‘stages’ in grieving to a concept of ‘positions’, implying a 
dynamic and fluid process where a baby (or grieving adult) oscillates between the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position 
and the ‘depressive’ position, rather than moving in a linear way from one to the other.  
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(A)ny pain caused by unhappy experiences, whatever their nature, has something in common with 
mourning. It reactivates the infantile depressive position, and encountering and overcoming 
adversity of any kind entails mental work similar to mourning. 
Klein (1940/1986, p.164) 
While Klein was careful to distinguish the “mental work” of unhappy experiences from 
mourning (for a person who has died), and was not specific about which aspects of such 
experiences are in common with it, I think it is valid to extend her theorizing about the 
process people work through in mourning to the losses of circumstantial childlessness. 
Klein’s discussion of the psychic work entailed in grieving and its relationship to early infant 
emotional experiences is a possible explanation for the intensity of women’s grief responses. 
Using these theoretical tools one can understand their grieving for the unique losses of 
childlessness to be laced with a sense of the precarious nature of their first early experience of 
grief, the threat of overwhelming emotions and ambivalence, and the fear of chaotic 
disintegration that it entailed.  
Klein also pointed to the part played by the acknowledgement and support of others in the 
bereaved person’s social world in a way that adumbrated a psychosocial approach. She wrote 
that at the time the infant is struggling with the feared loss of the internal ‘good’ object of her 
or his mother, the ongoing embodied presence of the real mother is a great help to her or him. 
She related this to the experience of a mourning adult: 
Similarly, if the mourner has people whom he loves and who share his grief, and if he can accept 
their sympathy, the restoration of the harmony in his inner world is promoted, and his fears and 
distress are more quickly reduced.  
(Klein 1940/1986 p.165)  
Her words have important implications for this research because they point to the additional 
and ongoing distress and psychic disharmony that ensues when there are not others about with 
whom a grieving woman can “share” her grief, or if she is unable to accept their “sympathy”. 
This was the experience of many of the participants, as I will discuss in the chapters that 
follow. 
Although he did not write directly about mourning in the circumstances of bereavement, 
Winnicott shared Klein’s understanding that the processes that form the basis of later 
mourning responses stem from the infant’s early experiences. He wrote that “most of the 
processes that start up in early infancy are never fully established and continue to be 
strengthened by the growth that continues in later childhood, and indeed in adult life, even old 
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age” (Winnicott 1965, p.74).44 For Winnicott “the capacity to feel sad and to be able to 
recognise a sense of loss is a developmental achievement” (Abram 2013, p.88). Writing about 
Klein’s conceptualization of the depressive position he wrote that “(t)he capacity to become 
depressed, to have a reactive depression, to mourn loss, is something that is not inborn nor is 
it an illness; it comes as an achievement of healthy emotional growth” (Winnicott 1988, p.86). 
Contemporary views of grieving 
Conventional theoretical approaches to grief that emerged—primarily out of the Freudian 
account of mourning—have been criticized for their “psychological reductionism” 
(Thompson 2002, p.5) because they ignore individual and cultural variations in the response 
to loss, and individualize the grieving experience as a “private act outside the context of 
human relatedness” (Neimeyer 1998, p.338). Towards the end of last century a new set of 
approaches significantly departed from these older understandings. They critiqued the 
necessity of ‘letting go’ and of an ultimate ‘acceptance’ for grief ‘resolution’ that were 
presumed to be an essential part of the grieving process. The emerging model was 
exemplified in the 1996 publications of Silverman, Klass and Nickman’s Continuing bonds: 
New understandings of grief and of Walter’s paper A new model of grief: Bereavement and 
biography. The new paradigm posits the purpose of grief not to be ‘hypercathexis’ but rather 
one of creating an ongoing “continuing” bond with the person who has died.45 Writing about 
these new approaches Klass noted:  
The consensus that seems to be emerging among scholars and clinicians is that the purpose or goal 
of grief is the construction of a “durable biography” (Walter 1996), a narrative story (Neimeyer and 
Stewart 1996) that organizes and makes meaning of the survivor’s life after the death as well as of 
the life of the person who died.  
(Klass 2001, p.78)  
These approaches have primarily been employed in empirical studies of bereavement, but are 
useful in this study for their understanding of grieving as an ongoing process of meaning-
making over time. One of the central features of these women’s narratives of circumstantial 
childlessness has been the focus they have on the dynamic quality of loss. 
                                                        
44 Winnicott considered Klein’s conceptualization of the depressive position is position to be her most important 
contribution to psychoanalytic theory, alongside Freud’s concept of the Oedipus concept (Winnicott 1963). 
45 Though this paradigm represents a radical shift in understanding about grief in the Western world, it has been 
a very common pattern throughout history in most other parts of the world, and in the Western world in 
premodern times (Klass & Walter 2001, p.433). In New Zealand, the Maori cultural practice of whakapapa, the 
descent line which traces “the connection between ancestors and their descendants” (Metge 1995, p.336), 
recognizes the place that the people who have died continue to play in the lives of the living.  
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Sociological and psychosocial explorations of issues, such as that of the impact of rapid social 
changes in people’s lives, deindustrialization and forced migration (Frost & Hoggett 2008), 
open up conceptualizations of loss and its associated grief that do acknowledge losses apart 
from death, and have potential for this study. These approaches often identify the role of loss 
in subaltern identities, and open up a consideration of losses and grief that is productive for 
this work. Butler (2004 p.467) suggests that they offer a way to think of loss as “constituting 
social, political and aesthetic relations, thereby overcoming the conventional understanding 
that ‘loss’ belongs to a purely psychological or psychoanalytic discourse”.  
Eng and Kazanjian (2003 p.ix), for example, articulate loss as “potential presence” in a way 
that resonates with the metaphor of negative space, and with what I describe in Chapter 4 as 
the ‘absent presence’ of the fantasy child. Instead of imputing to loss a “purely negative 
quality” they conceptualize it as “productive rather than pathological, abundant rather than 
lacking”. They make what they describe as a “double take” on loss: one which both “slackens 
and lingers” on what is lost, and which also “moves and creates”. Their focus is primarily on 
political and social losses, but in their suggestion of a “continuous engagement with loss and 
its remains”, they open up the possibility for considering grieving in response to loss as a 
creative process of identity production and meaning-making in the context of the fluidity of 
life’s inevitable changes and transitions, that meshes well with the processes of adaptation 
that I propose circumstantially childless women make. I draw on this approach to grieving in 
my discussion of the processes of adaptation women make to not having a child when they 
expected to do so in Chapter 6. 
Meaning-making 
A sociological perspective informed Parkes in his development in 1971 of the term 
“psychosocial transition” to describe the ways in which people are challenged to make 
changes in their assumptive worlds and develop a new identity in the face of major loss 
(Parkes 1998, p.22). His theorizing was premised on the idea that people create “structures of 
meaning” (Marris 1974) as a way of making sense of the world and their place in it, and that 
major changes in their life represent crises in this construction which need to be resolved. It 
paved the way for a discourse of grief as a process in which people are engaged in 
“incorporating and reinterpreting the past”, rather than giving it up (Parkes 2001, p.41).  
The concept of grieving as a process of meaning making that I draw on in Chapter 6 has its 
origins in this work. Thompson (2002, p.7) explains it as being premised on the fundamental 
argument that people who experience a profound loss also experience a loss of meaning; “a 
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potentially deep-going disruption of our life story”. The process of grieving can be understood 
as one of making sense of the loss, reconstructing aspects of life directly affected by it and 
integrating the significance of it after the previous meaning system has been disrupted 
(Thompson 2002). Neimeyer and Anderson (2002) describe three important aspects to 
reconstructing meaning after a loss: sense making; benefit finding and identity reconstruction.  
This provides a useful way of thinking about the ways women adapt to new way of 
understanding themselves and their lives when they have previously seen themselves 
becoming biological mothers. It adds insight into the need they may feel to establish 
a positive self identity when aspects of their being which have contributed to their self 
identity—such as their “sense of myself as a mother”—are perceived to have been altered or 
lost.  
Viewed through the lens of ‘meaning reconstruction’, the loss of the realization of fantasies of 
maternity and a child—or the adaptation of them in some way—might be understood as being 
a transformation of the assumed ‘self’ in the same way that becoming a mother is (Baraitser 
2006, De Marneffe 2006a). Butler writes: 
Perhaps mourning has to do with agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say 
submitting to a transformation) the full result of which one cannot know in advance. There is 
losing, as we know, but there is also the transformative effect of loss and this latter cannot be 
charted or planned (Butler 2004, p.21). 
2.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have constructed a web of theories relevant to what has engaged me in the 
research material, and that supports the analytical work I do in the chapters that follow. My 
focus on the fantasy of themselves as a mother in relationship with a child, and the ways this 
is implicated in these participants’ experience of loss and potential grief has shaped the forms 
of theory with which I have engaged. Having established the ontological bases of the 
psychosocial approach I have taken in the thesis, I turn now to a discussion of the methods I 
have used to gather, record and analyze the research materials.  
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Chapter 3:  “(T)hings that slip and slide” 
Pain and pleasures, hopes and horrors, intuitions and apprehensions, losses and redemptions, 
mundanities and visions, angels and demons, things that slip and slide, or appear and disappear, 
change shape or don’t have much form at all, unpredictabilities, these are just a few of the 
phenomena that are hardly caught by social science methods. 
(Law 2004, p.2) 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I introduced my focus on fantasy—of the “sense of myself as a 
mother” and of a child—in the lives of circumstantially childless women. The data in this 
project were laced with the traces of both participants’ fantasy children, and of their potential 
maternal subjectivities.  I caught glimpses of these fantasies permeating their lives, but they 
were not always easy to identify in their talk. Identifying fantasies is a difficult business 
methodologically, and my task perhaps epitomized the kind of epistemological difficulties 
Law speaks of in the epigram to this chapter. It entailed traversing what Gordon (1997, p.24) 
described as “the always unsettled relationship between what we see and what we know”.   
Methodologies have been a central part of this project for me because, in shifting from 
counsellor to researcher, epistemological and ethical issues have come sharply into focus. The 
gap between “what we see and what we know” is understood differently in these two 
practices for example, and ways of ‘knowing’ (and of checking out tentative interpretations) 
that I use as a counsellor were unavailable or contested in the research context (Emerson & 
Frosh 2005), as I discuss further below. I often felt that I was working backwards in analysis 
of the data; moving from what I (tentatively) ‘knew’ through my encounters with participants 
to finding ways of theorizing this knowledge in social science research terms. Although 
innovative practices have opened up in the spaces created by the radical changes that feminist 
and post structural methodologies and the ‘cultural turn’ (Roseneil & Frosh 2012) more 
generally have created in research methodology and methods, within social science ‘method’ 
“still tends to summon up a relatively limited repertoire of responses” (Law 2004, p.3). Law 
(2004, p.4) argued that “while standard methods are often extremely good at what they do, 
they are badly adapted to the study of the ephemeral, the indefinite and the irregular”. He 
suggested that in order to ‘know’ these things researchers need to develop methods that are 
“unusual or unknown in social science” (2004, p.3). He proposed, for example: knowing as 
embodiment; knowing as emotionality or apprehension; knowing as situated inquiry; and 
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knowing “the indistinct and the slippery without trying to grasp and hold them tight” (2004, 
p.3).  
Some of these ways of knowing are amongst those that are developing—and being debated—
in the emerging field of psychoanalytically-informed empirical psychosocial research 
(Hollway & Jefferson 2013) which I discussed in the previous chapter, and in which I situate 
this work. In this chapter I begin by discussing the methods I used in collecting the research 
materials for the study. I go on to outline the epistemological and ethical implications of the 
psychosocial approach I take. I discuss the effectiveness and limitations of the analytical 
research strategies I used to ‘know’ the “things that slip and slide”. I pay close attention to 
these methods in this chapter because although they are conducted within a small-scale 
project and have scope for much further development and use, I consider them to be useful 
parts of the contribution this thesis makes to new knowledge. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of aspects of the research materials associated with Lynn that illustrate some of the 
key points I have made in the chapter. 
3.2 Collecting the research materials  
In designing my research strategy for this study I decided primarily to use semi-structured in-
depth individual interviews. In reviewing empirical research work using an object relations, 
psychoanalytically-informed, psychosocial methodology I saw this method of eliciting 
narratives as having the capacity for me to co-construct with participants the kinds of data that 
would best meet my research aims. I chose to complement individual interviews with group 
interviews because they have the potential to be more interactive, and to generate a different 
kind of talk. Another reason for using groups was that I was concerned about the limitations 
inherent in working on my own without the input of other researchers who would provide 
triangulation (Hollway & Jefferson 2013) in interpretation and analysis of the data. My use of 
groups was intended in part to address this concern, although not all participants were willing 
to be part of a group interview. I discuss both group and individual interviewing in more 
detail below. 
My aim in recruiting participants was to gather a range of visual and written texts that would 
address the complexities of what is in play for women who identify themselves as 
circumstantially childless. I considered that I could better meet the aims of the study through 
working in depth with the interviews and drawings associated with a small number of women 
rather than a more superficial attention to the data associated with a large number of 
participants. As a consequence of this I did not go about recruiting a larger sample of 
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participants with the goal of differentiating between the experience of different social 
groupings of women. For example, I did not make a particular attempt to find Maori women, 
although it is possible that they may have added a different cultural dimension to their 
consideration of the issues associated with circumstantial childlessness.46 
Recruiting participants 
I did not anticipate having difficulty in identifying participants, and this was my experience. 
Indeed, as people began to hear about the research informally, I had more women offering to 
take part than I needed. I recruited women in a variety of ways, as I discuss below, but this 
was only partially successful in creating diversity among the participants in terms of their 
education. Though they came from a broad range of backgrounds, most are educated to 
tertiary level and I think this created a different set of options than they might have had 
available to them if they had less education and subsequently fewer work opportunities. Nine 
of the women are not New Zealanders by birth, and three of these do not have English as their 
first language, although they are entirely fluent in it. 
In order to find participants from different areas of New Zealand respondents were recruited 
via their responses to information about the research promulgated in a variety of ways around 
the country: posters in a large government department’s head office; notices in the national 
newsletters of a fertility consumers’ support group and of the local branch of a national 
organization of counsellors; a university women’s group email list; and personal links 
between some of the women I interviewed. 47 
The study received approval from the Human Ethics Committee of the University of 
Canterbury.48 As part of the application process I stipulated that I would not interview women 
with whom I had previously worked as a counsellor because it was important that my 
different roles as a counsellor and a researcher were not confused in the relationships I had 
with participants. I initially met with three women whom I did not know well, but knew to be 
circumstantially childless, and who approached me through the university when they heard 
about my study. They in turn linked me with other women. This experience of ‘snowballing’                                                         
46 This comment is based on my experience in writing a book about women’s experience of stillbirth (Tonkin, 
1998), in which the Maori women I spoke to took a very different approach both to the experience of childbirth 
and to participating in a research project about it. The women I spoke to then identified very strongly with their 
traditional Maori cultural heritage, in which a child is considered to belong to the whole family, rather than to 
the biological parents, as usually understood in pakeha (New Zealanders of European origins) families. In the 
current project I did not ask whether or not any participants identified as Maori. Some may have done so, but 
they were not explicit about this in their interviews. A summary of participants is in Appendix 1 on p.205. 
47 Details of the information sheet are in Appendix 4 on p. 209, and of the poster in Appendix 2 on p.206 
48 See Appendix 9 on p.215. 
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was not a simple one of women passing on a name; a number of participants commented to 
me that they had friends who were only willing to see me because I they knew me to be also a 
grief counsellor and they had an expectation that I would as a consequence be “gentle” with 
difficult feelings. Some participants told me that they knew of other women who were 
unwilling to talk to me because they anticipated it would be too painful to do so. In this way, 
the very process of recruiting participants gave me information about issues of grief and 
silencing which were further elaborated in the interviews.  
In all I interviewed 29 women individually, but five did not become part of the final interview 
set of 24 women: one I used as a pilot case before finalizing my interview questions; and one 
participant did not return her transcript. Three further women were in their mid to late 50s, 
and while their interviews gave me a sense of how women who are past the point of active 
decision-making about reproduction might talk about it in reflection, I decided to limit this 
study to the experience of women for whom it is more of a present concern. The research thus 
comprises individual interviews with 24 women whose ages range from 33 to 50 and whom I 
interviewed over a period of 15 months; 14 women in Christchurch, four in Dunedin, three in 
Wellington, and three in Auckland. I interviewed most of the women in their own homes, but 
in a few cases this was not feasible, and we met in a private space that was mutually arranged. 
My analysis initially drew on the data associated with all of these participants, but in the later 
stages of analysis I narrowed my focus to a more detailed exploration of ten cases, as I discuss 
further below. 
Interviewing and transcription 
I see interviewing as a process of active engagement that is different from day-to-day 
conversation in that it is a conscious, meaning-making process in which both parties are 
“necessarily and unavoidably active” (Gubrium & Holstein 2003, p.68). These interviews 
were “guided conversations” (Cole & Knowles 2001) that also had some of the informality 
and reciprocal quality of everyday conversation about them. I understand the narrative that 
emerged to be jointly constructed in the post-structural sense that each conversation is 
necessarily a product of the unique interaction of the participants in it rather than being a 
“neutral account of a pre-existing reality” (Hollway & Jefferson 2013, p.29). 
I interviewed each participant individually for around an hour and a half to two hours. 
Consistent with an epistemology that understands the researcher’s responses as a form of 
knowing, immediately after each interview I made notes in my research journal, noting my 
reflections and responses to both the content and the process of the interview. My interview 
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practices arose out my practices as a narrative counsellor but procedurally they are close to 
the biographical-interpretative Free Association Narrative Interview (F.A.N.I.) method 
(Hollway & Jefferson 2000, 2013).49 For example, the interviews were semi-structured in that 
I had a list of areas I wanted to cover that I had developed in my initial project planning, but I 
opened them with the question “How did you see yourself in terms of having children as you 
were growing up?” This broadly articulated question was designed to convey a message that 
the kinds of responses I was interested in were those that were personal stories located in 
emotional, temporal, and social dimensions. From there I developed questions which were 
open-ended and designed to elicit a complex, nuanced story rather than a “thin, rationally 
driven account” (Hollway & Jefferson 2013, p.143). As each woman told her story, I noticed 
at what points in the narrative a certain energy was expressed—strong feelings of excitement, 
anxiety, anger or sadness for example—or there was some sort of disruption in a smoothly 
articulated story. While such energy or disruption might not tell me what is lodged in the 
story at that juncture, it usually indicates something important to the speaker. What it is may 
be something that is private knowledge that the speaker is unwilling to tell me, or it may be a 
dynamic that he or she is not yet conscious of .50 Considered in terms of matrixial theory, it 
may relate to an affect or ‘sense’ that evades available language, and does not ‘make sense’. 
Hollway and Jefferson (2013 p.157) described the F.A.N.I. method as being “most powerful 
when the research question involves understanding people’s experiences through their own 
meaning-frame and when the area that needs to be tapped to address the research question 
implicates a person’s sense of self”. 
Hollway and Jefferson (2013) write that critiques of the F.A.N.I. method as it was originally 
outlined (Hollway & Jefferson 2000) focus on a number of issues. There is a concern that in 
its interest in drawing on the psychic dimension of individuals’ lives there is a lack of 
attention to the impact of the social. The appropriateness of its focus on single case studies 
has been called into question, and the potential to over-interpret data is seen to be 
problematic. Roseneil (2010) reported a perception amongst some critics of her work that 
researchers who employ it often do not assume a critical perspective, especially in relation to 
gender and feminist issues. Thomson (2010), who was also concerned about interpretive and 
ethical issues, was critical of a lack of attention to the researcher’s own defences. In my own                                                         
49 The F.A.N.I. (The Free Association Narrative Interview) method is guided by the psychoanalytic principle of 
free association and is designed to elicit narratives that are rich in emotional meanings for participants. Freud’s 
principle of free association is based in the idea that emotional significance—both conscious and often 
unconscious—is contained in the links between one idea and the next, as they are produced in relation to 
particular audiences. 
50 Spears (2005) makes this point in relation to research in a critique of Hollway and Jefferson’s work.  
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adapted appropriation of this method I have attempted to address these concerns throughout 
the thesis.    
With ten women in Christchurch and three women in Wellington I conducted a second, 
shorter group interview of about an hour that began with a drawing exercise, as I describe 
below. The group interview took place after the individual interviews; in Wellington within 
one or two days, but in Christchurch with a gap of up to two weeks for some participants. I 
anticipate that this time difference will have changed the nature of the talk in some ways since 
some participants had longer to reflect on the issues that arose in their individual interview 
than others. Not all women were willing to be part of the group interview, and in two 
locations (Auckland and Dunedin) time and logistical constraints meant I was not able to 
conduct a group interview there. 
These group interviews were also planned to be somewhat unstructured, in the sense that I 
was willing to let the conversations run if they seemed useful in terms of the key foci for the 
study, but the discussions focused fairly closely on the questions I had planned.51 I have 
experience in working with groups dealing with sensitive topics such as this in a therapeutic 
context, and am aware of the potential they provide for people to talk about an experience in a 
different way. My work as a counsellor with circumstantially childless women had 
highlighted a sense of isolation and invisibility in their experience as a common theme. The 
aim of these interviews was to facilitate a shared discussion that generated a different kind of 
talk because it was amongst other women whom the participants knew to share their 
experience in some way, and might add a further dimension to the details of that experience.  
The groups were run in the early evening in a meeting room at the University of Canterbury 
(at Christchurch) and at the Ministry of Health (in Wellington). I welcomed the participants 
with juice and snacks. Mindful of people’s time I was firm about keeping the interviews to 
one hour. The use of group interviews and of a drawing exercise within those groups was part 
of my application for ethics approval of this research project. 
In this study I considered talking with men as well as women and I am aware that in not doing 
so I am contributing to “the great uncharted territory” of male infertility (Van Balen & Inhorn 
2002, p.19). I decided that while some men undoubtedly experience circumstantial 
childlessness, theirs is a different (though not necessarily qualitatively ‘harder’ or ‘easier’) 
experience from that of women, because they are less temporally restricted in their ability to                                                         
51 See Appendix 7 on p.213 for the sets of questions I used as a loose guide to the semi-structured individual 
interviews, and Appendix 6 on p.212 for those I used in the group interviews. 
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have children biologically than women. In her study of infertility Letherby (1999, p.361) 
focused mainly on women, writing that “there is much historical and contemporary evidence 
to suggest that motherhood is a primary role for women in a way that fatherhood is not for 
men”. For these reasons I saw a study of circumstantial childlessness in men as a separate 
study which would not be adequately addressed in this project.  
Transcription is an important opportunity to reflect on the interview and to ‘capture’ as much 
as I can of the participants’ words and non-linguistic elements of speech, but I recognize that 
transcription is itself a form of interpretation (Josselson 2004). After transcription I emailed 
the resulting text to the participants and asked them to check for any inaccuracies. Many 
emailed comments about the effects reading their interview had had on them, and some added 
a short note of something they wanted to clarify. Some women asked me to change the 
pseudonym I had ascribed to them.52 I added all of these comments at the end of their 
transcripts and included them in the analysis as an additional part of the text.  
Drawing 
I initially envisaged using the drawing exercise as a starting point for discussion between 
participants, as a useful strategy to facilitate participants being able to ‘pool’ their experiences 
as circumstantially childless women quite quickly. The exercise was very successful in these 
ways, but its usefulness as a tool for data gathering was limited because I used it as part of the 
group interview in this way. As my interest in considering non-linguistic elements of the data 
grew throughout the project, I became frustrated that I had not set up this exercise as a way of 
concluding the individual interview, because then I would have had a visual text to lay 
alongside an individual interview for every participant. There would be some possible 
disadvantages of doing it in this way; for example, in that situation there would not be a time 
gap in which participants might reflect on their experiences before drawing about them. It is 
also possible that women would make (and subsequently describe) a different drawing when 
their immediate audience was only me rather than other participants who shared a similar 
experience. However, I think these considerations would mean the drawings would have been 
different, but not necessarily less useful. 
The drawing exercise began after participants had introduced themselves in the group 
interview. I introduced the exercise very carefully, stressing that its aim was to “provide 
another way to express yourself”, that it was “not about creating great art or a ‘good’ 
drawing”. I suggested they could use colours, metaphors, stick figures, words, or whatever                                                         
52 See Chapter 4, footnote 79, on p.93. 
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they chose, and told them that at the end of the time I would ask them to show and explain 
their drawing to the group, and that no one would be able to ask them about it or make any 
comments. I asked participants to find themselves somewhere quiet to work individually, and 
to take 10-15 minutes to make a drawing “about your experience”. The title was deliberately 
broad to allow for a wide interpretation. I provided each woman with a blank white A3 piece 
of paper and a small individual pack of twelve wax crayons in a range of colours.  
I used crayons deliberately for reasons of materiality; they carried with them a number of 
messages about my expectations of the products of the exercise. Firstly, they were sharp 
enough to facilitate some detail but, in contrast with the possibilities that would have been 
available in felt tip pens or coloured pencils for example, they suggested that I was looking 
for a ‘broad brush’ response to the impulse question; a response that captured the ‘essence’ of 
what was important to them about it at the time of drawing. Secondly they were intended to 
remind participants—perhaps unconsciously—of a time in their childhood at primary school 
when drawing would have been a frequent and accepted form of expression for them. For 
many young children writing and speaking about a topic in school is anxious ‘work’, but 
drawing a picture is more relaxed and absorbing, and seldom assessed. My intention in 
evoking their childhood in this way through their bodily response to the feel and smell of the 
crayons was to encourage a kind of relaxed ‘visual musing’ that is akin to Bion’s (1962) 
notion of ‘reverie’. Of course for many adults a sense of ‘performance anxiety’ about drawing 
arises as soon as they are asked to draw, and the crayons were intended also to carry the 
reassuring message that an amateur, childlike style was acceptable in ways that ‘adult’ 
material such as paint and fine brushes may not have been.  
I consider this experiment in using participant-produced drawing to have been very 
successful, although it was on a very limited scale. Only two women clearly did not find 
drawing enjoyable or useful in expressing their experience and used their crayons rather to 
write words. I have only a relatively small number of drawings (and their ‘explanations’) but 
each has added a dimension to the interviews that I would not otherwise have accessed.  
A focus on individual cases 
The analytic chapters that follow (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) are broadly informed and illustrated by 
cross-case findings and conceptual developments made early in analysis across the whole data 
set, but their analytic weight is in the detailed focus I made on individual cases. I chose this 
research design because I wanted to home in on the complexities rather than the generalities 
of women’s experiences of circumstantial childlessness and I see this approach as having the 
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capacity to elaborate “thickly descriptive, historically and contextually sensitive narratives” 
(Frosh & Roseneil 2012, p.30). The ten cases I used were chosen for the ways in which the 
narratives or drawings illustrated or otherwise enhanced discussion of the themes of fantasy, 
loss and adaptation that are the focus of my analysis. Where possible I chose cases where I 
had access to multiple sources of research material (interviews and a drawing).53  
Critics are concerned that the focus on individuals in this kind of psychosocial research 
inevitably obscures the social context (Hollway & Jefferson 2013). Hollway and Jefferson 
have contested this, claiming rather that attention to the psycho-biographical dimension of 
individuals’ experiences of particular phenomena adds a “level of understanding impossible 
to achieve without attention to the particularity of such cases” (2013, p.146). They emphasise 
that the purpose of case studies is not to show typicality, but rather to “explore, test and refine 
theoretical ideas about the relations among our core concepts” (Hollway & Jefferson 2013, 
p.147). Similarly Gadd and Jefferson (2007, p.6) described the use of case studies as a method 
for demonstrating and explicating the complex processes involved in thinking about the 
psychosocial subject as “not only appropriate but probably unavoidable”, because, in their 
view, cases are “essential” to theory-building.  
Although using case studies makes it possible to work with the complexity of the data as it 
applies in specific cases, creating a focus on a case also inevitably involves simplifying some 
aspects of its complexity.  My intention throughout the thesis has been to contextualize the 
case as much as is possible for the reader, within the limits of brevity and clarity. 
3.3 A ‘psychoanalytically-informed’ psychosocial approach 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2013) 
In Chapter 2 I outlined the aspects of the object relations approach that inform the primary 
theoretical structure for this thesis. The psychoanalytically-informed psychosocial approach I 
have taken has informed every stage of the research process in this project. It is grounded in 
an ontology that in turn has implications for the epistemology I adopt, and the methods I use. 
Clarke (2006, p.1154) argues that it is in the development of methodological practices that a 
psychosocial approach has made its most significant contributions to social science research. 
This approach, he writes,  
                                                        
53 To clarify, the ten cases I focused on were not the same ten women who attended a group interview. Having a 
drawing and transcript from a group interview as well as an individual interview was one criterion by which I 
chose the ten cases on which I focussed more closely, but I was also looking at cases in which the individual 
interview raised issues in particular detail or that contrasted markedly with other interviews. Kelly, whose 
interview I discuss closely in Chapter 5, is an example. 
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(C)an give us clearer insight into the emotional construction of the research environment and the 
reflexivity of the researcher; the ability of research to give voice to the research subject rather than 
a dominant theoretical paradigm; and the role of the unconscious in transmitting our ethnic, 
gendered, and class identities. 
Epistemological and ethical issues 
In this project I do not pay attention to issues of ethnicity and class, but Clarke’s words point 
to other issues that are salient to the study, and it is these issues that I address in this section.54 
In the previous chapter I outlined some of the ontological tensions and debates that exist 
within psychosocial studies about the use of psychoanalytic theory and methodologies in 
social science research. Froggett and Wengraf (2004, p.95) write that psychoanalytic theory 
has the capacity to inform and enhance analysis of empirical data generated by narrative and 
biographical research for researchers who are “posing the conceptual problem of linking the 
subjective, the social and the societal”. As I discussed in Chapter 2, however, there is critical 
concern with the use of psychoanalytic concepts outside of the clinical context. These 
concerns are exemplified in the debate around the use of the researcher’s subjectivity as an 
“instrument of knowing” (Hollway 2009b, p.8, see also Jervis 2009; Elliott 2011;Walkerdine 
et al. 2001), a notion that closely relates to the idea of counter-transference; itself a contested 
term. Some analysts see counter-transference and transference as phenomena that only occur 
in the clinical context, while others relate them to Klein’s notion of ‘projective identification’, 
which she saw as being used throughout life; an unconscious process in which an individual 
splits off unwanted or feared aspects of the self and projects them into an object (often 
another person). Parker (2010), writing critically about the extrapolation of the concepts of 
transference and counter-transference outside the clinical context, distinguished different 
versions of transference in the psychoanalytic tradition; an ‘attachment’ model, which he 
contrasts with an ‘intersubjective’ one, and a Lacanian version that is concerned with 
signification. He describes the “guiding motif” of the ‘intersubjective’ version—which I draw 
on here—as an understanding that “the relational dimension of human activity also operates 
as a kind of conduit for feelings that can be accessed by partners in the relationship” (Parker 
2010, p.20).55 Writing about using these concepts in the research setting, Hoggett (2008, p. 
381) said:  
                                                        
54 Issues of ethnicity and class, and their relationship with other issues such as participants’ level and experience 
of education, are highly relevant to building a better picture of the experience of circumstantial childlessness (see 
Walkerdine et al. Chapter 8), but I made the decision that space limited me in exploring them adequately in this 
thesis. 
55 I use the term ‘intersubjectivity’ in the sense of “the unconscious flowing of mental states between one person 
and another that constantly modifies them” (Hollway 2006, p.473). 
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(C)entral to object relations, and to most other strands within psychoanalysis, is the idea that we 
communicate affectively as well as discursively, and we do this precisely because of the inherent 
limitations of language in expressing experience. In psychoanalysis, this idea is embodied in the 
notion of the transference-counter-transference. 
Epistemologically this understanding fits well with my own training (in counselling) and my 
intersubjective and trans-subjective theoretical starting points in research. I was concerned 
from the outset, however, that extrapolated to a research method it fits better for researchers 
working as part of a team that has the capacity to share their responses than it does for a sole 
researcher (Josselson 2004). For this reason, although I drew on my own responses as 
additional data, I was cautious in using my counter-transferential responses as ‘warrant’ for 
even tentative analytic interpretation, and looked to other evidence to support them. An 
example is in my individual interview with Lynn, on which I focus at the end of this chapter, 
where I had a strong feeling that there was something else that was hovering in the space 
between us but not articulated. There are many reasons why such a ‘something’ might be 
unspoken; for example it could have been something that she was unwilling to discuss 
(because I was a stranger or because of a sense of embarrassment or shame perhaps), or an 
unconscious response of which she was unaware. A central feature of Lynn’s interview was 
her sense that because she felt unable to talk about her experience socially, she had difficulty 
making meaning of it, and she asked me to recommend a counsellor who might help her with 
this.56 In the group interview, which took place a day after her individual interview, the 
sequence of her sense-making in her drawing, and her description of that—as I describe at the 
end of this chapter—suggested that my sense that there was something else, part of which was 
her loss of the pleasure she anticipated in breastfeeding her baby, had been accurate. 
Positioning myself in the research 
A feminist sensibility in research implies a recognition that researchers will always be 
“knottily entangled” with their participants and “ambiguously positioned both inside and 
outside various worlds and realities” (Burman & MacLure 2005, p.34). I am not a 
circumstantially childless woman and being a mother has been—and continues to be—a 
powerful source of identity for me. Chodorow (2003) wrote of being similarly positioned, and 
of the strong counter-transferential response she had when working as a psychoanalyst with 
women who experience deep grief and ambivalence when they find it is “too late” to have 
children. Roseneil (2006 p.865) writes that we “bring our selves to our research, and we make 
assumptions about what we study on the basis of our unique psychosocial biographies”. It was                                                         
56 I made a list of suitable counsellors available to participants as part of the ethics strategy for the study. Lynn 
was the only participant who discussed the possibility of taking this up. 
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important that I reflected on the naturalized assumption (that women might want to have 
children) that I potentially brought to this process as a mother. Recognising this and reframing 
its impact helped me to shift my thinking on this project from a presumption of grief to a 
broader focus. 
My being a mother is also implicated in my own unconscious defences and the invisible (to 
me) constraints they inevitably created at every stage of the research. This is a difficult 
problem for sole researchers in an investigation since it is in the very nature of unconscious 
defences that they are unavailable for reflective consideration. Once again, I see this as a 
limitation of working as an individual—rather than as part of a research team—in this kind of 
research model. I was fortunate that my supervisors brought a different perspective and 
experience to the project and, although this was at times challenging for me, their insights 
were a helpful counterbalance. 
My relationships with women as a counsellor provided the initial impetus to this study, and 
negotiating the shift from ‘counsellor’ to ‘researcher’ and exploring the significant differences 
and overlaps between these two subjectivities are challenges that I have worked with 
throughout it. Hollway and Jefferson (2013, p.3) wrote that “(r)esearch is only a more 
formalised and systematic way of  knowing about people, but in the process it seems to have 
lost much of the subtlety and complexity that we use (…) in everyday knowing”. The 
particular form of counselling I practice is part of my repertoire of knowing, and as a 
researcher this repertoire came into play in framing the research questions, establishing 
rapport with participants, eliciting a certain type of account from them, the reflective practices 
I engage in, the analysis and interpretation of the multiple texts associated with each 
participant, and the ethical considerations that frame the way I work. My ways of working as 
a counsellor have close links to an object relations approach, to narrative methods which 
make use of biography and life history interviews (Hollway & Jefferson 2013, 2000; Cole & 
Knowles 2001), and to drawing as a therapeutic tool.  
In making the shift from counsellor to researcher it has often felt to me that I lost much of the 
“subtlety and complexity” that Hollway and Jefferson spoke of, but it was important to 
remember the differences between the two practices, which I understood to be primarily in 
their different purposes.57 The epistemological and ontological basis for research is to 
generate new knowledge, where counselling and psychoanalysis have a therapeutic intent, and                                                         
57 There are also important differences between the practices of counselling, psychotherapy, psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis (the lines are contested and blurred, and there are also major differences 
within different counselling and psychoanalytic traditions) that I want to acknowledge here, but all are primarily 
therapeutic in their purpose.  
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are indexed to the idiosyncracies of the person seeking counselling.58 This has implications 
for their practice. For example, ethically, my warrant for exploring my clients’ responses as a 
counsellor is that this is what the client has agreed to in engaging with me; there is an 
understanding that my task is to help him or her explore the issues that bring him or her to 
counselling, that our end goal is therapeutic, and that there might be a cost in terms of 
emotional comfort in reaching that goal.  
In practice, however, I found that even the notion of purpose was called into question in the 
sense that women’s purposes for participating in the research did not clearly delineate 
between knowledge generation and therapy in this way, as mine did.  Several participants told 
me that their motivation to be interviewed was therapeutic or for the purposes of meaning-
making; a purpose which resonates with Frosh’s description of the clinical psychoanalytic 
encounter when he says that “in few other places does a person have the opportunity to 
engage in a largely uninterrupted flow of talk with an attentive listener whose role it is to try 
to understand what is being said and to help the speaker make sense of it” (2010, p.1). 
Deborah, for example, said she saw the interview as “a personal development” exercise, and 
that seeing the transcript and my interpretation of it would be “useful and interesting” for her. 
It seemed that for her and other participants the interview was understood to be a therapeutic 
opportunity (Birch & Miller 2000) because they had so few opportunities socially to explore 
their responses to their childlessness. Inevitably, “as one pronounces upon experience, so the 
experience itself must change (…) putting something into language changes it; as we speak 
something shifts” (Frosh 2007, p.641-2). Birch and Miller (2000, p.90) write that the act of 
disclosure of something “deeply personal and private” in the interview setting may prompt a 
new understanding of past events in a way that may “parallel the therapeutic encounter”, and 
conclude that researcher must consider her or his responsibilities in the co-production of 
accounts. Within the time I spent with participants during the interviews I managed this 
responsibility by drawing on my skills as a counsellor in a range of ways: to get a sense of the 
emotional impact of talking about their experiences for participants during the interview; to 
provide adequate time for participants to think about and feel their responses as they made 
them (making space for their agenda for the interview, as well as my own); and to draw the 
interview to a close in a way that did not leave them emotionally upset. Beyond the 
interviews, I provided a list of suitably qualified and experienced counsellors that participants 
could access if they wanted to explore their experiences further in a therapeutic context.                                                         
58 This is not to say that counselling and psychoanalysis do not contribute to theoretical knowledge by virtue of 
reflections on and across case studies, but this is different from a research process that is not therapeutic in its 
primary intent. 
68 
Interpretation (and overinterpretation) 
A further concern about the use of psychoanalytic concepts and practices in a research context 
relates to the issues of interpretation. Josselson (2004) distinguished between two approaches 
to the interpretation of interview data; what she referred to as the hermeneutics of restoration 
and the hermeneutics of demystification. From the point of view of the former, “we, as 
researchers, believe that the participants are telling us, as best as they are able, their sense of 
their subjective experience and meaning-making” (2004, p.5). The aim of the hermeneutics of 
restoration for the researcher is “to re-present, explore and/or understand the subjective world 
of the participants and/or the social and historical world they feel themselves to be living in”. 
In research based in a hermeneutics of restoration, attention is paid to establishing a “genuine 
personal encounter” in the interview, since through this “participants may evolve new levels 
of understanding and meaning-making about their lives, and interpretation then becomes a 
shared event” (Josselson 2004, p.7). Josselson emphasized that this is “not a self-evident set 
of processes, since grasping the multilayered subjective and intersubjective meanings of 
another person is riddled with potholes of potential misunderstanding” (2004, p.7), and it 
follows that interpretation is “not limited to direct, expressed, explicit meanings”. Ethically, 
the issues for a researcher attempting interpretation from the point of view of the 
hermeneutics of restoration revolve around faithfulness to the meanings of the participants 
and issues of confidentiality. 
In contrast, in what Josselson referred to as the hermeneutics of demystification, “experience 
is assumed not to be transparent to itself; surface appearances mask depth realities; a told 
story conceals an untold one” (Josselson 2004, p.13). The researcher’s interpretive work is  
“to tear away the masks and illusions of consciousness, to move beyond the materiality of a 
life to the underlying psychic or social processes that are its foundation”. This analytical work 
is concerned with “those aspects of self-understanding or meaning-making that operate 
outside of the participant’s awareness” and as such, encompasses the notion of the ‘defended 
subject’ I posit here. Such an analysis is attuned to the multivocality of participants’ accounts 
and the interrelationship of various ‘voices’, as I discuss in my use of the ‘Listening Guide’ 
below. Josselson (2004, p.18) writes: 
(I)nterpretive work involves paying attention to how the story is construed and how its parts are 
ordered and juxtaposed, noticing the ‘negative spaces’ of silence and omissions, and focusing on 
contradictions and inconsistencies. Analysis and interpretation involve reading ‘between the lines’ 
for indirect reference and for signs of unconscious processes. 
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Such interpretive acts are part of our everyday experiences of making sense of one another, as 
well as being a feature of more formalized contexts such as the psychoanalytic clinic. 
However, ethical issues centre around inevitable power imbalances in the research process, 
and the potential for the researcher to “see ‘underneath’ a narrative the true significance of 
what the subject is saying” (Frosh 2007, p.643). He writes that this has the potential to be 
individualizing, essentializing, pathologizing and disempowering; (…) organized around a pre-set 
discourse that imposes an expert account on the research participant in a typical (of psychoanalysis 
as well as psychology) ‘researcher knows best’ set of moves.  
(Frosh 2007, p.643) 
Arguably, few participants understand the implications of the researcher assuming 
interpretative authority with the products of their interviews. 
In this thesis, I oscillate between these two positions. Josselson (2004, p.23) suggests that a 
“true combination” is “very difficult” and must consider how conscious or unconscious 
understandings are “weighted”. But she writes that it is possible, when “the interpreter is open 
to multiple levels of interpretation with focus on both what is said and what is not said, on 
both what meanings are intended and possible unintended ones”. My position is that these two 
approaches do not necessarily negate one another; that a psychosocial interpretation of 
participants’ interviews can attempt a faithful restoration of a participant’s account and also 
consider the meanings that “lie hidden”. A psychosocial account can “add an analysis of the 
individual, unconscious motives that intersect with cultural forms” (Josselson, 2004, p.23). 
Attending to data beyond the spoken text 
It is in the context of this position that I discuss my frustration with the “sovereignty of text” 
(Hollway 2009b, p.3), particularly in this project where a significant focus is on the ways in 
which women appear to be socially and personally constrained in articulating their experience 
and desires. Conventional research has privileged the words of participants as spoken in the 
research interview or written in other forms of data as the most valid way of accessing and 
communicating knowledge about the field of enquiry (Bagnoli 2009). My interest in troubling 
the notion of participants’ words alone as indicators of authenticity or narrative authority 
(Jackson & Mazzei 2009) and in visual methods of investigation is an acknowledgement that 
“knowledge or understanding is not all reducible to language” (Eisner 2008, p.5). I argue that 
considering ‘language’ more broadly in order to include non-linguistic elements and forms of 
communication may extend the boundaries of what constitutes ‘voice’ and provide access to a 
broader range of ways of understanding the complexities of human experience.  
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I addressed this problem primarily in two ways in this research: I mined the interviews for 
more of the richness and complexity about the field of enquiry than I believed attention to the 
text alone might offer by attending to their non-linguistic elements, and I used drawing as a 
way of accessing a different kind of knowledge about circumstantial childlessness. I wanted 
to consider transcriptions of the words participants spoke in the individual and group 
interviews, the para-linguistic elements of those interviews, and participants’ drawings as all 
contributing to a range of texts that enable a more complex set of understandings of what is in 
play for participants as they think, feel, and articulate for themselves and others what it means 
to find themselves not a parent when they thought they would be one. I consider the non-
linguistic and visual data not as the ‘poor cousins’ of written words, but as significant, valid, 
useful and intriguing interview material in their own right. I elaborate these two strategies 
theoretically further in the sections that follow.  
Issues of ‘voice’ 
In this research I move beyond an understanding that language transfers meaning or ‘truth’ in 
an uncomplicated way from one individual to another, and from a conception of the ‘voice’ of 
my participants as singular, stable, transparent, and self-reflexive. I understand each woman’s 
voice to be multiple and her narratives to be context specific, layered in conscious and 
unconscious meanings, and constrained by “the exigencies of what can and cannot be told” 
(Britzman 1991, p.13). I see them as fraught with “the struggle to express meanings that are 
difficult to pin down, irreducible to one essential source, historically contingent, contextually 
bound, and socially constructed (Jackson 2003, p.704). My aim was to develop an analytic 
method that takes account of the insufficiencies of spoken language; the inevitable gap 
between what is said and what is experienced, the circumstances when participants feel 
socially constrained and so say one thing but mean another, the times when they gesture 
rather than speaking and so forth. Maggie MacLure (2009, pp.98-99) describes these as 
qualities of voice that “lie on the boundaries of language”. She has captured some of the 
conundrums of working in this way: 
(W)e need methodologies that are capable of dwelling on, and in, those very properties of voice 
that make it such troublesome material for research. I have in mind a kind of ‘voice research’ that 
would attend to such features as laughter, mimicry, mockery, silence, stuttering, tears, slyness, 
shyness, shouts, jokes, lies, irrelevance, partiality, inconsistency, self-doubt, masks, false starts, 
false ‘fronts’ and faulty memories—not as impediments or lapses to be corrected, mastered, read 
‘through’ or written off, but as perplexing resources for the achievement of a dissembling, 
‘authentic’ voice. 
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MacLure’s challenge raises some of the problems for researchers who interrogate voice as I 
did. In attending to paralinguistic elements in this way, my intention was not privilege these 
elements over what is articulated in speech, but rather to add another dimension to my 
attention to the spoken words; as Lisa Mazzei (2009, p.46) writes, “to be faithful to the 
competing voices that are present towards a more complete, more nuanced, more complicated 
hearing of an impossibly full voice”.  
In analyzing participants’ narratives then, in addition to what is said, my interest has focused 
on the things that appear to be difficult to say, that cannot be articulated in speech, or are 
socially forbidden or disciplined in some way. I have looked at how these things might 
instead be articulated through para-linguistic means such as crying or tears, stuttering in 
otherwise smooth speech, unexpected links in the narrative, silences and pauses, change of the 
tone of voice, and jokes, for example. The moments in which these paralinguistic elements 
are marked might be seen as possible indicators of areas where unconscious and conscious 
conflicts or areas of ambivalence ‘leak’ into the carefully maintained personal and public 
image a respondent has constructed of and for herself; they “make visible otherwise invisible 
internal states” (Hollway & Jefferson 2005, p.151). This is particularly important in a context 
where a woman might judge her private thoughts and feelings to be at odds with what she 
perceives to be socially legitimate. At times where they were unable to symbolize something 
in words, or felt constrained in doing so, participants struggled to articulate the chaotic 
complexities, the inconsistencies, the contradictions, and the messiness of their experience, 
but I consider that struggle itself and the places in which it occurs to be a resource for 
analysis.  
A symphonic score 
In order to have robust protocols for systematically recording and identifying various para-
linguistic elements I developed a notation system, based on Bollas’s (2007) notion of a 
symphonic score, which “imaginatively graphs” the complexity of the unconscious to record 
these.59 Along with the category of language (what is said), he proposed that attention should 
be paid to the sonic dimension (how it is said); to elements such as timbre, pitch, volume and 
so forth. In discussing this notion, Bollas clarified that he intended the image to be used 
metaphorically rather than as an analytical tool in a clinical context, and I used it in a research 
context in the same spirit; as a useful way to structure my listening. Understanding silence as 
performative (MacLure et al., 2010), I paid attention to the times and ways that women                                                         
59 See Appendix 5 on p.211. 
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appeared to silence themselves. I paid attention as much to the how and when as to the what 
women were saying: having told me that they planned to have a child or children, for 
example, how did women talk about, or struggle to talk about not having done that? When 
were their narratives disrupted and what might that tell me about the social imperatives that 
surround this phenomenon or about the conscious and unconscious ideological conflicts a 
woman might be struggling with?  
Using visual methods 
My second strategy for moving beyond the limitations of spoken language was to use drawing 
as a participatory experience whose purpose is both to record and to generate understanding. 
Drawings are both visual products and also a process of meaning making; both a noun and a 
verb (Guilleman 2004, p.274). I include visual artefacts as forms of data in this study on the 
epistemological premise that there are “multiple forms of knowing” (Eisner 2008, p.5) and 
that these different forms in turn make possible different forms of representation. This 
premise has grown out of the “deliteralization of knowledge” (Eisner 2008, p.5) in which 
there is a greater recognition of the ways the social and the linguistic are closely connected 
and shape one another (Kress 2001). Kress (2001, pp.67-68) argues that representation—“the 
making of meaning”—happens at all levels. He calls for a “multimodality” that recognises 
that “communication and representation always draw on a multiplicity of semiotic modes of 
which [spoken] language may be one”.  
There are several ways in which drawing offers a rich complement to spoken-language-based 
methods. In drawing about something—in thinking about it in visual rather than linguistic 
terms—people are sometimes able to access and express another dimension of their 
experience that is difficult to put into words; “the ineffable, the elusive, the not-yet-thought-
through” (Weber & Mitchell 1995, p.5). Kress (2001, p.71) explained this accessibility in 
terms of the differing style of logic required: 
(T)he mode of the visual makes possible forms of representing which are not available to the mode 
of writing, and vice versa. The visual is founded on the logic of display in space, on the 
simultaneous presence of elements represented as standing in specific relations to each other. The 
written (and the spoken much more so) is founded on the logic of succession in time, and on the 
sequential unfolding of events. 
Gauntlett (2007, p.126) wrote that in this way drawing allows participants to “circumvent the 
inherent linear mode of speech” whereby one thing leads to another, and present a set of ideas 
“all in one go”. I have noticed that the products, and their engagement in the process of 
drawing, quite often surprise people and it seems possible that they are more easily—or 
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maybe differently—able to represent the relationships between complex emotions, events, 
relationships and metaphors for their experience holistically in a drawing. Eisner (2008, p.7) 
wrote that this is because “forms of feeling and forms of discursive expression are logically 
incommensurate”. 
Creative methods offer people the possibility of communicating abstract concepts such as 
identity and emotions because spending time in the reflective process of making something—
in this case a drawing—gives them the opportunity to consider what is particularly important 
to them before they generate speech about it (Gauntlett 2007). When this is followed by their 
own description of their drawing, it seems as if participants are then able to ‘translate’ this 
dimension into words that are recorded, and the pictures become visual data alongside the 
textual data that emerges as transcriptions from the recordings.  
Lastly, it seems that the process of drawing often helps people to access and articulate a 
clarity about complex issues. Kearney and Hyle (2004) used participant-produced drawings in 
a small scale study to examine the emotional impact of change on individuals in a tertiary 
institution. They found that drawing helped eight out of nine of their participants to access 
what they (the participants) described as the “heart” or “core” of their experience and to 
express it succinctly. I illustrate all three of these dimensions in my discussion of Lynn’s 
research materials at the end of this chapter. 
3.5 Analysing the texts 
Analysis of the various texts produced was an iterative process where I used a number of 
linked methods as lenses to focus in different ways on the research questions. I moved from a 
‘broad brush’ approach across the whole data set towards an in-depth interpretative analysis 
of individual women’s cases. My aim was to layer a number of texts generated from each 
participant along side one another.60  
Thematic analysis 
I analyzed the spoken texts initially thematically across the entire data set. A thematic 
analysis has the flexibility to be applied across a range of theoretical approaches (Braun & 
Clarke 2006). Because there has been little written about this particular form of childlessness,                                                         
60 Where participants had been part of a group interview as well as an individual interview five texts were 
available to me: transcripts from an individual interview and a group interview, their drawing, their description 
and discussion of their drawing, and my own field notes related to them as I worked through the research 
process. For those participants who had not been part of a group interview I was limited to two texts: the 
transcript of the interview (and any subsequent email correspondence) and my field notes. 
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my aim at this first stage of analysis was to develop such an account across the entire data set, 
rather than a detailed account of any particular theme or themes. I wanted to familiarize 
myself further with it as a whole, to identify patterns of relationships between important and 
predominant themes, and to make a rich description of the research materials, leaving a 
detailed account of particular aspects to the later case study analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) 
write that thematic analysis is a useful tool to do this, and to summarize key features of a 
body of data in this way.  
As this is an exploratory project I was keen to organise what felt initially to be a large volume 
of unstructured data. I used NVivo to code the entire (non visual) dataset systematically, 
identifying predominant themes within the data, and developing coding categories as I 
worked through them.61 At this initial stage it was my intention to code for themes within the 
“surface meanings” (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.84) of the transcripts, rather than looking for 
latent themes that I might begin to theorize as underlying the explicit content of the data. In 
identifying themes I tried to balance a recognition of my shaping role as researcher in coding 
for themes which I saw as relevant to the research questions and the possibility of identifying 
categories or patterns that I had not anticipated; a process that began earlier during the process 
of gathering the texts. I found NVivo coding to be useful in ordering the data but a very 
‘blunt’ tool that highlighted the inadequacies of language to capture the finer nuances of 
women’s words. For example, a number of women spoke about the idea of ‘settling down’, 
but they did so in different ways. For Connie “settled” was something one is (or is not). For 
her it was an adjective, a new way of being Connie in the world; she spoke of herself as 
potentially having a baby and taking on a new identity as a “settled” woman. In contrast, for 
Deborah “settled” was a verb, and being settled is something one does. She spoke of herself 
as continuing to be the same person, but one who was doing something different. The 
difference has important implications for the ways women conceptualize the changes that a 
potential identity as a mother might bring to them; whether they see themselves as 
‘sacrificing’ their previous identity or adding to it.  
Narrative Analysis 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p.97) write that one of the limitations of thematic analysis is that the 
researcher is unable to retain “a sense of continuity and contradiction” when working with 
individual accounts. There was a strong temporal thread running through participants’ stories 
and I wanted to find a way to maintain this since it also contextualized other key issues such                                                         
61 See Coding categories in Appendix 3 on p.207. 
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as grief. I wanted to capture something of the contradictions and complexities of women’s 
stories that I had elicited in the interviews and that were often narratively framed in the 
research data. Through the thematic analysis I identified three key interwoven threads to 
explore in greater depth over a smaller number of cases: choice, fantasy, and loss/grieving. A 
narrative analysis made it possible for me to privilege women’s meaning-making in their own 
words, and in the context of their whole account, without losing sight of the social contexts in 
which they were embedded (Emerson & Frosh 2005).  
The ‘Listening Guide’ 
In order to structure my analysis of the individual cases I intended to focus on each 
transcript—and sometimes drawing—more closely and to analyze the interviews narratively 
(Hollway & Jefferson 2013; 2000; Cole & Knowles 2001), I developed a modified version of 
the ‘Listening Guide’ (Doucet & Mauthner N.S. 2008; Gilligan et al. 2005; Mauthner N. & 
Doucet 2003; Brown & Gilligan 1992). Although this method was not initially designed for 
psychosocial research informed by psychoanalysis, it is a flexible and adaptable approach 
(Mauthner 2009) which is grounded in a relational ontology that sees individuals as being 
“embedded in a complex web of intimate and larger social relations” (Mauthner & Doucet 
1998, p.125).  The process is very time intensive and, given the constraints of my study, I 
decided to focus on ten cases which either exemplified or offered a markedly contrasting 
perspective to these themes for further in depth analysis.  
The ‘Listening Guide’ method takes a structured and methodical approach and entails formal, 
systematic, iterative readings of the texts, focusing on a different ‘layer’ each time (Mauthner 
2009). I used four readings; in the first I took Doucet and Mauthner’s (2008, p.405) lead and 
“combined the basic grounded theory question ‘What is happening here?’ (Charmaz 2006)” 
with elements from narrative analysis (recurring words, chronology of events, protagonists, 
plot, and so forth).  My second reading paid attention to the ‘I’ of both the participant and me 
as researcher; in particular I recorded the shifts the participant made between “I”, “you”, and 
“we”, and the ways in which she appeared to claim or distance herself somewhat from aspects 
of her ‘self’. Thirdly I read for the ‘voices’ of the protagonists of each narrative; for the social 
networks and close relationships between individuals and with ‘fantasy’ individuals. Lastly I 
read for the non-linguistic elements of the data in the ways that I have previously described. 
A short section from my interview with Kelly illustrates how these readings work together to 
open up the nuances and complexity of participants’ account. Kelly told me that her partner 
already had two children and was unwilling to have any more because it “wouldn’t be fair to 
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them”. Kelly emphasized that this was a logical decision, and that although she had found this 
difficult to accept at times in the past, she now said, “Now it’s more, um, being thankful for 
what I do have. Um, yeah”. However, as an apparently flippant afterword she added, “(i)t 
could change overnight if he was to wake up tomorrow morning and say that he wanted a 
child”. When I asked her how she anticipated she would feel if that happened she said, “[big 
breath in] Um. All of the emotions, I think I’d have all of them. I, I, you know obviously I’d 
be quite elated, but I’d also be very scared and apprehensive”.  
Lois: So where would the elation come from Kelly? 
Kelly: Um [pause] yeah, the, the, I guess those feelings that I’ve been [pause] suppressing or 
putting to aside. The feelings like wow, yeah, I would actually get to be a Mum [pause].Yeah, 
yeah. Yep [pause] mmm [long pause]. I think that probably would be [pause] yeah [pause] it, it 
certainly um [long pause] yeah [pause] it certainly would be there. Yeah, I haven’t [pause] doused 
that flame entirely. But yeah, I would still have those feelings.  
Lois: Is that the process you see, that you’ve gone through a process of kind of rationally thinking 
this through and, sort of dousing the little flames that flicker up as they come? 
Kelly: Mmm. Mm I think that probably is it. Because I am the sort to be reasonably practical in the 
sense that, if you, if you dwell on something or if you wish for something that has, that, is not 
going to happen or whatever, that you end up digging yourself into just a big hole of depression 
and it’s just, it’s just not worth it. It’s not worth putting that sort of pressure on yourself. 
From the first reading for the “I” in the narrative I developed a brief synopsis of the ‘plot’ of 
her story. This segment fits within the whole as a moment where her narrative—while often 
contradictory but nevertheless delivered smoothly and fluently throughout—faltered 
markedly. In this segment she spoke as “I” until she shifted in the last paragraph (at the 
repeated “if you, if you …”) to refer to herself as “you” with an almost admonitory tone. I 
noticed the tenor and content of the competing ‘voices’ that these changes in pronoun suggest, 
and what that might tell me about the conflicts that her relationships with both other people 
and internalized others in her life create. In considering my own ‘I’, I read for my place in 
relation to the participant in the sense of audiencing, considering my own stance and the 
implications of this for the encounter, what attitude towards her situation Kelly might be 
taking for me, and what that might tell me about her perception of other social ‘others’ to it. 
Her earlier big breath in, her pauses and repetitions (especially of “certainly”) suggested a 
powerful emotional exception to her otherwise measured tone that, taken along with other 
parts of her interview, underlined the conflicting feelings she has about her biological 
childlessness and the responses of others around her to it.62                                                         
62 I analyze this segment of Kelly’s interview further in Chapter 5, p.126 
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Drawing analysis 
I have noted that social science research methods have traditionally privileged spoken and 
written words as the objects of analysis. Kress (2001, p.72) argued that modes of 
communication generally are changing; that “modes of language as writing, and of image are 
newly coming into contestation”.  The visual world of the participants of this research is 
saturated in images, and although they may be unskilled as artists, they draw on a huge 
repertoire of genres and socially available images to construct their meanings. Critics of using 
the process of drawing in a research context are concerned that there is no shared language of 
images as there is (presumed to be) of spoken language sources. I contest this, and argue 
rather that participants generally draw on a set of simple images and styles that do generate an 
easily recognizable shared meaning. The common usage of stick figures and emoticons is a 
good example, as is the idea that red and black together are ‘angry’ colours (see Gina’s 
drawing on p.94). 
When considering how I might analyze the drawings, a semiotic analysis would have been an 
obvious option since semiology is centrally concerned with the social effects of meanings 
such as these. Rose (2007, p.75) writes that a semiological analysis “entails the deployment of 
a highly refined set of concepts which produce detailed accounts of the exact ways the 
meanings of an image are produced through that image”. However, she is concerned about the 
methodological limitations of semiotics, suggesting that it is “conceptually elaborate” and 
“there is a tendency for each semiological study to invent its own analytical terms” (Rose 
2007, p.78).  
I chose instead to use a modified version of Rose’s (2007) analytical methodology, paying 
attention particularly to production, content and composition of the drawing. I understand all 
images to be “vocative” (Riley 2004); that is they address the viewer and the viewer is 
positioned by them (Rose, 2007). Rose (2007, pp.12-13) identified three sites at which the 
meanings of images are made: the site of production, that of the image or object itself, and 
that of its audiencing (Rose 2007, pp. 257-8). These three sites can be further understood in 
terms of technological, compositional and social modalities. In the participant-produced 
method I used, I was able to largely control elements such as the technological aspects of the 
production of the image (by limiting the media available) and audiencing (by setting limits on 
how the drawings were shown and discussed).  
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3.6 Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter with some brief excerpts from the data associated with Lynn to 
illustrate the strengths and limitations of the methods I chose, and the ways in which they 
complement one another.   
Lynn 
Lynn was a 39 year old woman who had recently married a man who was unable and 
unwilling to have children. Her drawing demonstrated well the ways visual methods 
complement written (spoken) data.  
 
Figure 1: Lynn’s Drawing 
In describing her drawing to the participants in the group interview, Lynn first explained the 
small figures, which represented aspects of her past and of her present and imagined future 
life with her husband, much as she had previously described them in her individual interview 
with me. At the end she spoke about the larger images that dominated the drawing: 
(A)nd then I sort of put some big breasts over the whole thing [little laugh] because what I always 
have in [pause] because I, if I really try to feel [pause] feel not having a child I think I get left with, 
I do have quite deep feelings of, of having missed the opportunity to nurture, and I still [pause], I 
still would like that experience of a baby suckling on my nipple and I, [pause] I, yeah I feel it quite 
physically, the [pause] that [pause] I sort of think of it as a loss or something like that. 
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Lynn’s individual interview was one where she spoke happily about her relationship and 
somewhat more tentatively about plans for the future, a future whose happiness was 
contingent on her husband and their life together.63 Even though she spoke positively about 
how happy she was in the past two years since her relationship began, grief and loss run as a 
leitmotif through the interview as something she had not had the chance to make sense of. 64 
In her drawing this came into sharper focus. She repeated the narrative of the interview—the 
happy future with her husband, the isolation from other people, the previous lives and roles 
she had lived—“and then” “over the whole thing” she drew some “big breasts”. She began to 
say “what I always have in [mind?],” and moved instead to her feelings; “if I really try to 
feel”. “What I am left with” has the ring of the irreducible about it; that in her attempts to 
make sense of it all, to think her way through it and try to work out what it is that continued to 
trouble her about it, if she really tried she was “left” with “quite deep feelings” of having lost 
“the opportunity to nurture”. It seems for her that nurturing was embodied in the act of 
breastfeeding, but she did not simply say “breastfeeding”; it was not just the act of nurturing 
through the provision of milk that she longed for.65 Instead she chose words that are rich in 
considered detail and evocative of a sensual experience of an intimate relationship between 
her and a baby: “I still would like that experience of a baby suckling on my nipple”. The 
power of this image for her was shown in the symbol she chose to express it in her drawing. 
Unlike most of the other women who used stick figures to represent themselves, in Lynn’s 
drawing it is not the figure that represents her that is centred on the page. Instead the two 
huge, full pink breasts with detailed nipples are perfectly centred, dwarfing all the rest of the 
figures on the page. That missed experience was something she “feels quite physically”, but 
she had difficulty naming it; “a loss or something like that”. 
When she “put some big breasts over the whole thing” Lynn was able to present both the 
content of her individual interview and another, powerful dimension of this experience as 
existing simultaneously, and to use composition and relative size to evoke relevance for her. 
The viewer relates differently to the small figures—which all appear to be walking away—
than to the breasts, which belong to a woman who faces slightly obliquely, but still directly 
out to the viewer; almost intimately close. The drawing, and her description of it (‘I feel it 
quite physically’), suggest the extent to which the fantasy of her potential maternal                                                         
63 I analyze this segment of Lynn’s research materials more fully in Chapter 6, p.175) 
64 In Chapter 6 I discuss this not-making-sense in participants’ data as a possible expression of the matrixial 
dimension of their lives. 
65 Lynn’s drawing has a powerful symbolization if looked at through the lens of Kleinian object relations theory. 
Klein (1956/1986, p.215) wrote that “the breast in its good aspects is the prototype of maternal goodness and 
generosity, as well as creativeness. All this is felt by the infant in much more primitive ways than language can 
express it”. 
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subjectivity, while not an embodied fantasy, is rather a fantasy of embodiment, in a way her 
spoken language in the interview had not conveyed. She described the making of the drawing 
in a sequential way (“and then”). This suggests that it may for her have been a process of 
meaning-making; a realization that the loss of the opportunity to experience nurturing through 
breastfeeding for her was the “core” of her experience. In terms of composition, her “big 
breasts”—contrasting with the tiny figures of the rest of the drawing and placed in the very 
centre of her picture—suggested the way in which this fantasy of embodiment was indeed 
“over the whole thing” for her.  
Lynn’s research materials are an example of the way my research strategy of using both 
individual and group interviews gave an added dimension to this study. It seems likely that 
the different form of expression available to her in drawing— rather than speech—made it 
possible for her to introduce this dimension. Given the vocative quality of images (Riley 
2004) however, it may be that she used this opportunity of being among others in a similar 
situation to explore this dimension of her experience in a way that would not have been 
possible in an individual interview with me. 
An extract from her individual interview illustrates both the advantages and limitations of the 
method I devised to pay attention to non-linguistic elements.  In it Lynn talked about a feeling 
of loss that she felt about not having had a child, particularly when she was around her 
husband’s family. 
Lynn: And feeling this absence of children [pause] in the family, there are no children in the 
family. And [pause] yeah [pause] umm [pause]. And his, his mother’s [pause] kind of very umm, 
reluctant admittance how much she’d love to have a grandchild and [pause] umm, [pause]. My 
husband’s quite a lot older than me, and feelings of I suppose, wanting to [pause] to have a, a, a 
little [pause and a small nervous laugh] umm [pause] him, in a way. [shaky voice] 
Lois: To continue on? 
Lynn: [immediately] Yeah, yeah in a way, so I have those sorts of feelings [pause] mmm. 
The notation system I devised meant that I could record and compare elements such as sighs, 
gasps and repetitions across the entire dataset.  I was most interested however, in the patterns 
they made across each individual interview, and the times in which they occurred in relation 
to the story that was being told. For example, throughout her interview, Lynn used a small 
self-deprecating laugh at times in the interview when she was discussing issues about which 
she said she was concerned with other people’s responses (having had two abortions for 
example). The pattern that arose is that for Lynn, a particular small laugh appeared to be used 
to soften the impact of her words for me, her audience; to make them a little more 
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‘acceptable’. When she laughed in this way at her suggestion that having a child would give 
her a “little him” her laugh, pauses (in otherwise smooth uninterrupted speech) and repetition 
of “a, a, a” suggested that she felt uncomfortable about saying this. While I cannot know what 
is lodged in this discomfort, taken along with her tearful voice there is evidence that this idea 
has a strong emotional impact for her. I learn something of the ways in which Lynn 
experienced circumstantial childlessness as a loss and the judgment she anticipated to that 
loss by looking at the patterns of where and how these moments of impact occur in her 
interview. Taken together the data emphasized the privately held nature of these responses to 
circumstantial childlessness, and the perceived social inhibitions that support this. 
This extract of Lynn’s narrative represents a time when she is not retelling a familiar story, as 
she is elsewhere in the interview, but rather making meaning for herself (and me) of her 
experiences of circumstantial childlessness, within our encounter. There is a strong sense of 
the relational in both her drawing (and its description) and the interview segment. For Lynn in 
these segments, the ‘negative space’ of her absent child is filled with powerful presences: a 
transformation to her husband’s family; a  longed-for grandchild for her mother-in-law; the 
intense sensual pleasure of nurturing through suckling a baby at her breast; and a way to 
perpetuate something of a loved husband on into her life after his death. Read in the context 
of the whole of her interview, it stands out as exemplifying the contradictions and conflicts 
this experience creates for her. 
In this chapter I have discussed the methodology I have chosen and the methods I have 
developed to investigate the relationship between fantasy, loss and grieving in these 
participants’ experiences of circumstantial childlessness.  I discussed how I have paid 
particular attention to finding ways to capture the “things that slip and slide” in these 
participants’ accounts. These are things that are difficult to think and articulate; they are often 
unconscious and sometimes socially unspeakable. Frequently they were related to the 
evanescent quality of these womens’ fantasies of maternity and a child, and it is to these that I 
turn first in the three analytic chapters that follow.  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Chapter 4: Maternal fantasies and the ‘absent 
presence’ of unborn children  
People romance about their children long before they are born–long before and long after. They 
name them and rename them. They see them as their second chances, ‘a chance to get it right this 
time’, as if they were able to give birth to themselves. (…) Motives are seldom simple and never 
pure. 
(Mantell 2003, p.228) 
4.1 Introduction  
“The sense of myself as a mother” 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis I focused on an extract from Deborah’s individual 
interview in which she spoke about her difficulty in relinquishing “the sense of myself as a 
mother”. Her use of a present tense (as opposed to a past perfect one, conditional on her 
having had a child; the “sense of how I might have been as a mother”) suggests that in some 
way Deborah experienced herself to be already a mother. She spoke about her realization that, 
since she would not now embody her maternity, she needed in some way to abandon that 
aspect of herself.  
Deborah’s “sense” makes no sense logically—Deborah does not have children biologically or 
socially—but her words were unequivocal, so how might they be interpreted? Quite by 
accident, I encountered further data that illuminated this question. Some two thirds into the 
project I wrote a paper (Tonkin 2012) that addressed the ‘haunted’ quality of the relationships 
participants had with their unborn child. I quoted Deborah in it, and since she had requested 
that I send her anything published out of the research, I sent her a copy of the article. She 
replied:  
I do feel the paper gives voice to something I feel. I read it with gentle tears. I can hear the voices 
of Alisdair James and Elinor Elizabeth too, as though they are ‘down the back’ (the term we used at 
home when I was a child to mean playing on the farm somewhere distant from the house but never 
far enough away we couldn’t hear the cowbell signalling it was time to come home for a meal or 
some other reason). We didn’t ever name my ghost children in the interview; like other women I do 
name my unborn children too. 
Deborah’s response said a lot about the nature of the ‘absent presence’ of her fantasy children 
in her life. These children whose voices she ‘hears’ had names that appeared to be carefully 
chosen, but in giving permission for me to use them, Deborah explained that they would not 
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be identifiable since they “are personal to me (no one else, not even my husband, knows 
them)”, highlighting the very private, often secret nature of these relationships.  She added:  
(I)n some ways using the names gives my ‘down the back’ children a validity or reality I’m pleased 
to gift them (and myself). […] I realise that I continue to ‘mother’ Alisdair and Elinor because I 
give them life in my head. As I age I seem to think of them less often but some events certainly 
bring them back into a ‘ghostly’ (in the sense of ‘hazy’) focus–and interestingly it is more their 
voices than a visual picture of them.  
For Deborah, my use of the names of what she refers to as her  “unborn children” gave a 
“validity or reality” that they had previously lacked when they existed only in the privacy of 
her imagination; it suggests that for her, these imagined children who already had an 
existence “in my head” were called into a further existence as part of the social world by my 
naming them in this thesis. Perceiving this as a “gift” that she and I could give them is 
reminiscent of the idea of ‘giving birth’, and she underlined this by speaking of giving them 
life. Although she could not give these imagined children life through giving physical birth to 
them as embodied infants, she nevertheless appeared to understand herself to have given them 
a continuing life by creating them in her fantasy, and maintaining their existence in her 
thoughts. She saw it as a gift to her “unborn children” to make them more real in this way, 
and to herself to honour the maternal subjectivity she claimed in continuing to “mother them”.  
Although she was ‘childless’, Deborah perceived herself to be in some sense a mother with a 
relationship to the children of her fantasy.   
Her use of the words “down the back” elaborated this fantasy powerfully in several ways. She 
positioned her fantasy children within her broader family through reference to a term whose 
relevance and meaning everyone in her family would apparently understand. In this way, she 
highlighted the existence of the children within her own locus of belonging in her family of 
origin; for her they were part of her family culture. For Deborah, the term suggests that, even 
if others in her family did not know of the ‘existence’ of Alisdair and Elinor, her fantasy 
children were not only hers, but also members of her wider family; for her they too had a 
claim on the meanings of “down the back” for that family, just as her embodied nieces or 
nephews do, even if no one else in the family knew of their existence.  
“Down the back” gave a sense of ‘where’ her unborn children ‘are’ spatially for Deborah; it is 
a term that evoked a place that was always intimately connected to “home” and to the day-to-
day events of the family, and yet at the same time was distant and unseen (though within 
earshot). One senses that in Deborah’s family, “down the back” was a place where the 
children were understood to be mostly happily and safely engaged in playing together while 
their parents were busy with the other parts of their life. In envisaging her fantasy children in 
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this place, Deborah elaborated her “sense” of how her children ‘exist’ in relationship to her; 
co-existent with her life, unseen, but ‘heard’, distant but safely within the bounds of the 
intimacies and sense of belonging of “at home”.  
Lastly, in her shift from “I” to “we” (“we used at home”) Deborah moved viewpoints; from 
positioning herself as a child playing with her siblings “down the back” to her mother’s 
viewpoint of summoning the children “home for a meal”.66 As I noted in Chapter 2, Hollway 
(2009a, p.3) uses the term “generational pivot” to describe the process whereby new mothers 
are able to draw on experiences in their own infanthood and in this identification, relate “both 
with their mothers (as babies) and their babies (as mothers)”.  This process relates to what 
Bollas (1987, p.2) termed the “idiom of care” and which might be understood to mean care, 
not just of the infant but of the older child as well. It is through this shift of viewpoints that 
Deborah was able to position herself both as a mother (to her fantasy children) and as a child 
(to her embodied mother). 
In this chapter I develop this notion of a fantasy dimension to ‘mother’ through analysis of the 
ways it manifests itself in the narratives and drawings of the circumstantially childless women 
in this study. I begin with a general discussion of fantasies of maternity and of children that 
draws on research material from all the participants. In the second part of the chapter I engage 
in a detailed study of the five texts associated with Maree who was the youngest participant, 
and who—as far as she knew—still had the potential to have a child.67 Through this 
discussion, I indicate how her story captures some of the key elements of the complex 
relationship between these maternal fantasies and the dominant contradictory narratives of 
female identity in relation to mothering and motherhood. Finally, I conclude with a theoretical 
discussion of the issues raised. 
4.2 Fantasy: a fourth dimension to ‘mother’ 
I introduced this chapter with an unexpected glimpse of Deborah’s fantasy of maternity and 
children because it exemplified several qualities of these fantasies that were apparent across 
the research material: they were intense, detailed, extremely private and often secret, 
appearing almost by accident, and often very strongly ‘present’ in the interviews but 
ephemeral and slippery in analysis. Conceiving of Deborah as already in some “sense” a 
mother requires a specific understanding of ‘fantasy’. Rather than the popular understanding                                                         
66 Of course it is possible that it was her father, not her mother that summoned her in this way, but other sections 
of Deborah’s interview suggested that her parents largely operated within traditional gender roles. 
67 Maree took part in both an individual and group interview, completed a drawing and described her drawing.   
My case notes make the fifth element of the data associated with her. 
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of fantasy as “what you get up to when the surveying mind and surveying society are both 
looking the other way” (Rose 1996, p.2), it entails one that holds it to have a powerful reality 
which Jacqueline Rose (1996, p.3) writes is not “antagonistic to social reality” but rather is 
“its precondition or psychic glue”, and which encompasses both unconscious and conscious 
processes. Stone (2012, p. 28) articulates this understanding of fantasy in this way: 
Our lives are structured by ingrained webs of fantasizing and wishing, so ingrained that we 
scarcely notice them, although they saturate how we perceive, act, and relate to others. 
While Stone’s description gives a good sense of the ways in which fantasy permeates our 
lives, it glosses over the nuances of “fantasizing” in its emphasis on “wishing”. The 
understanding of fantasy that I propose here is broad enough to encompass a number of 
overlapping dimensions: unconscious fantasy (which includes primal fantasy), fantasy in the 
sense of creative ‘imagining’ in a way that relates to Winnicott’s concept of ‘transitional 
phenomena’ and ‘transitional space’, and his use of ‘fantasying’.68 For example, Deborah’s 
talk of her fantasy of Elinor and Alisdair describes her consciously experienced “imaginative 
exploration of the world” (Winnicott 1971, p.27), and also takes in the unconscious mesh of 
fantasies that have developed out of her relationships (particularly with her mother). Much of 
this latter material is by its very nature inaccessible to her in symbolized form.  
There appears to be a dimension of fantasy that women are previously unaware of, but which 
becomes available to conscious reflection through exploring the issues of circumstantial 
childlessness as part of the research process. Deborah’s “sense” of herself as a mother may 
have been part of this process of incipient awareness, since she wrote about it after taking part 
in the interview, reflecting on her transcript, and reading my published work which analyzed 
an aspect of it.69 70 I relate this possibility to Winnicott’s notion of a ‘transitional space’ and 
‘transitional phenomena’, which he theorized provided a “bridge between inner and outer 
worlds” (Phillips 2007, p.114).71 It may be that Deborah’s interactions with me in the context 
of research were able to function at times as a transitional space for collaborative exchange in 
a way that resonates with (but is not the same as) the way Winnicott understood the clinical                                                         
68 For a more full explanation of my use of these terms see Chapter 2, p.30. 
69 I discuss the ways in which women talk about a social invisibility about the experience of circumstantial 
childlessness inhibiting their understanding and exploration of it in their own lives in Chapter 5. Other writers 
(e.g. Birch & Miller 2000) have written about the therapeutic potential that participating in research might 
provide for individuals. While this is a very different process from psychotherapy, it nevertheless provides an 
opportunity and an audience to explore aspects of their experience through narrating it in a different way. One of 
the participants in this project (herself both a researcher and a counsellor) referred to her interviews as “free 
counselling”. 
70 Further email correspondence with Deborah adds weight to this analysis, as I explain in Chapter 7.  
71 I discuss Winnicott’s concept of the ‘transitional space’ in Chapter 2, p.30. 
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psychoanalytic setting to do. Winnicott (1971, p. 2, italics in original) wrote that the 
transitional space in which children play and adults talk is: 
an intermediate area of experiencing to which inner reality and external life both contribute [which 
exists as] a resting place for the individual engaged in the perpetual task of keeping inner and outer 
reality separate yet inter-related. 
As well as a reconsideration of ‘fantasy’, a shift in understanding meanings of ‘mother’ is also 
necessary. In a consideration of the biological, psychological, cultural and sociological 
implications of new reproductive technologies, Welldon (2006, p.70) writes “(w)e have to 
adjust our understanding of ‘mother’ to cover three distinct categories–genetic, gestational, 
and carer”.72 I propose ‘fantasy’ to be a further dimension to this understanding. Just as a 
woman becomes a mother through having a child, so this fantasy of maternity becomes 
possible because of the relationship, in fantasy, to a child or children. Understanding ‘mother’ 
in this way entails a shift whereby maternity is not exclusively indexed to the embodied 
existence of a child, and a woman therefore either ‘is’ or ‘is-not’ a (biological or social) 
mother. This is not to say that I am suggesting that all women ‘are’ mothers if they imagine 
themselves to be, but rather to acknowledge that women’s conscious and unconscious 
fantasies of maternity and a child or children have a powerful significance—a further 
reality—that is a precondition of the social reality of a maternal identity, that shapes their 
experiences of maternity if they go on to have a child, and that has the potential to create 
material and emotional effects in their lives even before they become mothers in genetic, 
gestational or care-giving terms. However, since fantasy is popularly cast as somewhat 
frivolous, and because much of our fantasy may be unavailable to conscious awareness, the 
importance of these fantasies is not recognized, and the opportunity to explore them is 
limited.73  
Fantasies of ‘mother’, and mothers’ fantasies 
Mantell’s epigraph, written in the context of her own unintended childlessness, highlight the 
unconscious dimensions to the ‘romancing’ women do in constructing maternal fantasies and 
to the reproductive choice-making all women do. It also addresses the question of the 
idiosyncratic meanings having a child and being a mother have for each woman. Those 
meanings are inextricably linked to the relationship women have to their own mother, and to                                                         
72 Other writers (eg Letherby 1999) refer to ‘social’ mothers rather than ‘carer’ to describe women who are in a 
mothering role to children to whom they have not given birth. 
73 Fantasies of parenthood exist for both men and women. My exclusive focus on women’s experience is not 
intended to imply that men’s fantasies of paternity are not equally (albeit differently) important. In Chapter 5 I 
discuss the difficulties the women in this study had in exploring and making sense of these fantasies more fully. 
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her past and present desires and anxieties. Because every woman is both a daughter as well as 
a potential mother, she is the embodied product of her own mother’s “romance” with a 
fantasy child; the often unwitting and sometimes unwilling accomplice in her mother’s plan to 
compensate for losses and disappointments of her own life, and the object of her mother’s 
longing to, and for, love. She could also wish to reproduce the pleasure of loving a child, first 
experienced through being loved as a child herself. 
The complexities of crossgenerational fantasies and one of the mechanisms through which 
they might pass from a woman on to her child are described here by British object relations 
psychoanalyst Alice Balint:  
I have found that much more than the mother’s general mood is absorbed by the very young infant, 
who reacts, for example, to her aliveness or deadness and to unconscious anxieties, which do not 
necessarily arise from the relation between the mother and baby. What can be perceived by the 
infant and internalized by him are aspects of the mother’s unconscious life, that is to say, aspects of 
her mental life of which she herself is unaware. […] One way of describing this is in terms of 
unconscious projection. The essential point, however, is that in trying to understand a woman one 
has always to be in touch with three generations: the patient, the patient’s parents and the parents’ 
parents, that is the patient’s grandparents. 
(1992, pp.110-111) 
In this way, the lives of participants can sometimes be also understood to be embodying their 
mothers’ fantasies of not having had a child.74 Lesley, for example— who spoke of her 
unhappy relationship with her mother throughout her life— travelled in her 20s and early 30s, 
and said she delayed having children because  “I really felt that I needed to sort myself out 
and that I could see aspects of my mother within me, and I was determined to not […] 
recreate what my mother had created”. Describing herself as “the product of a relationship 
where my mother didn’t want to be a mother”, she told me: 
I feel that I have actually lived the life that my mother would have wanted to live; […] my mother 
married when she was 21, had me when she was 24, and she was not really well suited to being a 
mother at that point. You know she had a lot of stuff from her own family to sort out, so she was a 
reluctant [pause], I mean look it would have been much better if she’d just hadn’t gotten married, if 
she’d travelled, done what she really wanted to do, and perhaps met my father later on, seen a 
therapist, kind of got herself sorted out. It would have been a much more different life. 
Lesley was explicit about her own yearning to have a child, and it is impossible to untangle 
here whether she found herself instead living her mother’s fantasy, or her own fantasy for her 
mother, and hence the “very different life” that might have been her own, as well as her                                                         
74 Several participants said that during their growing up their mothers had explicitly emphasized that not having 
children was an option available to them. I can only speculate about the part the historical context played in 
participants’ circumstantial childlessness. These women are the daughters of the first generation of women to 
have more reliable reproductive choices, and were raised in the early years of second wave feminisms. 
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mother’s. I suggest this is because they overlap, even though they might find different 
expression in each woman’s life. Hollway’s (2009a, p.6) claim that the relationship between a 
woman and her daughter continues to be intersubjectively “porous” throughout their lives 
suggests that their mothers’ fantasies continue to play a part unconsciously in adult daughters’ 
lives in the same way as they do when they are infants. Perhaps these fantasies materialize in 
different ways in the two generations, in part reflecting cultural changes in attitudes to 
maternity and women’s lives. Other women in this study also made the link between their 
mothers’ experiences and the ways these experiences may have contributed to their 
unconscious fantasy of maternity. Julia, whose mother had two miscarriages and two stillborn 
children, commented that she had grown up “surrounded by dead babies”, and though she 
spoke with tremendous sadness about not having had children, also said, “I mean in some 
ways [having children] terrified me”. 
The mother/daughter relationship is pivotal to the development of a woman’s maternal 
fantasy in terms of its impact on daughters in another way. Lax (2006) writes that, although 
pressures in a girl’s broader social worlds are an important part of what she describes as the 
“craving” to have a child, her conscious and unconscious interaction with her mother is a 
“uniquely significant contributory factor”. She understands the  interactions between a girl 
and her mother to be central to the development of a woman’s fantasy of maternity:  
This pivotal relationship of love and idealization, anger, hate, envy, and competition, which 
undergoes many vicissitudes, eventually forms the basis for a girl’s ideal of motherhood. When the 
woman’s childhood experiences were good, identification with her own mother is the basis for this 
ideal. When childhood memories are filled with anger and pain, ambivalence prevails and the ideal 
may be determined by reaction formations. However, the ideal of motherhood also unconsciously 
contributes to the wish for a child, a fantasized opportunity to play out the role of mother and child 
in an unambivalent idealized form desired in the woman’s childhood. In this fantasy the woman 
wants to be the mother she wanted to have. 
(Lax 2006, p.3) 
Many participants’ narratives in this study reflected the idea of motherhood being “‘a chance 
to get it right this time’”, as Mantell (2004, p.228) wrote in the epigraph. Janine, for example, 
said, “I would like to have had the opportunity to be a different type of mother to the one I 
had […] I would be perceptive and, um, more, um, [pause] more aware and more [pause] 
nurturing and more focused”. In her fantasies of being a mother a baby perhaps offered the 
possibility to “heal the shortcomings of her own childhood” (Parker 2005, p.27), where the 
baby would stand in for her baby self, and she could become “the mother she wanted to 
have”. 
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Anxious fantasies 
Mantell’s idea of “romance” underplays a further dimension of maternal fantasies; those 
aspects of ‘mother’ that are laden with anxiety and ambivalence. De Marneffe (2006, p.244) 
writes that to some women “the desires associated with wanting to mother feel uncontrolled, 
overwhelming, and regressive, emotionally and politically”. In spite of the emancipatory 
changes that feminism has brought to women’s lives, socially motherhood is still both 
valorized as an important part of being a woman and also feared as a threat to the 
independent, interesting and fulfilling life women aspire to. She further notes that “(f)or some 
young women struggling toward a sense of identity, it is not surprising that motherhood 
comes to symbolize everything antithetical to the independent life they want to pursue” (De 
Marneffe 2004, p.16). Many of the participants’ narratives in this study were threaded with 
these and other anxieties, and their fantasies of maternity thus have both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ dimensions. They are weighted with all that ‘mother’ and ‘baby’ means for each 
participant; what she anticipates she would gain, what she would lose, what she fears and 
what she desires. In Lesley’s interview, for example, her fears appeared to centre not only on 
what sort of mother she might unwillingly (and unwittingly) become, but also about her 
ability to provide the ‘right’ circumstances in which a child might flourish happily. Her 
fantasies of mothering were often expressed in terms of what she was anxious to avoid: 
Lesley: I didn’t want to bring a child into the world where I felt like I would be struggling and that 
I would be trying to be a parent as well as work, as well as trying to juggle financial things. I didn’t 
want to bring up a child where I was living in a rundown old house which was [pause] struggling to 
find money for food and having to rely on my parents for top-up things, and be like that for 20 
years. That’s not a life, and I just don’t feel [pause] that wasn’t a life that I wanted to bring a child 
into [shaky tearful voice] [pause] that I couldn’t do that. 
Lois: So you had choices around it in that you made decisions about the kinds of circumstances and 
environment under which you would have a child? 
Lesley: Yeah. And if I couldn’t create those [pause]. And certainly in my 20s there was a feeling 
like I don’t want another child like me who’s incredibly sensitive and [pause] because at that stage 
I really felt like the world was [pause] not necessarily dangerous, but not a caring place for 
sensitive children, or sensitive people, and that, for me to bring another little being into the world 
who was again supersensitive, well what [pause] would she or he ever thank me for that? 
Here Lesley shifted her identifications, in a way that recalls Hollway’s (2009a) notion of a 
“generational pivot”, between her own perspective, her mother’s, and her fantasy child’s. She 
appeared to anticipate (in fantasy) what it would be like to be a mother herself, if she was the 
object of her child’s anger in the same way as her mother had been of hers. Parker (2005, 
p.28) notes that the “welcome fantasy of motherhood invokes a dual identification–with the 
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mother who cares and with the baby who is cared for, with the container and the contained”. 
Lesley’s concerns are the flipside of this “welcome” fantasy, but the dual identification is 
evident in her words. From an object relations perspective it is important to stress that just as 
the mother a child perceives should not be understood in an empirical sense but is rather 
filtered “through the prism of his (sic) fantasies” (Stone 2012, p.22), so too are the associated 
cultural resources. In Lesley’s case these resources include images and discourses of 
struggling single mothers, and of the hypersensitive individual.75  For her, and for other 
women in this study, these cultural resources also include other aspects of the contradictory 
social discourses both of being a ‘woman’ and being a ‘mother’, in which each young woman 
is immersed as she grows (Walkerdine et al. 2001), and the range of different maternal 
identities (Thomson et al. 2011) within which she anticipates positioning herself—or being 
positioned by others—if she has a child in the future.  
The ‘absent presence’ of fantasy children 
Many of these participants articulated their maternal fantasies primarily around the idea of 
being a mother in general terms, and although they may have had detailed fantasies of a child 
or children, these did not appear in the research materials associated with them.76 Others 
described their fantasy child or children and their interactions with them in quite specific 
ways and contexts, often in very vivid terms. Like Deborah, some women had named their 
fantasy child(ren) as a way of making them ‘real’ by symbolizing them in language. Shelley 
for example, who for a time considered adopting a child, said, “I gave her a name, and that 
was my biggest mistake. I called her Sophie, and, she was human, she was real”.  
Connie had not named her children, but spoke of her fantasy children in this way:  
Connie: Well I always thought I would have a family, of my own, and for a long time I thought I 
would have two boys.  
Lois: Did you have names for your boys, in your mind? 
Connie: No but they always had dark short hair, liked climbing trees and things like that. 
Lois: You saw them as kids rather babies.                                                         
75 Elain Aron’s book The highly sensitive person (1997) and its sequel The highly sensitive child: Helping our 
children thrive when the world overwhelms them (2002) were extremely successful commercially and increased 
public awareness of the idea that some individuals are particularly sensitive to a range of stimulae.  
76 It was not until I was well into the interviewing phase and moving into the analysis phase of this study that I 
became aware of the ‘presence’ of the these fantasies of a child in the lives of many of these participants. I had 
not asked any questions specifically designed to elicit talk about these fantasies, but a significant number of 
women spoke of them in the way that Connie does in this extract. 
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Connie: Yes, as children. As real boys. Yeah. 
Connie presumably meant that these children were real boys in the sense of liking to climb 
trees and play actively, but in her detailed imagining of them they also appeared to be real to 
her in the sense of her having a vivid fantasy picture of them. Connie talked about herself as 
having spent the past few years in a complex and painful process of temporarily relinquishing 
that picture. She told me that during that time she had visited a medium to ask about her boys: 
I said ‘I’ve had this, this, this vision for such a long time and now it turns out it’s not going to 
happen. Is it just my imagination? Just to give myself, you know, peace, or is it some truth in there? 
What do you think?’ 77 And she said, ‘Well I can see those children too, those boys, and even 
though they’re not with you here now there is a connection and they do support you’ [crying] but 
she said, ‘It’s going to be unlikely that you have them in this lifetime’.  
Connie appeared to find it difficult to describe the nature of her relationship with these boys 
of her fantasy. Though she spoke smoothly, she stumbled over “this, this, this vision”. This 
struggle may have been because the possibility of these children existing in some way is not 
socially recognized, and yet that was her experience. They were “there and not-there”, and her 
struggle was with the conflict between “what we see and what we know” (Gordon 1997, 
p.24); between her ‘inner’ reality, and ‘reality’ as it is understood in her social worlds. When 
she did find the word “vision” however, it was not a vague ‘idea’ that she spoke of, but rather 
one that had the weight of what she in some way, saw.  
Elena is another woman who talked in terms of her child already existing on another plane or 
in another time, as Connie did. Although I did not ask a specific question that was planned to 
elicit discussion about it, 11 of the 26 participants spoke explicitly of a belief in the possibility 
that their fantasy child(ren) might be embodied as their biological child, later in their lives or 
in a future life. Setting aside the question of religious belief systems about reincarnation, one 
possible reason for women talking of their child in this way is that there are few available 
narratives to talk about a relationship with a child who exists in fantasy rather than in an 
embodied form, but feels in some way ‘real’. I asked Elena, “(H)ow real is the child? How 
much have you imagined that child? ” 
Elena: Oh you know it’s all, already here, to be honest with you. It’s not that I can see it’s a boy or 
a girl, or it’s called [pause] you know, but it’s, I have a—it sounds ridiculous but I have a sense of 
[pause] this child. Because I, I think of you know [pause] the souls, and I think of [pause] um 
[pause] because I, I believe in reincarnation don’t ask me why or how, it just sort of makes sense to 
me, to me you know that souls are reborn—um [pause] I sort of think, yeah [pause] it, it, it’s there, 
you know? [pause] um [pause] it’s there. It’s somewhere, it’s with me.                                                         
77 English is not Connie’s first language, and although she speaks it fluently, she made some unusual sentence 
constructions such as this at times. 
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Elena’s talk was full of uncertainty and anxiety about how I might hear it. In commenting that 
“it sounds ridiculous” she was fearful of my judgment of her “sense of this child”, for 
example, perhaps because as her audience I stood in for the wider social world.  Her use of 
“to be honest with you” could be interpreted as appealing to me to be accepted as speaking as 
a sincere and truthful person, even though she feared that what she said might be perceived as 
unlikely or socially invalid. Elena clearly struggled to articulate how or where this child 
existed, but she was clear that it did, in some way.  
Elena’s talk about her fantasy revealed another dimension to women’s fantasies of a child. 
When I asked her what would be lost if she did not have a child as she planned she said: 
I feel like it will be part of me, to be honest with you. That I have lost a part of me that I have 
already sort of accepted.78 It’s part of you know [pause] yeah I, I [pause]”  
Lois: “Can you describe that part of you? Can you tell me about it?”  
Elena: [sigh] “I don’t know, it’s sort of [pause] because of course your child [pause] is a separate 
person, you know, but I think in the first years [pause] the mother and the child, they are 
connected. Very much. You know the child is [pause] doesn’t survive without the mother, um, so 
[pause] I don’t know. 
When a woman gives birth she is immediately confronted with the embodied otherness of her 
child, and she faces the task of reconciling that baby with the baby of her fantasy (Mauthner 
2002). When a woman does not have a child, her fantasy is able to remain intact, as “part of” 
her. Elena’s struggles to articulate the contradictory way in which a child is both “a separate 
person” and yet “connected” relate to this intersubjective positioning whereby the child of her 
fantasy is both her and not-her. Unless and until it is embodied, Elena’s child is fixed in her 
fantasy, unchallenged by a different reality. 
The ways in which women’s relationship with their fantasy child(ren) spilled over and created 
material effects in their social worlds was evident in many participants’ narratives. 
“Everything is in the shape of a baby”, Janine commented as she looked around her home 
during our interview. When I asked her what it meant to her not to have a child she replied, 
“(i)t’s, it’s empty and it feels like there’s something missing; it feels like there’s someone 
missing”. When women lived with a partner, some aspects of the fantasies sometimes became 
shared.  Isabella said that she had always wanted to have a child, but she had not found                                                         
78 English is also not Elena’s first language. It is hard to know whether her saying “That I have lost a part of me” 
(rather than “that I will have lost”) is a product of this, or an unconscious recognition that her chances of 
successfully conceiving and birthing child were small, and she was probably already facing that loss. At the time 
of the interview Elena was in her late 30s and planning to try for a child through A.R.T. as a single parent. She 
was, however, out of work, and not eligible for government funding for treatment, so had delayed it indefinitely. 
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anyone she was able to form a relationship and start a family with until she met William in 
her mid 30s.79 William was willing to have a child together but at the time of the interview 
Isabella (by then in her late 30s) had not conceived because of “unexplained infertility” 
(presumed age-related). She talked about the child they hoped to have: 
We see ourselves as having a daughter […] I always threaten that she’s going to be a horse rider 
and William is going to have to go to equestrian events and you know, brush the pony’s tail, and 
things like that. [pause] Yeah, she is quite real. […] She [pause] I always sort of [pause] we talk 
about her, and we just, yeah feel that, it’s meant to be [pause].Yeah. […] She is somewhere. 
Berger and Quinney (2005, p. 13, italics in original) write that “(w)hat constitutes a ‘family’ 
is very much a social construction. For many people, family constitutes not just a presence 
but an absence as well”. Isabella’s words suggested that her fantasy child became more real 
through being one she shared with William, and was for them in some “quite real” ways a 
presence in their household. Along with the materiality of the ‘little bits and pieces I have 
packed away’ for her to wear, Isabella and William’s talk about their anticipated daughter 
brought her into existence in their daily life and into the detail of their possible futures. I 
sensed a shift from a playfulness between them about what was understood to be an imagined 
future where their daughter might be a horse rider (“I always threaten”) to a different 
conceptualization of her in the present, where Isabella’s pauses and hesitations pointed to her 
struggling—as Elena had—in a more serious way to articulate how and where her daughter 
existed. Like Elena, Isabella concluded with a firm assertion that she ‘is’. 
Elena used the word “sense” to describe her perception of the child of her fantasy—“I have a 
sense of this child”— in the same way as Deborah did when she spoke about  “the sense of 
myself as a mother”. It is hard to know how to interpret the ‘isness’ of these fantasies that is 
implied in their use of “sense”, Connie’s use of “vision” and Isabella’s use of “is”, in this 
way. Perhaps in choosing these ways to describe their fantasies of maternity and a child—as 
opposed to an ‘idea of this child’ for example—these four women might be understood to be 
deliberately attempting to articulate an experience of a particular kind of reality for these 
fantasies, that is hard for them to express. Frers (2013, p. 433) writes that as something that is 
experienced, an absence is “not just immaterial, a mere thought without an anchor in the 
corporeal world”, but rather it “arises in the experience, it is a relational phenomenon that                                                         
79 In Chapter 3 I addressed the difficulties of capturing the “things that slip and slide” of fantasy in this research 
process. As an example of the ‘did I see that or did I imagine it’ kind of thinking that so often happened in this 
project, several of the women returned their transcriptions with no changes except to the name I had given them 
as a pseudonym, and in every case they were for popular contemporary children’s names: two of the women 
chose the name “Sophia” for example. Isabella’s name was her own choice, and since—along with Sophia—it is 
also currently one of the most popular names for baby girls I found myself wondering if this was the name she 
and William had chosen for their fantasy daughter. 
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constitutes itself in corporeal perceptions. Someone has to miss something for it to be 
specifically absent.” Frers is writing here in the context of something that once existed in a 
material form—he notes (Frers 2013, p.434) that “an absence necessitates a relation to a lived 
place-time”—but he adds that “the feeling of dislocation and disruption […] originates in the 
disruption of expectations”. It is in the expectation of their eventual subjectivity as a 
biological mother in relationship with a child that these women’s fantasies and sense of 
absence are based, and I suggest that it is the absence of that ‘relationship’ that is here 
(almost) constituted in “corporeal perceptions”.  
The apparent inexplicability of these women’s assertions of their fantasy children’s ‘isness’ 
becomes more explicable if viewed through the frame of the concept of the transitional space; 
the “intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both 
contribute” (Winnicott 1971, p.2) and which Winnicott (1971, p.13) theorized to be in “direct 
continuity” with the play of small children. He wrote that from the time of their birth 
individuals are concerned with “the problem of the relationship between what is objectively 
perceived and what is subjectively conceived of” (Winnicott 1971, p.11). These fantasies 
might be understood to exist in a conceptual ‘space’ where what is usually understood as 
objective reality and as subjective fantasy overlap; where Elena, Deborah, Connie and 
Isabella’s experience of their fantasies of maternity and a child might be “neither a matter of 
inner psychic reality nor a matter of external reality” (Winnicott 1971, p.96) but something of 
both.  
Drawing a fantasy 
I suggest that one of the struggles many of the women in this study had in talking about their 
fantasy child(ren) stems from the difficulty in articulating in language this experience of a 
fantasy relationship that nevertheless has a feeling of reality for them. I was interested to see 
whether it might be possible for them to do so differently through the alternative possibilities 
that images—and subsequent talk about these images—offered. Drawing represents a 
different modality than words and talk for expression, and may have the capacity to capture 
different aspects of this experience. Two participants’ drawings stand out in this respect.80  
                                                        
80 I am not implying here that drawing exists outside of discourse, but rather that it represents a different 
modality than words and talk for expression, and may have the capacity to capture different aspects of this 
experience. 
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Figure 2: Gina’s Drawing 
Gina began the description of her drawing in its bottom left corner, saying that her most 
recent experience of circumstantial childlessness was one of a “kind of surprise […].You sort 
of go along thinking that you don’t know how things are going to end up, and so then, if one 
day you realise that, actually, this is how things end up [pause] that’s quite shocking”. 
Moving clockwise up the page, the red and black figure described “moments when I’ve been 
very angry because I felt [pause] because I felt that my partner was being selfish. And I didn’t 
have, I didn’t believe I had the ability to change any of the conditions in my life [pause] um 
[pause] yes, so then you’re left with that”.  She introduced the rest of the drawing in this way:  
And then my overwhelming feeling is [pause] being kind of, this is me being kind of existentially 
alone and also [pause] alone in the sense of not having a real strong biological connection with 
another being because […] I was adopted, and I have step children and all this kind of thing. So 
I’ve showed all my [pause] family, and I, I we treat each other as family and I love them all dearly 
and I’ve got grandchildren and […] this is my husband and [pause] and we love each other […] but 
there’s still this sense of [pause] separation. I mean it’s related to existential separation that I think 
everyone feels so it’s related to this feeling of not having a [pause] offspring who can never 
disconnect from me no matter what I do [laughs]. And that feeling is right here [taps page at the 
black asterisk] right here where the offspring would be. It’s not huge, it’s just little. 
Lynn (see drawing on p.78) began at the top right of her drawing with the two figures of her 
and her husband “we’re sort of walking, we’re walking into the future really”. The rainbow 
was “kind of representative, that this is [pause] I’m in a good space and I’m feeling kind of 
96 
hopeful about [pause] quite hopeful about my life and I’m kind of looking forward”.  The 
small red figures scattered around the perimeter of the drawing represented Lynn at “different 
stages of my life or different roles that I’ve had”. In Chapter 3 I noted that Lynn concluded 
the description of her drawing by saying: 
(A)nd then I sort of put some big breasts over the whole thing because what I always have in 
[pause] because I, if I really try to feel [pause] feel not having a child I think I get left with, I do 
have quite deep feelings of, of having missed the opportunity to nurture and I still [pause], I still 
would like that experience of a baby suckling on my nipple […]. 
These drawings are similar in that they are both composed with a series of small figures 
showing aspects of the participant’s ‘real’ life and relationships, arranged around a central 
point that symbolizes their fantasy child/maternity. Gina’s fantasy was “not huge; it’s just 
little” and Lynn’s floated almost diaphanously “over the whole thing” but both dominated the 
image through their central positioning. Gina’s small dense black asterisk created a focal 
point for the image, surrounded as it was by relatively uncluttered space, and Lynn’s large red 
breasts were a motif, striking in its contrasting scale, that overlaid the narrative of her 
drawing. Each in its way captured an important aspect of these two women’s maternal 
fantasies that was not achievable in spoken language; the way in which these fantasies both 
dominated other aspects of their lives, at the same time as being subordinate to them, through 
being able to be read simultaneously as both background and foreground. That their drawings 
were able to do this is as an outcome of the ways in which drawing can represent time, space, 
and objects’ relativity to one another differently than language (Kress 2001).  
4.3 Fantasies of motherhood 
The maternal fantasies of the women in this study originated in their unique experience in 
relationship with others, particularly their mother, and in the often contradictory discourses 
and narratives of mothering in which their lives were embedded socially. As a consequence of 
this, their fantasies of maternity each represented a personal version of common themes and 
tropes of motherhood. Although these fantasies were idiosyncratic, they were almost always 
variations of their becoming a particular kind of woman living a particular kind of life. Many 
spoke of a ‘mother’ as being a selfless, nurturing woman who had a strong sense of 
belonging, who loved and was loved unconditionally, and who had a relationship of enduring 
and indestructible love with her child(ren). Becoming a mother was perceived to be a unique 
route to achieving these aspects of relationship and personal qualities in their own life, and 
their fantasies of maternity reflected this.  
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Motherhood as transformation 
The theme of motherhood as a nexus of transformation was reflected in participants’ fantasies 
of motherhood right across the research material in this study. Samantha spoke of it in this 
way: 
There’s got to be something about it [motherhood] that [pause] something that I can’t [pause] 
fathom, and won’t, wouldn’t, won’t be able to fathom. (…) I think it is a unique relationship. 
Lois: In what way? 
Samantha: [very quietly] In a look in the eyes. In the [pause] almost one year old ‘where is  
she? Oh, there she is!’[in a whisper] and vice versa. Instant recognition. (…) I think  
that I’d like to be part of that, in a sense of [pause] growing up, becoming a different  
[pause] you know another [pause] different type of person, almost a stage of life.  
Which is not to say that I see it as a sort of [pause] a life, a set part of a life course,  
which would, that without it would mean a lesser life course or anything like that, but  
pause] another dimension of who one is as an individual, just as all sorts of other  
new experiences bring out another dimension of an individual, but this, that sort of  
experience would be [pause] I think fundamentally different. 
In this extract Samantha touches on both the idea of the mother/child relationship being 
“unique”, which I discuss further below, and of motherhood creating the potential for a 
woman to become “another different type of person”. Lisa Baraitser has theorized maternal 
subjectivity as “a fundamentally changed state” for a woman, involving “substantial shifts” 
that prompt “a renewed configuration of self” (2006, p. 221). There is a sense in Samantha’s 
words that the fantasy she held of herself as a maternal subject in a relationship with a child is 
something that she both knew and at the same time did not know; something reached for in 
speech but never quite able to be articulated. It may be that she drew at some—probably 
unconscious—level on her embodied experience, as a child, of the kind of connectedness that 
she speaks of between a mother and her child, but she had not experienced for herself from 
the other side, as a woman/mother. Perhaps because of this experience she had an awareness 
or intimation of the shift Baraitser speaks of, but she was only able to articulate her 
understanding of its potential in her own life in oblique ways.  
Women may fear a “renewed configuration of self” for the uncertainty and potential loss it 
entails (Baraitser 2006), but this research material suggests that many of these participants 
also appeared to be drawn to what they perceived to be its potential gains; among which was 
the opportunity they understood it to present in terms of “growing up”—as Samantha put it— 
or of developing “another dimension” of themselves. In doing so they might be seen to be 
drawing on a discourse of motherhood as a necessary part of growing into mature 
womanhood, but on several occasions participants explicitly denied this idea. In Chapter 6 (p. 
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177), for example, I note how roundly Lynn rejected her sister’s suggestion that she was not a 
“proper woman” unless she had had children. Samantha was quick to clarify that she did not 
understand a life without children to be “a lesser life”, and in this clarification made it 
obvious that she was aware of feminist critiques of the idea of a woman’s life being lacking in 
some important ways if she does not have a child. Samantha’s pauses may indicate a tension 
in her attempts to find a way to talk about what she understood to be a fundamentally 
different change that motherhood would potentially create in her, while at the same time not 
diminishing the status of women who do not have children. 
Belonging in a unique and enduring relationship 
Samantha’s emphasis on the unique and transformative effect of motherhood, and her spare 
vignette of a carefully observed mother and child, described in a quiet intense voice, 
eloquently expressed her sense of aspects of this relationship being intangible and 
indescribable for her. It was telling that she shifted register markedly in answer to my 
question about why a mother/child relationship was unique. Apparently unable to ‘explain’ it 
in logical terms, she used words that for her evoked an embodied experience of the intimacy 
in the recognition of a shared pleasure in one another that might exist between a mother and 
her young child. This shift may indicate a time in the interview where, in matrixial terms, 
Samantha found the language available to her inadequate in its capacity to capture her sense 
of the particular quality of this relationship. For her, and for many of the women in this study, 
this relationship between a mother and her child was understood to be “unique” in this 
quality. 
There is a further apparently contradictory quality to these maternal fantasies. Women’s talk 
reflected a sense in which motherhood itself represents something that links them to the 
experience of Life, understood in elemental terms. They chose words that indicated a grand 
scale; of having a child being “living life to the full”, of a child being both a “gift” from Life 
and a “contribution” to it, and “one of the main reasons why we’re here” for example. Their 
visions of the mother/child relationship often had an idealized optimal, quintessential quality; 
they used words like “complete”, enduring “no matter what”, forged of love that is 
“unconditional” and so forth. When women spoke of their personal fantasies of being a 
mother however, these ideals found their expression in very ordinary, domestic moments: 
watching a child’s performance in a school drama production or sports match; helping with 
homework; joining in a child’s play; being able to join in the talk at the lunch table at work. 
Samantha’s intimate vignette captured this well.  It may be that these images are brought in to 
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do service for the ineffable quality of connectedness of the mother/child relationship, and 
these activities are idealized in the absence of a maternal practice.  
An embodied child creates a woman as a ‘mother’ socially, and also makes possible the web 
of relationships that women spoke of as “my own family”; different from but related to their 
family of birth. It was this idea of family that made many women unwilling to have a child on 
their own; for many it seemed a family is larger than just a mother and her child (or a woman 
and her partner). Women’s fantasies of maternity were often expressed as being about 
creating this family that they belonged to and that belonged to them. 
I’ve never felt a strong sense of family because my parents split up (…) there were no brothers and 
sisters, there were no um cousins, and aunties and uncles and that sort of stuff. (…) I think it’s the 
um, I don’t know, it’s that sort of creation of a being together, you know the um, I don’t know how 
to describe it really, that sort of yearning to have, to be a unit in a way.  Yeah, just to have, I don’t 
know somehow I’ve (…) it’s sort of like, um the sense of completeness that you have as a family. 
Irene struggled here to find words for her fantasy of belonging and being ‘complete’; it was a 
yearning that was particularly strong in women who described themselves, as she did, as not 
“having a strong sense of family”. When Gina, for example said, “I’ve spent my whole life 
trying to, trying to [pause] belong, to a family and it always felt like it was just half there (…) 
[Lois: “and so a child would have been…”] “A whole one. Yeah. A whole one, yeah”, her 
repetition emphasised the power this sense of wholeness held for her. For women who spoke 
of having previously experienced this sense of family in their own family of origin, the 
longing was to recreate it for another generation.  
While Gina and Irene yearned to belong to a family of their own making, other women spoke 
of their yearning for a child who belonged to them. Many participants invoked the notion of 
‘unconditional love’ in talking about this relationship between a mother and her child. Their 
fantasies of the mother/child relationship were not only unique in their quality, but also in 
their endurance; they were “far more steady than the other things we fill our life with”. Gina 
talked about “offspring who can never disconnect from me no matter what I do”, and “the 
simple fact of being someone’s mother, they can never erase that”. This quality of perceived 
durability—a fantasy of something that persists—was also evident in the ways many 
participants spoke of children being in some way a legacy; a loved husband who lived on in 
some way in his child, a person to teach about the values they held to be important, someone 
who will remember them after they die, someone to whom they would leave cherished 
belongings.  
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Psychoanalytic and popular literature, and indeed everyday experience of the relationships 
between mothers and their children, make it clear that such an idealized relationship of a 
persisting and ‘unconditional love’ is often a fiction: that all mothers struggle at times with 
ambivalent feelings towards their children, and that strained, painful or distant relationships 
between mothers and their children are not uncommon. Parker (2005, p.1) writes that 
maternal ambivalence is an experience “shared variously by all mothers in which loving and 
hating feelings for their children exist side by side”. Many of the participants in this study 
were self reflexive women who had access to feminist critiques of idealized mother/child 
relationships and found themselves in the contradictory position of both personally 
fantasizing an idealized relationship, and simultaneously being critical of these kinds of 
idealizations. The tension this created for many of these women was evident in their 
narratives, and they framed their responses to this tension in different ways. Lesley, for 
example, talked about the existence of difficult aspects of her relationship with her mother 
throughout her life as evidence of this quality of durability in the mother/child relationship 
rather than of its fragility. Commenting on the very painful relationship she had with her 
parents, especially her mother, she said, 
I have wondered about the intense need to actually resolve my relationship with my parents and 
that I really come down to the fact that I can’t walk away from it; there is something more there, 
there is some much deeper bond there that I have to resolve, or I have to resolve the difficult bits 
of. That it is kind of a psychic bond which can be stretched but never really broken. 
The ‘selfish woman’ 
One of the sites in which the fantasy of motherhood as transformation was most marked was 
in the contradictory potential for it to be both the source of and escape from the spectre of the 
‘selfish’ woman. Tyler (2007, p.174) argues that the “hated and feared” figure of the ‘selfish 
feminist’ that developed in the 1970s was a “predominant caricature” of feminism; a “myth 
[that] was mobilized to undermine the social and political aims of the women’s movement”. 
Perhaps the idea of the selfish feminist was able to make a strong foothold in the popular 
imagination because of an underlying presumption that women are naturally unselfish 
because they are ‘natural’ mothers. Selfishness was certainly understood by many participants 
to be a quality that is an inevitable part of becoming older, and motherhood was often invoked 
as a way of changing one’s fate in this regard. Stone (2011, p.169) writes that “insofar as one 
gains value on becoming a mother this is because one comes to be regarded as a special sort 
of person who is selflessly devoted to others”. Becoming a parent (for the ‘right’ reasons) was 
often understood to be a route to becoming a better and less selfish person. Discussing what 
was lost if one did not become a mother, Julia, for example, said: 
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You lose the experience of loving in a particular way, being required to love in a particular way. I 
think you lose the opportunity to know yourself better, I think, as a person. I think from what I 
observe, parenting is a huge training ground (…) for being human. 
It is to the particular aspect of “being required” that Julia here attributed the potential 
transformation of motherhood.  Gina described it similarly as “that experience of really 
existing for another being. To cut through the selfishness that we all seem to inherit as part of 
our species”.  
As all of these fantasies do, this aspect reflects both women’s experience as infants and 
children, their observation of others, and the social and cultural resources in which they are 
immersed. The idea of motherhood demanding something particular from women is one in 
common circulation. Baraitser (2006, p.8, first cited in Moyers & Tucher 1990, p.60), for 
example, quotes the writer Toni Morrison saying, 
There was something so valuable about what happened when one became a mother. For me it was 
the most liberating thing that ever happened (…) Liberating because the demands that children 
make are not the demands of a normal ‘other’. The children’s demands on me were things that 
nobody else ever asked me to do. 
Many participants appeared to be wary however of the potential to have a child for the 
“wrong reasons”. Kim captured the concern of many participants who spoke of the selfishness 
of women in choosing to have a child to fulfil their own needs and desires: 
I think the thing that I feel strongly about is [pause] you’re not having a child for you, you’re 
having a child [pause] so that that child [pause] has a [pause] good life. You know it’s not [pause] I 
mean I [pause] I feel quite strongly about that, that’s it’s not really [pause] you know, so that I’ve 
ticked that box in my own personal accomplishments.  
Similarly, many participants had considered having a child on their own when they were 
unsuccessful in ‘finding’ a partner, but rejected it because of perceived selfishness inherent in 
a single parent choosing to sacrifice the rights of a child (to a father) or a man (to his child) in 
order to satisfy their own desire for a child. Paradoxically then, the notion of the ‘selfish 
mother’ who prioritises her own desires to have a child runs alongside one of the selfish 
woman who also chooses to prioritise her own desires; by not having a child.  
Being ‘maternal’ 
In describing the qualities of someone taking up a maternal identity the words “maternal”, 
“caring”, “mothering” and “nurturing” were often used interchangeably to refer to the idea of 
“taking care” of people and helping them to “be fulfilled”.81 A desire to nurture can be                                                         
81 I discuss the idea of ‘nurturing’ and being ‘maternal’ more fully in Chapter 6. 
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interpreted in different ways.  In contrast—or maybe resistance—to a commonly held 
discourse of motherhood as sacrifice, a “self-abnegating masochistic femininity” (Baraitser 
2006, pp. 223-224), there was a strong sense in many of these narratives of being maternal 
being about taking pleasure in taking care of people. De Marneffe (2004, p.8) argues for the 
recognition of the “intrinsically valuable” experience of mothering. She writes: 
(A mother’s) love for her child makes her want to put herself aside, and the way that putting herself 
aside to care for her child paradoxically fulfills her (…) (H)aving a child changes a woman’s 
relation to herself and others in a way that has implications for how we think about the self. 
De Marneffe (2006a p.241, italics in original) 
De Marneffe’s words link back to the ways in which Gina and Julia, among others, talked 
about motherhood having the capacity to free them from what they understood to be an 
inherent selfishness. Rather than being understood to be driven by a lack, these women’s 
fantasies of nurturing maternity might be understood to be a means of materializing a 
“primary affective compassion”, or love (Ettinger 2010, p.1).  
Being ‘maternal’ was not only understood as an adjective however, but also used as shorthand 
for being a particular kind of woman that was understood to be socially desirable. Many of the 
participants identified themselves as “maternal” and were very anxious to distance themselves 
from an assumption that they had made a choice not to have a child. The importance and 
intensity of this distancing was revealed in a comment from Shelley in a discussion about 
being asked whether or not she had children:  
I really struggle with people who make the assumption that you’ve chosen not to have children.(…) 
I didn’t choose not to be a mother. I love, you know, I would have loved to have been a mother. 
I’m not some nasty cold-hearted bitch who’s set her whole life on her career.  
Shelley drew here on the figure of the selfish and childless career woman—the ‘selfish 
feminist’—and actively resisted the potential for others to frame her in this way. She set “I 
love” and “I would have loved” against the figure of “some nasty cold-hearted bitch” and 
vehemently distanced herself from it. The intensity of her words suggests that the associations 
she had with the identity of childless woman may have made it one that she felt strongly 
defended against. Like Deborah, Shelley appeared to construct herself as already maternal, 
though not a mother. Her words suggest that for her, having a child may have represented an 
opportunity to embody qualities such as nurturing and selflessness that are popularly 
associated with mothering, and that she valued highly in herself.  
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4.4 Igniting the fantasy 
Almost all of the women I interviewed told me that becoming a mother was something they 
grew up presuming would be part of their future, but for a range of reasons, it had not 
happened; there were other more pressing things to do first, and there seemed to be plenty of 
time. I have suggested however, that throughout their life the fantasy dimension of their 
potential maternal subjectivity was in constant development. It seems that as well as being 
composed of unconscious material that was inaccessible to them, much of this fantasy 
material was dormant; outside of their conscious awareness for most of the time, although it 
became apparent occasionally. Kelly, for example, said that throughout her 20s “when I saw 
friends with theirs [children] I always got a bit of a pang thinking, you know I’d love that one 
day and all those sorts of things. But it was always ‘one day, one day’”. 
There was a distinct point in most participants’ narrative where this changed; where the ‘sense 
of themselves as a mother’ was triggered, and for many of these participants, this was an 
unexpected pregnancy, which was terminated or miscarried. Over and again women told me 
that a longing to have a baby became different and much more dominant in their lives after 
this experience. Although these women did not experience their baby as somehow separate—
through sensations such as its movements within their womb for example—it seems their 
brief pregnancy may have provided them with an embodied awareness of the existence of a 
life, that was not their own and yet was somehow part of them, that is unique to pregnancy. 
This can be understood to come about through changes of their experience of their body such 
as enhanced sensations of taste or smell, tiredness, nausea and so forth. From a matrixial 
perspective this brief pregnancy might be interpreted as re-animating the shared borderspace 
stratum that they shared with their own mother (Pollock 2006). These women spoke of 
themselves being changed by the experience in terms of their sense of themselves as a mother, 
and their perception of this was often that the pregnancy had created this change.  
I suggest that one way in which this might be interpreted is that the embodied experience of 
pregnancy triggered their dormant maternal fantasies, bringing more of them into conscious 
awareness. It may be that it is not so much that a pregnancy creates a fantasy of having a 
child, but rather that for some women it may have a particular power to ignite the fantasy of 
maternity that has been largely unconscious. In Ettinger’s terms it might be understood to be 
an experience that “brings the trans-subjective stream closer to the surface” (Hollway 2012b, 
p. 550). For women who have not experienced a pregnancy, it may rather have been a 
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growing awareness that their fertility was limited, coupled with a marked change in their life 
circumstances, that triggered this change.   
4.5 Maree 
Our current cultural climate, and perhaps feminism itself, stressing the incompatibility of career 
and motherhood, provide a cover for internal conflicts and fears, enabling women to mask conflicts 
and ambivalence about motherhood by turning them into conflicts between motherhood and career. 
(Chodorow 2003, p. 1187) 
Before turning to a general discussion of the key themes of this chapter I want to illustrate 
them in a more detailed study of the research material associated with Maree, a 33 year old 
pakeha woman who said that as a child and teenager growing up she “assumed” she would 
have children.82 She described herself as a “tomboy” teenager who was more interested in the 
work she wanted to do “working with people, helping people somehow”. In her 20s, while she 
“wondered” whether she did want to have children because she did not feel “particularly 
clucky”, she says she felt “quite sad about not having children at all” and considered adoption 
or “being a foster mum”. In her late twenties she became engaged (“to the wrong person”) 
because she felt “a strong sense of pressure from society” to get married and have children. 
The engagement broke up and she decided to take a year travelling overseas. During this time 
she became “accidently” pregnant, and “rushed” home to New Zealand to have a termination. 
At the time of her interview she had recently finished counselling training. 
 
Figure 3: Maree’s Drawing                                                         
82 Pakeha is a Maori word in common usage in New Zealand to describe someone of European descent. 
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“Feeling torn” 
In making a drawing participants often find themselves able to create a succinct 
representation of the key elements of their experience (Kearney & Hyle 2004), although it is 
necessarily one that is situated in time and space. Maree was one of the women who attended 
a group interview and made a drawing that she discussed with the other women in the group. 
She summed up her drawing for a group of other women who share a similar experience in 
two words: “feeling torn”. Her strong drawing of a naked female figure taking up the whole 
of the central space of the page was a self portrait rather than a generic ‘stick figure’, 
particularly recognisable in the detail of her hair, since Maree’s thick, dark, wavy hair is a 
striking feature of her appearance. Given the important part that embodiment plays in the 
analysis that follows, it is intriguing that she represented herself as a whole fully shaped 
female body, rather than as a blob, a face, or a stick figure, as other participants did. The 
‘biological clock’ is set at 4.10 or 5.10; if this is read as a metaphor for her fertility-time 
passing (and assuming it is day rather than night) it is not yet dark evening, but it is getting 
late in the day.  
She described her drawing in this way: 
Um, mine is about feeling torn. Um [pause] on one side I’ve got biological kinds of things 
happening with my body, like, just, umm, all of a sudden being really aware of seeing babies 
around and pregnant women and, “ooh, what’s it about?” and [pause] just, really feeling the tick 
tock of the clock.[…] Ummm. Wanting my own family, umm [pause] wanting the opportunity to 
be a mum [pause] umm [pause] fear of missing out [pause] and [pause] some societal pressure, but 
not huge amounts, but it’s definitely present. […]Ummm [pause] and the other side is [pause] my 
career, my life purpose, it’s a spiritual thing too because it’s something that, um, I felt called to do 
[pause] umm [pause] for a long time. So [pause] I’ve been working towards it for ages. Um, I’ve 
just finished my training as a counsellor, so that’s what I feel I’m here to do. Umm [pause] and also 
planning for future security. And whether or not I, you know, find a life partner, I have no idea so, I 
need to plan for my own future security, and I want my own home and land, so [pause] just feeling 
really torn and at this stage this arm’s slightly longer, because that’s the things that are happening. 
So [pause] umm [pause] I don’t know, feeling a bit stretched. 
Maree appeared to conceptualize the options and choices available to her as a binary where 
motherhood and family was assumed to be in opposition to career and “life purpose”. This 
binary is exemplified in her drawing, where motherhood—highlighted with a blood red 
overlay—is seen as being a yearning with “biological” origins, and is set against the weight of 
her “spiritual calling”, her “life purpose”, and powerful issues of career, money and future 
security. There is a hint in her description of her drawing of the way such a binary has long 
been weighted in the Western tradition, where the demands and desires of the body have been 
judged inferior to the higher moral claim of a spiritual call. 
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“This arm’s slightly longer” 
At a point of making choices about a potential maternal subjectivity why is it that one side of 
Maree’s choices was defined as winning out over the other “at this stage”? One obvious 
interpretation is in her words “because that’s the things that are happening now”; in other 
words, there was a temporal aspect to this experience, but it was fluid and, given her age, she 
understood there to be still choices available to her.  
A second interpretation of Maree’s drawing is contextual. Salecl (2010) claims that choices 
are anxiety producing because the individual is concerned with the way others will judge his 
or her choices. In the group interview—the setting for the drawing and its explanation—
Maree appeared to be concerned with representing herself and her choices to others in the 
group in the most favourable light.83 I suggest that revealing her “politics of lifestyle” 
(Giddens A., cited in Cassell, 1993, p.337) to a group of women unknown to her who may 
judge her and find her wanting in some way was potentially anxiety provoking for her. Given 
this concern, the way she presented her binary, with her arm stretching further to the ‘career’ 
option, suggests that she may have understood motherhood as a less socially acceptable goal 
than one of developing herself and her career, pursuing her ‘life purpose’ and establishing 
financial stability and security. De Marneffe (2004, p.3) argues that many women’s longing to 
nurture their children has become “increasingly problematic”. She writes: 
In the current milieu, women rarely perceive their desire to care for their children as intellectually 
respectable, and that makes it less emotionally intelligible as well. On a broader social level, 
mothers’ need and desire to work and its importance to their self-sufficiency and self-expression 
get a strong public hearing, but mothers’ needs and desires with respect to nurturing their children 
receive comparatively little serious discussion.  
(De Marneffe 2004, p.13)  
The ubiquity and popularity of narratives of self development and self-expression, making life 
goals and so forth are socially validated and valorized concepts that are readily recognisable 
and therefore easy to articulate. Perhaps they offered Maree little concern that the other 
women in the group might question them. I suggest that something of this shadow of the 
dubious desirability of motherhood spilled over into Maree’s attitude towards it, both in her 
reckoning of how others might judge her, and also in her own internal conversations about the 
choices she made.  Giddens (2006, p.3) writes that asking “Who am I, what shall I do, and                                                         
83 An example of her concern occurred in the individual interview, which preceded the group one, in which 
Maree expressed concern about how her termination might “go down” with the group, and said she would be 
“very private” about it in that context. Other participants who had had terminations had the same concern, and 
though a number talked about them playing an important part in their life story in the individual interview, none 
discussed them in the group interviews.  
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who shall I be?” is potentially liberating, but also fraught with anxiety. In contrast to her 
apparent ease and comfort in talking about her career and life goals, Maree appeared to find it 
harder to express the nuances of her maternal desires and her responses to them.  
It may also be that her ‘career’ arm was longer because her fantasies about being a mother 
were, as de Marneffe (2004) puts it, “less emotionally intelligible”; a yearning that she had 
not been able to make meaning of and symbolise in language. Maree’s comments in the 
individual interview suggested that she felt she had not been able to make sense of some 
important aspects of her longing to be a mother because she had not had adequate 
opportunities to explore them.  
The tension of opposing pulls in Maree’s drawing powerfully illustrated the complexities and 
pressures of the competing and contradictory discourses of motherhood that she faced as a 
young woman making reproductive choices. In all the group interviews I was struck by the 
way that women who were very expressive about their yearning to have a child in an 
individual interview were much more guarded in the way they talked about it in the group, 
even though they knew these to be women who were in a similar situation. It was as if there 
was something about a desire to be a mother that was perceived to be only acceptable socially 
if one is also primarily ‘successful’ in terms of career, education and material achievements. It 
was only as interaction in the groups progressed and some trust was established within them 
that individuals began to acknowledge their desire to have a child and their feelings about not 
having done so. Perhaps participants spent the early part of the group time making a judgment 
about whether or not the group’s dynamics replicated or were different from their interactions 
with others in the ‘outside’ world, where they experienced there to be no place for, or 
recognition of, the different reality of their maternal fantasies.  
“That maternal thing” 
It was in the context of these conflicts that Maree introduced the particular ‘fateful 
moment’(Giddens 1991, p.113) when she was 31 that she perceived to have changed her 
orientation to motherhood, and that I suggest ‘ignited’ her maternal fantasies.  
I thought I’m just going to put it [the decision about whether or not to have children] to one side 
and if and when I meet the right person, um, then I’ll decide on that point.[pause] Um, so I finished 
my degree and then I decided to take a year off and go travelling, and [pause] quite a big thing 
happened while I was overseas.  Um, I met someone and accidentally got pregnant, and decided 
that it was all completely wrong and couldn’t happen.  And so I rushed home and had a termination 
and I’ve always felt that that was the right thing to do, um [pause] but it did something to me.  Um, 
it was quite, it, it, it kind of, that maternal thing that wasn’t there before came and, um, it’s quite, 
it’s quite interesting because even though I feel like it’s the right, I’d made the right decision, um, 
the, the person wasn’t someone I could imagine being with and raising a child with and, and they 
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were on the other side of the world and, um, it all felt completely wrong, um, and I just, I knew 
really, really quickly what I needed to do and I knew that I had to do it.  So, [pause] um, yeah but 
as I said, after that sort of something changed and I don’t know whether it’s [pause] like a human 
instinct thing or something biochemical hormonal change just from being pregnant for a short time, 
I’m not sure what happened but, [pause] um. 
In her interview up to the point at which she discussed this moment, Maree had spoken in a 
smooth but flat tone—almost as if she were ‘reporting’ on her life—but her account of this 
segment of her life story was marked by a clear change in her tone and fluidity of expression. 
In the first two sentences she set up the background to the story she was about to tell, then at 
the pause before “quite a big thing happened” this speech change occurred. During the 
narration of the story she broke her sentences into short segments which seemed carefully 
chosen and articulated, she repeated words and phrases quite often, and she ended the 
segment with the sharp inward gasp that she used at other points in her interview which 
seemed particularly emotionally laden. The change in her delivery throughout this component 
of the interview suggests that this segment of her story was difficult for her to tell, and 
important for her to tell ‘truthfully’; her difficulty may have been related to telling a possibly 
shameful story to me, to her feelings related to the story, her remaining confusion about its 
impact on her, or to other reasons which are unavailable to me. Her care in telling it, and her 
immediate recall later in the interview of the exact date at which the events took place—
although it was two years past—suggest that the content of it continued to carry weight for 
her.  
The segment carries a strong theme of Maree’s sense of moral agency in her understanding of 
her ability to make decisions and the necessity of acting on them. In telling the story to me it 
seemed to be important to her to stress that choosing the right father for her child, and his 
being an active presence in the child’s life, was an essential factor in being an ethical parent 
for her. There seemed to be a link to her own experience in this; in another part of the 
interview Maree said she believed it would be “not fair” to raise a child as a single parent 
because her own father was “not actively” around for her as a child. It is interesting that 
Maree, as a high functioning successful professional person with a wide range of skills and 
capacities, used her own experience to say that she had a special responsibility to provide an 
active father for a child she might have, rather than using her experience to say that a child 
can grow up successfully, without the active input of a father.  
Maree understood her ambivalence about having a child to have changed when she became 
pregnant; “that maternal thing came”, something that “wasn’t there before”. She seemed to 
understand the “maternal thing” and its coming as something that “happened” both in her and 
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to her; something that stood outside of her ability to control it. Maree struggled to find words 
to articulate and make sense of this change in her, but it is clear that its impact was 
considerable. In the absence of any other explanation she fell back on the idea of an 
instinctual response but she did not appear to be entirely convinced about this. In speculating 
that the genesis of her longing to become a mother was possibly biologically based, Maree 
implied a force that is somehow outside of her control; simultaneously her and not-her.  
Writing sociologically about the quality of being ‘haunted’ in an individual’s life, Gordon 
(1996, p.8) says, “(b)eing haunted draws us affectively, sometimes against our will and 
always a bit magically, into the structure of feeling of a reality we come to experience, not as 
cold knowledge, but as transformative recognition”. When this change arose for Maree, she 
‘recognised’ it, and she named it: “that maternal thing”. She understood ‘it’ to be something 
that she ‘knew’ in some way and she symbolised it as “maternal”. In Gordon’s 
conceptualization of “being haunted” Maree’s experience of pregnancy and termination is one 
whereby she was drawn—“a bit magically”—into a “transformative recognition” of the 
reality of “that maternal thing” which haunted her. I suggest that that reality might be 
understood to be her fantasy of maternity; her “sense of myself as a mother”. The metaphor of 
haunting is useful in its emphasis on the powerful yet unseen quality of this fantasy. 
“Being nurturing”: selfless maternity as “a really important part of being 
human” 
This component of the interview also suggests something of the content of Maree’s maternal 
fantasies. She elaborated “that maternal thing” in this way:  
Maree: Yeah it’s a desire to be a mother, it’s not so much, I’m not necessarily clucky with babies 
or, um, but the whole mother thing, um… 
Lois:    What is it about being a mother that, that appeals to you, do you think? What do you think 
about when you think about yourself being a mother? 
Maree: Nurturing, um.[pause] Yeah that’s an interesting question.  Just being really nurturing and, 
um, [pause] I just, I think it’s almost part of the human experience and I guess if I don’t get to 
experience it, [pause] I’d feel like I’ve missed out on a really important part of being human. 
As several other participants did, Maree endowed a maternal subjectivity with a quality that is 
a highly valuable part of being “human”—“almost” an essential one—  that she can only 
achieve by becoming a mother. Gina expressed a similar idea when she said: 
It’s like, I guess similar to the sense that if you were born wealthy, and you never wondered how 
you were going to pay the rent. Ever. Then you don’t have the same credibility with your fellow 
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people, and in fact you have missed out on something very basic, so you’re going to go through life 
not having experienced that. 
For both women the nature of “that maternal thing” was slippery and they struggled to 
articulate what it was, but it had the weight of something that gives one “credibility” as a 
human being; something that is “basic”; fundamental in a way that sets it apart from other 
potential subjectivities. For Maree, “the whole mother thing” was much bigger than having a 
baby, and although she found the word “nurturing” it seemed not quite enough; the 
experience was one that eluded symbolization for her, though it was in some way familiar to 
her and she was aware that for her it was “really important”.  
Maree’s maternal fantasy in this segment hinged on the relational practices of selflessly 
nurturing a child. Without that in her life, she said, there is “a void; that maternal, like I’m 
not, there’s, there’s no, um, what’s that word, object is the wrong word, but there’s nothing 
that I can give my maternal nurturing-ness to”. To speak of a child fulfilling her longing in 
this way appeared to create a tension for her. Clearly nurturing is a process that involves an 
‘other’ to nurture, but she was anxious that I did not interpret her desire to be a mother as 
simply one of filling a void in her life. Her reluctance to refer to a potential child as an 
“object” was that to do so would imply that she might be needing a child to meet her own 
needs to “nurture”, and that would be incommensurate with her maternal fantasy of herself as 
a selfless mother. She went on to elaborate: 
It’s, [pause] it’s, it’s hard, I don’t think my maternal instinct is a selfish one, I know that’s a strange 
thing to say, but it’s not.[pause] I don’t want to have a child for me it’s like, um, I want to nurture 
someone, especially knowing what I know about human behaviour […] I see all the horrible, well, 
challenges that people can face if they’re raised in, you know, um, [gasping breath in] challenging 
environments […] I’d like to have the opportunity to, um, nurture, you know, try and give someone 
all that they need.  
Maree was keen to distance herself from those whose maternity was “selfish” (that is, based 
on meeting the emotional needs of the mother); she was quick to clarify that her “maternal 
instinct” was to provide a child with what she saw as the ideal circumstances for 
development. It seemed she was only able to acknowledge her longing to have a child by 
transforming it into an unselfish desire to nurture another human being. In this way she also 
revealed the details of her fantasy of maternity: a mother who expresses an important part of 
what it is to be human by providing selflessly for the needs of her child. For Maree, ‘mother’ 
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is a verb; it is about doing mothering in a particular relationship, and its legitimate motivation 
is to meet the child’s needs, rather than her own.84 85 
Embodying a fantasy 
When she returned to New Zealand while pregnant, Maree was put on a waiting list for the 
termination procedure but had to wait for some weeks before it happened. She described that 
time in this way:  
I, I was actually nine and a half weeks and all sorts of things were happening to my body and, um, 
[pause] so I had the opportunity to, to, because I can’t just pretend things don’t [pause] I’m not one 
of these people who can, um, do something else and pretend something’s not happening.  So I was 
processing the whole thing during the whole experience and, and, um, kind of connecting to this 
little embryo [small laugh] and, and apologising that I can’t, you know, I just can’t, you know, do, 
do this and I believe in, in souls and things and um [pause]. And so I did all that and, um, explained 
[small laugh], you know, just, I, you know, for whatever the embryo was I did love it and care for it 
and it was the best thing for it not to come this time round. [Big breath in]  
This section of Maree’s account tells a lot about both how finely detailed a woman’s 
relationship to her fantasy potential maternal subjectivity and child may be, and also about 
concerns around the ways in which such fantasies might be perceived socially. Maree began it 
by positioning herself as one who has a certain personal honesty and courage in confronting 
what is happening in her life. Her words imply that to do so was not the easy way out that 
others might have taken. She often positioned herself as other to those who may want to 
mother for ‘selfish’ reasons, and those who do not ‘process’ or pay emotional attention to the 
decision not to terminate a pregnancy. In doing this she drew on discourses that in some ways 
evaluate people in terms of their emotional maturity and sensitivity. It was important to her 
that she situate herself in relation to me as a person who acknowledged the presence of the 
“little embryo” and explained her regrets and reasons to it in as loving and honest a way as 
she could. At the same time though, in her small laughs, Maree attempted to minimize her 
actions, showing her concern that I might be judging the actions she took in “connecting to 
this little embryo” as perhaps slightly silly. Her repetitions of “you know” can be read as a 
plea for empathy with the necessity of her choices.  
As I have discussed more generally earlier, I suggest that Maree’s experience of her brief 
pregnancy and the termination of it was, in Ettinger’s terms, an experience that was 
transformative in bringing what she understands as “that maternal thing” into her conscious                                                         
84 I explore the concept of ‘nurturing’ as it relates to the maternal more fully in Chapter 6. 
85 Maree’s emphasis on the importance of doing mothering resonates with a sociological insight first advanced 
by Morgan (2011, 1996) and later Finch (2007) in terms of their discussion of the significance of family 
practices, in which they argue that in order to understand families attention must be paid to what people in 
families do as well as how they are positioned. 
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awareness because it offered her a brief embodied experience of her fantasy maternity and 
child. It seems that the physicality of pregnancy, and the physical materiality of items such as 
baby clothes (which Maree twice commented that she “loved” to buy for friends with babies) 
somehow came to symbolize this “maternal thing” for her.  
The segment is also an example of the oblique way a woman’s maternal fantasies are revealed 
in their talk. Maree took up a subject position of ‘nurturing mother’ through  “loving” and 
“caring for” “the embryo” in ways that she immediately knew how to assume because they 
already existed in her fantasy of being a mother. In turn for her “the embryo” readily took up 
the place of the child of her fantasy in her interactions with it. In this sense, in fantasy she was 
already a mother, in the same way as Deborah was. In hearing her account I sensed the kind 
of mother Maree might want to be to a living child and, because she knew me to be a mother, 
I think this was her intention; that is, in acting as she did she was performing the mothering of 
her fantasies, and in describing her actions in relation to the embryo she was eliciting my 
recognition of her, as a particular kind of mother. 
“Something I really, really want” 
There is a sense of an opaque and conflicted quality to this awareness of her fantasy for 
Maree however; in some ways it remained a mystery to her, something that she was unclear 
about and a little reluctant to claim. When I asked about the times in which she is aware of 
what she described as the “void” occupied by “that maternal thing” in her life, for example, 
this opaque quality of her yearning for “my own family” was revealed in her responses to a 
cousin’s experience: 
Um, I’ve noticed a big reaction, um I’ve got a cousin who’s like a brother, um, he’s up in [northern 
city], he’s like a younger brother.  And he recently, like in the last two years he met, um, this 
awesome girl and they fell completely head over heels in love, got married really quickly and had a 
baby really quickly [breath in], and, and they just, you know, they’re perfect, you know, it’s just so 
lovely.  Like I’m so happy for them and, um, just thinking about their situation makes me smile, 
you know, because I’m down here in [southern city].  When I’m physically around them it’s, again 
it’s beautiful to watch and it, and it’s awesome but I, it’s like I just, I fall really flat after that and 
for about three days, and I’m thinking, “What’s going on here?”  The first time I was thinking, 
“What the heck’s going on here,” and then I sort of recognised that it’s obviously something I 
really, really want [small laugh].  Um, and this next time round I knew straightaway and it took me 
a few days to sort of pick myself back up again.  So it’s, while I’m really, really happy for them I 
feel quite sad and like I’m missing out on all that and, ‘cause it’s right in front of me and they’re so 
happy. 
The marked contrast in Maree’s tone and style of delivery between this segment of her 
account and much of the rest of her interview tells me that it is a part of her story that carries a 
particular energy for her, as the earlier segment about her pregnancy and termination in which 
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she also became much more animated also did. She had described herself as the “tomboy” of 
her family of origin, and I wonder if in this role she identified with her male cousin who was 
“like a younger brother”. Perhaps there is something about the embodied nature of someone 
(who is ‘nearly’ her) taking up this subjectivity that she so desired which made it more 
difficult for her. Intersubjectively speaking, perhaps the boundaries between ‘me’ and ‘not-
me’ between close siblings (or quasi-siblings in this case) and others with whom people feel a 
close connection are more porous than they are between those who are more distant, and that 
it is less possible to dismiss that longed-for life as something ‘other’ people have, rather than 
something one might almost have had, and may still have. As a further example, Maree also 
commented elsewhere that she felt “guarded” around her sister’s family of four children, 
finding it “rough” because “they’re all nested in and they’re this really awesome solid family 
[…] and it’s something that I’d love too”. It seems that when she was at a distance and she 
could keep the vision of her sister, or her cousin and his “perfect” little family as an idea, she 
could take pleasure in their happiness, but faced with it embodied—“right in front of her”—
she was less able to ignore the gap between it (and the fulfillment of her maternal fantasies 
that it represented for her) and the present reality of her life.  
I relate Maree’s slight hesitance in recounting this experience to my earlier discussion about 
the shadow cast by the dubious desirability of motherhood. Her small laugh when she told me 
“it’s something I really really want” suggests that she wanted to minimize this statement; she 
seemed a little embarrassed to be admitting it, suggesting that it is in some way at odds with 
the image she wanted to project and believe of herself or that she understood to be socially 
acceptable.  
Overall her enthusiasm in telling this story about her response to her cousin’s coupled 
happiness and the conception of his child, the language she chose, and the repetitions and 
hesitations in her speech are in marked contrast with the measured and deliberate way she 
talked about her life elsewhere in the interview. Hearing it, I found it hard to reconcile these 
two very different ‘versions’ of Maree: the serious, responsible young woman with a slightly 
‘flat’ delivery who was committed to establishing an independent life for herself in the world, 
and the bubbling young woman so obviously attracted to a “perfect”, romantic story of a 
couple falling “completely head over heels in love”. Once again, Maree’s sharp breath in after 
“had a baby really quickly” may indicate words that were emotionally laden for her. I suggest 
that, along with her minimising little laughs, it suggests a yearning for a romantic ideal of 
something “so lovely” in her own life that she perceived to be in some way incommensurate 
with the rational, measured, successful identity she strove for. The romantic ideal of 
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fulfillment through a close and continuing intimate relationship continues to have a strong 
cultural hold for women (Trimberger, 2005), but it is often perceived to be in conflict with 
competing narratives of independence, financial and emotional autonomy and ‘personal 
growth’.  I suggest that some of the intense conflict apparent in Maree’s drawing is also 
reflected here in her discomfort in claiming motherhood as a socially acceptable goal. 
Embodying a mother’s fantasy 
A further possible interpretation of Maree’s apparent confusion about motherhood being 
“something I really really want” appears in a segment in which she discusses her mother’s 
reaction to her not yet having had a child. She told me that her mother “wasn’t sure whether 
she could see me having kids when I was growing up”. 
Lois: Because of the whole tomboy thing? 
Maree: Yeah. Um and I think with my sister being so maternal and having all the kids, oh I used to 
say she’s had them for both of us, I’ve said that for years to sort of take the pressure off. 
Lois: Mm. 
Maree: ‘Cause she’s had four, so, um.  And I think Mum was sort of living vicariously through 
each of us, like she had the maternal daughter and the career- minded one, and the independent one 
and the family one, and so she got, you know, we were so very different, so Mum was quite happy 
with me being there. 
The segment suggests that, from Maree’s perspective,  her mother had unconsciously resolved 
her own version of “feeling torn” by living a version of her own fantasies “vicariously” 
through her daughters. Maree appeared to see her mother as positioning her very differently in 
relation to her sisters. It seemed that Maree understood herself and her sister to be exemplars 
of different ways of being an adult woman in the 21st century, and while she wanted to be an 
independent career woman, she also longed to be a person who ‘falls in love’, ‘nests’ and is a 
selfless loving mother. This extract suggests that Maree’s framing of her situation, vis a vis 
her mother’s perception of her and her fantasies of what ‘mother’ looks like, constrained the 
possibilities that she saw to be available to her. Because she was positioned by others—and 
positioned herself—as the ‘tomboy’ of the family, she appeared to find it difficult to envisage 
herself as a mother in conventional terms. Under such circumstances it might have been 
difficult for Maree to recognise, make sense of, and acknowledge her own maternal fantasies.  
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4.6 Concluding discussion 
Revisiting fantasy and maternal subjectivity 
It is in this area of maternal fantasy that Law’s “things that slip and slide” are at their most 
elusive in this project. I have suggested that making sense of it entails a particular 
understanding of both ‘fantasy’ and ‘mother’, and I have described how the ‘porous’ 
intersubjective relationship between a mother and her child, is tangled in the maternal fantasy 
that develops. At this point I want to summarize my argument in relation to these concepts in 
the light of the research material, and to take them one step further into the trans-subjective 
through attention to Bracha Ettinger’s theoretical work.   
The transition to motherhood is often discussed as a process that begins at conception, and 
continues as a woman moves through her pregnancy, anticipates the birth of her baby, and 
accommodates the huge physical, psychological and social changes that being a new mother 
creates.86 Part of that adjustment, after the birth, is coming to terms with the embodied reality 
of motherhood and her baby—although of course they have been embodied in a different way 
throughout the pregnancy—and accommodating the distance between them and the fantasies 
of maternity and a child that have developed. 
This is not to imply that embodied ‘reality’ takes the place of fantasy after the birth of a child, 
because fantasy continues to permeate the ways a woman takes up a maternal subjectivity, but 
rather that when women who do not go on to have a child, their maternal fantasies have the 
potential to continue unchecked by the embodied realities of a child or motherhood. This 
works both ways, since women who do go on to have a child and find the experience difficult 
may fantasize (perhaps in Winnicott’s sense of ‘fantasying’) about how life might have been 
if they had not had a child; a fantasy that may play itself out in their daughters’ ambivalent 
maternal fantasies. A number of participants spoke, as Lesley did, of having mothers who did 
not want to be a mother, or were explicitly ambivalent about it. 
In this view of the development of a maternal subjectivity, ‘being’ a mother hinges on the 
embodiment of a child and, to a lesser extent, the embodied practices of caring for him or her. 
This defining factor has always been a little blurry—is one a mother if one’s only baby has 
died, or if one is an adopting or surrogate mother with no further contact after birth, for 
example?—but the reality of a baby’s embodiment is still the key factor, even if the definition 
                                                        
86 See for example Miller (2005) and Thomson et al (2011) 
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of ‘motherhood’ is extended to encompass “genetic, gestational, and carer” mothers, as 
Welldon (2006) has done.  
My strategy has been to foreground the role of conscious and unconscious fantasy as a further 
aspect of the development of maternal subjectivity. Stone (2011 p.167) writes that mothers 
experiences and development are organized in a “particular relational or psychical position—a 
distinctive subject-position”. My argument for a woman’s “sense of herself as a mother” 
existing even before she becomes a mother in genetic, gestational or care-giving terms 
extends Stone’s theorization of this “position” and hinges on the understanding that the 
development of the fantasy element of maternal subjectivity can be understood as a process 
that does not begin at birth when a woman ‘becomes’ a mother, nor even in pregnancy in 
relation to an embodied foetus, but rather takes place throughout her life. Indeed, given the 
way women talked about their fantasies of becoming a grandmother later in their life, and the 
impact of their mother’s fantasies on the development of their own—even before their 
conception—I suggest that a woman’s fantasies of maternity can be understood to be 
unlimited temporally, since they are linked to her mother’s own fantasies, and logically, to her 
mother’s and so forth.  
These maternal fantasies are not limited to the experiences a woman had in relationship with 
her own mother as a baby and child growing up, since they are also imbued with the myriad 
social and cultural resources of motherhood in which she has been immersed. These shape her 
understandings of what it is to be selfish or unselfish, sexually attractive or otherwise, 
fulfilled or unfulfilled, loving and lovable, successful, feminine and so forth, and are 
constantly framing what it might be to be a mother. It is impossible to overstate the 
complexity and diversity of the development of these maternal fantasies, and they might be 
best understood to be boundless not only temporally as I have suggested, but also socially, 
and relationally.  
I understand a woman’s maternal fantasies to be of a different order than other “possible 
lives” (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame 2003) she might have. Firstly they are uniquely loaded 
with the weight of social expectations of what a woman might be that still link femininity 
with motherhood in spite of the enormous cultural changes in (Western) women’s lives in the 
last 60 years or so; uniquely in the sense that all the other possibilities for subjectivity that 
women might take up—such as being an artist or a scientist or whatever—are not indexed to 
femininity in this way. Secondly, they are saturated with a woman’s developing sense of 
herself as an individual having begun within the context of her early maternal bodily 
relations—what Stone (2011, p.6) refers to as “the locus of a kind of presubjectivity embodied 
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between mother and child”—and later developed in intersubjective relationship with her 
mother. 87 Because of this saturation, women ‘know’ something of what it is to be a mother—
through their intersubjective and trans-subjective experience as a child—in ways that they can 
not know the experiences of ‘artist’ or ‘scientist’, for example. I used Samantha’s vignette of 
the mutual recognition that passes between a mother and her very young child to illustrate 
aspects of this (section 4.3 of this chapter). 
The interview material discussed in this chapter suggests that many women’s maternal 
fantasies are largely unconscious for many years—both in the sense of being in part 
constituted of archaic memories and therefore unavailable, and of being not accessed in 
conscious thought in a way I would describe as dormant—until they are ignited in some way. 
This ignition has usually been understood to be linked to a re-immersion in the viscerality of 
maternal body relations as a new mother (e.g. Stone 2011; Raphael-Leff  2009), but I have 
described how other experiences such as contact with babies and small children, a brief 
experience of pregnancy, or even a realization that one’s fertility is fading, have been a 
triggering factor. When I write of aspects of her fantasy being “ignited” by events in a 
woman’s life, I mean the way in which these events bring aspects of her fantasy into her 
conscious awareness; in Balint’s (1987, p.95) terms events move these aspects from 
‘phantasy’ to ‘fantasy’, where they might be “played with”.88 89  
Drawing on the ‘matrixial’ 
The stretch that conceiving of maternal subjectivity in this way entails can be accomplished 
theoretically if one considers it through the lens of Ettinger’s (2006) notion of the matrixial 
borderspace.90 For Ettinger, the originary trans-subjective matrixial stratum does not 
disappear, but after birth it is accompanied by other strata which are to do with partial 
separation and increasing individuation, alongside which it co-exists; in Ettinger’s words “it 
accompanies the phallic subjectivity all along its voyage” (2004, p.78), and matrixial 
processes continue throughout life. This perspective creates the possibility of identifying                                                         
87 Of course, some babies and children are primarily cared for by their father or other individuals, however 
women are—and have historically been—the primary carers of infants and children, and the maternal figure is 
the “first orienting figure” (Stone 2012, p.34).  
88 I want to emphasise again that I am not suggesting that all women should have children, or that they want to 
have children, and that this desire is somehow thwarted or suppressed. In focusing on this aspect of women’s 
maternal subjectivity I have left aside the question of how women make the reproductive choices they do. The 
ambivalent nature of these fantasies, competing desires, and a variety of social factors all play a part in an 
increasing number of women choosing not to have children. 
89 Within their conscious awareness it seems circumstantially childless women are constrained in “playing 
with”—that is making meaning of—their responses because of a lack of opportunity to explore them with others. 
I discuss this further in Chapter 5. 
90 I discuss Ettinger’s concept of the matrixial in Chapter 2, pp.34-38. 
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events and contexts in a woman’s life that contain traces of a maternal subjectivity where “the 
split [with the mother] collapses, yet difference is maintained” (Ettinger 2006, pp.196-197).  
From this perspective, traces of the archaic trans-subjective relationship a woman has with her 
mother might be understood to exist alongside those of the later intersubjective relationship 
that develops as the daughter grows, and to permeate the fantasy dimension of the “relational 
or psychic position” that each woman develops.91 The ‘ignition’ of her fantasies of maternity 
that I have described can be understood to bring the trans-subjective stratum closer to the 
‘surface’ of her conscious awareness (Hollway 2012b). It may be that the “sense of myself as 
a mother” is grounded not simply in an imagining of what it might be to be a mother, but 
rather in an archaic embodied experience of a woman’s porous trans-subjective relationship 
with her mother in the late uterine period, as well as in the later relationship with her mother 
and other people and resources in her social world in the period after her birth and throughout 
her childhood.92 93 In this way Ettinger’s matrixial concept adds a further dimension to my 
argument that aspects of the fantasy element of a woman’s maternal subjectivity develops 
before maternity itself is embodied. 
Ettinger (2006a, p.220) writes that matrixial space-time is “usually fore-closed or infolded 
inside more phallic dimensions and ignored”. Women’s experiences (and maternal desires) 
can be understood to be in tension at times between these strata since the weight of phallic 
logic, inscribed in language, lies in the necessity to develop what Hollway (2012a, p.30) 
describes as “that masculine gold standard of individuality”; an autonomous self. Even if 
early relations with the maternal body are not considered before birth as well as after it, these 
research materials illustrated the tensions that are created for young women through a set of 
assumptions about the individual’s necessity to separate from early relations to the maternal 
                                                        
91 Since we are all “of woman born” (Rich 1976), this potential is also available to men, but it has different 
implications.  
92 I use the word “imagining” in its popular sense here. It could be argued that all imagination is originally 
grounded in embodied experience in some way; however here I use it in the sense of something that is fabricated 
out of ‘nothing’. 
93 This porous psychical relationship finds its embodied form in the phenomenon of microchimerism; the 
intermingling of cells from one person inside the body of another. The tissue that connects a pregnant woman 
with her unborn foetus is not an impenetrable barrier but a “selective border crossing”. Scientists working in the 
field of microchimerism have found that fetal cells, genetically differentiated from those of the mother, continue 
to develop in her many years after the birth of a child. Work into their role is ongoing, and it is thought they may 
later play a protective role in inhibiting the development of some auto-immune diseases, and a healing role in 
injury, as they appear to “migrate” to injury sites (Shute, 2010). 
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body that are embodied within the dominant strands of our social imaginary.94 Stone (2012, 
p.10) writes: 
The most common modern version of these assumptions is that one must leave the maternal body 
behind to become an autonomous individual subject, the author and architect of one’s experience 
and of the normative authority of the values and meanings to which one commits oneself.  
This is the tension that De Marneffe refers to in the epigraph to this chapter, and the impasse 
that women such as Maree find themselves in, where becoming a mother and embodying her 
maternal fantasies is intensely desired, yet is perceived to be at odds with the goal of 
becoming an independent self.  
In trying to identify indicators of a matrixial dimension to participants’ fantasies I am very 
definitely in the territory of the “things that slip and slide”. As I noted in Chapter 2, in her 
own work looking at the experience of new mothers through the lens of matrixial theory, 
Hollway (2012a, p.23) understood participants’ repeated use of the word ‘weird’ to stand in 
for “the ineffable, something that is not readily explicable through language”, pointing to “the 
extent that pregnancy cannot be expressed adequately in language and consequently perhaps it 
feels like it cannot be understood”. In my own research materials I looked for times in 
participants’ interviews where language failed them and they seemed stymied in their 
attempts to express their thoughts. For example, when Samantha was asked to elaborate on 
the “unique” relationship between mother and child, her voice suddenly dropped to a whisper 
and she answered not with an explanation, but with the vignette that for her captured the 
intimate mutuality of the connection between a mother and her child. I also paid attention to 
times when participants moved abruptly from their thoughts to their feelings, or to a sensory 
register. As I noted above, a number of participants used the term ‘a sense of’ to capture their 
experience of the ‘isness’ of their fantasy child or maternity.  
Weber and Mitchell (1995, p.35) write that “(d)rawings offer a different kind of glimpse into 
human sense-making than written or spoken texts do, because they can express that which is 
not easily put into words: the ineffable, the elusive, the not-yet-thought-through, the 
subconscious”. I read this kind of matrixial sense-making in Lynn’s completing her drawing 
of the sequential narrative of her life (as she had previously articulated it in her interview) by 
placing large red breasts overlaying it all, and explaining this by changing from a cognitive to 
a sensory register as an illustration of an intimacy she ‘knows’, but does not know, all at once.                                                         
94 Taylor (2003, p.23) describes the concept of social imaginaries as “the ways people imagine their social 
existence, how they fit together with others, how things go between them and their fellows, the expectations that 
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”.  
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I suggest that Lynn struggled to speak of something that is pre-discursive, as Hollway’s 
participants did; to communicate the idea that a ‘knowing’ might be somehow experienced 
bodily, and yet it was not of her body.  
There is no way I can ‘know’ in any conventional sense whether this interview material is 
‘evidence’ of a matrixial dimension to women’s fantasies of maternity. No one visiting her 
could see the baby shaping “everything” in Janine’s home or the pony-riding daughter in 
Isabella’s, the dense black asterisk lodged in Gina’s womb or Lynn’s physical experience of 
loss at having missed the opportunity to nurture. These are certainly “phenomena that are 
hardly caught by social science methods” (Laws 2004, p.2). I can however, identify their 
(literally) inexplicable quality, their intensity and their very private nature. In this way, this 
research makes these fantasies and understandings of self, which cannot be articulated in a 
broader context, visible and accessible.  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Chapter 5: Loss and mourning in the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness 
(A)bsences make themselves known in routine passages, in everyday encounters and in the 
management of ordinary affairs. 
(Meier et al 2013, p.424) 
5.1 Introduction: “the grieving for something not fulfilled” 
Um [long pause, and then puffing breath out] it’s not loss in the sense of something known. You 
know how if one loses a parent, or loses a sibling, or, you know loss in the sense of um [pause] 
having known something, and then losing it. It’s not loss in, in that sense, and yet it is loss of 
[pause] I don’t know, a vision or a hope or a dream or an expectation, or [stop].  So there is 
grieving that goes with it. Just, it’s, I don’t know that it’s the same grieving as the loss of 
something that was known to exist. But I think it exists. That [pause] that sense of loss, and the 
grieving for something not fulfilled is, is, you know, does, does exist. Yeah. Yes. 
Deborah 
“A vision or a hope or a dream or an expectation”  
Loss and suffering permeated all the research materials in this project. Sadness, yearning, 
regret, anger, perplexity and a sense of feeling misjudged, misunderstood, isolated or 
unrecognized threaded through every interview. Here, Deborah attempted to articulate the 
maternal fantasy that she understood was lost. Though she struggled to verbalise what is 
‘lost’, she insisted that her loss is real and claimed her experience as ‘grief’. Her repetitions at 
the end of the excerpt above suggested a determination to defend its existence against a 
challenge; that its validity might perhaps be called into question.  
Read in the context of the whole of Deborah’s research material, this hesitation about the 
social recognition of her experience of loss has a particular pertinence, and the “something 
that was known to exist” a particular charge. There is no glimpse here of Alisdair and Elinor, 
Deborah’s fantasy children whom I discussed in the previous chapter, or of her “sense of 
myself as a mother”, because neither of these was “known” (by others) to exist. They were 
rather, as Mantell (2003, p.229) writes, “in a sly state of half-becoming [where] they lurk in 
the shadowland of chances missed”. Although it was unintended, with them in mind the “it” 
that is the subject of “(b)ut I think it exists” can be read as having an unintended double 
meaning; it is possible that she is referring both to her maternal fantasy, that she ‘knows’ to 
exist, and also to her grief at not bringing it into existence through pregnancy, birth and 
parenting.  
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In the previous chapter I argued that many of these women appear to have developed a sense 
of themselves as a mother from the very beginning of their lives that is both conscious and 
unconscious, and I attempted to pin down the fantasies that “slip and slide” through their 
interviews and drawings. In this chapter and the following chapter I provide a psychosocial 
account of their experiences when these fantasies are not embodied. My focus here is on the 
losses, grieving and isolation women talked about. I argue for a conceptualization of  
‘grieving’ to encompass the responses to losses that are not material and are not related to a 
specific temporal point, and I explore the ways that grieving is tied up with questions of 
agency and the notion of ‘choice’.  
5.2 What—or whom—is lost? 
(I)f you’ve never been pregnant and you’ve never had a miscarriage, you’re not grieving something 
that’s died, you’re grieving something that has never had a chance to start. Yeah, I don’t know 
what we grieve for, but it is really very real. (…) It’s losing a dream, losing [pause] something 
that’s kind of, I just [pause] innate in you, I don’t know… 
Isabella 
I guess it’s weird isn’t it because you haven’t really lost anything because you didn’t have it in the 
first place in a way. But there’s that, but I yeah, but there’s that loss because you haven’t got it, you 
haven’t had that chance, yeah, yeah.  It’s, I suppose you could almost, you could describe it as grief 
really because you, I don’t know, it must be a, I suppose it’s such a powerful thing this urge to have 
children to, you know, so yeah I think you could call it grief, yeah.  
Irene 
It is difficult to make sense of these participants’ stories of loss in terms of existing theoretical 
accounts of loss and mourning; both in terms of what is lost and of the process that women go 
through in grieving for these losses.  In trying to clarify what is lost—the root loss with which 
the idiosyncratic secondary losses of each woman are associated—like Isabella and Irene I 
found it hard to shift beyond the presumption of material loss; beyond the idea of a 
‘something’ or ‘someone’ that one once had and was now lost, that is deeply embedded in 
both psychoanalytic literature and popular understandings of grieving. These two women fell 
back on a presumption of an “innate” human “urge” to have children to explain the intensity 
of their yearning, and hence of their grief when it was not fulfilled, but although they were 
certain of their experience of loss and of grieving for it, they remained perplexed about how 
to conceptualize and talk about the object of their grief. Like Isabella and Irene, many 
participants struggled to name what was lost in their experience of circumstantial 
childlessness, but they were explicit about the personal reality of their loss. A number of 
women referred to the loss of a dream as Isabella did, but since ‘dreams’ and ‘fantasies’ have 
such an ethereal, evanescent quality in popular understanding these women fall back on a 
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biologically based notion to make sense of the intensity of the loss they feel. Framed through 
Ettinger’s theory their words might be understood to speak to the “ineffable” (Hollway 2012a, 
p.23) quality of the matrixial in these fantasies and in what is perceived to be lost.  
Freud’s paper “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917/1954) has dominated and shaped the 
development of the literature around grief in Western thought for almost a century now. Grief 
and grieving have been framed predominantly within a Freudian psychoanalytic discourse or 
the psychological accounts that developed out of it. Although he wrote of mourning as “the 
reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the 
place of one such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on” (Freud 1917/1954, p. 243, my 
italics), there remains at the root of his theorizing the presumption of the material loss of an 
individual, and a loss event that can be pinpointed to a particular moment. Popular 
understandings of grief that have emerged out of these psychological accounts are still 
primarily associated with the losses of bereavement. In the past thirty years loss and its 
associated grief have been interpreted more broadly in individuals’ or communities’ lives—as 
an expected outcome of divorce for example, or of a disaster such as the Canterbury 
earthquakes—but even with this more generous framing there is still a presumption of the 
loss, at a particular time, of something which one once had.95  
It was only when I came back to a focus on fantasy, and to the psychic reality of these 
fantasies of maternity and a child for participants, that I was able to identify what is lost,  and 
make sense of the grieving that most of these circumstantially childless women talked about 
doing. Losses such as these are better understood when the question shifts from what is lost to 
include whom; when women’s fantasies of maternity and a child or children are understood to 
be charged with the powerful reality that I discussed in Chapter 4, and when the ways in 
which these fantasies permeate women’s lives is acknowledged.  “We are always, already, 
utterly embedded in relationships” (Thomson (2007, p.1) writes, and it is our relationships 
with others that create the “I” we understand ourselves to be. A child creates a woman as a 
mother and thereby creates a web of belonging both in a family and in the company of 
generations of mothers. For these women the loss of the potential to embody their biological                                                         
95 In the early stages of writing this thesis the area in NZ in which I live was struck by a series of earthquakes, 
two of which caused major damage and significant loss of life. Over an extended period life of the entire broader 
community was seriously disrupted by the impact of these events. I have paid particular attention to the way in 
which grief has been framed in public and private contexts throughout this time. While the losses experienced by 
individuals whose family members or close friends were killed have been prioritised in public mourning, it is 
clear that grieving has also come to be acknowledged in the lives of individuals and the whole community as an 
effect of loss more broadly: loss of home and property, jobs, community facilities such as libraries, familiar 
loved landmarks and public spaces, schools and so forth. The focus has always been however, on the loss of  
“something known to exist”; the obviously material such as buildings and familiar landscapes, and also the less 
tangible ‘things’ such as a sense of security or predictability.  
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maternity through the birth of a child signals the loss of this fantasy relationship as they have 
understood it until now, and consequently of this fantasy aspect of themselves that has 
developed throughout their lives, including—from a matrixial perspective—before their birth.  
Each of these women grieved in some way for this “sense of myself as a mother”, and for the 
idiosyncratic meanings that being a mother and having a biological child held for her. Some 
grieved for the child of their fantasies, and for the experience of nurturing that child in an 
embodied way through carrying, giving birth, and feeding him or her. Some grieved when 
they had lost the opportunity to be called “Mum”, and to be seen by their child and others in 
their social worlds as a mother.  
Loss has a quality of folding in on itself, creating a loss-within-a-loss. Although the loss of 
their realization of maternal fantasies may exist for all of these women, the meanings they 
ascribed to that loss was idiosyncratic for each one. Envisaging their loss in this way makes it 
possible to take account of the range of responses women have to not having had a biological 
child. Understanding ‘whom’ or ‘what’ is lost in her fantasy of maternity is the terrain of 
meaning-making, and I will discuss developments around this aspect of grief theory in more 
detail further below. 
5.3 Kleinian theoretical roots of mourning 
I turn now to a discussion of the process of grieving and adaptation that I understand these 
participants to be engaged in. In Chapter 2 I discussed an object relations perspective of the 
process of mourning. It is usefully summarized in the following quotation from Klein: 
In normal mourning the individual re-introjects and reinstates, as well as the actual lost person, his 
loved parents—who are felt to be his ‘good’ inner objects. His inner world, the one which he has 
built up from his earliest days onwards, in his phantasy was destroyed when the actual loss 
occurred. The rebuilding of this inner world characterizes the successful work of mourning.  
(1940, pp.166-167) 
Klein’s theory is based on the restoration of the lost loved person, and the loved ‘good’ 
objects of his or her infancy, in the bereaved person’s “inner world”. Once securely 
introjected, he or she is able to draw more confidently on a sense that “life inside and outside 
will go on after all, and that the lost loved object can be preserved within” (Klein 1940.1986, 
p. 163, my italics). I see this process happening in a bereaved person when he or she reaches a 
point of taking pleasure in their memories of a loved person; drawing on their internalized 
sense of that person in the ways they construct a new life without the physical presence of 
him or her in their lives.  
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This mourning—grieving and preserving—is not to be understood as a linear process but 
rather one that changes over time. Klein (1940/1986, p.164) notes that “in mourning, as well 
as in infantile development, inner security comes about in waves”. Craib (1994, pp.25-26) 
described it as: 
(A) continual movement between the manic defences (and it is often possible to believe that we 
have overcome this grief through discovering new levels of creativity) and the depressive position 
(where, for a while, we might believe that we are irretrievably caught up in the grief). 
Extrapolating to the focus of this study, Deborah implied this kind of movement in this 
extract: 
I think through a variety of people, um, relationships, um, and probably a, a reasonably prolonged 
period of, um, quite structured personal development, you know, I’ve sort of, every time it comes 
up [pause] I look at it again. [voice shakes] I wouldn’t say I’ve dealt with it, you know [pause]. I 
think probably, um [pause] hearing the shake in my voice now, feeling the tears in my eyes, um 
[pause] it’s quite likely that I will [pause] I know [pause] talk about it with [her husband], ah, 
[…]because I suspect that from today there’ll be things that I’ve heard myself say [voice shakes a 
lot], for the first time, or [pause] um, yeah, it will bring stuff up. 
Managing “sorrow and pain” 
I will come back to the issue of ‘preservation’ in Chapter 6, but first want to comment on the 
range of strategies women described in response to the “sorrow and pain” (Klein 1940/1986, 
p.156) of loss. Many talked about denying or suppressing the pain of the “pining” for the 
loved lost object and the “longing to regain” it that Klein (1940/1986, p. 151) proposed was 
central to the depressive position. Irene, for example, spoke of the feelings that seeing a “cute 
kid and a happy family” would trigger for her. I asked her how she handled this and she 
replied:  
I suppose you just bury it.  I’m very good at burying things, I tend to block things out, um, they just 
get shut away in the dark deep recesses of my mind and come out, get dragged out every so often 
and then very quickly put back again, yeah, because they hurt so yeah. 
Irene’s use of “suppose” and “the dark, deep recesses of my mind” suggests that, for her, 
there was some awareness of this denial being a partly conscious, but largely unconscious 
process of refusal to acknowledge her painful feelings. Maree also commented about this, 
saying “it’s too painful to sort of keep at the front or wherever it might be, you know, with 
everyday life, um, so I pack it back there somewhere, but it’s still there”. Klein (1940/18986, 
p. 152) wrote that “(w)ithout partial and temporary denial of psychic reality the ego cannot 
bear the disaster by which it feels itself threatened when the depressive position is at its 
height”.  
126 
Many participants also talked about the ways in which they engaged conscious cognitive 
strategies such as positive self-talk. Sophia, for example said: 
I mean you do feel like a failure, you really do, but you can’t be a victim all your life so you’ve just 
kind of got to pick yourself up, dust yourself off and get on with it, pretty much.  I mean, you 
know, […] (t)here’s people worse off in the world than what we are, um, there’s just a huge chunk 
that’s missing.  But it’s, you can’t let it rule your life. 
In Sophia’s repeated use of “you” there is a strong sense of self-admonition that was very 
common in many of these women’s interviews. It reflects dominant cultural influences in loss 
and grieving in the ways some of these women responded to their situation.  Kelly’s 
interview, for example, epitomized a valorization of a stoic, no-nonsense approach to life’s 
losses and disappointments, particularly those that are disenfranchised in the ways that 
circumstantial childlessness is. 96 She was 38 at the time of the interview, and had chosen to 
be with a man who had two young boys and was unwilling to have more. She told me that she 
had moved through a time of distress that she would not have a biological child of her own to 
mainly “being thankful for what I do have”, but commented “(i)t could change overnight if he 
was to wake up tomorrow morning and say that he wanted a child”.  
Lois: What do you think you’d feel if he said that?  
Kelly: [quick breath in] Um. All of the emotions, I think I’d have all of them. I, I, you know 
obviously I’d be quite elated, but I’d also be very scared and apprehensive […] 
Lois: So where would the elation come from Kelly?  
Kelly: Um [pause] yeah, the, the, I guess those feelings that I’ve been [pause] suppressing or 
putting to aside. The feelings like wow, yeah, I would actually get to be a Mum [pause].Yeah, 
yeah. Yep [long pause] mmm [pause] I think that probably would be [pause] yeah [pause] it, it 
certainly um [pause] yeah [pause] it certainly would be there. Yeah, I haven’t  [pause] doused that 
flame entirely. But yeah, I would still have those feelings.  
Lois: Is that the process you see, that you’ve gone through a process of kind of rationally thinking 
this through and sort of dousing the little flames that flicker up as they come?  
Kelly: Mmm. Mm I think that probably is it. Because I am the sort to be reasonably practical in the 
sense that, if you, if you dwell on something or if you wish for something that has, that, is not 
going to happen or whatever, that you end up digging yourself into just a big hole of depression 
and it’s just, it’s just not worth it. It’s not worth putting that sort of pressure on yourself.” 
Kelly’s spontaneous use of the metaphor of ‘dousing the flame’ of her fantasy is 
extraordinarily powerful in its evocation of both the vitality of this fantasy and her determined 
                                                        
96 I introduce Kelly in Chapter 3 on p.75. I quote this segment of her individual interview in full again here for 
ease of reading.  
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mastery of it. The question about her “elation” appeared to catch her out, and she stumbled in 
her otherwise mainly smooth narrative. Hearing herself say “I would actually get to be a 
Mum” almost overwhelmed her with her longing to embody her fantasies of being a mother, 
but she eventually recovered herself and reverted to what in Kleinian terms might be 
understand to be a ‘manic’ defence of denial and triumph against the pain of grief in her 
efforts to maintain control over it. Her change of pronoun from “I” to “you” in the final 
paragraph is significant. It represented a strong voice of sensible reason that is a culturally 
learned defence again the pain of difficult emotions.  
I found myself wondering whether Kelly’s notion of being “practical” in the face of loss was 
an example of the stereotype of New Zealanders taking a commonsense, no-nonsense, ‘no 
drama’ approach to life’s vicissitudes, or whether it was part of a broader Western minimising 
of strong feelings, in response to non-death losses in particular. It is interesting to speculate 
on how the processes of mourning that Klein outlined might be expressed in differing ways in 
different cultural settings. In places where the outward expression (and ‘inward’ tolerance) of 
high emotion is more encouraged than it is in New Zealand, the idea of being “practical” 
about one’s grieving might seem unthinkable.  
Meaning-making 
Kelly described her mother as “hanging out to be a grandma” but said “she’s really good 
about that sort of thing. She’s really good about saying you know, if it doesn’t happen, it 
doesn’t happen and you know not pushing […] She’s never asked, so, um yeah. And that’s 
probably, um, it’s probably where I get my thinking from as well”.  I read Kelly’s response 
and meaning-making around her experience psychosocially as a product of her 
psychobiography (in particular her mother’s similarly stoic response to not having 
grandchildren), her unconscious processing of loss, and the predominance of cultural ‘rules’ 
of grieving that emphasize these qualities as desirable.  
The responses these women made to the pain of loss were not only a product of their past but 
also became part of their way of going on in the world; that is, these strategies were not 
simply coping strategies that disappeared once the pain of loss had faded, but rather become 
part of a complex process of meaning-making (Neimeyer 2001) in their lives.97 Comparing                                                         
97 The term ‘meaning-making’ in this context comes out of a growing body of work in the bereavement field that 
considers meaning reconstruction in response to loss as a central process in grieving (for example see Neimeyer 
2001; 1998; Attig  2001). Marris (1974) adumbrated this paradigm from a psychosocial perspective when he 
envisioned grieving as “the tension between conserving and relinquishing a world of meanings undercut by the 
loss of a defining attachment” (cited in Neimeyer 2001, p.4). I consider this paradigm to be different from but 
not incommensurate with the object relations approach that underlies my theoretical position in this thesis.  
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themselves with others as way of minimising the painfulness of their experience as Sophia did 
in the extract quoted above was common, but as part of this process of making meaning of 
their experience several of these participants also often used this comparison as a means of 
connecting that experience with a broader perspective that loss is a part of living. Gina, for 
example, said “I’ve talked myself through it too. I don’t have a friend who has gotten 
everything they wanted in life, I’ve never met such a person”. Reflecting on her experience 
Kim, said: 
I just think at some level we have pain in our lives you know, and [pause] it’s almost more about 
how you [pause] endure through things, and um [pause] and I think, like I say at some level I 
would acknowledge you know I’m sorry I didn’t have children, but [pause] I’m sorry about lots of 
things, you know, […] and I think I sort of see enough people around me [pause] who’ve got other 
stuff, and I admire people who [pause] persevere, through adversity. 
Rather than a kind of ‘others are worse off’ self-admonition that Sophia’s extract suggested 
Kim and Gina’s responses suggested that they understood perseverance through adversity to 
be a part of what it is to be human, in a way that resonates well with Craib’s (1994) notion of 
the normal “disappointments” of life. ‘Perseverance through adversity’ is a common trope 
that is part of the particular set of sociocultural resources available to these women. Socially 
such a response is often characterized as ‘brave’ and ‘courageous’. As well, it may be a 
successful defence against painful and frightening losses in early life; a mother who left or 
died when their child was aged two to three was part of both Kim and Gina’s life stories. For 
all of these participants, the meaning they made of their circumstances was a complex mix of 
the conscious and unconscious, and the overlapping of the psychological and the social in 
their lives. 
(A)ny  pain caused by unhappy experiences, whatever their nature, has something in common with 
mourning. It reactivates the infantile depressive position, and encountering and overcoming 
adversity of any kind entails mental work similar to mourning. 
Klein (1940/1986, p.164) 
Klein’s (1940/1986) paper “Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states”’ built on 
her earlier (1935/1986) paper “A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive 
states”. In extending this to the experience of mourning more broadly, like Freud before her, 
Klein also wrote in terms of the death of a loved person. In her theorizing about the period in 
mourning when “the mourner feels more strongly (…) that the lost loved object can be 
preserved within” (1940/1986, p.163), however, Klein wrote more generally that “suffering 
can become productive” and she extended this possibility to a broader interpretation of losses. 
She wrote that in this period “painful experiences of all kinds” may “bring out” creative 
expression such as painting or writing, and individuals may become more capable of 
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appreciation of people and things, and more tolerant of others. She understood this 
“enrichment” in the creative capacities of people to be “gained through processes similar to 
the steps in mourning” that an infant makes in achieving the manic-depressive position. 
While Klein was careful to distinguish the “mental work” of unhappy experiences from 
mourning (for a person who has died), and was not specific about which aspects of such 
experiences are in common with it, I think I am justified in extending her theorizing about the 
process people work through in mourning to the losses of circumstantial childlessness. 
Klein’s discussion of the re-experiencing of the depressive position is relevant to the way 
these women talk about their grief at not becoming mothers. Her discussion of the psychic 
work entailed in grieving and its relationship to early infant emotional experiences helps to 
explain the intensity of women’s grief responses. Using these theoretical tools one can 
understand their grieving for the unique losses of childlessness to be laced with a sense of the 
precarious nature of their first early experience of grief, the threat of overwhelming emotions 
and ambivalence, and the fear of chaotic disintegration that it entailed.  
In “Mourning and Manic-Depressive States” Klein also pointed to the part played by the 
acknowledgement and support of others in the bereaved person’s social world in a way that 
adumbrated a psychosocial approach. She wrote that at the time the infant is struggling with 
the feared loss of the internal ‘good’ object of his mother, the ongoing embodied presence of 
his mother is a great help to him, and she related this to the experience of a mourning adult: 
Similarly, if the mourner has people whom he loves and who share his grief, and if he can accept 
their sympathy, the restoration of the harmony in his inner world is promoted, and his fears and 
distress are more quickly reduced.  
(1940/1986, p.165) 
Her words have important implications for this research because they point to the additional 
and ongoing distress and psychic disharmony that ensues when there are not others about with 
whom a mourning woman can “share” her grief, or if she is unable to accept their 
“sympathy”. This was the experience of many of the participants, as I will discuss and 
illustrate in the sections that follow. 
5.4 The impact of time  
Unlike many other life losses, the loss of the potential to embody their fantasies of maternity 
is one that develops over time as women’s fertility wanes. Although there was sometimes a 
pivotal moment at which these women apprehended their potential childlessness more 
intensely, inevitably the recognition that one will not be a mother does not take place all at 
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once, and is not grasped all at once; rather it can be understood as a continuum along which 
each participant moved both forwards and backwards, usually over a period of 10 to 15 years 
from the early 30s to the onset of menopause in the mid 40s.98  
One of the difficulties that emerged in the construction of this chapter was to do with 
generating research materials around the theme of grieving; not because there was no grieving 
for participants to talk about, but rather that there was too much. This problem reflected the 
long process that grieving for these losses involves. That process is tied up with the slow 
decline in individual women’s fertility, the intensity of grief that many of these women 
experienced, and the ways in which their making sense of their losses and expressing grief is 
constrained by social ‘rules’ about who has the ‘right’ to mourn, as I discuss below. These 
factors meant that although every woman I interviewed talked about grief, it was difficult to 
speak to anyone whose grieving was immediate, in the sense that it would have been if I had 
been interviewing people in the ‘throes’ of grief with a recent loss such as a bereavement, for 
example.   
Although the process is inevitably long because of the slow waning of fertility, many of the 
older participants identified an extended period of intense mourning in their 30s which 
gradually changed as they moved towards their 40s. Connie’s drawing exemplified this. She 
was 44 at the time of the interviews, and hers was one of several drawings that conceived of 
circumstantial childlessness in temporal terms as a linear process from her 20s through to the 
present day.  
                                                        
98 Some participants attempted to fix a point in their lives (“if it hasn’t happened by the time I’m 40”) at which 
they would decide that the time for hoping to have a child had passed, but in all cases the point moved forward 
when they reached it. It seemed the onset of the menopause was the point at which most women abandoned the 
possibility, but this is also not a point but rather a slowly unfolding continuum, and with the development of 
assisted reproductive technologies this too is called into question. A number of participants raised the issue of 
public music and film personalities having the capacity to have a child after menopause through A.R.T., pushing 
the limits of the continuum further out still. 
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Figure 4: Connie’s Drawing 
She described it in this way: 
In my 20s I’d just had, you know, faith, and hope, that it was all going to happen at some point. 
And um, so, probably just was, um leading quite a rosy life, and enjoying myself, and um, but then, 
in my 30s I, um, um I, yeah. My friends started having families, and um, and, I wasn’t in the, 
wasn’t in the right relationship or not in a relationship, and towards the end of my 30s really the 
anxiety and the pain, the black part [taps drawing] was very strong. Probably until my early 40s.   
For these older women, it is only in retrospect that the finality of their loss of the potential to 
embody their fantasies became clear. They spoke poignantly and often tearfully of their grief, 
but talked about their times of intense grieving being in the past. Gina, for example said “[It 
was] “really hard. Really hard. And sad. I felt sad and as if I didn’t belong, and I felt as if I 
didn’t have a [pause], a signature (…) that it wouldn’t make any difference if I didn’t exist”. 
Her choice of the metaphor of a “signature” gives a sense of the intensity of her grieving and 
the way she perceived her loss to define her at that time. Many of these older women told me 
they would not have been able to talk to me a few years earlier because their grief then was 
very much more painful and consistently present for them.99 At the time of interview they 
talked about it still being triggered at times, but having been ameliorated by the long process 
of adaptation that I discuss in the next chapter.                                                          
99 This is consistent with my experience of people grieving other major life losses such as the death of someone 
close or the breakdown of a relationship. 
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Younger participants also spoke of their sense of loss and times of grieving but their 
experience was always tempered with their hope that things could change and they might yet 
become mothers.100 In the following segment, Maree talked about the internal dialogue she 
engaged in to accommodate the difference between the life she expected and the one she was 
living: 
I think where my reality’s different from how I saw myself being or something similar to that 
[pause] so there’s psychological and emotional pain if I stay in that place of dissonance.  So I pour 
my energy into my work and tell myself that’s [pause] okay for me at the moment and I’m hap 
[stop], well I am [pause], I convince myself that I’m happy. [laughter]  But I am happy, um, um, 
with, with that and, because I think to pull out of that and really delve into it [pause] would reveal 
more grief than what I’m perhaps aware of.(…) (I)t’s too painful to sort of keep at the front or 
wherever it might be, you know, with everyday life, um, so I pack it back there somewhere, but it’s 
still there. 
In her words “for the moment” Maree pointed to the key factor that differentiates the younger 
women’s narratives from those of older women I interviewed. Time runs a parallel track with 
fertility in women’s lives. Where the older participants saw themselves as running out—or 
having already run out—of time and fertility, these were potentials that Maree saw herself as 
still possessing. That possession offered her the possibility of a different reproductive future, 
and the choice to set aside for now the painfulness of confronting what she saw as a potential 
future grief of unknown dimensions.  “(F)or the moment” carries with it an awareness of an 
unsettling impermanence however, and Maree spoke elsewhere of the way in which women, 
unlike men, “have time against us”. She understood herself as being inevitably in conflict 
with time—the heavily underlined “tick, tick, tick” of her drawing—because of the 
constraints of female embodiment. When I asked her if there was a “niggling anxiety” about 
time passing, Maree’s repeated affirmations and sharp breath in indicated her concern: “yeah, 
definitely, yeah, [breath in], no that’s accurate”. 
Four women told me that they had friends who were living in the time between these two 
stages, when their chances of having a child were becoming slight, but it was still possible. 
They said, however, that although these women were very interested in the project, they felt 
unable to talk to me because their grief was simply too raw. I suggest that talking about their 
sense of loss would have been very painful but also, since they did not know me, their 
concerns about the social legitimacy of their grieving may have been particularly marked. I 
return to this issue further below. 
                                                        
100 During the time I was engaged in this research I knew of at least three participants who went on to have a 
biological child. 
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5.5 Losses within a loss 
Folded within the loss of the potential to embody their fantasies are the idiosyncratic 
secondary losses each woman experiences. When I asked Sonya what was lost if she did not 
have a child, the following response came very quickly, as one that had already been well 
explored and rehearsed in her thoughts:  
I always think having a child is an extension of the love that you have with your partner. I see that. 
And it’s something that you obviously um, share, and of course the, the life of a little human being.  
I mean, gosh you know. And I think, when I see friends that have had children there’s something 
different [pause] about them after they’ve had a child, I think. Giving birth and that whole, I mean 
God, it’s amazing, isn’t it. So I think there’s something very, very special in that itself and I think, I 
don’t know, it’s like a glow or [pause] I don’t know what it is but, yeah, but something about 
women that have, have children, and it, it extends beyond that, you know, my parents won’t be 
grandparents, you know, my brother and sister won’t be uncle and aunties, I, I won’t have children 
that will be friends with, you know be cousins to their children, um, I won’t have children that will 
grow up with my friends’ children, um when I die, what will I, who will I give all of my jewellery 
to? [laughs] Who will I pass on, you know [pause], there’s all, all those sorts of things, it’s the 
whole, whole picture [pause]. I’ll never, I’ll never have that. I’ll never, you know, I won’t have 
that, that family or that love or those [stop] and all your friends have died and [pause] you know 
there’s nothing, to, that passes on a part of you, so yeah, there’s all those things too, you know, it’s 
not just you, it goes beyond that. 
Embodying relationship 
Sonya’s list of losses includes many that other participants raised. It begins with the 
opportunity to embody the love shared between her and her partner in the creation of a child. 
In speaking of an “extension of the love” she implied that a child has the potential to embody 
and make manifest the power of the otherwise invisible bond between her and her partner. 
This was expressed over and over by participants and underpinned one part of why exploring 
having a child on their own did not interest many women. Gina, for example, said “I really 
wanted to have his child, and I wasn’t, you know, wasn’t interested in considering other 
options for quite a long time. I wanted to have one with him”. In a time when reproductive 
technologies make it possible for women to have a child on their own, when their reason for 
being circumstantially childless is often (at least ostensibly) the lack of a willing partner, this 
strong motivation many women have to make this a “shared project” with someone they love 
may be underestimated.  
Embodying maternity 
Sonya moved quickly to an attempt to articulate a key difference between her and women 
who have had a baby. Her use of the popular metaphor of “a glow” covers her struggle to find 
words to address what Hollway (2012a, p.21), drawing on Ettinger’s matrixial theory, has 
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described as the “language-defying state prior to birth”. There is a strong sense of a mystery 
that she both ‘knew’ somehow but could not express in words; one senses that the “something 
different” that she perceived exceeds the “pregnant glow” with which popular discourse 
provides her. This is the loss of an opportunity to participate in the mystery of being a woman 
in relationship with a child; a mystery that she knew intersubjectively and trans-subjectively 
as an infant and child and created in her fantasy, but was unable to embody and realise as an 
adult. There is a sense of the feeling that she had ‘missed out’—a term many participants 
used—on something “very very special” that she perceived to have the power to transform 
her.  
The idea of motherhood as transformative is widely held. Baraitser (2009, p.52) writes that 
maternal subjectivity is “a fundamentally changed or transformed state, a state at or beyond 
the border that we once would have recognized as a self-boundary, and from which we may 
glimpse ourselves anew”.  From Ettinger’s (Lichtenberg-Ettinger 1997, p.381) perspective, 
this is a “bi-directional though not symmetrical” transformation, in which both the infant-to-
be and mother-to-be transform one another. Sonya’s “very, very special” captures this sense 
of transformation, though it appears to gloss over the often overwhelming nature of it. 
Baraitser (2009, p.52, italics in original) writes: 
(M)otherhood’s transformative potential resides in its ability to cause a kind of psychic crisis in the 
lives of women. If crises can prompt breakdown, they can also allow a reconfiguration of our 
relation to new and necessary fictions of who we once were, are, and would like to be.  
Almost all of the women talked about their regret at the loss of this opportunity to experience 
the embodied relationship of motherhood: developing a pregnant belly and a sense of the 
growing foetus, giving birth, breastfeeding, and the physical sensations of caring for a baby 
and child. Toni, for example, said “I love the idea of seeing my growing belly and, and 
nourishing of the baby and experiencing childbirth and breast feeding”. Toni’s niece lived 
with her three days a week from the time when she was a very little baby, and as a child 
called her her “other mother”. Toni described their relationship as “different” to the one her 
niece had with her biological mother but she was still involved “watching a child grow, being 
involved in those decisions about, you know, her wellbeing. And, and her daily life, making 
her school lunch, picking her up from school, those sorts of things, supervising homework”. 
These are the kinds of daily physical and organisational intimacies that women’s fantasies of 
maternity consisted of, and they mourned the absence of these intimacies in their lives. Toni 
said engagement in her intensive mothering relationship with her niece “softened” her grief at 
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not having her own child but “it still didn’t give me what the experience of biological 
motherhood would have given me”.101  
Social recognition  
With “it extends beyond that” Sonya pointed to the ways the meaning of not having a 
biological child expands beyond her both relationally and temporally, creating a tumbling 
string of losses that she perceived to stretch horizontally throughout her wider family and 
vertically through time and into the future. Becoming a mother would provide her with a 
means of taking part in the ongoing construction of the intergenerational relationships that 
thread through families and connect people within them (Thomson et al 2011); for her a child 
would be an agent of transformation, (re)creating her as a mother, her parents as grandparents, 
her siblings as aunts and uncles and so forth.  
Along with the loss of having an embodied relationship with a child through pregnancy “it 
extends beyond that” also points to the social identity that Sonya perceived mothering would 
provide and the acknowledgement and validation that goes with this. Sonya helped care for 
her partner’s two sons each week, but for her this did not constitute being a mother. There is 
an irony to this aspect of her maternal fantasies since women who are biological mothers are 
often concerned with the lack of social recognition given to the actual work of mothering; 
there is often more attention paid to pregnancy and birth, but not as much appreciation of 
what is entailed in being a mother of an older or adult child.102  
Many women talked about children giving potential access to social worlds that are 
unavailable to them without children, and from which they felt excluded. Deborah, for 
example, said, “[Parents] have some freedoms, or some places or roles in society that they are 
granted or freely given, because they’re parents”. As a woman without children “there’s a 
sense in which you’re excluded from the world of children”. Some women talked about 
feeling marginalized by others through their sense that they were judged as unacceptable 
because they were not mothers. Deborah spoke about it in terms of her not being acceptable. 
Here she struggled to make sense of it: 
For me it’s about not being acceptable. Some judgment being made about me not being acceptable. 
Somehow there’s something about me that isn’t acceptable. (…) I feel the judgment is, sometimes, 
is that [pause] if I’m without children, then I don’t like them, I don’t want to be involved with 
them, don’t understand them, ah, don’t have experience, won’t be any use. Um, I don’t know; some 
sense in which people without children are not [pause] able [pause] around children. Or, [pause] 
ah, not just not able, but not interested in, not, um, yeah. I find that a sort of gross assumption.                                                         
101 I explore these aspects of Toni’s story further in Chapter 6 p.182. 
102 I discuss the issues of social recognition further in Chapter 6 pp.181-184. 
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For Deborah the sense of not being acceptable as a person coalesced around her suspicion 
that, because she doesn’t have children, she is in some way judged as being lacking in  
relation to them and this sets her apart from the world of children in other people’s eyes. For 
her, and for almost all the women, there was a strong feeling that they were marginalized by 
some others in their social worlds. Many spoke of a resulting loss of a sense of belonging. 
Kim was the only participant who spoke of resisting this marginalization. Speaking about 
other people’s responses to her circumstantial childlessness she said, “I couldn’t care less; I’m 
not a conformist, and if people have a problem, fuck them. You know?” 
From an object relations perspective this sense of being judged might be interpreted to be part 
of the sense of persecution that mourning individuals experience in their relationships with 
others. Klein (1940/1986, p.156) wrote that when a woman loses a child though death her 
“early dread of being robbed by a ‘bad’ retaliating mother is reactivated and confirmed’, 
along with her sorrow and the pain of mourning.103 She considered this sense of persecution 
to be particularly painful because “as a result of an increase in ambivalence and distrust, 
friendly relations with people, which might at that time be so helpful, become impeded”. It 
may be that there are times when an apparently innocent remark that may have even been 
intended to be encouraging is experienced as thoughtless and hurtful. Janine described an 
incident at a social occasion: 
(Y)ou’re always asked if you have children.  Um, and I’ve said, I was asked this particular night, I 
said, “No,” and, um, this woman said, “Oh and is it as glamorous as I imagine it to be?”  And, you 
know, you just think, “Look lady you’ve got no idea”.  And what, I mean what kind of question is 
that?  Was she trying to be, fill a gap, you know, of, with words or was she actually serious? 
On the other hand, other participants’ stories of exclusion or judgment were unequivocal. 
Deborah also told a story of being asked whether or not she had children, by a woman who 
was a midwife: 
(A)nd I said ‘no, we don’t have any children’, and she said ‘oh, why not?’ I thought, ‘sorry?’ 
[laughs]. From a midwife I thought that was the height of gross insensitivity! [laughs] You know, 
given that as a midwife she should be perfectly well aware that there were some people who chose 
not, there were some people that desperately wanted to, and couldn’t, um, etcetera, etcetera. (…) 
Um, and I also [pause] remember, then, she made some throwaway comment about, ‘oh, I always 
think people who don’t have children are incredibly selfish’. 
                                                        
103 Klein here wrote in part from her own experience. Her paper “Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive 
states” was published six years after her eldest son had been killed in a climbing accident (Mitchell 1986). 
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An investment in the future 
Sonya went on to articulate her fantasy of a child who is a vehicle through which to pass 
aspects of herself, and to which to pass the things by which she has created herself in the past 
and present, on into the future. She looked to a child to be a still-living witness to her life in 
the world when all the other people who make up her present social world have died. Her 
“jewellery” might be understood to stand in for the aspects of herself that are precious. 
Passing it (them) on to her child is a way of creating a trace of her mortality, without which 
she fears that the ‘she’ she understands herself to be would be permanently extinguished. 
This idea of the loss of a child who in some way would carry her or others she loved on into a 
time beyond a woman’s biological life, was very strong in women’s narratives. Irene, for 
example said, “I guess the line finishes with me; there’s nothing, there’s no continuation, (…) 
there’s no legacy, there’s nothing you, there’s nothing that, like it’s just you and when you die 
there’s nothing to say that you were here”. For Lynn, having a child would have been a way 
of carrying her loved husband into the future; “My husband’s quite a lot older than me, and 
feelings of I suppose, wanting to [pause] have a, a, a little [small nervous laugh, and shaky 
voice] umm [pause] him, in a way”. For some other women, a child gave meaning to the ways 
the present and the future are linked. Sophia, for example, talked about it in terms of the 
purpose such a legacy would give her actions in her present life: “(Y)ou know, you work hard 
and you have a nice house and [pause] you have retirement plans, and savings and things, and 
then you think, well I’ve not got any children to leave it all too, what’s the point?”  
The difficulties of speaking 
Attention to the structure of Sonya’s narrative gives a sense of the intensity and meaning of 
these losses for her, and to the ways in which she was unable to capture them in speech. There 
was no hesitation or pause for thought as she contemplated her reply; this  segment of her 
narrative tumbled from her as a stream of anticipated losses. But as she moved through the 
segment her narrative stumbled on the finality of her repeated “never”, and then faltered to a 
stop as she spoke of its impact on her throughout her life. It is as if in identifying and 
speaking her list of losses to another she heard them for herself and was overwhelmed by the 
extent of them and the inexpressibility of them. “Suffering resists definition because it is the 
reality of what is not”, Frank writes (2001, p.355). For Sonya, her “the whole, whole picture” 
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stands in for losses that are multitudinous, incomprehensible and inexpressible; beyond 
symbolisation.104 
5.6 Triggers for grief 
With most loss events people experience themselves to be grieving when moments in their 
daily life are marked by the absence of something or someone that was previously present; 
they miss them and mourn their absence. Circumstantially childless women, having no 
previous presence to mourn, and grieving rather for a potential to create such a presence, find 
their grieving is triggered by times, people, things and places that symbolise that potential for 
them. Family times such as Christmas, and Mothers’ Day were often spoken of as particularly 
difficult times. Many talked about how being around pregnant women, small children and 
families was often unbearable for them and they avoided them where possible.  
Participants’ talk about their everyday lives illustrated their heightened sensitivity to these 
symbolic triggers, and the inevitable ubiquity of such triggers in what Meier at al describe in 
the epigraph to this chapter as their “management of ordinary affairs”. For many women, 
menstruation was a regular monthly reminder of what they were grieving, and the trappings of 
personal care a potent symbol of their loss. Isabella described her feelings at the supermarket 
for example: 
Oh, I’m sick of it! Even the way that they lay out supermarkets is really really insensitive. [Lois: 
how do you mean?] You go down the aisle that you’ve got tampons in [pause] and right next to 
them is nappies. It’s like a constant reminder: if [pause] if you can’t have a nappy you can have a 
tampon. (…) It’s like, here we go again. And sometimes I’ve walked past [the tampons] and I’ve 
gone, ‘I’m not buying you! I’m not buying you this month! I don’t need you!’  
Gina described a regular reminder of her childlessness at her workplace to other members in a 
group interview:  
(T)here’s a whole row of um lactation, breast feeding posters [at her workplace], and so you walk 
down this gauntlet and it’s a kind of narrow um hallway and it’s just like poster after poster after 
poster after poster and they, and most, a lot of them have a naked woman with a naked baby on her 
breast,  actually on her chest, in between the breasts, and the message is ‘skin on skin’ you know, 
they love it; it’s a really cool positive message. But I always find it [pause] hard (…) because, 
yeah, I mean everybody loves that, I mean, and I would have loved it, it [pause] and I yeah and I 
still mourn for that [taps on her drawing] kind of, just that, just that [pause] experience and but, and 
so it’s like a reminder every time I walk down that corridor, and mmm. Yeah. 
Gina’s use of “gauntlet” and Isabella’s angry response to the tampons apparently taunting her 
in the supermarket aisle illustrated both their intense emotions and their feeling of exclusion                                                         
104 In Chapter 6 (p.181) I discuss how these women’s difficulty in articulating aspects of their experience might 
be related to Ettinger’s theory of the matrixial. 
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from a world that is “insensitive” to or unaware of their emotional distress. Gina’s conflict 
was clear: “everybody loves” the message the posters gave, and she too “would have loved 
it”, but, because she is excluded from participation in that experience, she is not part of 
“everybody” and the reminder gives her pain rather than the positive pleasurable message that 
she presumes others in her social world have. Small, apparently impersonal but very powerful 
symbols like these served as constant triggers to participants’ grieving. Her image of a narrow 
hallway in which she is unable to distance herself physically from these repeated painful 
reminders (“poster after poster after poster”) evokes a sense of a series of blows that she feels 
forced to endure each time she takes that corridor.  
The continuum of loss/hope that these women discuss moving through in their 30s and early 
40s however also meant that these possible triggers for some older women could also be 
things that younger participants saw as symbols in which they took pleasure, because they 
represented the possibility of mothering in the future. While many women talked about 
avoiding being around babies and children for example, others spoke of their delight in doing 
this. Similarly the ‘trappings’ of maternity were often discussed. Thomson (2007, p.3) has 
described material objects such as baby clothes, shoes, and toys as “important memory texts 
within which time, emotion and history are condensed”. It seems for many of these women 
they represented rather a kind of future text, in which their hopes and fantasies of maternity 
were condensed. Younger women spoke of buying these for themselves and the child they 
still hoped to have. For these circumstantially childless women, such items, bought or passed 
on from family members and carefully ‘put aside’, were powerful materializations of their 
maternal fantasies and symbols of their hope of them becoming embodied reality.  
Such symbols of a possible future carried with them disappointment and pain when that 
hoped-for future was not realized. Sonya, for example, said that giving away the clothes she 
had bought for imagined babies “really hit home”. In the following segment her halting 
speech was an indicator of the emotional impact that still suffused the experience, even in the 
retelling of the event some years later.105 
Sonya: I had them [the baby clothes] out to [pause] you know [pause] it was [pause] you know 
[pause] yeah. I guess the, the feelings you have when you [pause] bought them, you know and you 
just imagined [pause] and then getting to the point that that didn’t, yeah [stop]                                                         
105 Thomson et al. (2011, p.197) write that “the increased commercialization of motherhood can be seen as a 
key change in the way motherhood is lived and experienced in contemporary times”. Perhaps for these women, 
buying ‘things’ is an “illusion” in the sense that Winnicott spoke of; an unconscious attempt to create a reality by 
materialising their fantasies (See Chapter 2, p.30). 
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(…) 
Lois: What do you think it represents? 
Sonya: Hope. 
The experience of grieving 
While grieving is twinned with sadness in popular understanding, a psychoanalytic  
perspective on mourning recognizes that a much broader range of emotional experience is 
involved and this is indicated in the interview transcripts and drawings. Tangled with their 
sadness, participants talked of incidents in which painful feelings of rage, envy, shame, guilt 
and hatred were also triggered. Many participants spoke of an enormous anger at their sense 
of injustice that life had turned out as it had for them. Kate, for example, talked about how 
these emotions were tied together for her:  
(T)hat absolute grief of being really angry at the world, that it seems so unfair (…) [I felt] really 
ripped off, that life was pretty unfair. It was horrible, I remember it was really, really horrible. And 
thinking I was never ever going to get over it. That I was just going to be [pause] I was going to be 
[pause] yeah that was the hardest thing, thinking, ‘if I don’t have kids, I’m going to be this sad for 
the rest of my life!’ 
For many women the anger was at times triggered by and focused on other women who were 
pregnant or had children. Speaking about the years in her early/mid 30s for example Connie 
said: 
It was hard because it turned out to be a time when my whole social circle was starting to have 
families. And so all my girlfriends started families and it was this terrible time of hearing again that 
one of them was pregnant and, yeah it was just very painful and it was really difficult to feel happy 
for them, which I felt bad about because of course for them it was great and they were in the right 
circumstances to have a baby. But it did bother me a lot. I’ll never forget one birthday party that I 
had—my own birthday—and it was outside in the garden and one of my girlfriends there, she told 
us that she was pregnant, and it just ruined my whole birthday party. She wouldn’t have known it 
was so sensitive to me at the time, and when I tried to talk about it later on I felt that it wasn’t 
working—she was so full of herself she felt that I was very selfish. 
Craib (1994, p.18) noted that the complex psychological processes of mourning involve 
“feelings that might not be readily associated with it” such as “jealousy, triumphalism, a 
desire to punish”. Connie was envious of her friend’s pregnancy, and ashamed of feeling this 
way. Her choice of the term “full of herself” to describe her friend is interesting, evoking as it 
does the fullness of a pregnant woman. Along with this envy is a sense that an announcement 
of a pregnancy trumped Connie’s birthday celebrations; a time when she might reasonably 
expect to take pleasure in being the focus of attention in her social group.  
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5.7 ‘Choice’, and the right to grieve 
Individual people—men and women—are by definition engaged in at least two interlocking forms 
of emotional work: the ‘internal’ work of coping with contradiction, conflict and ambivalence and 
the ‘external’ work of reconciling what goes on inside with what one is supposed or allowed to 
feel.  
(Craib 1995, p.155) 
Connie’s shame is about the feelings of envy she is not “supposed” to feel. An individual 
grieves both as an individual and as a member of a social system (Brabant 2002). Craib’s 
words speak to the ways in which people’s emotions are a set of complex responses, in which 
the social and the psychological are inextricably interwoven and mutually structured, and 
their social worlds shape the experience and expression of grieving they do. A sense that their 
experience and the grieving that was part of it was unrecognized and illicit in some way, 
because of the choices these women had made, was apparent across the research materials. 
Their narratives were full of evidence of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ “emotional work” that 
Craib spoke of, and in their stories it is possible to see some of the features that lie underneath 
the construction of normative rules that define what they are “supposed or allowed to feel”.  
‘Disenfranchised grief’ 
Doka’s (1989, 2002) concept of ‘disenfranchised grief’ is useful in conceptualizing the ways 
in which the social regulation of grief shapes the grieving of circumstantially childless 
women. Doka argues that some grief, some losses, and some grievers are stigmatized, 
minimized or rendered invisible because they fall outside of a set of normative boundaries. 
Extending this idea, Corr (2002, p.41) suggests that the normative order establishes “who 
have a right to experience and express their reactions (to significant losses), and who can 
expect to have their losses and their subsequent reactions and responses to those losses 
acknowledged and supported by society”.  
There are a number of ways in which the participants in this study appear to fall outside the 
set of people who are socially permitted to grieve. The most obvious relates to the type of loss 
they are dealing with. Participants drew on available discourses to frame and make sense of 
their experience and, since they are not related to a bereavement, for the most part these 
women’s experience do not fit with popular understandings of loss, and hence of grieving. 
Irene and Isabella’s comments (section 5.2) illustrate this difficulty, and I suggest that this is 
one of the key reasons that many participants were tentative in naming their experience as 
grief. Other participants who were trained as counsellors or psychotherapists had been 
exposed to a broader alternative discourse of loss and grieving, and were much more 
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confident in framing their experiences of loss as ‘grief’, both in their conversation with me, 
and to themselves. Kate, for example, is a counsellor:  
I don’t think it’s seen as an OK grief to have, or there’s things about: oh well, if you’d really 
wanted kids you would have settled down by now, and it’s not [pause] you know? I’m not just 
going to settle down with any old person you know. I do, I think it’s not recognized, and I think 
that my church, when I was going through a real grieving thing I used to sit there feeling quite 
angry because they used to talk about family and sure, I’ve got my own family but they were 
meaning in the sense of your own kids, and I used to feel like screaming, ‘what about the rest of us 
who don’t have kids here!’ 
‘Chronic Sorrow’ 
In his discussion of ‘suffering’ Frank (2001, p.355) wrote, “(a)t the core of suffering is the 
sense that something is irreparably wrong with our lives, and wrong is the negation of what 
could have been right”. This is the essence of Susan Roos’ (2002) concept of ‘Chronic 
Sorrow’, a particular form of disenfranchised grief that provides a significant exception to the 
absence of study around non-death losses, and encompasses ‘living losses’ such as those 
associated with a deteriorating condition such as dementia or Muscular Dystrophy. In some 
ways there are parallels between these losses and those associated with the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness. Those losses too are not marked by a fixed loss event that pins 
grief to a particular point with a ‘before’ and ‘after’ the loss occurred, but rather unfold as 
time passes and the condition worsens.106 Roos, developing a concept introduced in the 1960s 
within the context of disability (Olshansky1962), defined ‘chronic sorrow’ as:  
A set of pervasive, profound, continuing, and recurring grief responses resulting from a significant 
loss or absence of crucial aspects of oneself (self-loss) or another living person (other-loss) to 
whom there is a deep attachment (…) The essence of chronic sorrow is a painful discrepancy 
between what is perceived as reality and what continues to be dreamed of. 
(Roos 2002, p.26)  
It could be argued that the loss or absence of “the sense of myself as a mother” is felt by many 
circumstantially childless women to be a “crucial aspect” of themselves in this way. In 
addition, Roos describes fantasy—“what could have been or should have been (and maybe 
will be, after all)”—as being central to ‘chronic sorrow’. The parallels with the role of fantasy 
in circumstantial childlessness are clear in her description of its part in ‘chronic sorrow’: 
“(a)ctivation of the fantasy intensifies painful emotions, as the disparity between the fantasy 
and current living reality can be cruel and wounding” (2002, p.27). She compares these losses 
with death and with other non-death losses such as divorce “where there is an end point or                                                         
106 For some people a diagnosis creates an artificial point at which the loss ‘happens’ but other losses associated 
with the condition continue to accrue after that time. 
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finality” and writes that ‘chronic sorrow’ is different because it is about “living with the 
realization of a loss that cannot be removed and that continually requires energy for 
adaptations” (2002, p.27). 
In spite of these parallels with the grieving circumstantially childless women do I am reluctant 
to conceptualize it as ‘chronic sorrow’. Roos is wary of the concept being “overly inclusive” 
because of the danger of its losing its “meaning and utility”, and is anxious to prevent its 
“over-expansion” (2002, p.45) beyond the field of disability. In its strong focus on the part 
that trauma plays—in the birth of a child with a disability, or acquisition of one, or an 
accident that brings this about in the case of other-loss for example—it is not a good ‘fit’ for 
circumstantial childlessness. Most germane is that, unlike the losses in circumstances 
associated with disability that Roos documents, circumstantial childlessness is not a 
pathological condition.107 Women who experience it rightly resist a framing of their bodies or 
their lives as being disabled, flawed, inadequate, or in some way unhealthy.  
The complexities of ‘choice’ 
The part that agency and ‘choice’ plays in the phenomenon of circumstantial childlessness is 
an important further point of difference, since ‘chronic sorrow’ is a choiceless loss, whereas 
the losses of circumstantial childlessness are in part an outcome of the choices women have 
made, and this impacts their experience of mourning them.  
A further ‘infringement’ of social laws of grieving that renders these women’s right to mourn 
illegitimate draws on the idea that there is a natural ‘logic’ to grief; that grieving people are 
necessarily passive victims of circumstance, and those who have played a part in bringing 
about loss in their lives are by inference not eligible for support from others (and perhaps 
from themselves). Maree implied this when she said,  “women are not allowed to feel any loss 
about it, because they’ve made that happen that way”. As a consequence of this logic, the 
grief of circumstantially childless women is further disenfranchised because of the 
complexities of agency, ‘choice’ and reproductive decision-making in contemporary women’s 
lives; because of what they have “made happen”. 
I use apostrophes around the word ‘choice’ to highlight that from a psychosocial perspective 
the whole notion of ‘choice’ as it is popularly understood is compromised. Chodorow (1986, 
p. 197) wrote, “(p)sychoanalysis radically undermines notions about autonomy, individual                                                         
107 Women who go on to develop ‘age-related infertility’ might be understood to have a pathological condition in 
the medical sense of that word, but the phenomemon itself is not inherently pathological in either the medical or 
the popular sense, as the conditions associated with disability are.  
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choice, will, responsibility, and rationality, showing that we do not control our own lives in 
the most fundamental sense”. Along with conscious decision-making, complex unconscious 
forces have also shaped the decisions these women have made, and the ambivalence they feel 
in relation to doing so. Many aspects of their reproductive decision-making are inexplicable in 
terms of rational choice (Salecl 2011). Theorizing from a psychoanalytic perspective about 
her clinical work with women for whom it is “too late” Chodorow (2003 p. 1182) noted that 
the task of these women is in part to recognize how their not having children was “due to their 
own psychic realities and the behaviors that these realities generated”. She writes:  
Destructive wishes towards the woman’s own womb and her mother’s lead to behaviors that 
sabotage fertility and pregnancy. These wishes and behaviors meet up with an unconscious belief 
in and commitment to time standing still, and with cultural tropes and trends that obscure 
intrapsychic conflicts and denials about motherhood, aging, and time.  
(Chodorow 2003, p.1181) 
Acknowledging the cultural context in which women’s lives are embedded she noted that  this 
unconscious sense of “time standing still” may be more likely in cultures that emphasize 
“youth, no aging, longer lives, later fertility, and a family life cycle that seems to have no 
fixed routine and to be a voluntary rather than a taken-for-granted option”. 
Elsa’s interview highlighted these issues well. She spoke at length about the difficulties and 
complexities of her relationship with her mother, and of the “expectation” in her family 
culture of becoming “well educated” before she “settled down” and had a family. Talking 
about the time she spent in her 30s doing doctoral study she said, 
I was sort of, you know, it’s like okay I’m carrying on doing my PhD. I’m doing this work, actually 
I could also stop doing my PhD and focus on the other bit [finding a partner and having a child]. 
But then it’s like I don’t want to do that because I’m not going to be happy if I don’t fulfill this and 
I need to do what makes me happy but, it’s sort of like but I still didn’t want to give up on [pause] 
on what I always wanted to do in having kids and settle down with a family, yeah. 
Elsa was one of many women who appeared to have an “unconscious belief in (…) time 
standing still”, and who told me they always thought there would be plenty of time to have 
children in the future. It was only in retrospect that she realized that making the choice to 
complete a PhD limited other choices she might have made. In this segment she drew on a 
discourse of the necessity of ‘fulfilling’ herself in order to be happy, and did not appear to 
consider that such fulfillment might be found in having children. Rather she saw the idea of 
“having kids” and ‘settling down’ as something a woman does after she has fulfilled herself 
in other ways. 
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Like Elsa, other participants in this study understood themselves to have made active choices 
about prioritizing travel, education, career and other experiences, about taking up 
relationships with partners who are unwilling or unable to have a child, and about terminating 
unplanned pregnancies earlier in their lives. The ‘choices’ they made are based on competing 
discourses about what it is to be a successful, happy, autonomous woman. They do not 
account for the contradictions, complexities and realities of women’s lives. Many women 
struggled with conflicts inherent in taking personal responsibility for their lives as Elsa did, 
and a sense of injustice that the complexities of their decisions and the grief inherent in 
opportunities lost are not acknowledged socially.  
Termination of pregnancy was a site in which this complex interplay of agency, time, and the 
‘right’ to grieve was most clearly illustrated in several participants’ narratives. In discussing 
the complexities of her decision to terminate her pregnancy and its impact on her, Maree 
distinguished between the ‘permission’ she gave herself to grieve and her perception that 
“society” would judge things differently: 
I had the opportunity to have a child, um, so I don’t have the right to be sad about not having 
children [pause] in society’s eyes, yeah.  I give, I, yeah I give myself the right, privately, yeah 
[pause] I understand what, you know, because it seems logical looking from the outside in, um, if a 
woman had the opportunity to have a child and, and didn’t and then was sad about not having 
children that wouldn’t make much sense.  
Once again Maree draws on a naturalised ‘logic’ to grieving in suggesting that she had no 
right to social support in her grief for the pregnancy she terminated. Lynn also talked about 
the difficulties of her decision-making around abortion and its impact on her talking with 
others about her childlessness: 
I think that has made it really hard for me to talk to people about it [her childlessness]. The sort of 
irony of wanting children and having had two abortions. And the [pause] um [pause]. I mean, 
they’re contradictory [pause] feelings, and unless you know the detail behind it, then it’s umm 
[stop]. 
Like Maree, Lynn was anxious that her terminations were not discussed in the group 
interview. Even in that setting, she was concerned that she would be judged, and although a 
significant number of women I interviewed had had an abortion in the past, she appeared to 
presume that she would be alone in being circumstantially childless even though she had been 
pregnant in the past. 
Women’s particular fantasies of maternity create an additional conflict in making the decision 
to become a mother. On one hand women are now able to make choices about whether or not 
they get pregnant (or continue an unplanned pregnancy), but on the other they are confronted 
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with a barrage of social and personal injunctions about what it means to be a ‘good’ mother. 
Participants’ personal maternal fantasies were of being a particular kind of mother in 
particular circumstances. Providing the material circumstances that made it possible to do so 
was perceived as impossible for some participants. For Lesley (see Chapter 4, p.87) and many 
other participants, having a child became contingent on a set of particular conditions and 
circumstances, and they prioritized the circumstances in which they would have a child over 
their capacity to do so. On a conscious level they appeared to understand themselves 
simultaneously as both not having agency (because they were ‘unable’ to make their 
contingencies come about) and having agency (because they were making choices about what 
those conditions or contingencies were). These complexities of choice are not accounted for 
in the simple social logic of Maree’s “women are not allowed to feel any loss about it, 
because they’ve made that happen that way”.  
5.8 Silence and isolation 
The concept of ‘disenfranchised grief’ is also a useful tool in considering the painful sense of 
isolation that was a very strong element in the narratives of the women in this study. It was 
often reflected in their drawings; many featured a single figure separated from others in their 
social worlds by a membrane of some sort.108 Both in group and individual interviews women 
talked about the rejection they experienced in the very places they might have expected 
support—family and social connections such as church for example—and of feeling “alone”, 
and “not being seen” in their relationships with others in these close social networks.  
Kauffman (2002, p.69) argues that the social process of disenfranchisement itself creates this 
isolation for individuals. He writes: 
A basic part of the loss inflicted by disenfranchisement is a loss of the shelter of community. Cut 
off in his or her grief from social recognition, the disenfranchised griever is prone to experience an 
underlying sense of alienation and loneliness, shame, and abandonment. The experience of being 
disenfranchised by a social group alienates one from that group, and it may contribute to a 
degeneration of the individual’s sense of being part of the social fabric. 
For many participants this sense of alienation was apparent in their perception that there was 
no socially acknowledged space or category for their experience of circumstantial 
childlessness, both institutionally and within their more intimate social spheres. A vivid 
example of the structural invisibility of this experience is seen in official statistics in New 
Zealand, where no distinction is made between those who are childless by choice and those 
who do not have a child as a consequence of other events in their life (Boddington & Didham                                                         
108 See for example Gina’s (p.95) and Julia’s (p.153) drawings. 
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2007). Over and again women expressed a sense of being set apart from  “the whole society”. 
Kelly alluded to the way this lack of recognition is codified in the public spaces of official 
forms, saying, “(A) a lot of them ask about your family situation (…) and [sigh] I’m like 
[pause] I’m, I’m none of those. There’s no group that, that matches you know”.  
Although there does appear to be an increasing coverage of the growing phenomenon of 
‘circumstantial childlessness’ in public media, the frequency with which these women talked 
about their experience being unrecognized (at least as they perceived it) leads me to question 
how accurately this developing public narrative reflects and represents women’s own 
perception of their experience. I was astonished by how often participants tentatively 
wondered whether there might be others in a similar situation.109  Frank (2010, p.2) writes that 
stories “give form—temporal and spatial orientation, coherence, meaning, intention, and 
especially boundaries—to lives that inherently lack form”. Without an expected access to 
stories of ‘me as a mother’, and a rejection of positioning themselves as women who have 
chosen to be childless, these women appeared to find there to be a limited range of public 
narratives of circumstantial childlessness available to them.  
The warmth that quickly developed between women who were mostly strangers to one 
another in the group interviews created an interesting contrast that threw their usual 
experience of isolation into relief for me. An extract from my research journal written after 
one such interview highlighted this. Reflecting on the interaction between the group 
participants that began to develop immediately after they had shared their drawings with one 
another I noted: 
I was aware of feeling the power shift inside myself. Suddenly I felt an outsider in a room of 
women who were all in a similar boat. I felt their sense of pleasure in being—for once—in a room 
where their situation was known, shared, and didn’t need to be justified. It was a very interesting 
reversal of how it must so often feel for them. 
Self-disenfranchisement: a collusion with silence 
The mourning process “requires both a mourner who can tolerate the painfulness of grief and 
an external world that aids and abets in that process” (Prager 2009, p.150). An important 
effect of the isolation I have described is the absence of the kind of support that Klein alluded 
to in writing that the care of those around her can ameliorate a person’s suffering at a time of 
loss. For the circumstantially childless women of this study this type of support was largely 
missing. Over and again women told me that they had not been able to talk to others. Kate, for                                                         
109 The focus of articles in popular literature tends to be more on the factors that contribute to women’s 
childlessness (see for example Barnett 2010) than on their experience of it.  
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example, commented, “(b)ecause it’s so invisible I think you struggle with it so much on your 
own (…); you think by talking about it people are going to go ‘what?’ That they won’t get it”.  
Perhaps the most serious outcome of this isolation are the constraints the women felt in 
seeking support and sharing their stories with others in similar circumstances. This affected 
the social resources they have available to them, and added to the social invisibility of their 
experience. Very few of the women I interviewed told me they felt able to speak to others, 
and then only rarely, with perhaps with one other woman. It is clear that although the 
phenomenon of ‘circumstantial childlessness’ might be read through a sociological framing as 
a public issue emerging from a particular conjunction of social, historical and economic 
circumstances, for these women it is primarily experienced—in a decidedly lonely way—as a 
very ‘private trouble’ (Wright Mills 1959). 
Gina’s story illustrates this sense of isolation. When she met the man she later married, he 
already had children, and was unwilling to have more, creating a situation where she felt she 
had to choose between staying with him, or leaving and trying to find someone else with 
whom to have a child.  She talked about the painful complexities of decision-making she 
struggled with in her 30s in relation to her longing to have a child saying, “(y)ou know, your 
calculus is choosing between this abstract scenario that might or might not work out, or this 
real live person that you’re in love with. There’s no discussion about what that’s really like”. 
In the excerpt that follows she struggled to make sense of the decision she made and the ways 
she understood this as constraining her ability to seek support from others in dealing with the 
grief she felt in not having a child:  
Oh it’s complex isn’t it. Maybe I should have made this choice [to leave her husband] long ago and 
[pause] given that I didn’t, I don’t have any right to gripe about it now [pause]. But I didn’t want to 
leave him. I didn’t want to leave him. And that’s why I didn’t. So I mean [pause] I think the 
implication is: it’s my life, there’s my desires, or putative desires, so if I [pause], I made my choice 
and I should not feel regret or grief about it (...)  [Making that choice] wipes out any avenue for 
complaining about it, or even talking about it really [pause]. I reckon that’s a big mechanism at 
work in women’s tendency to stay isolated and not discuss it. As a woman, as soon as you bring 
something up, you’re implicitly seeking support, emotional support. And so you have to have the 
[pause] right to seek that support. 
Gina’s doubts here are both about her having the right to grieve  (“I should not feel grief or 
regret about it”) and the “the right to seek support” from others. Once again it is based on a 
kind of grieving ‘logic’ and it represents an internalizing of the societal rules about grieving 
in which she is immersed. Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps (1996, pp.32-33) write that: 
(s)ilencing is a product of internal and interactional forces in that a person may repress and 
suppress emotions and events, but these processes are linked to external circumstances, including 
others’ expectations and evaluations. […] Silencing is part of the fabric of culture in that it is 
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critical to socializing prevailing ideologies. Assuming one’s expected place entails conforming to 
and telling stories that reinforce social order. 
The process by which those around him or her disenfranchise a person’s grief may be simply 
one of a lack of awareness, such as might be experienced by thoughtless comments made to a 
woman about her being “lucky” to be childfree, but Corr (2002, p.4) writes that it may be 
much a more active one of “disavowal, renunciation, and rejection”. Deborah, who described 
her relationship with her nieces and nephews as being extremely important to her, spoke of 
her outrage and hurt in a situation where she was offering to care for her brother’s children: 
“He said to me [pause] get your own children, and don’t steal mine”. And I just [pause] I was 
[pause], I didn’t say anything, I’ve never said anything to him about it”. Her silence in 
response is indicative of the part that circumstantially childless women may themselves play 
in contributing to the social silence that they perceived to be surrounding this phenomenon. In 
the excerpt that follows Lesley suggested that an awareness of the depth of her own feelings 
and also of what she described as “a Pandora’s box” of potentially difficult feelings that might 
have constrained her from talking to other circumstantially childless friends:  
[I don’t talk] even with close friends. Mainly just because I think I would, you know, cry a lot like I 
have this morning [at the interview]. And I just don’t want to do that. And I actually don’t know 
how some of my other friends have come to terms with it, and to what extent they are sitting on the 
same sort of emotional depth that I am.  
Lesley’s silence appears to originate in an effort to protect both herself and others, but 
ironically it has the effect of maintaining the disenfranchising of her grief and creating the 
invisible margin that separates her from others. Gina told a story in her individual interview—
which she later repeated in the group interview—of a time when she had opened the 
“Pandora’s Box” of childlessness with a friend. Her telling of the story in two settings, her 
repeated description within the story of the incident as “awful”, and the response of the others 
in the group to it all suggested that this was understood amongst them as a powerfully 
cautionary tale:  
I mean actually not long ago I did accidentally do that, with someone (…) and that was awful. It 
was just awful. Because I was on the phone with her, and I couldn’t tell at first that she had started 
to cry, and it was just awful. And then she [pause] wept for a while, and she couldn’t speak and I 
couldn’t get her to [pause] say anything, and then she, and then I said, you know, ‘I’d like to come 
over, I’m really sorry, I’d like to come over. Do you want to talk?’ and she just didn’t, didn’t want 
to talk about it. So it was just like the most awful, awful [pause] thing and, you know, she’s 
someone I really care about, and we still haven’t been able to talk about it. Like I’ve been really 
gentle [pause] with her and I’ve tried to give her lots of space when I’m with her as well, and 
[pause] because she knows. She knows that I’ve [stop] I would love it if she’d bring it up but 
[pause] God, you don’t want to do that to people. 
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The implications of a social silence 
Making meaning of the events in one’s life is both a social and a cognitive process (Neimeyer 
2001). The narratives of these women affirm that talking with others about an experience of 
loss or grieving, or sharing it vicariously through various media, is an important part of 
individuals’ making meaning of it for themselves (Attig, 2001). Without adequate opportunity 
to explore their experience with others who share it, and in social spheres more widely, these 
women struggled to make sense of it for themselves. There was often an eagerness to talk in 
the interviews and, through that talk, to engage in meaning-making about it. Lynn spoke 
about it in this way: 
I find it quite hard to explore it, and understand it [pause]. There’s times when I really could have 
done with some [pause] support [pause], and I, and also like I’m, you know, I know I can’t be the 
only [pause] woman who has gone through some of the [pause] thoughts, and angst that I’ve been 
through, but you don’t [pause] it’s hard to read about it. Not in a kind of sophisticated [pause] 
intelligent way. 
Lynn’s comments point to this difficulty in making meaning of her life for herself, and also to 
the ways the invisibility of her circumstances in public discourse constrains her finding social 
support from others as she works through the long process of adapting to the loss of her 
opportunity to embody her fantasy of maternity and a child. And as Gina’s story illustrated, a 
telling aspect of that isolation is the constraints it makes on opportunities to share and make 
meaning of their experience with other circumstantially childless women.  
All of the women that I interviewed were clear that they did not want others’ pity, because 
that would pathologize their lives, and nor did they want to be seen as a victim of their 
circumstances. Many commented that they did want social recognition of the phenomenon of 
circumstantial childlessness and of their being women who like and value children, rather 
than having made a deliberate choice not to be parents. In the light of this research, I suggest 
these many of women were looking for a social space that does not pathologize their 
experience and has room for their ongoing connection to their fantasies of maternity and a 
child—their “sense of myself as a mother”—even as they grieved for and adapted to the 
reality that they would not embody these in a biological child. 
5.9 Julia 
Julia’s interviews and drawing provide a powerful case study that illustrates and further 
develops the key themes of this chapter. At the time of the interview she was a 48 year old 
pakeha woman who described herself as being someone whose extensive training and 
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experience (as a psychotherapist) had schooled her to think very closely about language. In 
the interviews she chose and weighed her words extremely carefully, apparently in order to 
give as accurate an account as she could. My sense was that Julia established a trust in me 
very quickly in the interview that was in part based on a presumption of a common language 
and set of practices and beliefs related to my being a grief counsellor and educator whose 
work she knew and respected. She spoke confidently and directly, and was unapologetic and 
apparently comfortable about her tearfulness at times throughout the interview. She was 
explicit about her losses and her grieving for them, and the ways in which her experience of 
grieving was inextricably tangled with issues of agency and the complexities of ‘choice’. 
As she was growing up the idea that she would have children was “definitely there” for Julia. 
She described herself as an “over responsible” child who “couldn’t wait” to get away from the 
responsibility for caring for three younger siblings. Like Maree, in her 20s she felt some 
ambivalence about children, but by her early 30s “it really kicked in that I wanted to”. 
Chodorow (2003) wrote that the phenomenon of circumstantial childlessness—or “too 
lateness” as she put it—is marked in her clinical practice by women who had a number of 
siblings, and whose mothers were “depressed, downtrodden, submissive, and tired from 
taking care of so many children” (2003, p.1190). Although it is not clear whether or not Julia 
perceived her mother in this way, she said her mother had “a very difficult time” having 
children. She speculated that her mother’s two miscarriages and two stillborn babies 
(“basically I was surrounded by dead babies”) must have had “a large effect”. At the same 
time as wanting to have a baby, she said, “in some ways it terrified me too”. She commented 
that her mother once said to her that she “didn’t have to have children”. 
Embodied fantasies 
In her 20s Julia twice became pregnant, and both times terminated the pregnancy. There was a 
marked shift in tone in her individual interview from a strong voice to a much quieter one, 
with crying, when she discussed these events. She spoke very tearfully of the difficulties and 
complexity of choice and the long-term impacts of the choices she had made. The first time, 
she said, “I just felt too young. I wasn’t that young but I felt too young”. She added,  
I’ve often thought: what decision would I have made if that had been my only [pause] if I’d known 
then what I know now [small laugh], and I, I don’t have an easy answer for that. I deeply regret 
those decisions [pause] and [pause] [crying] but I don’t know if I’d do it any different. So yeah, 
it’s, it’s horrible really.  
The regret around those decisions to terminate, and what she described as a “huge amount of 
grief” in her early 40’s, came from her realisation that they had “take[n] away all these 
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opportunities or experiences” further on in her life (she named being a grandmother as an 
example). Julia’s maternal fantasies, ignited by her brief experiences of pregnancy, became 
strongly associated with the two “children” (her word) she had aborted, as I discuss further 
below.  
Alienation and isolation 
Talking about the triggers for her feelings of grief Julia said: 
Extended family I find really hard, so any extended family functions. They’re not very often. 
[pause] Christmas; I have found Christmas hard. In fact I will no longer choose to have Christmas 
outside of my family. There was a time when I would spend it [pause] I remember spending it with 
some friends in New Plymouth and their young children and I suddenly looked at myself and I 
thought, ‘what am I doing? I’m a freak! I’m just a freak; I don’t fit in here! That’s not my family’. 
So [pause] um [pause]. I will not ever do that again. 
The occasions Julia found hard were those that highlighted her position of divergence from 
the norm as an adult woman in a context in which others might judge her for this difference. 
Her use of the descriptor ‘freak’ suggests how powerful this perceived judgment was, and the 
ways in which she may have projected her own judgment of herself onto others, presuming 
they would be seeing her in the same way. Julia said she felt “like a failure” for not having 
had children.  
Julia’s sense of isolation in her social worlds was the aspect she focused on in making her 
drawing. 
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Figure 5: Julia’s Drawing 
Julia’s drawing is a vivid visual text about the perceived distance from what she described as 
“society” that stems from her not having had a biological child. Describing it to the group she 
explained she had drawn herself as an orange dot, separate from but linked in a figure-of-eight 
to “two friends that I have that are in a simi [stop] that are like [pause] us [the other women in 
the research group]; that don’t have children”. Spatially Julia depicted herself as alone, 
separated quite markedly from “society”, adjacent to but still separated from her family, and 
most strongly linked to these two friends who also did not have children. Highlighting the 
sense of solidarity she felt with these two women she said, “I really, you know I really [pause] 
ohh um [pause] align myself with them? [pause] or [pause] they’re really really important 
because they are like me [catch in her voice] [pause] so they’re my [pause] um, sisters. 
Yeah”. Identifying these “sisters” as being “like us” suggests that Julia identified herself as 
part of a minority subculture of ‘circumstantially childless’ women and was drawing on the 
research group for a “social bond between fellow sufferers (…) where a common life situation 
connects them as peers [who] share the same fate” (Ketoviki 2009, p.392).  
Adjacent to the figure of eight and touching but not linked to it is another encapsulated oval 
representing her immediate family, and in another separate capsule, further away, is 
“everybody else in the world”. She described herself as having a “difficulty” with “the rest of 
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the world being geared for families and children, and I just [pause] hate it”. Her drawing gives 
a sense of the ways in which she potentially both isolated herself and was isolated by others. 
Her sense of alienation from others in her social world was underlined in her comment in the 
group that “there’s this whole fantasy about my life which is so far removed from the truth of 
who I am”.  
“A constellation of circumstances”: the limits of agency and complexities of 
‘choice’ and time. 
The tensions around agency, choice and grieving were very evident in Julia’s interviews and 
drawing. In her drawing she appeared to choose colour deliberately (if initially 
unconsciously) and began by emphasising that she had chosen orange for herself because it is 
“vibrant and alive”.110 She also used colour to link herself strongly to her childless friends in 
warm tones, to separate herself from the somewhat cooler tones she used for others in 
“society”. Even though she went on to describe a situation in which she felt isolated from a lot 
of what she described as “society” and marginalized by the social structures around her, in her 
deliberate choice of colour Julia resisted an image of herself as a drab victim of her 
circumstances. Throughout her interviews she vehemently refused to be positioned as 
someone who was lacking in any way that diminished her and she made active choices about 
how she reflected on herself. For example, she described herself, both initially to me and 
within the group as “childfree”. When I asked her about this she said,  
I’m not less because I don’t have children. [pause] So I’ve really consciously chosen to use that 
phrase now (…) it’s not quite right [but] for my own personal process I keep reminding myself of 
what’s possible in a childfree, rather than a childless condition.  
From her position of a woman making strong active choices in her life Julia stumbled at times 
in discussing the complexities and contradictions of ‘choice’ in her life.  
Lois: Have you seen yourself as making choices throughout this [process of becoming 
circumstantially childless]? 
Julia: Not consciously, no. I mean, yes I made a conscious choice not to have two children in my 
20s but I don’t ever believe that I have ever said ‘I’m not having children’. [pause] That’s not a 
choice. That wasn’t a choice. 
Lois: It wasn’t a choice? 
Julia: No, that wasn’t a choice.                                                         
110 It appears to be only in retrospect, as she described the drawing to the group, that Julia became aware of the 
significance of her colour choices; although she said she “chose green” to symbolize her family later in the 
description, at the beginning she noted that “I didn’t really deliberately choose these colours I don’t think”.  
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Lois: So how would you describe what happened? 
Julia: Um [pause] it was like a constellation of circumstances that didn’t [pause] um [pause] allow 
for it to happen [quietly]. (…) And I, I was, I think I was kind of deluded in some respects. You 
know there’s all these people round me having babies and I’m still going ‘oh yeah. It will happen. 
One day’. Not, not really being conscious of time passing and conscious too - ‘actually, if you want 
this you have to make it happen in some way. (…) you have to be active about it.’ And I guess I 
wasn’t. I was probably a little bit more passive, until it was maybe too late. Yeah. 
Julia’s repetitions (“that wasn’t a choice”) were explicit; she wanted to emphasize to me (and 
perhaps to herself) that she had not chosen to be without children, but, like Lesley, she had 
made choices about the circumstances in which they might come into being. Taking a passive 
voice (“didn’t allow it happen”) suggests that she continued to see herself as having limited 
agency over “circumstances”, even though she had realised “too late” that she needed to do 
something about conceiving if she was to bring her maternal fantasies into embodied reality. 
In this respect, she seemed to be saying that finding herself without children was an outcome 
of her choices rather than a choice in itself (Wager 2000). 
Julia appeared to relate some of her ‘delusion’ to her not being “conscious of time passing”. 
Adam (1990) writes that ‘clock time’—the organizational linear time frame of society, 
production and politics—has become so pervasive that it defines ‘time’ in popular 
understanding, but it is at odds with the cyclical, repetitious and “eternal recurrence of a 
biological rhythm” that Kristeva (1979, p.191) calls “women’s time”. As I have discussed, 
Chodorow’s (2003) clinical work with circumstantially childless women identifies a pattern 
of their operating with distorted understandings of time as Julia does; her words very strongly 
invoke Chodorow’s (2003, p.1191) notion of “time standing still”. Chodorow writes (2003, 
p.1196) that a  “meshing of women’s time with a culture that denies biological aging and 
implies that all things are possible” is amongst the cultural tropes and social trends that 
contribute to the phenomenon of circumstantial childless.  
Julia’s narrative illustrates this tendency. She described a “very painful process” of realizing 
that it was probably too late for her have children in her late 30s and early 40s, and 
commented that it was the onset of menopause that finally convinced her it was “too late” (“I 
remember thinking, ‘it’s not over until then! It’s really not over until then’”), and, even when 
her periods had ended, she experienced “an element of denial” as she thought “people get 
pregnant in menopause! It could still happen!”  
Her choice of the word “deluded”, however, suggested that she blamed herself in some ways 
for her predicament. The question of her agency in the choices she made around the 
terminations was very difficult for Julia to articulate. When I asked her how she would 
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“account for the way that life has turned out” she came back to these terminations, and the 
process of adaptation she has worked through as she has tried to come to terms with them: 
Well, I’ve talked [stop] yeah [stop] I sup. [stop] in a psy.[stop] it’s ohhh [stop] I, I have a very clear 
understanding now of, of why I cho [stop] didn’t have the capacity to choose, like it just didn’t feel 
right. I in some sense just didn’t have the capacity, and I get that. Um [long pause] I suppose there 
has been [pause] has been [stop] has, has, there has had to be a process of forgiveness, because I 
had the opportunities to do it, so I’ve had to go through that, and one of the many meanings is that 
love takes many forms and being an aunt is one of those forms. At another level, it is like maybe 
these spirits do choose and so [pause] that was their time and it wasn’t meant to be that they could 
fully incarnate. They could only get that far. Whatever that means; I don’t know what that means, 
but that’s kind of like their soul journey. 
Julia’s perception of her agency shifted around in this segment. Within the first two sentences 
she began to say “chose”, which implies a positive agency, changed it to frame it in 
developmental terms as a “capacity” to choose (she “felt too young”), and then abated this to 
a “sense” in which she did not yet have this capacity. Her understanding of the ‘choices’ she 
made thus moved from an active choice to have the terminations to a less active stance; 
something of an incapacity to choose to have the children that would be the product of the 
pregnancies. Above all throughout her interviews Julia was adamant that she did not want to 
be pitied; to be seen as a hapless victim of circumstances, or as someone who could not 
manage her own life.  
This created a tension whereby she wanted to see herself—and be seen—as an agential 
feminist subject, and yet there were limits to her agency.111 She had found a number of ways 
to resolve this tension. Her choice of the word “forgiveness” suggests that part of that 
resolution was an acknowledgement to herself that in some ways she did have agency about 
the choices she made. Perhaps she understood being a loving aunt as another way of 
embodying love in the world as a redemption of sorts for her. On “another level” she explored 
the possibility that the choice that was made shifted in part from her to the “spirits” of the 
“children” that were aborted. 
These complexities of choice for Julia were highlighted in a segment in which she talked 
about a conversation she had with a child about her not having children. A number of 
participants talked about the advice they would give to a girl or younger woman. I understand 
it to be both a sense of sharing painfully gained wisdom, and also a conversation in fantasy 
with a younger version of themselves.   
(C)hildren will ask me as well [whether she has children]. You know children are so funny, I can’t 
remember who it was, this one child: ‘Do you have any children?’ ‘No.’ ‘Why not?’ [laughs] ‘Cos                                                         
111 Julia identified herself as a feminist elsewhere in the interview. 
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I don’t like them!’[laughs] I didn’t say that but [pause] I can’t remember what I said. I think it was 
a girl, it might have been a girl. I think I said ‘because I’ve chosen not to’ and they were like ‘oh 
my goodness, it’s a choice?’ Because I think I wanted to [pause] plant that seed, that there is a 
choice, even though it’s not been what I call an active choice in my life; it’s more of a kind of a 
passive choice. I don’t like hearing myself say that, but it’s probably the closest to the truth. 
Julia begins by apparently ‘joking’ with the child that she didn’t like children. The segment 
comes after an earlier one in which she talked about how she “live[d] in terror of my clients 
asking me ‘do you have children?’”, so it might be assumed that the joke is about how much 
she disliked being asked, and in fantasy retaliated by hitting back at the child. The section that 
follows (“I can’t remember what I said. I think it was a girl, it might have been a girl. I think I 
said ‘because I’ve chosen not to’ and they were like ‘oh my goodness, it’s a choice?’”) also 
has a similar ring of fantasy to it, as if this is the conversation Julia would like to have had 
with a girl child, rather than a recollection of the one she did in fact have. There is a tension 
here for Julia. Like her mother, she was keen to make it clear to a future generation of women 
that there is a choice about whether or not to have children; that becoming a mother is not a 
“gender fate” (Miller 2005), even though, for her, it was a “passive” rather than an “active 
choice” not to do so, and one that she had painful regrets about.112 
Claiming ‘mother’, and claiming loss 
As part of the resolution of the tension between grief and agency Julia chose to actively 
remember the two “children” she had aborted in her 20s, and in doing so to claim her status as 
a mother, and to ‘do mothering’ in relation to them. Some twenty years after terminating the 
pregnancies and following the advice of a Maori healer with whom she was studying, Julia 
chose to go “up into the mountains” of the South Island of New Zealand, which was her 
childhood family home:  
I collected all these little taonga113 treasures for them and I did a ritual. […] So in that process I 
really claimed being a mother, and I put them to rest. So, I know, I know where they are and 
whenever I drive through [that area] I [pause] talk to them. [crying] So even though that’s a little 
bit like [foof – forced exhaling sound signifying something hard to do] I’ve, I’ve, I’ve also done 
                                                        
112 Key to Julia’s understanding of herself is the modernist notion that individuals have choice and can exercise 
agency in this way. Social theorists such as Giddens and Foucault have in different ways problematised 
simplistic binaries of choice/agency and active/passive from a sociological perspective. This perspective 
emphasizes the ways in which individuals exist in a social context that is suffused with discourses of agency, and 
yet this agency is an imaginary; a product of ideas about it and the ways they circulate and are embedded in our 
social worlds.  
113 A Maori word which means ‘treasure’, either in the tangible sense—such a family or cultural heirloom—or 
intangible sense such as ‘water’ or ‘the land’. Children (tamariki) are taonga. 
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[pause] um what I think a mother should do, yeah, which is to [pause] take care of them. [very 
softly, and tears] 114  
Lois: So there is a sense in which you don’t have children but you are a mother? 
Julia: Yeah. Yeah. And I, I’m not very visible with that though. Yeah, I haven’t yet [pause] had the 
courage to do [talk about] that. 
Julia began this section in a very clear strong voice that faltered and became softer and tearful 
at the point where she said she knows where her “children” are and she talks to them. Her 
change in tone marked the shift from a factual narrative of the event to her emotional response 
to her ongoing connections to those children when she is close to the place that marked the 
place of the ritual. It suggests that this place had the symbolic meaning of a grave for her; it is 
where she remembered her “children” and their embodied existence, and marked her ongoing 
connection to them.  
“I’ve also done what I think a mother should do, yeah, which is to take care of them” was said 
very quietly.115 Was this because she was at this point crying, and tears are intimate? Her 
apparent lack of discomfort about her tears elsewhere suggested otherwise to me; I read her 
quietness rather as hesitance. Though her use of “yeah” in the middle of the sentence 
reinforced Julia’s affirmation of her belief in the truth of what she was saying, her words 
made real in the social sphere (through my witnessing them), her claim that in some way she 
is a mother, in the same way that my use of Deborah’s fantasy children’s names made them 
‘real’ for her. Julia’s quietness suggests her concern that her claim to the name of ‘mother’ 
and the doing of mothering are not socially sanctioned, at least in the pakeha world. This was 
confirmed in her next sentence when she said she was “not very visible” with this sense of her 
being a mother; it would take “courage” to talk about herself in that way.  
When she said “claimed being a mother” and “I put them to rest” Julia did so with an upward 
inflection to “mother” and “rest”. Although it was a statement, it was also almost a question. 
It could be that she worried that I (representing the rest of the pakeha social world) would 
ridicule or judge her claim, or that part of her (as a pakeha woman herself) to some degree 
questioned her own claims.                                                          
114 Julia is a psychotherapist. It is not uncommon for New Zealanders of European origin who work as health 
professionals to undertake training in traditional Maori healing practices as part of their professional 
development. These practices are grounded in a Maori ontology in which the dead are understood to hold an 
ongoing and important part of the lives of the living. Julia explained that a ritual such as this would usually be 
done on a marae (a communal sacred space that serves religious and social purposes) or a family plot, 
reinforcing the idea that symbolically, the place Julia chose for this ritual for her “children” was similar to a 
grave.  
115 Other bereaved mothers whose children were stillborn have told me that they felt that washing, dressing and 
burying them was the last thing they could do to care for their infants (Tonkin 1998). 
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It seems that for Julia, and for some other women whose children were briefly embodied and 
were aborted or miscarried, that those children who died acted as a kind of container for her 
ongoing maternal fantasies and for her grief: 
As I’ve got older I’ve always thought about the two children that I didn’t have, and wondered what 
they would look like, and what they would be doing. And I notice myself attracted to same age 
children; I think ‘oh they’d be this age now’. And I think that’s really interesting. It’s like, it’s like 
[pause] they have grown up with me.  I’m not—I love babies but I’m not [stop]; I’m thinking now 
I’d have children in their 20s and it’s like ‘oh that would be cool’. 
Her words suggest that for some women the present absence of their fantasy child(ren) and 
maternal subjectivity may be something that is not abandoned with time as the opportunity to 
embody it wanes with their fertility, but rather continues to be present in their psychic life, 
and to age with them. In this way Julia’s fantasy life has kept in step with her contemporaries 
who did have embodied children who are now young adults. Julia’s loss is both of her 
potential to experience her relationship with them in an embodied form, and to have the social 
world around her acknowledge and validate that relationship.  
In another sense though, her loss is also of those two children, who were very briefly 
embodied. Like Connie, Julia had formed a tentative belief that her children might yet be 
born, in another life. She told me: 
I remember early on someone saying to me, you know, maybe children, you know as spirits choose 
their own time. [pause] I remember when I first heard that I thought ‘what a load of shit. What a 
load of shit!’[very softly] I wasn’t ready to hear that. Over the years [pause] I was really angry 
because it felt like that person didn’t even begin to understand (…) and over time I’ve come to 
[pause] I don’t know, um do I believe that now? [pause] I suppose I do to some degree. Yeah. (…) 
It’s like that was, that was enough, that was, that was all there was at that moment. They might 
come back. They might come back. Yeah. 
Julia described this belief as a “comfort strategy”, and her repetitions of “they might come 
back” underlined the importance of it for her. It is as if she tested the reality of the statement 
by saying it out loud, and found herself able to affirm her own claim. Her beliefs had shifted 
over time to accommodate the possibility that those two children might yet be restored to her, 
and in doing so, her grieving for her fantasy children and fantasy of maternity was eased.  
5.10 Concluding discussion 
The phenomenon of circumstantial childlessness offers an opportunity to expand the 
parameters of conceptualizations of loss and grieving. These research materials clearly 
illustrate that a sense of loss and its associated grief is a signature feature of almost all of 
these women’s experiences, yet those experiences are incompatible with both popular and 
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theoretical understandings of grieving in important ways. I have highlighted a number of 
ways the kinds of grieving these women do might be contrasted with the dominant temporal 
and material assumptions about the process of grieving. In this final section I summarize these 
differences, and argue that the grief they experience can only be accounted for if loss and 
mourning is framed differently. 
Temporal issues 
There is no fixed ‘loss event’ associated with this experience, but rather a continuum of 
potential losses experienced concurrently with a gradual process of accommodation to the 
reality of their finality. Klein (1940/1986, p.147) reiterated Freud (1917) in writing that the 
testing of reality is “an essential part of the work of mourning”. This testing is the painful and 
repeated encounter with the realization that the loss has occurred. In the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness these encounters happen over a long period of several years, but 
for much of that time, the loss is a threat, rather than a current reality. Although there is no 
question that the pain of this grieving is very intense for many women, it is often ameliorated 
by this way in which it is only in retrospect that its finality is apprehended.  
At the same time however, unlike a death or otherwise fixed event, this same temporal open-
endedness can have the effect of prolonging grieving. Media stories of women who distort 
“women’s time” (Kristeva 1979, p.191) by extending the limits of their childbearing 
capacities through the use of technologies such as donor eggs or surrogacy can stretch this 
still further, even if such technologies are financially out of reach for most women. For 
circumstantially childless women, the reality of their loss shifts because it is indexed both to 
their waning fertility and to their social circumstances. There is, as Gina put it “always a little 
hope that he would change his mind or that something would happen. [pause] Some other 
thing can happen, you know?” The concept of ‘chronic sorrow’ addresses losses that have no 
endpoint in this way, but it is a poor fit for circumstantial childlessness in other respects, most 
notably because it has the potential to pathologize women’s experience. The ‘chronic sorrow’ 
concept also does not address the part choice plays in these women’s childlessness. 
Material issues 
Unlike other loss events, in circumstantial childlessness there is no material loss that once 
existed and now does not. These losses are not material ones but rather the loss of the 
potential to embody a fantasy of maternity and a child; a fantasy that I have argued holds a 
unique and powerful position in many women’s lives. From a matrixial perspective this is the 
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loss of the potential to re-experience, this time as a biological mother-to-be (where formerly it 
was as a child-in-becoming), the matrixial experience of pregnancy. Circumstantially 
childless women experience what Frank (2001, p.355) has described as “the absence of what 
we fear will never be”.  Rather than the loss of something that was and is no more, it is the 
loss of future potential, of something that might have been. It holds the potency of all that that 
“something” means to each individual woman, including the relationship to a fantasy child.  
It might be argued that all loss is both a loss of the past as well as of the future in this way; 
that individuals fantasise a future with someone they love, and grieve for that future when it is 
no longer possible. In that case, however, if Freud and Klein are correct about the importance 
of ‘reality testing’ in working through the process of mourning, grieving the loss of someone 
who has died is more productive because the future for which they mourn is indexed to a past 
reality that is fixed. People might wonder, “what would he have been like at 90?” or “we 
might have done this when she was old enough”, but these thoughts are linked to an embodied 
relationship that they have once known. For circumstantially childless women, their 
reflections on what is ‘lost’ are linked to fantasy, and fantasy is unlimited; unchecked by 
reality. 
As I have suggested, in the case of termination of pregnancy these boundaries between 
fantasy and embodiment become blurred, because there has been a material loss. Gina hinted 
at this when she spoke of the difficulties of grieving for the “potential” of the “child” she had 
aborted: 
Well in my case there was a child. Nobody can ever say whether it was right or wrong, that I 
terminated that pregnancy but there was a child and there is a real loss there. There is a  person 
there, really, or a potential. And I did, from time to time I’d think about it and it’s that hopelessness 
of ever knowing what that person would have been like, you know. It’s just hopeless. So, you tell 
your brain to just [pause] shut up. There’s absolutely no point pursuing it. 
Gina’s experience, and, it seems, Maree and Julia’s, is that the child she aborted was 
potentially a person. All three of these women were explicit in their interviews about their 
support for a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.116 
Issues of agency and choice 
Participants’ experiences of grief and of mourning the loss of their potential to embody their 
fantasies of maternity are further tangled with the complexity inherent in issues of agency and                                                         
116 The issue of the possibility of a sense of loss and potentially disenfranchised grief that women (and men) may 
experience after the termination of a pregnancy is a separate topic, but one that these research materials suggest 
has particular salience for women who go on to become circumstantially childless.  
162 
ideologies of choice. In Western societies loss is dominantly cast as unfavourable and 
grieving as passive in the sense that a grieving person is positioned as a victim of his or her 
circumstances; as someone something has happened to, and that others might perhaps pity. 
This understanding positions the experience of loss and grieving in opposition to an active 
agentic stance in life.117 As these women’s narratives illustrate, a woman who sees herself as 
taking such a stance may resist the idea that she is grieving, and may question the legitimacy 
of her own grief. 
It follows that women may not think of or talk about their experience in terms of loss, and 
their response in terms of grief, for a range of reasons. Firstly, they may reject the notion of 
loss and subsequent grief because to do so positions them as victims of their circumstances 
rather than as agentive selves making active choices in their lives. Secondly they may not see 
themselves as having ‘valid’ loss in the way that women who have always been biologically 
infertile do, or they may not conceptualize it as a loss since their loss is disenfranchised—that 
is it is not acknowledged or not validated as such by others—and perhaps self-
disenfranchised, if they understand themselves to be people who are living with the fruits of 
their previous life choices. Alternatively, women may make active choices about how they 
deal with the losses of this form of childlessness. Julia’s “ritual” is an example of this, and I 
discuss these actions more in the following chapter. 
Pushing the limits of ‘loss’ and ‘mourning’ 
The psychoanalytic models of mourning I have drawn on are useful in their exploration of the 
early roots of the process of mourning and the ways these continue to impact on adults’ lives 
in later experiences of loss, but I consider their spirit to have been altered in the years since 
they were developed. The sense in which the capacity to mourn is understood to be a 
developmental achievement that is difficult but achievable for the baby—as Klein and 
Winnicott proposed—is underplayed in contemporary understandings. Instead, a change in 
focus to framing mourning psychologically as ‘healthy’ and ‘normal’ or ‘pathological’, has 
shifted understandings of responses to loss. Grieving is usually conceived as recovery (or as 
failure to do so); like an illness in which one is somehow set aside from ‘real’ life, and 
through which one must work in order to return to ‘normal’ functioning. 
If circumstantially childlessness women’s grieving is not to be pathologized, a 
conceptualization of loss and mourning must move out of its framing within a health and                                                         
117 Attig’s (1996, 2001) concept of ‘active grief’ may appear to contradict this, but it is also premised on the 
notion that loss is usually choiceless, even though an individual’s response to it need not be.  
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illness metaphor to take account of the responses to experiences that are both distressing and 
also an expected part of human existence. Such a framing is not in conflict with an 
acknowledgement of an often painful and difficult suffering that is implicit in these responses. 
In his critique of some ‘therapeutic’ responses to the inevitable difficulties and losses of life 
Craib (1994, p.12) wrote:  
Changes in the way we live in the modern world produce a set of difficulties to which we respond 
by denying the difficult, painful adjustments that we have to make, attempting to transform painful 
experiences of loss into a creative experience, as if the loss could be shrugged off. The 
psychoanalytic theory of mourning has lost its original depth (…) Mourning itself has been 
increasingly pathologised. 
Craib argued for a recognition of the importance of the “disappointment” these difficulties 
create in individuals’ lives, and for the part psychoanalytic psychotherapy can play in making 
it possible for people to “learn how to suffer” (1994, p.194). Although I think 
“disappointment” is too gentle a word to capture their painful essence, Craib’s emphasis on 
their value and inevitability is helpful. Living inevitably involves “difficulties”; encountering 
aspects of life that do not turn out as expected or planned, and individuals grieve for the 
possibilities for living that are no more. This grieving is not pathological, and it does not 
make them ‘victims’ of these circumstances. In this chapter I have focused on the experience 
of these difficulties. I turn now to the “difficult, painful adjustments” that these negotiations 
often entail for circumstantially childless women.  
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Chapter 6: Being ‘maternal’ 
6.1 Introduction: “What remains?” 
(A)s soon as the question “What is lost” is posed, it invariably slips into the question “What 
remains?” That is, loss is inseparable from what remains, for what is lost is known only by what 
remains of it, by how these remains are produced, read, and sustained.  
Eng & Kazanjian (2003, p.2)   
In the previous chapters I have argued that their narratives suggest that many of the 
circumstantially childless women in this study appear to have a “sense of myself as a 
mother”; a fantasy of themselves as mothers in relation to a child or children that has both 
conscious and unconscious dimensions. I have theorized that these fantasies are a product of 
the mutual overlapping of their unique psycho-biography and the social worlds in which they 
have developed as children and adults. Within an overarching object relations approach I have 
drawn on theoretical resources of both intersubjective processes in individuals’ relationships 
with others after birth, and trans-subjective processes before it, to consider the origins of this 
fantasy. 
In chapter 2 I used the visual metaphor of negative space as a way of conceptualizing the 
importance of the meaning-making presence that fills the space of apparent absence in these 
circumstantially childless women’s lives. Eng and Kazanjian’s question in the epigram 
operates on the same logic of this metaphor in implying that what is lost and what is left after 
loss are integral to one another. I have suggested that for these circumstantially childless 
women, “what is lost?” is their potential to embody their fantasy of themselves as a mother in 
relation to a child or children. 
In this chapter I consider the question of  “what remains” and the ways in which those 
remains are “produced, read and sustained”. My interest is in what became of these women’s 
fantasies of maternity and a child, as time passed and their opportunity to embody them 
through the birth of a biological child faded. I wondered what processes of adapting to this 
loss women engaged in, and what the limits and possibilities of these processes might be for 
them. As their fertility waned, and the loss of the potential to embody these fantasies 
increasingly became their lived reality for many of these participants, it might have been 
expected that those fantasies would simply peter out, as a potential subjectivity that they had 
not taken up and was now unavailable to them. That is not what these narratives and drawings 
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indicate; as I will illustrate, these fantasies appeared to continue in some way. In this chapter I 
consider why, and in what ways, this happened.  
In my introductory chapter I used an extract from Deborah’s interview where she talked about 
her “sense of herself as a mother” to illustrate the starting points for this project. I asked how I 
might make theoretical sense of this idea in the context of feminist analysis in which 
biological or religious discourses of the ‘natural’ function of women are not dominant in 
feminist theory. By way of introduction to the central themes of this chapter, I return to that 
extract, and begin by contextualizing it a little more than I did previously.   
Revisiting Deborah’s ‘sense of myself as a mother’ 
The primary reason Deborah gave for the decision she and her husband made not to have a 
child was related to her older sister, whom she described as having “complex disability”. She 
spoke of her perception of the rising risk of having a child with disability because, having met 
in their early 30s, she and her husband were both in their mid 30s by the time they came to 
make the decision about children.118 Her concerns were twofold: having been a carer for her 
sister throughout her childhood, she felt that she “could not do that again” if they had a child 
with a disability, and secondly, she and her husband did not feel comfortable with antenatal 
testing for disability and the possibility of abortion. After reading her interview transcript she 
emailed me because she wanted to clarify this point for me: “On the one hand we 
acknowledged we couldn’t cope with caring for a child with disability and on the other hand 
we did not feel able to deny a child life (once that life had begun) for failing to be our view of 
‘perfect’”.  After some time of “fence-sitting”, they decided not to try to have a child. 
Deborah’s response in the extract below was prompted by a question about why this decision 
not to have children that she and her husband made was difficult for her. Although I quoted a 
section of this extract in my introduction to the thesis I include the entire piece here again for 
ease of reading it in context: 
“[It was] incredibly difficult. And is still difficult. (…) It was difficult because [pause] um [pause] I 
think it was difficult because [pause], I think it was difficult because [long pause] I had never 
[pause], and in a way still haven’t, um, relinquished a, sort of [pause] sense of myself as a mother 
[trembling, quiet voice, crying]. Um [pause], [it’s] very hard to describe but, um [pause] I guess 
[pause] you know, for example, in my job at the, in my job at the moment as [position], one of the 
things that I do, um, as part of my job, and I love, is mentoring of, and supervision of [a set of 
people]. And [pause] in some ways, some of the life skills, personal skills that I apply in those                                                         
118 A concern about the perceived risk of having a child with disabilities because of their older age was a stated 
concern of eight of these participants, and may have been for others. This anxiety was often framed in terms of 
responsibility. Natalie, for example, said “I probably feel that sort of beyond forty I would consider it reasonably 
irresponsible, just because of what I know, to have a child”. 
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relationships—I mean these are not parental relationships [laughs], it’s entirely inappropriate that 
they should be—um, and yet there are some skills, some attributes of myself, that I use in those 
relationships, um, or make available in those relationships, that would also be available and used 
within a mothering, or a parenting type of relationship. And [pause] I think that, um [pause] and 
strangely, you know, whether it’s in a relationship with a pet [laughs], or a relationship with a 
spouse, or a relationship with a sibling, or a relationship with a niece or nephew, […] somehow 
there are elements of myself, in each of those relationships that [pause] that are, that parts of those 
things are a sort of a parenting, nurturing sort of part of me. And, so I guess I’ve never relinquished 
the idea of myself as a [pause] parent, nurturer, um, type of person. And, so I think it’s, it’s [pause] 
um, one of the struggles I’ve had with not having my own biological children, is there hasn’t 
[pause] on the one hand that’s the obvious outlet for those parts of me, um, and I don’t have that, 
and yet I still see places, relationships, um, where those, those parts of me exist, and are used, and 
are valued, and so on. And so it’s a tension, I think, between, you know, if you’re not a mother—
you don’t have biological children, then you’re not maternal, or you’re not nurturing, or you’re not 
something”.    
Clearly Deborah’s maternal fantasies had not disappeared with the decision she and her 
husband had made not to have children, nor in the years since it was made. Deborah is a 
highly articulate woman, whose professional career has trained her to be skilled in using 
language to express complex ideas. These skills were demonstrated throughout her interview, 
where she spoke almost entirely with a notable clarity and fluidity, choosing her words very 
carefully. Her modifications, points of laughter, and the faltering and grammatical fumble she 
made in this section of her interview were a significant exception to her clarity of style in this 
interview, and provide useful points for analysis in themselves. A psychosocial analysis takes 
account of both what is said and what is not said, of the tone of speaking, and of what might 
be indicated in a change in delivery. When I asked Deborah why it was hard to decide not to 
have a baby, why did she not continue in the strong fluid style of speaking she had used 
throughout the interview and simply say “it was hard because I am a nurturing person, and it 
saddens and angers me that I am not recognised as such by others because I am not a 
mother”? Why did she struggle, and cry, and eventually find the extraordinary phrase “the 
sense of myself as a mother”?  
When she tried to express the ‘something’ that had made that decision so hard to make, she 
faltered, and ended her sentence with “it’s hard to explain”. If I frame Deborah’s experience 
through Ettinger’s matrixial theory, I might understand her uncharacteristic struggle to find 
words for her experience in the first part of this extract indicative of a dimension of trans-
subjective relationship that was beyond symbolization. Ettinger (2009, p.393) writes that “a 
retroactive matrixial ‘sense’ may reach its archaic roots in relations with the other”. The idea 
that particular kinds of interactions that Deborah has with some others resonated with her 
earlier matrixial experience helps to make sense of her “sense” of herself as a mother. But the 
matrixial is grounded in an experience of subjectivity as encounter that is pre-linguistic, and 
since our linguistic frames develop in the phallic sphere it is difficult to even think the 
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matrixial. It is possible that Deborah struggled because her experience was beyond the limits 
of the language available to her to think or to communicate about it.  
After her initial struggle to find words, Deborah’s two pauses and an “um” may have been an 
attenpt to collect herself again, to reposition herself as a reliable subject through recourse to 
the logical, reasonable language in which she had been trained to express her thoughts. She 
attempted an explanation through talk of a range of “elements of myself” in which she 
realized a “nurturing sort of part of me” in other ways in her life, but even here she was not 
able to articulate her thoughts and feelings with the same clarity that she did elsewhere in the 
interview. Finally, in the last sentence, with a significant shift of pronoun from “I” to “you”, 
she hinted at the limitations of that realization in her social worlds, because she was not a 
biological mother. The I-you shift suggests that the idea that being ‘nurturing’ was not 
possible if one is not a biological mother  is the ‘message’ that she perceived from others in 
their encounters with her. 
Deborah’s shift from “sense” to “idea” is also significant. The former has a stronger affective 
meaning than the latter. It is coloured with the totality of associations and references to an 
internalized experience of ‘mother’ that encompasses the richness of her fantasies of Elinor 
and Alisdair “down the back”, in ways that the cognitive notion of a generalized “idea” does 
not. I might also read her initial attempt to do so expressed in terms of embodied affect 
(“sense”) and her subsequent shift to the more logical, cognitive “idea” as an overwriting of 
the matrixial by language structured in the phallic dimension.  
During this part of the interview Deborah moved from her inability to relinquish a “sense” of 
herself as a “mother”, articulated with a tearful catch in her voice, to—after a pause—the less 
powerful (in terms of its symbolic power) “idea” of myself as a “parent, nurturer, um, type of 
person”. I understand this shift to be indicative of the process of adaptation of her fantasy of 
herself as a mother that Deborah—and other participants—had made, or were in the long 
process of making. When Deborah spoke of “those parts of me [that] exist, and are used, and 
are valued” in other ways in her life, she illustrated how this process might happen. Rather 
than understanding those “parts” as something she had not developed because she had not 
become a mother, she had become engaged in a process (both conscious and unconscious) of 
mining her maternal fantasies for the aspects of ‘mother’ that she recognised and valued in 
herself, and taking pleasure in embodying what she understood to be those maternal 
dimensions of her subjectivity in a life without biological children.  
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This is not so much a process of doing other things instead of being a mother, but rather of 
what she described as being ‘maternal’ finding its embodied expression in her life in different 
forms. It may be that through this process Deborah was able to keep something of her “sense 
of myself as a mother” intact. (I say “something” because there are socially constructed limits 
to this process, as I discuss further below). Conceiving of ‘maternal’ in this way requires a 
radical shift in thinking from a popular understanding that constrains it to an embodied 
relationship between a woman and a child. Writing of the matrixial Pollock (2009, p.7) asks: 
Where is maternal subjectivity, and is it confined to a maternal subject? Is it singular? (…) Can the 
maternal situation, which implies transformation to a new or different condition of being as a result 
of a co-becoming, occur without an other that/who in the same process is coming into being, and 
thus bringing about in a simultaneous encounter-event the complex that might be named the 
maternal?  
Deborah’s words suggest that she had understood and identified the notions of “nurturing” 
and being “maternal” as “elements” of herself that constituted the sense of herself as a 
mother. Excluded from identification with the subjectivity of ‘mother’ because she had not 
had children, Deborah had decoupled ‘nurturing’ from ‘biological mother’ in her own mind 
by identifying other relationships in her life in which she embodied ‘nurturing’. That is, in 
understanding herself to be applying her ‘maternal’ elements in other relationships she was 
able to keep intact her “sense of myself as a mother”; she distinguished between being a 
mother, and being ‘maternal’ through doing a different form of what for her constituted 
‘mothering’. 
In terms of other people’s acknowledgement of her capacity to nurture however, she 
perceived these alternative ways of being ‘maternal’ to be judged inadequate. This judgment 
caused Deborah considerable distress; in another part of her interview she commented 
“(t)hose are the times, I think, when I feel the pain the most, is when I get a sense that a 
judgment [of her] is being passed. When I feel that people have no reason to be making the 
judgment other than an observation that we don’t have children”. For Deborah this judgment 
implied that being ‘maternal’ in other ways is popularly understood to be both less adequate 
than being so as a biological mother—it’s “not the same”, as several participants noted—and 
also unacceptable in some way. Deborah’s two little points of laughter and use of the word 
“strangely” were maybe intended to signal to me that she realized that on a common sense 
level what she was saying was absurd. They were designed to soften her articulation of the 
notion that her relationship with others or with pets was in some way enacting her sense of 
herself as a mother. They were necessary as a narrative device in this way because she 
perceived that such a notion is understood by others to be laughable at best; at worst 
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objectionable (“entirely inappropriate” with some people in her workplace) and unspeakable. 
She understood it to be “inappropriate” that the relationships were parental, because values 
such as nurturing and concern are closely associated with the maternal, and expression of the 
maternal is limited to the care of children by their (preferably biological) mothers in dominant 
discourse.119 Although it was her experience that these relationships express her “sense of 
myself as a mother” she did not feel comfortable in saying this, and disavowed her own 
maternality in these relationships.  
“And yet”; and yet, even though it did not make sense and was not socially speakable, this 
was Deborah’s experience and she wanted to be as honest and full in her response as she 
could be, and to offer that experience to me for this research. Even as she disavowed it, she 
also (tentatively) claimed it.120 Perhaps it was also important to her to honour her experience 
of that “maternal” sense of herself, just as it was later when she wrote of my use her fantasy 
children’s names giving them “a validity or reality I’m pleased to gift them (and myself)”. 
The “and yet” was an expression of the tension she experienced in the contrast between her 
sense of herself as being “maternal” and the lack of social acknowledgement of this because it 
had not been expressed in biological motherhood. This “tension” was not fully articulated in 
her sentence; one side of it is the way in which her being maternal is not recognised socially, 
but the other side—the way in which she understands herself in some ways to be a mother— 
was unspoken; perhaps an “unthought known” (Bollas 1987, p.3). In this aspect too, 
Deborah’s experience exceeded the capacity for expression in discourses of maternity. 
On the face of it, the idea that nurturing is intrinsic to her would suggest that Deborah was 
conflating ‘woman’ and ‘nurturing’ in an essentialist way, but I do not think this is an 
adequate analysis. I argue rather that part of her difficulty in talking about these feelings is 
that she was very anxious not to adopt an essentialist approach, but she found it hard to talk 
about her responses without appearing to do so. This is my dilemma as a feminist researcher 
as well. In Chapter 2 I discussed the notion of ‘nurture’, and the ways it has been theorized to 
develop in an individual from an object relations and matrixial perspective. I further engage 
with Ettinger’s matrixial in this chapter in order to work through how these women’s 
responses might be understood in a way that avoids framing them in an essentialist way.                                                          
119 It is important to note that the word ‘inappropriate’ has a different resonance in different professional 
contexts. In some contexts it is particularly important that relationships between professionals and the people 
they work with are understood to be different from family roles because of the potential for damage to all 
concerned through inequalities of power. 
120 I had a strong sense throughout the interview that Deborah, as a senior academic herself, was wanting to do 
all she could to support me as a new researcher, particularly as I am working in a field that has such personal 
relevance for her. 
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My focus in this chapter is the fluidity and durability of fantasies of maternity that the women 
I interviewed saw as integral to their sense of themselves, after the potential to embody that 
maternity has passed. I use short vignettes of the interviews with Connie and Lynn to 
illustrate these persistent fantasies of the maternal. 
6.2 Maternal fantasies as dynamic, fluid and durable 
Alongside their grieving, “what remains?” for a number of the women were their fantasies of 
a specific child or children and their “sense of myself as a mother”, read idiosyncratically, 
that had not found expression in becoming a biological mother.  
There are two aspects to these fantasies: the specific fantasies of a child or children and the 
more general fantasies of being a mother. Since I did not ask about their fantasies of a specific 
child or children, and only stumbled across them by accident as it were, I am not aware 
whether all participants had such fantasies, and I analyze them only briefly before moving on. 
Specific fantasies of a child or children 
Deborah’s email, telling me about her highly detailed fantasy of Elinor and Alisdair, made it 
clear that even though it was some years since the decision not to have children had passed, 
her fantasy of them was intact. Perhaps Deborah—and other participants who spoke of their 
fantasy children in very explicit ways—was able to sustain her fantasies of Elinor and 
Alisdair in a way that isolated them in a private, conscious ‘inner world’; separate from her 
more general sense of herself as a mother/nurturer. Describing her own relationship to her 
fantasy of a child when the possibility of giving birth to her had passed Mantell (2003, p.227) 
writes: 
(N)ow that an era of my life is over, and my schoolfriends are becoming grandmothers, I miss the 
child I never had. I know what Catriona would have been like. I have a mental picture of her, 
which I have built like one of those criminal profilers whose formulations—let’s be honest—never 
fit too well. 
Rosen (2005, p.188) writes that “(u)ndone dreams, our failures as humans, may never be 
rectified in our lifetimes. But we can invest in our fantasies about our children”.  
Mantel’s “let’s be honest” highlights her awareness that her fantasy of Catriona is somewhat 
idealised; it is one that has never had to correspond with the realities of embodied existence, 
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and yet, like Deborah’s, it is surprisingly detailed.121 The women who did discuss these 
specific fantasies with me talked in a way that suggested that they continued to think of them 
as Mantell did, even after the possibility of their being embodied was past; not with the 
intense longing they once had, but rather with a kind of nostalgic treasuring that is not 
dissimilar to the affectionate remembrance people often hold for loved ones who have long 
died, when the pain of early grieving is over.122 For several participants these specific 
fantasies took the form of a belief or hope that they would go on to mother the child(ren) in a 
different life, as I have discussed previously (see p.90), suggesting that their fantasy of them 
was postponed indefinitely, rather than abandoned.  
Maternal fantasies as dynamic 
I turn now to participants’ more general fantasies of themselves as a mother, and here I focus 
particularly on the experience of the 13 older participants, who understood their potential to 
have a biological child to be past.  
In the previous chapter, in which I discussed the grief expressed in these women’s talk about 
their loss, I drew parallels between the ways in which individuals experience and respond to 
the pain of loss and the infantile processes of mourning that Klein wrote about in Mourning 
and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States (1940/1986). In relating the losses of 
circumstantial childlessness to the aspect of mourning in which Klein theorized that the 
individual re-introjects and reinstates and “preserves” the loved object however, the picture is 
more complex. The relationship these women had with their fantasy child and their sense of 
themselves as a mother was and had been part of their ‘inner world’; indeed it was their 
ability to make it ‘external’ that was lost. In terms of Klein’s explication of an object relations 
framework of grieving, their process would be to mourn for this loss and, as part of that 
mourning, to “preserve” the potential to embody “the sense of myself as a mother” in some 
way.  
The idea of ‘preservation’ however, highlights the inadequacies of Klein’s theorising for these 
circumstances. It is too static to account for the dynamic ways in which many of these women                                                         
121 Mantell (2009, p.227) went on to write, “(s)he would be nothing like me at all. She would be strong like my 
mother, broad-shouldered like my husband, with that milky Irish skin that freckles but never tans. I see her small 
competent hands, chopping an onion; making unwritten dishes, which she has never been taught to make”.  
122 Clearly there is a significant difference here, in that bereaved people have the embodied memories of the 
person who has died to draw on in this remembering. However, my speculation is borne out in my work as a 
counsellor, where I see parallels with the ways circumstantially childless women talk (very cautiously) about 
fantasy children and some aspects of the ways bereaved people talk about someone who has died. People might 
‘memorialize’ others by doing things such as naming a loved pet or making their computer password the name 
they had chosen “if I ever had a child”, for example. My musing on the names that participants chose as 
pseudonyms for this research (in Chapter 4, footnote 79, p.93) is related to this idea. 
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described their maternal fantasies as having continued, but also shifted, transformed, and 
adapted over time.123 In the vignettes of Connie and Lynn that follow, I illustrate this process. 
6.3 A challenge to maternal fantasies as continuing 
Not all of the participants in this study spoke of their maternal fantasies as an ongoing 
experience in their lives. Kim, for example, described herself in this way: 
I think my trajectory was; thinking about it, sort of [pause] having a period where I sort of felt I did 
want to have children, but not having the situation where I did [pause] see myself being actually 
able to do it, um, and then [pause] forgetting about it […] well, more or less just [pause] moving on 
to other things. 
A closer analysis of the interviews of the women who spoke in this way suggests that these 
descriptions are a little more complex than they seem initially though. Connie, like many of 
the older participants, spoke of the intensity and yearning to have a child fading as time 
passed, and her drawing also reflected this. As they moved into their 40s she and several other 
women drew on a biological discourse of hormonal change to explain this difference. In 
describing her drawing (see p.130; I repeat the first section for ease of reading) Connie said,  
In my 20s I’d just had, you know, faith, and hope, that it was all going to happen at some point. 
And um, so, probably just was, leading quite a rosy life, and enjoying myself, and um, but then, in 
my 30s I, ahh, yeah. My friends started having families, and um, and, I wasn’t in the, either wasn’t 
in the right relationship or not in a relationship, and towards the end of my 30s the really, the 
anxiety and the pain [taps drawing], the black part was very strong. Probably until my early 40s. 
And umm [pause] I must say now, I really feel I’m here, um definitely the hormones, now that I’m 
45, it’s such an, it’s so noticeable that just the, the body just doesn’t ask for it anymore I think. Just 
um, really over the last two or three years I feel the hormones are really settling, really settling 
down. And I feel um, much more content [pause] ah er, with my life, than before, I think. I feel like 
I can really be myself. And umm, and feel relieved I’ve come out of this black part [small laugh]. 
And I feel like I can just move on. Yeah.  
On the face of it Connie’s drawing and explanation would seem to suggest that her maternal 
fantasies were simply in a process of fading out with time, challenging my argument that they 
persist. This was certainly how Connie seemed to see it; she told me, “I’m sure that over time 
the acceptance will grow more and more. I think the grief I can still feel now every now and 
then, I’m sure time will solve that”. It is possible however that Connie’s reasons for this claim 
complicate her reconciliation to being childless. It may have been important to Connie to 
consciously abandon her hopes of embodying her maternal fantasies in the way she suggested, 
                                                        
123 In their work that outlines a new ‘continuing bonds’ paradigm for conceptualizing grieving in the context of 
bereavement Klass et al (1996, p.16) made a similar comment. They write that ‘internalization’ as it is 
understood psychoanalytically “does not accurately describe” a process that is “more colorful, dynamic and 
interactive than the word “internalization” suggests”. 
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but on another level perhaps she had both postponed them for a future life and adapted them 
for this one. 
Connie’s biological explanation for her adaptation to not having children fits well with her 
explanation for why she wanted to have children (“I guess it’s just, it’s really instinct. It’s 
really [pause] it’s nature”). While it seems likely that there is indeed a biochemical dimension 
to this experience, Connie draws here on understandings of a biological “instinct” that do not 
also take account of the social changes in her life that age had brought. A number of 
participants commented that as they moved into their 40s their sense of loss was less likely to 
be triggered by friends announcing a new pregnancy, for example, and that those close to 
them were less likely to question them about their plans to have a child. So while it is likely 
that Connie felt grief associated with the loss of her potential to have a child less often and 
less intensely, and less frequently found herself yearning to have a child, it may be that her 
maternal fantasy had not waned in the same way.  
Another possible interpretation of Connie’s words takes into account the ways in which she 
may have been unconsciously defended against thinking and talking about her fantasies of 
mothering her “real boys” persisting. After some difficult relationship experiences in her 20s 
and 30s choosing a partner who would be a “companion” that she could “trust” had been a 
priority for her. Her partner was an older man who did not want to have more children. She 
talked about beginning a relationship with him as “a far more mature way of starting a 
relationship? You know it was not like butterflies and oh, here we go!” She was not prepared 
to “jump into something again and just [pause] be heartbroken again”. Connie was faced with 
the same “calculus” that Gina had described when she spoke of choosing between “this 
abstract scenario that might or might not work out, or this real live person that you’re in love 
with”.124 In terms of deciding between staying with this man who did not want another child 
and her own longing to have a child she described the choice she made as “just [pause] yeah 
mind over matter […] I grew towards the conclusion that this was my life right now”. Her 
                                                        
124 In this respect these women challenge theorists of individualization who suggest that now “traditional bonds 
play only a minor role and the love between men and women has likewise proved vulnerable and prone to 
failure” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1995, p.73). They argue for “a new type of unmarried mother (…) who wants 
to have a child alone, without a man or a traditional kind of partnership”. In my sample only one woman was 
contemplating sole parenthood in this way, and almost all of the participants specifically said they would 
definitely not choose to have a child alone. 
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words imply an active suppression of her maternal desires and a deliberate investment in her 
relationship.125  
The “right now” suggests that her strong belief in reincarnation and the implications of it for 
being a mother to her fantasy dark-haired “real boys” in another lifetime made it more 
possible to exert “mind over matter in this way”. Connie took a long view of her maternal 
subjectivity, and said,  
I just think I’m preparing myself now to become a mother in the next lifetime [laughs]. I think 
there’s a lot of things that I can work on for myself—particularly in the relationship—and I think if 
I really focus on that this lifetime then I create a good foundation to have a family next time. 
Apart from postponing her fantasies of a children in this way Connie described two parts of 
her life which can be interpreted as being manifestations of her adapting and continuing her 
maternal fantasies (in this lifetime). Firstly she spoke of being very close to her nieces, and 
wanting to play an active part in their lives. Her relationship with these girls “fulfills the idea 
of having a younger generation that you have a bond with” for her. She also talked of taking 
pleasure in caring regularly for her three year old step-granddaughter. 
The second aspect was the work she planned with her partner. ‘Moving on’ for her involved a 
reconsideration of her career since around the age of 37, and retraining in an entirely different 
field as a primary school teacher.126 She and her partner planned to work together in 
developing countries because that “definitely is looking for contributing more than just 
enjoying life and living it away. Yes. I definitely look for a sense of purpose”. This idea of 
contributing, finding a way to live life that gave it a sense of purpose and extended it beyond 
the scope of taking pleasure in one’s own life and “living it away” has a sense of generativity 
about it that I relate to Connie and other womens’ fantasies of maternity. Although it comes 
from a different paradigm I find the concept of ‘generativity’ to be useful and not 
incommensurate with an object relations approach in this respect. Chodorow (2003, p.1185) 
writes: 
(A)lthough motherhood is usually one central meaning of generativity for women, generativity for 
both sexes means more than parenting one’s own biological children (Erikson 1950). It can involve 
many kinds of creative and caring activities, or activities that foster the next generation or the 
environment. Such activities directly express the parental components of generativity.                                                         
125 It is hard to know how much to read into the phrase ‘mind over matter’. A matrixial reading of Connie’s use 
of this term might suggest that she used it unconsciously to describe a process that was for her a choice between 
‘mind’ that was rational and measured against ‘matter’ that had the indefinable blurriness and elusiveness of an 
embodied matrixial dimension of her subjectivity.  
126 The late 30s, especially around 37, 38, seems to have been a time when many of the older participants were 
confronted more urgently by the possibility of their remaining without biological children. This, for example, 
was the time that both Lynn and Lesley talked about having become very depressed.  
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Chodorow uses the term ‘generativity’ here in the Eriksonian sense of a “concern in 
establishing and guiding the next generation” (Erikson 1963, p. 267). Within the context of 
his theory of life-span development Erikson understood generativity not to be limited to the 
sphere of raising children but more broadly as a stage where an individual “nurtures, teaches, 
leads and promotes the next generation while generating life products and outcomes that 
benefit the social system and promote its continuity” (McAdam & de St. Aubin 1992, 
p.1003). Considering ways to live out this kind of generative gesture in other spheres of their 
lives seems to have been part of the process of adaptation of their maternal fantasies for many 
of these older participants, as Lynn’s narrative, which I discuss next, will illustrate. 
In summary, Connie’s story draws attention to two important aspects of the durable quality of 
these maternal fantasies. Although she presents her fantasies as having faded, it is also 
possible to understand them as continuing in several different forms: caring for and 
maintaining a “bond” with other children in her life who were important to her; postponing 
her general fantasies of maternity and specific fantasies of children for another life; and 
finding a sense of purpose in contributing to the education and development of others, 
particularly children. While she still experienced a sense of loss and grieved for not having a 
child at times, she also described herself as happy; her relationship with her partner and a 
sense of “fulfillment” in her work brought her pleasure. These sources of satisfaction were 
explicitly weighed against the experience of childlessness. 
6.4 “A little something I haven’t put aside yet”: the adaptation of 
fantasy as an ongoing process 
Many of these participants hinted at or spoke directly of a sense of something remaining—
something apart from the traces of grief—in a way that was similar to the “sense of myself as 
a mother” that Deborah found so difficult to “relinquish” and to articulate. Lynn’s narrative is 
a good example of this ‘something’ that remained.127 From her mid 20s to her early 30s she 
had a long, unsatisfactory and “messy” relationship with a man who already had a child and 
did not want more. During this time she became pregnant twice, and had an abortion each 
time. These were very complex and painful experiences for her because she had felt torn; she 
had very much wanted to have a child, but not in the circumstances she was currently in, or 
with the man who was the father.  
Around age 37-38 the quite severe depression that Lynn had struggled with in recent years 
culminated in “a bad time” in which she also found herself coping with some physical health                                                         
127 I first introduce Lynn in Chapter 3, p.78.  
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issues as well as psychological ones. She described herself as feeling more ambivalent about 
having children, “just the whole, getting older, how much harder it would be, feeling, feeling 
older actually, feeling a lot older […] and feeling like, God it would be hard”. Around this 
time she met the man she went on to marry, and described herself as being “open’ to the 
relationship because of the “space” she had come to in relation to having children, although 
she knew from the outset of the relationship that he was neither able nor willing to have 
children. In her interview she described their relationship as a “fantastic” one in which she 
“feels blessed”. She said the past two years with him had “kind of been the happiest of my life 
[pause] without children!”[laughs]. Her laughter was presumably ironic because she had 
described spending much of her 30s grieving about her childlessness and actively trying to 
find ways to have a child.  
Alongside this happiness Lynn also talked about an ongoing sadness and difficulty that her 
not having had a child created for her. After speaking about the contribution children would 
make to a family she said,  
I guess I’ve got, I feel, like I can, even just talking about it, I can feel the emotion in my, sort of 
physically in my body, and I [pause] I’m a great [pause and breath in] I sort of believe in trying to 
deal, that it’s helpful to deal with things in terms of your physical health [pause] as much as 
anything [pause].Yeah [pause] I sort of feel like, I think you store grief in your body[pause] and 
umm […] maybe it’s, maybe it is about understanding it better. 
Lynn’s words are full of hesitation, confusion and tension. Her life was happy and fulfilled 
and her pleasure in her relationship was clear, and at the same time there was something that 
felt unresolved, perhaps incomplete or lost to her. She was unable to articulate what it was, 
but she experienced it as embodied “emotion” and believed it was important to “deal” with it 
in some way.  
I summarized the way I understood Lynn’s position to her at this point in the interview as one 
of having been through a period of some ambivalence about having a child that was still 
continuing, although lessened, and seeming mostly to be feeling  she was coming to terms 
with the idea that she would not have a child. She agreed, but added, 
I think that’s right, yeah, I still, I still do have some stuff that I’m [pause] I feel like is unexplored, 
or unarticulated or something […] it’s almost like it’s, I still feel like I’ve got a little something that 
I haven’t quite put aside yet. […] I don’t quite know how to do it really, yeah, and I don’t know 
whether it’s, I suspect it’s mixed up with something about the abortions and stuff as well.[pause] 
But mostly I’m pretty comfortable with where I’m at.  
I relate Lynn’s “little something that I haven’t quite put aside yet” to Deborah’s discussion of 
her inability to “relinquish” her “sense of myself as a mother”, to the black asterisk—“it’s just 
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little”—in her womb in Gina’s drawing (see p.94), and to the “maternal thing” that “came” 
for Maree. I speculate that this “little something” that revealed itself in different ways in 
women’s talk is the nub of their fantasies of maternity.  
As I discussed in chapter 3, Lynn explored this same territory in her drawing (see p.77). In it 
she moved in a clockwise direction around the paper, her small drawings showing aspects of 
her past unsatisfactory life (“some horrible job that I hated”), and moving to a depiction of her 
happy life with her husband, moving hand-in-hand towards the future together (“the rainbow 
and the Earth: it’s kind of a future thing”). It was at this point that Lynn added the huge 
breasts “over the whole thing”,  
because what I always have in [pause] because I, if I really try to feel [pause] feel not having a 
child I think I get left with, I do have quite deep feelings of, of having missed the opportunity to 
nurture, and I still [pause], I still would like that experience of a baby suckling on my nipple and I, 
[pause] I, yeah I feel it quite physically, the [pause] that [pause] I sort of think of it as a loss or 
something like that. 
Like Deborah, Lynn clearly struggled to articulate her experience in language. I have 
suggested that through drawing Lynn was better able to capture the ineffable quality of the 
“something” that eluded her; something that was “over the whole thing” of her life, in spite of 
her happiness in a relationship. For her it was best symbolized in the breasts that invoked the 
bodily act of nurturing a baby through breastfeeding.  
Like many of these participants, Lynn is a highly articulate woman who drew frequently on 
feminist critiques of popular notions of femininity in her talk about her experiences. She told 
me that she had been keen to find “sophisticated and intelligent” comment on the issue of 
circumstantial childlessness and had searched out an old copy of Broadsheet to find “other 
women’s words”, but found there was nothing “salient” in feminist literature for her; “the 
focus was on women who didn’t want to have children, rather than women who did”.128 She 
told one story of her sister, who, knowing how much she wanted to have a child, suggested to 
Lynn that she should have IVF in order to achieve a pregnancy, saying “You’re not, you’re 
not a real woman until you’ve had children”. In response Lynn said,  “Well I just ignored it, 
because it’s such a [pause] unreasonable thing to say. [laughs] […] I mean, I actually don’t 
believe that at all. I think there’s lots of ways to contribute to [pause] the planet or whatever. 
Women aren’t just um, child bearers”. In trying to make sense of their longing for a child and 
the experience of biological mothering, it seems likely that Lynn—and other participants who 
were positioned in this way—would have explored the potential to understand it as an                                                         
128 Broadsheet was a New Zealand feminist magazine that was published monthly from 1972-1997. 
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outcome of social imperatives and found these did not explain her yearning adequately for 
her. There appears to be something in the experience of circumstantial childlessness that 
exceeds the potential for either popular understandings of motherhood and femininity, or 
feminist critiques of these discourses, to explain it. 
Lynn was five years younger than Deborah, and her relationship with her husband—and 
therefore her realization that she would not have a child—was only two years old. It seems 
likely that her progress through the process of adaptation of her fantasies that I suggested 
Deborah had made (and was making) was not as fully developed as it was for Deborah. When 
I asked her about her plans for the future she said, 
Lynn: I guess, uh, I, I sort of, I’ve still got [pause and big breath in] I’d sort of like to consolidate a 
career a bit more [pause] always been interested in government. I was quite a political activist in 
my sort of 20s, and I’d like to [pause] eventually go back to that [pause] probably [pause]. Take my 
career somewhere. I feel more, um, I guess I feel more energy for that now, yeah [pause] have 
more time. 
Lois: And is that about having a purpose, do you think? 
Lynne: “It’s a bit of [pause] it’s a bit of a purpose I think, it’s [pause] I’m not quite sure what it is, 
it’s about um [long pause and breath in] I just want to kind of contribute somehow to [pause] I 
guess we all do, making the world a better place, um [pause] and I do believe that you can, if you, 
yeah [pause] yeah.[…] Yeah, so there’s that, and the other thing is that umm, my husband and I are 
quite umm [pause] keen to live a more [pause] to set ourselves up with a more sustainable kind of, 
you know, like a bigger vege garden, we’ve got bees, we want to get chickens, that kind of thing, 
um, and we’d like to look into, you know, alternative power stuff and things like that, […] so that’s 
another thing that I want to put some energy into, yeah [pause] and then I’ve got my sister’s family, 
who I also do feel, you know, I want to do that [pause] auntie thing”. 
Lynn faltered and appeared lost for an answer as she began in the first section. Unlike 
Deborah, who was able to identify ways in which she was enacting aspects of her maternal 
fantasies of nurturing, it seemed that Lynn was still invested in future plans that were as yet 
unclear. Linguistically, “I’ve still got” is a clear statement of ‘what remains’, but in terms of 
her meaning, the phrase was unfinished. It seems Lynn was not sure what she still had, and 
the sentence carries the weight of implication that something was understood to be lost. Her 
big breath in could indicate an unconscious need for energy to strengthen her from a point of 
loss.129 Her plans still seemed undefined and somewhat tentative at this point. The extract can 
be read as a conversation between two parts of herself; one that was a little less sure, and 
another that was wanting to reassure herself with repetition of the affirmative “Yeah”.                                                         
129 This assertion is based on my close reading of the interviews of the 10 cases I had chosen for more detailed 
study, in which I paid particular attention to participants’ breathing patterns at points in the interview where they 
were speaking of issues that seemed particularly affect-laden for them (see for example my discussion of Kelly 
in Chapter 3, p.75). It is also grounded in my experience as a counsellor, where I have learned to hear a gasping 
intake of breath as a possible indicator of an issue that the speaker is struggling with in some way. 
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This sense of vagueness shifted in the second section with Lynn’s second big intake of breath. 
Unlike Connie, the idea of ‘purpose’ did not resonate, but she too was interested in an active 
sense of contribution. Her repeated use of “yeah” and her emphasis on “I do believe that you 
can” (make the world a better place) again suggest that she was both stating this as a belief 
and also convincing herself of its truth. This small section (where she discussed the plans she 
and her husband had for a sustainable life) was the one in which her demeanor, affect and 
voice tone was the most spirited and positive of the whole interview. It was clear that she had 
a lot of enthusiasm for it. Daphne de Marneffe (2006b) writes that: 
Maternal desire is not about turning children into accessories to our narcissism, but about 
connecting us to what really matters, to our own deepest human desires and values, as a wellspring 
for caring action—toward our own children, but also toward the larger world. 
It could be that in the absence of children in her life Lynn was looking for—and taking 
pleasure in—other ways to tap into “a wellspring for caring action”. 
In summary, the research materials associated with Lynn further illustrate that it was often 
difficult to find language to understand or explain some important aspects of the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness. When she talked about what was lost, it was the opportunity to 
“nurture”, and when she spoke of what was still available to her, it was a sense of reaching 
beyond herself; of finding fulfillment through ‘contributing’ to the world in some way. 
Although she was happy in her life with her husband, there was still an inexplicable 
“something” that continued.  
6.5 Other nurturing relationships 
Many other participants in this research also talked about a range of relationships in their lives 
in which they embodied ‘maternal’ in other ways, while not being mothers. Four participants 
were counsellors, nine were in positions of teaching or mentoring adult students, two were 
preschool teachers, one cared for people with intellectual disabilities, and one was a primary 
school teacher. At least four participants spoke in the interviews about having made a 
deliberate choice to change direction in their work and retrain in order to work in roles that 
involved working with children or caring for people in some way, when it became clear that 
they would not have a biological child. Lesley, for example, described having children as 
“one of the most creative things you could do”. She spoke of a time in her late 30s when she 
decided: 
I could sit and grieve, I could sit and be an administrator, be good at my job but not enjoy it, and 
grieve […] and slowly draw into myself and retreat. Or I could do something different.  Yeah. […] 
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It was about being creative. Yeah. In an important way. I just realise I can be creative in many, 
many different ways and it was about having [pause] using my energy constructively and 
channelling it. 
Almost all participants talked about taking pleasure in their relationships with children in their 
lives, particularly those that were part of their extended families. They spoke of the 
importance of caring for and spending time with step-children, grandchildren, god-children, 
nieces and nephews.  
A significant number of participants told me that they had very close relationships with their 
pets, and saw these relationships as a way of having a nurturing relationship with another 
creature. Sonya, for example, said,  “I definitely, yeah, definitely mother [her pets] like 
specially you know [her dog, sitting on the floor near us], […] he’s just, you know he’s my 
shadow a lot of the time. He’s, I always call him my baby boy”. Similarly, at the end of a 
discussion about the opportunities having a child offered people to “cut through” an innate 
selfishness Gina said: 
And, I mean its [pause] you can’t compare, when you talk to other women you can’t compare 
children to dogs, but I’ve had a dog and my relationship with her was really special in a lot of 
ways.  She was, she and I had an unconditional bond of love and understanding. It’s a different 
kind of relationship than you have with people your own age. And it’s that unconditionality and 
that sense of selflessness and that [pause]. You know what I’m saying eh. 
With her repetition of “you can’t compare” Gina wanted to make it clear to me that she 
understood the comparison between a relationship with a pet and one with a child to be a 
socially illegitimate one to make. Nevertheless, she did make that comparison, and it was that 
relationship that came to mind when she thought of her experience of the “unconditional bond 
of love and understanding” that she understood to be created through a selfless commitment 
to nurturing another creature that so many women saw as the essence of the maternal 
relationship. She struggled to name the elements of this relationship but, knowing me to have 
children, ended with a call to me to acknowledge that I understood, that I knew what she was 
unable to articulate, because I am a mother. 
A number of women talked about exploring options around adoption or fostering children, 
and two spoke of recently having taken on a fostering role of some sort with a small child. 
Many talked about their experience of caring for other people’s children as being 
tremendously important to them. Gina, for example, told the story of travelling around the 
globe to spend time with her closest friend when her baby was born:  
I was able to hold [him], every morning while she took a shower and had a break from him, and put 
my finger in his mouth to stop him crying, and sing to him, and just be there for his first few weeks 
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of life in a way that was really precious. So [pause] she did that, for me [pause, and close to tears] 
[…] she knew that there was a [pause] hole there, and that she can help a little bit. It was really 
precious, it really was. It was so cool. As far as infancy goes, this is it for me; [he] was pretty much 
it. And it was really special. Really special. I felt incredibly fortunate.  
Gina’s repeated use of “really” and “precious” gave a sense of the power of this experience 
for her, and also the inexpressibility of what it meant for her to comfort and nurture a baby in 
this way. She perceived this time to have given her an opportunity to experience an embodied 
version of nurturing an infant that would otherwise have been unavailable to her.  
It might be argued that Gina’s perception of this experience as ‘precious’ is a product of a 
popular but unrealistic narrative of mothering a newborn baby as a blissful time of closeness.  
As Ruddick (1995, p.29) commented however, “(i)t is hard to speak precisely about 
mothering. Overwhelmed with greeting card sentiment, we have no realistic language in 
which to capture the ordinary/extraordinary pleasures and pains of maternal work”. Gina’s 
words may also reflect her experience of her time with the baby triggering the “bodily, 
habitual, emotional remembering” of her own infancy (Stone 2012, p.6) that is archaic and 
preverbal, as I discussed earlier (in Chapter 2, p.33). It may be that in Ettinger’s matrixial 
theory there is the “language” that makes it possible to speak about aspects of the maternal 
experience that was not available to Ruddick in 1995, and that addresses the ways these 
women deliberately develop nurturing relationships. I discuss this possibility further in the 
section below. 
6.6 “It’s not the same” 
If the potential to express the nurturing qualities that develop via intersubjective and trans-
subjective processes that I have described in Chapter 2 is available for these women, why did 
Deborah speak of a “struggle” with the ways “those parts of me exist, and are used, and are 
valued” in other places and relationships in her life? What lies under the “tension” that she 
tries to express; “you know, if you’re not a mother […] then you’re not maternal, or you’re 
not nurturing, or you’re not something”? 
I suggest that Deborah’s shift from the embodied/affective quality of “sense” to the more 
cognitive one of “idea” and her struggles with the “tension” that she spoke of both have their 
origins in the way this dimension of the maternal is not recognised in the social contexts she 
inhabits. In part, I suggest this is because the matrixial dimension is suppressed by the phallic 
structure of language itself, by the dominance of discourses that posit that relationships begin 
at birth, and by a culture that valorizes the autonomous individual and fears the formlessness 
and permeability of subjectivities that is implied in the matrixial dimension.  
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Even if the matrixial dimension is not taken into account however, a maternal subjectivity is 
not socially acknowledged in women who do not have children for other reasons. In spite of a 
growing recognition that there are many ways in which to become a mother, it seems that 
culturally these are still compared to the gold standard of the biological mother who continues 
to care for her child. Discussing ‘infertility’ Letherby (2012, p.13) notes that “(b)iological 
(and if at all possible genetic) parenthood complement dominant discourses of ‘true’ 
motherhood and fatherhood and ‘proper’ families”.  
Kelly and her partner shared care of his two small children with his former wife. Apart from 
the segment I quoted earlier (in Chapter 5, p.126), Kelly maintained a steady, strong voice 
and unbroken narrative throughout her interview. At the end of it however, I asked her how it 
was to talk about these issues. Although she considered that the interview would probably not 
impact on the decision (not to have children) in response to this question, Kelly seemed 
shaken: 
[breath in] Ummm [shaking voice] [pause][…] maybe I’m kidding myself [pause] um [pause] 
yeah, and I, you know I may never lose that feeling that [pause] um [pause] it’s not the same, it’s 
not quite the same, as having your own, but [pause] yeah, it, it’s just that acceptance of it really. It 
does pull at your heartstrings, it certainly does, it does you know [pause]. I can’t be called 
someone’s Mum [pause] um. 
The strength of the dominant discourse (of ‘true’ motherhood and fatherhood and ‘proper’ 
families) is such that while many participants talked about ways in which they understood 
themselves to be enacting maternal subjectivities, the idea that it was “not the same”—in the 
sense of ‘not as good’—was often asserted, as it was here. “I can’t be called someone’s Mum” 
was for Kelly the essence of this denial of her maternal subjectivity: no matter how much she 
was involved in her stepchildren’s lives, it would never be possible to be called “Mum”; to 
experience the appellative recognition of her ‘true’ maternal subjectivity. Her use of the 
bodily metaphor of “pulling at your heartstrings” and her repetition of “it does” underlines her 
powerful emotional response to this positioning. 
Toni, who cared for her niece for three nights every week from the age of 18 months until she 
left home in her later teens, is another participant who illustrated this well. She talked about 
her relationship with her niece as one of “watching a child grow, being involved in those 
decisions about, you know, her wellbeing.  And, and her daily life, making her school lunch, 
picking her up from school, those sorts of things, supervising homework”. She spoke of 
“strong vivid memories” of her at age “ten, eleven, I just love those years, particularly with 
her.  And sometimes I’ll just dream of that, you know, and picture her so clearly […].  And 
I’ll wake up and I’ll wake and realise I’ve had tears, just, you know, I’ll wake with wet 
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cheeks”. The image, and Toni’s repetition of “I’ll wake” that breaks her narrative flow, 
powerfully evokes a reollection of an intense maternal entanglement with a loved niece.  Her 
words suggest however, that although she was closely, emotionally and bodily connected to 
her in what might easily be described as a ‘maternal’ sense, her part in her niece’s life was not 
acknowledged by close family, friends and others in her social worlds. She commented that 
“being a biological mother must offer so much more, because, you know, you get recognition 
for a start”. The painfulness of the nonacknowledgement of her maternal subjectivity is clear 
in the following segment: 
(A)ll my life in that role I’ve suffered from lack of recognition and that’s hurt, like it makes me 
want to cry, you know, it really hurts, still hurts.  So that even [pause] her mum was pretty good at 
recognising my role. I mean for God’s sake I had her three nights a week for years and years and 
years and years.  Her mum was quite good at it, but other family who never saw me as just a 
regular auntie, realised what role I had and [pause], you know, and friends and others often, they 
didn’t seem to have a framework for managing that. 
Toni’s comment that people in her social worlds did not have a “framework” for 
understanding her as a mother is a telling one. It seems likely that although many of the 
women in this study had found ways of expanding ‘maternal’ in their own thinking, and 
embodying aspects of it in creative ways in their lives, they did not experience recognition of 
these dimensions of their maternal selves from others.  
While the perceived lack of social recognition makes up one reason that “it’s not the same” 
however, Toni’s story suggests a further dimension. Toni is a lesbian and both she and her 
partner were keen to have a biological child. She described a long and complex process of 
deciding which of them would bear the child, and finding someone who was willing and 
suitable to donate sperm to them. In time, Toni did become pregnant but at seven weeks 
miscarried. She described: 
seven weeks of being pregnant and, you know, I remember going to bed and just laughing with 
glee because I’d hit the stage where I’d be ravenously hungry after a big evening meal and couldn’t 
wait for breakfast, and, you know, laughing about that with [her partner].  And, and having sore 
breasts and not being able to lie on my tummy in bed and, um, so, so I treasure those memories, 
yeah and the excitement we had when, when we, you know, when I finally did a pregnancy test and 
it was positive. 
In this story Toni narratively constructed herself as a mother—albeit briefly—in ways that are 
similar to other participants who were pregnant for a time. Her story focuses on what 
delighted her about the pregnancy and the sense of being a mother. Both Toni and her partner 
found the pain of loss very difficult, and although Toni tried to get pregnant again, it did not 
happen. Eventually her partner decided that she could not face the ongoing hurt of the process 
and they did not take it any further.  
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When Toni talked of the pregnancy she spoke almost exclusively of her satisfaction in bodily 
terms. Although the opportunity to have a child was past because of her age at the time of the 
interview, she still said, “ I love the idea of seeing my growing belly and, and nourishing of 
the baby and experiencing childbirth and breast feeding.  Um, yeah, really, really, really 
warmed up to that.  I still think it would be lovely”. Her repeated use of “really” emphasized 
how powerful this idea was for her. At the same time, Toni had the skills to deconstruct this 
dream: 
I look at pregnant women and I just like, you know, I think they look incredibly beautiful and, you 
know, to see that expanding belly I think it just must be such an exciting time.  You know, I mean 
and also, that’s also romanticised, you know, I’ve been, um, I’ve had friends who’ve had horrific 
pregnancies where they’ve, you know, been sick every single day. […] So it’s not that I don’t 
know about those stories are absolutely romanticised.   
In spite of this awareness, it seemed that for Toni, the embodied dimension of motherhood 
entailed something that was different from the social mothering she did with her niece, and 
exceeded even the potential for the romanticising she expected. Although I find it a difficult 
conclusion to come to, for her and many of these women, it seems there was a dimension of 
maternal experience that they longed for, and that they experienced as being irretrievably lost 
when they had not given birth to and cared for a biological child. 
6.7 Concluding discussion: being ‘maternal’ 
In this chapter I have drawn on the narratives and drawings of these circumstantially childless 
women to show that, although many saw their longing to have a child fade over time, their 
maternal fantasies did not simply peter out as their fertility waned. In order to understand 
what their “sense of myself as a mother” is, and why it persists, I have focused on several 
narratives to illustrate the ways in which, over and over throughout the research material, the 
fantasy of being a mother and the idea of being ‘maternal’ coalesced around the idea of being 
‘nurturing’. This term is broad enough to encompass a spirit of caring, concern for others and 
the environment, contributing, teaching, mentoring and cherishing, and also carries 
connotations of feeding and growing in a physical sense, through pregnancy and 
breastfeeding for example.  
As I have noted, these women’s unique maternal fantasies had both conscious and 
unconscious dimensions, and were a product of the mutual entanglement of the psychic and 
the social in their lives. Their sense of what ‘mother’ and ‘maternal’ meant to them was 
similarly a product of psychic and social dimensions. Chodorow (1999, p.2) described what I 
understand by ‘meaning’ in this context in this way: 
185 
(M)eaning as we experience it comes always both from without and from within. (…) Meaning is 
an inextricable mixture of the sociocultural and historically contextualized on the one hand and the 
personally psychodynamic and psychobiographically contextualized on the other. (…) Some 
constructions of meaning may be more likely than others, but neither the intrapsychic nor the 
impersonal past, on the one hand, nor the culturally given, on the other, determines meaning and 
experience in the immediacy of the present.  
Because the meaning of being ‘maternal’ was unique to each woman, it was expressed in 
idiosyncratic ways in their narratives, but since those meanings are produced psychosocially 
in the way Chodorow described, they were freighted with the shared cultural values of that 
concept. It is unsurprising then, that ‘nurturing’ should be the dominant feature of these 
women’s maternal fantasies, since nurturing is one of the key values associated with maternal 
care (Stephens 2011).  
For these women to maintain a “sense of myself as a mother” without its expression in the 
care of a biological child, they needed to find ways to decouple ‘nurture’ from ‘mother’, and 
envision ‘maternal’ more extensively than pregnancy and care for a young child. I have 
suggested that the older circumstantially childless women in this study had engaged in a long 
process of adapting their fantasies and embodying ‘nurturing’, in creative and largely 
satisfying ways in their lives, by reframing of what being ‘mother’ meant to them. In this way 
the lost object of their capacity to embody their maternal fantasy was partly realized through a 
constellation of responses to others in their lives (I use ‘others’ in the broadest sense here of 
life in all its forms; children, adults, animals and also elements of the environment such as 
insects, plants and ‘the Earth’). I suggest that they did not see these relationships and actions 
as something they did instead of ‘being maternal’ because they had not had a child, but rather 
as aspects of their ‘maternal’ subjectivity that found their expression in a range of different 
activities and social relationships. 
Positing maternal subjectivity and the capacity to nurture through object relations theory as I 
have in Chapter 2 has made it possible to conceptualize these nurturing relationships as 
‘maternal’, because ‘maternal’ can be understood to extend to relationships other than the 
emotional and embodied relationships mothers have with their infant or children. Hollway, for 
example, has suggested that aspects of these maternal subjectivities, in the sense in which I 
have been discussing them, might become known and available to individuals regardless of 
whether or not they have children. She writes (2006, p.80) that “equivalent capacities to care 
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could be precipitated by other caring relationships and responsibilities, not necessarily by 
one’s own baby”, but she does not elaborate how this might happen.130  
The research materials in this study support this claim. I propose that these aspects of 
maternal subjectivity are available to circumstantially childless women precisely through the 
same intersubjective and trans-subjective processes that came into play in developing their 
fantasies of maternity (see chapter 4). That is, I suggest that these women have drawn on their 
psychosocial knowing/experiencing of maternal subjectivity as a child in embodying aspects 
of their fantasies of maternity in other nurturing relationships in their adult lives.  
Why do these fantasies persist rather than falling away as these women age and cease to be 
capable of conception? One explanation might be that despite 40 years of feminist work to 
dismantle the ideologies that link womanhood with motherhood, femininity, and nurturing, 
for many of these women, these understandings of gendered identity persist. Girls still grow 
up immersed in a culture that often teaches them that becoming a mother is a desirable goal 
for women, and they subsequently value those ‘maternal’ aspects of themselves and want to 
embody them. Many of these participants’ narratives support this argument; Deborah’s 
“tension” that “if you’re not a mother—you don’t have biological children, then you’re not 
maternal, or you’re not nurturing, or you’re not something” for example, suggests that her 
perception is that, as far as other people are concerned, she is not understood to be ‘maternal’ 
or ‘nurturing’ because she has not had a child.  
However, for me this is not a wholly satisfactory explanation. It is clear that Deborah herself 
did not understand the issue in that way, and as I worked with the research materials over time 
it struck me how many of the women I interviewed were like her; highly articulate, educated, 
self reflexive people who had grown up with mothers who identified as feminists. These 
participants had a complex understanding of and engagement with the themes and issues that 
have dominated feminist debate throughout their lifetimes. In spite of this, they did not 
understand, refer to or explain their experience in these terms. The ways in which many of 
these participants demonstrated a sophisticated level of acuity around the feminist politics of 
gender discourse adds weight to my analysis that there is something about their experience 
that these discourses and feminist discourses of biological determinism do not account for; 
something that the research materials suggest was as an active part of their lives, cutting 
across the available discourses of maternity, and somehow eluding their capacity to speak of 
it.                                                          
130 Hollway draws more extensively on Ettinger’s matrixial in later work, e.g. Hollway 2012a. 
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Matrixial theory offers a further dimension for understanding these women’s experiences and 
the ‘something’ of their narratives. In Chapter 2 I introduced aspects of matrixial theory that 
are salient for this project and built an account of the intersubjective and trans-subjective 
processes through which people have the potential for a ‘maternal’ subjectivity that is linked 
with their capacity to care for and nurture others. I discussed the ways in which this 
subjectivity is potentially available to both men and women, and to mothers and non-mothers, 
although it may find a particular expression in the care of a child by its biological mother. In 
Chapter 4 I drew on matrixial theory again in my suggestion that for some women 
experiencing circumstantial childlessness the  “sense of myself as a mother” may be grounded 
in an archaic embodied experience of a woman’s porous trans-subjective relationship with her 
mother in the late uterine period, as well as in the later relationship with her mother and other 
people and resources in her social world in the period after her birth and throughout her 
childhood.  
A central aspect of matrixial theory is that it has, at its base, an ethics of compassion. What 
satisfies the self may not be the main driver of an individual’s life, as is proposed in theories 
of individualization. Rather the idea that an individual has the capacity to develop in tandem 
with others emerges. Viewed through a matrixial lens, these participants may be seen to make 
connections with others in a ‘nurturing’ way, via the matrixial dimension of their subjectivity, 
which they call ‘maternal’ because of the dominant cultural associations of nurturing with the 
maternal. Pollock (2009, p.15) notes, 
(W)anting a child may be a matter of wishing for a re-encounter with the kind of otherness-in-
proximity that is the gift of our mothers to us as woman-subjects, a gift to all subjects that may also 
be reactivated in a variety of other ways as well, notably in relations with others. Since this gift is 
primordial and open to every human being it created, it does not need childbearing to realize its 
potential in human society or creativity.  
It is not surprising that this dimension of their subjectivity might be understood as “the sense 
of myself as a mother”. For many women nurturing is frequently expressed through the birth 
and care of a baby and child, for two reasons; that experience is rooted in her archaic trans-
subjective relationship with her own mother, and it is the route to the expression of nurturing 
that is still most validated socially, in spite of feminist work to challenge the assumption that 
women are inherently nurturing. Matrixial theory proposes that women are particularly likely 
to re-experience and express the matrixial dimension of their subjectivity in having a child. 
However, as Pollock suggests, when a woman has not “reactivated” the matrixial dimension 
of her subjectivity in pregnancy and the birth of a biological child, it is potentially expressed 
in other ways. Ettinger (e.g. 2006a; 2004) has written extensively of its expression in art-
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making and clinical psychoanalytical practice. For some circumstantially childless women, 
nurturing might be best understood as another dimension of their subjectivity, running 
alongside the phallic dimensions that develop after birth, that they draw on in a particularly 
deliberate way in their relationships with others in their life.  
If this is true, what yearning is still unmet in their experience? How I can account for Lynn’s 
“little something” that still remains for example? Ettinger’s matrixial theory addresses the 
problem that the body speaks to these women in ways that are not easily expressed in 
available language. This yearning requires an analysis other than the essentializing of a 
biological explanation for women’s longing to have a child such as ‘hormones’, and the ‘body 
clock’. I suggest that the ineffable strangeness of the matrixial dimension potentially became 
more available to Lynn in the two pregnancies she began, as it also appeared to do for some 
other participants who had been pregnant for a time.131 It may be that for many of these 
women, this dimension is realized partially in other ways in their lives; through their fantasies 
of maternity, through being social mothers, and through nurturing and generativity in wider 
relationships with others.  However, for women that have a biological child it might be 
understood to be  realized differently in relationship to a child in the womb because in that 
case there is a direct continuation of matrixial state through the passageway of birth, after 
which it becomes overlaid by the phallic dimensions of subjectivity and the necessity for the 
repeated separations of weaning, language acquisition (Kristeva 2005) and so forth. For some 
of these circumstantially childless women an important aspect of their sense of loss may be in 
not realizing it in the form of a pregnancy and a child. This possibility is reflected in those 
narratives and drawings that emphasize the embodied aspects of nurturing a baby and child, 
such as Lynn’s and Toni’s.  
It appears that the creative ways in which many of these women have enacted their maternal 
fantasies evade available discourses of the maternal. This interpretation is consistent with 
their perception that their expression of what they experience to be the maternal aspects of 
their subjectivity in forms other than being ‘mother’ are always understood by others in their 
social worlds to be in some way inferior to the gold standard of ongoing biological mothering; 
at best as a “way of coping with childlessness” (Letherby 2012, p.14), at worst illegitimate 
and laughable.  
Inevitably then, these women articulate loss and yearning. However, while my aim has been 
to probe this loss in order to understand the experience of circumstantial childlessness in their                                                         
131 Maree, Julia, Connie, Gina, Kim, Irene and Toni all spoke specifically about the ways in which a pregnancy 
which was aborted or ended in miscarriage galvanised a change in their fantasies of maternity. 
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lives in a more nuanced way, I do not want to overstate the difficulties of it, or position them 
as  ‘victims’, or sufferers of it. In discussing the something that still nudged Lynn, for 
example, I want to acknowledge that this is a “little something”; that “mostly” she described 
herself as “pretty comfortable” within her life. These are women who are responding to the 
inevitable “disappointment” (Craib 1994) of life in creative and effective ways. 
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Chapter 7: A “narratable” life 
A life that is not fully narratable is vulnerable to devaluation. Certainly stories told about categories 
of persons can injure those persons. But silences can be equally injurious, implying that there is no 
story to tell about lives such as these. Resistances to these silences begins by making them 
narratable, telling the stories can make lives vivid and morally recognizable. 
(Frank 2010, p.75) 
7.1 Introduction: “a place where I am ‘mother’” 
This thesis contributes to knowledge about circumstantial childlessness in the hope that it may 
be better understood; that stories about the lives of women who are circumstantially childless 
might become, in Arthur Frank’s words, more “narratable”.132 Its focus is on a subject area 
that has received little attention empirically, and is addressed only superficially in popular 
media. The knowledge claims I am making for the thesis are about reframing, challenging and 
extending understandings of circumstantial childlessness. Under an overarching object 
relations framework I have demonstrated the value of utilizing a range of theoretical 
approaches to interpret and dig deep into detailed understandings of what women in these 
circumstances have to say. I provide an analysis of participants’ accounts  that is a carefully 
nuanced consideration of their experiences, and that adds depth and complexity to the 
treatment made of this topic in magazines, newspapers and the internet. In this chapter I bring 
together the insights and arguments I have developed across the three analytic chapters of the 
thesis.  
Throughout the thesis I have remarked on the limitations of working as a sole researcher 
using the form of psychosocial methods I have employed in it. Except for the process of 
layering the different forms of data associated with each participant against one another in 
order to build up a ‘thick description’, it has been impossible to ‘test’ analysis in the ways I 
might have done if I had been working as part of a research group. My unplanned extended 
contact with Deborah provided an opportunity to co-create further research materials. In 
Chapter 4 I explained that I had brief email contact with her, after I sent her a copy of a paper 
I had written. I emailed Deborah again to ask her permission to quote from her response to it. 
She replied, and these two emails provided the means for a more careful interpretation of my                                                         
132 Frank uses the word “narratable” in its usual sense of a story that might be told to others. The perception of a 
lack of social recognition and social space for their stories, and the subsequent need for a space for these stories 
to be told, is a central theme of this thesis. As well as this meaning, in my use of his term here I extrapolate from 
this meaning to one that encompasses the further dimension of a story that is able to be told to oneself and used 
to made sense of oneself; that is, one that can be symbolized in thought.  
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analysis, and a further depth to it. My analysis in the thesis draws on material across the entire 
dataset of 26 women. Its detail comes from the closer attention I paid to the research materials 
associated with 10 of those women, as I discussed in Chapter 3 (p.63). My repeated focus on 
Deborah is partly because of the added dimension that communication after the interview 
provided as I engaged in analysis of her story. I have also used the research materials 
generated by my interactions with her as a structural device that connects various parts of the 
thesis. 
After she received a published paper from me, Deborah wrote: 
I realise that this process of expression (writing for myself) and then choosing to email you what 
I’ve written gives not only validity to my ‘down the back’ children; it also gives validity to the 
‘me’ that is ‘mother’. You provide (thank you) the safe, interested, non-judgmental (and well 
beyond that, accepting) place for me to say what I’ve said and to hear myself ‘say’ it in these 
emails. I feel I am moving on slowly toward a place where I am aware that I am ‘mother’ in ways 
that are possible and matter (are of value) to me. Alisdair and Elinor are part, not all, of being 
‘mother’. And I’m starting to feel ok about that. […] I think I live within a silent grief because I 
feel that others think I could have made different choices so somehow the place where I find 
myself and the feelings I have are my own fault and therefore I should just suck it up and not 
whinge (the underlying message being “well you could and you didn’t, it’s not like you are 
infertile, so you’ve only yourself to blame for leaving it too late, so why do you expect any 
sympathy?”). Actually I’m not looking for sympathy—empathy would be great though! In the end 
it becomes easier to either pretend we wanted children and couldn’t have them, or didn’t want them 
at all. Neither is true, but for some reason both of these positions seem more acceptable to others—
perhaps because they are the two obvious explanations for not being parents? 
In this email, Deborah developed points she had made earlier about her fantasy children, and 
the process of adaptation to the loss of their embodiment—and her embodiment as a mother—
she was engaged in. In the sections that follow, I refer back to this extract in my discussion of 
the thesis’ central themes of fantasy, loss and adaptation to different forms of motherhood.  
7.2 Ways of ‘knowing’ 
The methodology I chose for this thesis has shaped the knowledge that I have produced from 
it. Clarke (2006, p.1166) writes that psychosocial methods provide “glimpses and insights 
into our internal world which [add] a further layer of understanding to sociological analysis”. 
It was important for me to base the research in a methodology that accounted for this “further 
layer” in my chosen focus on processes of fantasy and grieving in circumstantial 
childlessness, since I understand these processes to be constructed in the overlap of these 
women’s ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. 
Throughout each stage of the project I have attempted to tread a sometimes difficult path in 
embracing ways of ‘knowing’ that acknowledge “the indistinct and the slippery” (Laws 2004, 
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p.3) in research materials. My analyzes of non-linguistic forms of communication are 
examples of ways of knowing in which I was able to access some of these ‘slippery’ aspects 
of women’s narratives. In the extract from Deborah’s email that I reproduce here, for 
example, her words are very considered and reflective, as is her language throughout the 
interview and previous email. In comparison with the transcript of the spoken interview 
however, her words here feel almost ‘flat’ in the sense that, because they come from an email, 
they do not have the added richness and nuancing that attention to the non-linguistic elements 
and forms of communication of her interview was able to provide.  
Paying attention to these aspects of these women’s stories of circumstantial childlessness has 
been a feature of the design of this project. My interview with Kelly, where her pauses and 
repetitions often provided a counterpoint to the words she was saying, is a further example.  
My adaptation of Bollas’ notion of a ‘symphonic score’ (see Chapter 3, p.71, and Appendix 5, 
p.211) in a notation system that allowed me to record non-linguistic elements across the 
whole dataset has been a useful aspect of the research strategy I used. While every 
individual’s use of these elements is particular to them, people learn to use non-linguistic 
features such as sighs, gasps and nervous laughs from others, in the same way as they learn 
spoken language, and in this way they too have shared meanings. Researchers can further 
develop their collective and individual skills in interpreting and analysing these features, and I 
hope that this thesis contributes to this development.  
My use of participant-produced drawings is a key feature of the research design. While there 
is a burgeoning of interest in the alternative possibilities to text that visual methods offer, the 
use of participant-produced drawings in this kind of psychosocial qualitative project in this 
way is uncommon. My use of the method in this project was limited, but demonstrated its 
potential for further development. The use of crayons and paper for the production of the 
drawings in signaling the level of drawing detail I expected worked well as a research 
strategy. It would be useful to experiment with other versions of the use of participant-
produced drawing as a method. I could have incorporated drawing into individual interviews, 
or encouraged the production of drawings over the course of two or three individual 
interviews. I might also have developed discussion in group interviews of the drawings 
participants made.  
The data in these drawings can receive more detailed analysis in papers that focus specifically 
on these visual texts, and that develop the analysis through attention to more of the drawings, 
or through comparing them with one another in greater depth. In this project I have been able 
to use those associated with Maree, Gina, Connie, Lynn and Julia at various points in the 
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thesis to extend my analysis of their data in useful ways. Lynn’s drawing (Chapter 3, p.78), 
for example, provided a valuable further dimension to the narratives she offered in the 
individual and group interviews.  
7.3 Fantasy: Exploring “the indistinct and the slippery”  
Nowhere were the qualities Law writes of more apparent than in my discussion of these 
women’s fantasies of maternity and a child. Fantasies slipped and slid through the 
narratives—and sometimes drawings—of all of the participants of this study. All of the 
women I interviewed appeared to have constructed some fantasies of themselves as a mother, 
and often of a child or children. Their narratives demonstrated a fluid investment in these 
fantasies that shifted with time, and was tangled with the inevitable changes in their bodies as 
they aged. 
One of the key themes that I have explored in the thesis is the idea that some of the 
participants in this study experience themselves to be already a mother in some ways, 
although they do not have a biological child. As I have illustrated, Deborah’s fantasies of 
Elinor and Alisdair were detailed, and explicitly discussed, but other women’s maternal 
fantasies did not appear so explicitly. While these fantasies clearly have both conscious and 
unconscious dimensions, the women I interviewed varied in their willingness or capacity to 
explore or communicate their fantasies of maternity and a child. The object relations concept 
of the unconsciously defended and ambivalent subject provides an explanation for why this 
may be (see Chapter 2, p.26). It may be that some participants defended themselves against 
the pain of the loss of their experience by denying or repressing their fantasies of maternity or 
a child.133  
There appeared to be a spectrum of subtlety to the fantasies, from those that were conscious 
and described in detail to those that were not as obvious, but were implicit in the ways 
participants talked about aspects of their story. Like Deborah’s named children, Connie’s 
“dark-haired boys” and Isabella’s pony-riding daughter were examples of fantasy children 
that were explicitly discussed in the interviews. Similarly, when Janine talked of the kind of 
mother she would like to be—perceptive, aware, nurturing and focused—and Maree spoke of 
the ways she talked to “the little embryo” in her womb, their fantasies of being a mother were 
evident in their talk. Some participants did not make claim to a fantasy of maternity and a                                                         
133 Gina’s comments about her deliberate repression of her thoughts about the “child” she aborted—“ it’s that 
hopelessness of ever knowing what that person would have been like […] you tell your brain to just [pause] shut 
up. There’s absolutely no point pursuing it”—illustrated a conscious version of this. 
194 
child, however, their fantasies were discernable in other ways; in their visions of what it 
might be like to be a mother, sometimes expressed in ambivalent terms, or in their 
descriptions of caring for other people’s children. Lesley’s fears of “living in a rundown old 
house […] struggling to find money for food and having to rely on my parents for top-up 
things” painted a vivid picture of the darker sides of her fantasies of solo motherhood. The 
small intimacies in Gina’s story of caring for her best friend’s newborn baby—of comforting 
him when he cried and singing to him—can be interpreted through the frame I have 
constructed in this thesis not simply as ‘babysitting’, but as her enacting her own idiosyncratic 
“sense of myself as a mother” through her interactions with this child. 
In the extract above, Deborah showed her willingness to claim aspects of the subjectivity of 
‘mother’, at least in the context of our communication. In Chapter 5, in my discussion of the 
research materials associated with Julia, I demonstrated how she too understood herself to be 
already a mother in some ways, and enacted that assumed subjectivity in the ritual of 
remembering her “children”, even though she said she had not yet had the “courage” to be 
“very visible with that yet”. I have suggested, however, that in most cases a highly nuanced 
understanding of ‘mother’ is necessary to take account of this “sense of myself as a mother”. I 
suspect that if I were to ask many of the participants in this research directly whether or not 
they experienced themselves as mothers, it is very likely that many would deny doing so. The 
discrepancy (between my analysis and what I think it is likely participants would claim) is 
accounted for by the ways in which, in popular understanding, fantasy is set in opposition to 
‘reality’, and ‘mother’ is limited to the embodied care of a child (preferably understood to be 
a biological child). Considering these women as already a mother in some way appears 
nonsensical, if taking up a maternal subjectivity is indexed to the existence of a child, as it is 
usually understood to be. In Chapter 4 I argued that this possibility is more intelligible when 
both maternal subjectivity and fantasy are conceived of in particular ways. I proposed that 
‘fantasy mother’ could be considered as a further dimension of maternal subjectivity—along 
with those of genetic, gestational and carer (Welldon 2006)—that could be understood to 
begin before a girl’s birth, and to continue throughout her lifetime.  
Several women that I interviewed said that, as far as they knew, they had never been 
pregnant. In contrast, Julia, Maree, Gina, Irene, Connie, Toni, Lynn and Kim were all 
participants who spoke explicitly about having been pregnant at some point. In some cases 
these women had miscarried, and in others they had terminated the pregnancy because they 
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made the decision that the time or circumstances were not right for them to proceed with it.134 
In these participants’ cases, their fantasy of maternity and a child had been briefly embodied, 
and many of these women linked the way they saw themselves as mothers to the experience 
they had of having conceived, and briefly carried, a child. The terminology women used 
might be interpreted as suggestive of the relationship they felt to the miscarried or aborted 
foetus/child; for example, Julia described them as her “children” and Maree’s spoke of 
making a connection with  “the little embryo”. From a matrixial perspective the sense of 
ongoing connection of some sort that Julia, Maree and Toni articulated, and others implied, is 
relevant. In matrixial theory, these women’s transsubjective feel/knowing of the other life that 
had briefly shared the matrixial borderspace with them, is understood to hold an imprint of it 
which would have a continuity in their own lives.  
Not all of the women who spoke of having had terminations talked of an attachment or sense 
of a relationship to the foetus/child, but all of them spoke about it as being something they 
had continued to think about in relation to their not having gone on to have a child. Their 
stories underlined what Lynn described as the “messy” complexities of abortion, and the 
“irony”—for circumstantially childless women—of wanting children and having 
terminations. The issue of terminations is a difficult area for feminist research, because it 
involves confronting the ongoing emotional and psychological work some women do post-
termination, which does not always sit easily with advocacy for women’s right to have 
terminations. An argument can be made for women’s rights to reproductive choices that also 
acknowledges the sometimes difficult emotional outcomes of those choices. This research 
could be linked to future work relating to the experiences and understandings of women who 
have had terminations or early stage miscarriages; both with respect to how they 
conceptualize themselves and their relationships to the foetus/child, and to the issues of 
disenfranchised grief that may be their experience.  
In Chapter 4 I drew on a range of sources to theorize about the origins of these fantasies of 
maternity and a child. I suggested that women’s fantasies of motherhood may be shaped by 
what they have ‘known’ of it in various ways: trans-subjectively before their birth (Ettinger 
2006a, 2006b); intersubjectively through their “vestigial experience” of their own mother 
(Hollway 2006, p.65); trans-generationally through the impact of their own mothers’ 
experience and fantasies of motherhood; through their observation of other mothers as an 
infant and child; and through their immersion in the conflicting and contradictory social                                                         
134 I did not ask a direct question about experiences of pregnancy and miscarriages or terminations, but these 
women volunteered this information. Others may have had these experiences without speaking of them in the 
interview. 
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discourses of mothering as they grew to adulthood. Lax (2006, p. 4) writes that “(m)aternal 
inwardness, the creation and enjoyment of the “fantasy child”, and the fantasy of the 
interactional relationship with this child is the most significant preparatory state for 
motherhood”. She makes this statement in the context of a discussion about the psychic 
preparation a woman makes when she is pregnant. The research materials I have analyzed 
suggest that for many of the participants in this project, the “creation and enjoyment” of the 
fantasy child and their interaction in fantasy with her or him appears to begin much earlier.  
Throughout my work on this thesis I have been intuitively convinced that Ettinger’s matrixial 
theory offers a potential to understand a further dimension of what Spigel (2009) calls the 
“slippery nature of the maternal” in the experience of circumstantial childlessness. In 
particular, in its radical reinterpretation of the ‘relationship’ between mother-to-be and child-
to-be and the potential for traces of that trans-subjective relating to continue alongside the 
intersubjective relating that develops after birth, it offers a way of thinking about a woman’s 
yearning for the matrixial experience of pregnancy and motherhood that is not simply a 
nurturing altruism.135 136 In turn, I consider that circumstantial childlessness has the potential 
to illuminate aspects of the further use of matrixial theory in empirical psychosocial studies. 
Matrixial theory, however, is complex and controversial. Within the parameters of social 
science research it can be read as speculative and overgeneralising. Although Ettinger writes 
from a feminist perspective, it presents a challenge for feminist analysts in that it can be 
misconstrued as essentialising. In this thesis I have felt constrained by these problems and 
issues of space in which to develop them adequately. I have not fully explored the potential 
for understanding the experience of circumstantial childlessness through the frame of 
matrixial theory—or for using this material to further explore matrixial theory empirically—
in an extensive way. Instead I have used it on a smaller scale to suggest an earlier—pre-
birth—dimension in which some aspects these participants’ narratives might be interpreted, 
and some of the ways this dimension might continue to resonate in this aspect of their lives, 
albeit in a largely foreclosed stratum of existence. There remains a rich potential for further 
work that explores circumstantial childlessness through the lens of matrixial theory. 
I have drawn more extensively on Winnicott’s work in understanding the origins and nature 
of these fantasies. The narratives of many of these participants illustrated the ways in which                                                         
135 I use ‘relationship’ in single quotes here to highlight that from a matrixial perspective the word relationship—
which implies  a ‘me’ and a ‘not-me’ who relate with one another—is inaccurate. The matrixial borderspace is 
patterned on the unique non-binary relational dynamics of neither/both, two/one, between a mother-to-be and the 
child-to-be in her womb, for which phallic language has no words. 
136 I am grateful to Wendy Hollway for the term ‘nurturing altruism’. It captures well both the positive potential 
and the limits of the ways women chose to adapt their fantasies of maternity in other forms of mothering.  
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their maternal fantasies permeate their everyday lives in vivid—although usually intensely 
personal—ways. In order to make sense of this, I have discussed these fantasies in terms of 
Winnicott’s (1971) notion of a ‘transitional space’. I have speculated theoretically that the 
psychic ‘place’ in which they might be experienced and explored in conversation (and in 
Deborah’s case, correspondence) with me could be related to this space “between inner reality 
and external life” (Hollway 2011, p.50); a space that bridges their ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. 
Winnicott (1971) used this concept to consider the process whereby some of the contents and 
processes of an individual’s inner world are made manifest through art, creativity, and play, 
as well as in the analytic encounter.137  
The idea of a ‘space’ is at the heart of another device I have used to make sense of the power 
of these fantasies in these women’s lives. In Chapter 2 I conceptualized absence as a negative 
space. A negative space is a space of potent presence, where what is not defines—and is 
defined by—what is around it. In a work of art its power is in its capacity to make visible the 
equal importance, to the whole, of the places where there appears to be nothing. I theorized 
that in the experience of circumstantial childlessness, the space of absent presence is not filled 
with memories of something that was once a tangible and material presence, but with the 
powerful fantasies of maternity and a child in the future. 
Conceptualizing these participants’ fantasies in these ways has made it possible to think of 
them as psychic constructions that have material effects in their lives. When Janine said that 
“everything here [in her house] is in the shape of a baby”, she was indicating that her 
particular fantasies of maternity and a child were already taking material form in the ways 
that she and her husband had chosen and planned their choice of a home and their use of the 
spaces within and around it. These things then came to re-present—to symbolize—her 
maternal fantasies. For other women the absent child/ren were symbolized in other ways: by 
naming the child or children of their fantasy as Deborah and Shelley spoke of doing; by 
buying clothing or toys for them as Sonya talked of, by the reminders of the embodied acts of 
nurturing a baby or child, particularly through breastfeeding, as Lynn’s drawing (p.78) 
illustrated; in noticing other pregnant women or small children; and in imagined acts of 
mothering such as attending school plays or sports matches.   
                                                        
137 Ettinger’s conception of the matrixial borderspace, which she understands to be a prototype for this ‘space’, 
develops this idea much further (see for example Massumi 2006; Ettinger 2004). 
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7.4 The disenfranchised grief of circumstantial childlessness 
In Chapter 1 I described the process in which I gradually narrowed my focus for this study to 
an exploration of the meanings that being—or not being—a mother matters to the 
circumstantially childless women in this study. I was interested to know whether there was a 
sense of loss, and, if so, what they understood to be lost, and what the response to those losses 
might be. Although I framed the study carefully, in a way that did not presume that they 
would feel loss, an experience of loss was threaded through the narratives of all of these 
participants, to a greater or lesser extent. My analysis of these research materials clearly 
demonstrates that loss, and a grieving that is associated with it, is a significant part of the 
experience of circumstantial childlessness for the participants of this study. 
While all of the participants talked about a sense of loss, there was a range of ways in which 
they talked about that loss being difficult for them. While some talked about it being painful 
at times—but not by any means overwhelming—several participants compared their 
experience of the intensity, emotional distress and duration of the losses of circumstantial 
childlessness with the grieving they had experienced at the death of someone close. 
Discussing their responses in Chapter 5, I drew in part on a Kleinian theorization of the 
mourning process in which an individual re-engages with the very early developmental 
processes of grieving for the feared loss of the ‘good’ object of the mother in her or his later 
losses in life. I suggested that the unconscious anxiety of that process may be a factor in the 
intensity of the grieving that some women spoke of.  
In spite of the parallels some women drew between the losses of circumstantial childlessness 
and those of bereavement, in analyzing the research materials I found that that there are 
significant distinctions to be made between these women’s experiences and that of people 
who are grieving for the absence of something or someone that once existed as part of their 
everyday life. I discussed how these divergences are related to a different temporal and 
material logic: the losses of circumstantial childlessness are of a potential future, rather than 
the past, and of a fantasy rather than an embodied or material reality of which they have 
memories. When these participants had not had an expected biological child, it seems that the 
material and embodied symbols of their maternal fantasies that I discussed above were 
amongst the triggers for their sense of loss, but it is what these things represented—rather 
than what they in themselves were—that was lost.  
In order to make sense of these losses, I have needed to stretch the boundaries of both popular 
and theoretical understandings of loss. I found neither Kleinian theory (and the Freudian 
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theory of mourning on which it is originally based), nor contemporary psychological 
conceptualizations of grieving, were useful in forming ideas about the kinds of losses these 
participants spoke of feeling, or the grieving they did in response to them. In particular, I 
needed to find a way in which the experience of circumstantial childlessness was not framed 
negatively as a failure or a tragedy in these women’s lives, while at the same time 
acknowledging the often painful losses that it entailed for them. I found Craib’s (1994) focus 
on the importance of “disappointment” as a response to the inevitable losses and difficulties 
of life to be useful in doing this, although the word itself seems inadequate to encompass the 
anguish that some of these women described themselves feeling. 
The “silent grief” that Deborah refers to in the second part of the extract from her email that I 
quote above is related to her sense of what I have discussed in Chapter 5 (p.141) as the 
disenfranchised quality of the experience of circumstantial childlessness. In this study I have 
shown the disenfranchisement of these women’s loss and associated grieving to be a 
significant aspect of this experience. In some way, every participant spoke of their sense that 
they feel misunderstood, judged, unacknowledged, ignored, and isolated by others, in this 
aspect of their lives. Deborah’s memory of her brother telling her to “get your own children, 
and don’t steal mine” was a vivid example. 
I also noted the ways in which these women at times appear to have internalized the ‘grieving 
rules’ that bring this disenfranchisement about, and minimize their own experience of grief in 
these circumstances. This is a complex, subtle, largely unconscious process, and there are 
several factors that initiate it. I have commented throughout the thesis on the ways in which 
the narratives of these women can frequently be read as an internal conversation between 
conflicting aspects of themselves.  It could be that, along with the experiences of perceived 
misunderstanding, criticism and isolation that Deborah and many other participants recounted, 
part of the critical and judging “underlying message” that Deborah ascribes to others in the 
introductory extract, is also one that an accusatory part of her makes to another part of herself. 
Self-disenfranchisement is a descriptive example of the ways in which the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
aspects of the experience of circumstantial childlessness are inextricably part of one another. 
In the 30 years since Doka’s concept of disenfranchised grief was first developed and 
introduced in 1982, it has been applied in a range of loss settings. My use of this concept in 
this context has made it possible to develop it further.  My finding about the ways in which 
the experience of disenfranchisement is linked to these issues of agency and choice is a 
particularly pertinent to the notion of disenfranchised grief. Maree’s comment that 
circumstantially childless women are “not allowed to feel any loss about it, because they’ve 
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made that happen that way” illustrated her perception that other people invalidated her 
experience because she had made choices that have resulted in her being childless. She 
insisted that “I give myself the right, privately” to grieve, but also noted that “it seems logical 
looking from the outside in, um, if a woman had the opportunity to have a child and, and 
didn’t and then was sad about not having children that wouldn’t make much sense”. Several 
other participants oscillated between disenfranchising their own experience and 
simultaneously resisting this disenfranchisement as she did. Her comments highlight the 
difference in the capacity for agency that she and other participants understood themselves to 
have in relation to having children, when compared with what they perceived others in their 
social worlds generally to see them having. As I have illustrated, time and again participants 
voiced their feeling that there is no real understanding of the complexity of the ‘choices’ they 
had made that had culminated in their being circumstantially childless. This is highlighted in 
Deborah’s comments that— from her perspective—there is no story for her to tell that makes 
sense of her predicament to others, and she feels forced to “pretend” in order for it to be 
comprehensible to others.  
7.5 Issues of agency and choice 
Self-disenfranchising their grief responses is a further example of the ways in which issues of 
agency and choice ran right through these participants’ narratives. The complexities of how 
agency works in people’s lives were at the heart of the problem the women in one of the 
group interviews had with the notion of ‘contingent childlessness’. My intention in using this 
term was to capture the sense in which these women’s decisions about when, and whether (or 
not) to have a child was contingent on other factors in their lives; financial security, a partner 
to share care of the baby, a career established or an educational goal achieved, and so forth. 
Seligmann-Silva (2006, p.135) writes that to think of contingency means to reflect on a series 
of concepts such as “chance, accident, rupture, catastrophe, [and] chaos”, and to dialectically 
confront them with others such as “necessity, fate, experience, [and] rationality”. For some of 
the participants with whom I discussed this term, ‘contingent’ felt like a judgment that they 
had not taken charge of their lives as they ‘should’ have. Things had ‘just happened’ to them; 
they had left their life too much to chance, or that their unconscious desires or anxieties may 
have undermined their conscious decision-making in ways they did not plan. The presumed 
ability to conceive a child and carry it to term is the key difference between the experience of 
circumstantial childlessness and biological infertility. For these women, the sense that their 
predicament is their ‘own fault’ contributes to them disenfranchising their own sense of loss, 
and inhibits them from seeking support from others.  
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As I have noted, in several of these interviews there appears to be a linkage between these 
women’s fantasies of motherhood and their experience of their mother’s experience of being a 
mother that is both conscious and unconscious. Some women, such as Janine and Lesley, 
were clear that they wanted to provide a different experience of being a child for a child of 
their own. The desire to create a different kind of childhood than the one they experienced as 
painful or lacking is recognised as being a motivating desire for women (and men) to have a 
child (Lax 2006), but here I link it with the experience of circumstantial childlessness, to 
issues of agency and choice, and to the neo-liberal agenda that I discussed in Chapter 2. The 
tenets of individualization require young women to compete and succeed. They are expected 
to take responsibility for constructing their own lives and provide the conditions they perceive 
to be necessary for the successful development of their children. For women like Lesley and 
Maree, the determination to create and provide the ‘right’ emotional and material 
circumstances in which to raise a child, within the temporal limits of their fertility, may 
ironically be one of the factors that contributed to their becoming circumstantially childless. 
In prioritizing decisions about the circumstances in which they would have a child, and 
exercising agency in this way, they found they lost control over whether or not they would 
become mothers. 
This sense of being out of control of their lives was difficult for people who saw themselves 
to be agents in their own lives but who have not been successful in having a child. For women 
such as Gina, Lynn, Connie, Sonya and Kelly—all of whom were in a committed relationship 
with someone who was unwilling or unable to have a child with them—the complexities of 
‘choice’ were particularly painful. These women made decisions about the relationships they 
were committed to, and one of the outcomes of those decisions is that they did not have 
children. Gina’s comment that “(m)aybe I should have made this choice [to leave her 
husband] long ago and [pause] given that I didn’t, I don’t have any right to gripe about it [not 
having had children] now” captures the complexity of the link between agency, choice and 
the right to grieve. This complexity is what lay behind Julia’s reluctant admission that her 
choices had been “passive’ rather than “active”. Elsa made the same point about continuing 
on with postgraduate study, even though she was concerned that her fertility was fading (see 
Chapter 5, p.144). The experience of circumstantial childlessness highlights the complexities 
of this relation between structure and agency; in this case, women are confronted by the limits 
inherent in their bodies and the embodied constraints of their fertility.  
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7.6 A process of adaptation 
My research has lead me to conclude that when participants have not had a child biologically 
these circumstantially childless women have not simply abandoned the potential maternal 
subjectivity and child(ren) of their fantasies in the pursuit of alternative subjectivities, as the 
popular cliché of ‘Oh No! I forgot to have children!’ implies.138 Gradually realizing that 
biological motherhood was unlikely or impossible, grieving for the opportunity to embody 
their maternal fantasies in the birth and nurture of a biological child, and finding alternative 
ways to do so in their life appears to be a process that is actively engaged in over several 
years in these women’s lives. The varying ways the participants talked about this process was 
the focus of Chapter 6, and I have argued that in some respects it may be understood to be 
boundless; temporally, socially and relationally.  
Deborah’s words in the extract from her email that begins this chapter illustrate aspects of this 
process. I have suggested that, as her words imply, this process is often lengthy, fraught with 
loss, ambivalence, and social and emotional complexities. For her, a partial resolution has 
been in finding ways of being ‘mother’ “that are possible and matter (are of value) to me”. I 
found that the process for each participant was an idiosyncratic one of consciously and 
unconsciously mining her fantasies of maternity and a child— her “sense of myself as a 
mother”—for the aspects that were important to her understanding of herself, and creating 
ways to embody those in other ways in her life. For example, Lesley’s choice to retrain in a 
different career as a counsellor in order to be able to work with people more creatively, 
Connie’s decision to work further with children in developing countries, and Lynn’s nurturing 
of her garden and of the planet through social and environmental activism can all be 
interpreted as examples of this process. Other participants spoke of ‘mothering’ other children 
in their lives, and the possibility of fostering or adopting a child in the future. 
My analysis of these women’s stories suggested that a delicate balance of two apparently 
contradictory aspects of this experience emerges with this process of adaptation. On one hand 
many of these women talked positively about finding aspects of their lives to be happy and 
fulfilling. Lynn’s comment that recent years had “kind of been the happiest of my life [pause] 
without children!”[laughs] exemplified this. This positivity was not about women ‘surviving’, 
or being happy ‘in spite of’ their circumstantial childlessness, but rather of their finding ways 
to live their life that were different from what they had expected, but that were not defined in                                                         
138 This text, or others similar, as a caption in a pop-culture cartoon graphic depicting a close-up of a 1960s era 
woman is available in merchandise such as mugs, t-shirts and so forth. See Appendix 8 on p.214 for an example. 
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terms of their having—or not having— a child. On the other hand, this sense of fulfillment 
co-existed with an ongoing sense of loss of a dimension of embodied maternal experience that 
was irretrievably foregone once the potential to have a biological child had passed.  
7.7 Towards a better understanding of circumstantial 
childlessness 
In this thesis I achieve my overall aim of creating a richer and more nuanced understanding of 
women’s experience of circumstantial childlessness through the close analysis of these 
participants’ stories and drawings. It contributes a resistance to the idea that women’s stories 
of circumstantial childlessness are not “narratable”. Although I have explored the linkages 
between fantasy and loss in circumstantial childlessness, much more research work is needed 
to facilitate these stories and explore their complexity and diversity.  
This research suggests that circumstantially childless women need further opportunities to 
reflect on their experience. Such opportunities are only possible if circumstantial childlessness 
as a category of experience becomes more acknowledged socially; if the stories told about this 
phenomenon reflect the many-faceted implications of it in women’s lives, and the creative 
and satisfying ways that women without biological children express “the me that is ‘mother’” 
are validated and valued.  
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Appendix 1: Description of the sample 
Connie 44, city planner (retraining as teacher), living with partner who has 
an adult child and one grandchild that they frequently care for. 
Gina 43, research analyst, living with partner who has three children and 
two grandchildren they frequently care for. 
Deborah 45, lecturer, living with partner. 
Elena 37, training in early childcare, single. 
Elsa 41, postgraduate student, single. 
Irene 40, postgraduate student, living with partner who has part-time care 
of his two children. 
Isabella 37, advertising consultant, living with partner who has part-time 
care of his two children. 
Janine 36, marketer, living with partner.  
Julia 48, psychotherapist, single. 
Kate 36, counsellor, single 
Kelly 38, administrator, living with partner who has part-time care of his 
two children. 
Kim 44, lecturer, single. 
Lesley 43, counsellor, single. 
Lynn 39, policy analyst, living with partner. 
Maree 33, postgraduate student, single. 
Natalie 36, manager, living with partner.  
Nic 38, administrator, single. 
Samantha 36, lecturer, living in a different city to partner during teaching 
term. 
Sarah 48, postgraduate student, single. 
Shelley 50, administrator, living with partner who has adult children. 
Sonya 40, caregiver, living with partner who has part-time care of his two 
children. 
Sophia 41, not in paid work at time of research, living with partner. 
Susie 41, early childhood teacher, single. 
Toni 46, lecturer, living with partner. Has shared care of (now adult) 
niece. 
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Appendix 2: Being Childless Poster 
 
Being Childless 
There is an increasing number of women in their late 30’s/early 40’s who always saw 
themselves as having children one day, but find that things haven’t worked out that way for 
them. They may not have met someone they wanted to raise a child with, or their partner may 
already have children and not want to have more, for instance. Or maybe they have waited to 
have a baby and then find themselves unable to conceive. These women are coming to terms 
with possibly not becoming biological mothers.  
For some women this experience isn’t an issue, while others find it difficult at times. It seems, 
though, that there is little public understanding of what it is like. Lois Tonkin is a trained 
counsellor and is a PhD student in Sociology at the University of Canterbury who is 
researching in this area. She wants to talk to women aged between 35-55 with this experience.  
If you would like to talk to Lois about possibly being involved in this research please contact 
her at: 
Phone 03 942 9435, or 021 337942. Email: loistonkin@paradise.net.nz 
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Appendix 3: Coding Categories 
1. Intersubjective relationship with mother 
2. Constructions of femininity/motherhood 
3. Constructions of family 
4. Agency/choice 
5. Abortion 
6. Exclusion 
7. Invisibility 
8. Unconscious 
9. Biological urges 
10. Expectation/perception/responses of others 
11. Identity 
12. A mother’s role 
13. Family of origin influence 
14. “Spiritual” dimension 
15. Feminism 
16. Ambivalence 
17. Future 
18. Childless/childfree 
19. Time/age/biological clock 
20. Other ways of “having children” 
21. End of hope/changes over time 
22. Waiting for right man/woman 
23. Coping strategies 
24. Single parenting 
25. Selfishness/selflessness 
26. Attitudes changing 
27. Grief 
28. Stigma 
29. Loss 
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30. Feelings 
31. Caring/nurturing  
32. ‘Having children is what I was meant to do’ 
33. Envy  
34. Potential to be a mother 
35. Travelling 
36. Reasons for having children 
37. Partner’s situation 
38. Impact of age 
39. Chance of “problems”/perfect child 
40. Self-disenfranchisement 
41. Body 
42. Advantages of not having children discourses 
43. Labels 
44. Other people’s voices 
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Appendix 4: Information Sheet 
Name of the project:  
Contingent Childlessness: Narratives of desire, being and becoming. 
What is this project about? 
The number of women who have not had a child is increasing in New Zealand, as it is 
elsewhere in the world. Some of these women have actively chosen not to have children, but 
for others the choice of whether or not to have a child depends on other factors—being in the 
right relationship, or feeling financially secure for example— and sometimes these things 
haven’t come together for them. Women who saw themselves as having a child or children at 
some point in their lives respond in different ways to finding themselves without children, 
especially in their late 30s or early 40s when having a baby begins to be less of an option for 
many women.  In this project I will talk to women who find themselves in this position to find 
out what it’s like for them, and how other people in their lives have talked to them about it.  
What will happen? 
I plan to talk with 20-25 women about their experiences. Each conversation will be private, 
and will take place in your home or a place that we choose, at a time that is convenient for 
both of us. If you live away from Christchurch and are happy to do so, we may talk by phone. 
We will talk for about an hour and a half, and we may arrange to talk for a further session if 
time runs out. I will tape the conversation, transcribe it and then send the transcription to you 
if you wish to receive a copy. I will be happy to discuss any changes you may wish to make. I 
also plan to run discussions with women in groups of 8-10. You may be willing to meet 
individually, in groups, or both.  
Participants in the group will be invited to draw about their experience of contingent 
childlessness and to discuss their drawings, as well as take part in a general discussion of the 
issues. You may be willing to meet individually, in groups, or both. 
You are free to withdraw from the project at any point, and comments you have contributed 
will be removed. This will be possible if withdrawal occurs before the material has been 
analyzed, at which point it is not always possible to isolate and remove an individual’s 
comments.  
At the end of the project you will receive a summary of the research findings and have 
information about writing that is developed out of the project. The information will be used to 
write a PhD thesis about the findings. I hope that it may also eventually be able to be 
published elsewhere to increase awareness about this form of childlessness. 
How will your privacy be protected? 
Your conversation with me is strictly confidential: your identity and details will be protected 
with a pseudonym, the data from this project will be kept secure in a locked cabinet in my 
office and destroyed after 5 years have elapsed. Any identifying characteristics will be 
changed in any reports or writing that grows out of the project. 
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Contacts for the project: 
This project is being carried out as a part of study for a PhD in Sociology by Lois Tonkin 
under the supervision of Dr Victoria  Grace. You can contact Lois by phoning her at 942 9435 
or emailing her at loistonkin@paradise.net.nz, and Victoria at 
victoria.grace@canterbury.ac.nz  Either will be happy to discuss any concerns you have about 
the project. 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Lois Tonkin 
School of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Canterbury. 
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Appendix 5: Non-linguistic elements  
Content 
Prn  Shift from “I” to “you” or “we” 
Circle  Moral discourse such as use of “should”, “need” or “ought” 
≠  Conflicting voices in tension with one another 
Rep  Repeated metaphors or phrases, or words 
≈  Unexpected links or sequence in the narrative 
ø  Voices that are silenced, or things that appear difficult to say 
Ppx  Parapraxes  
Elements of voice 
__  Where stress falls on words 
p, pp, f, ff         Volume   
≤, ≥                  Pitch 
Fast/slow Tempo/Rhythm 
Timbre Variations in timbre 
…  Pauses, silences  
Expressions of affect 
XX Laugh Different types of laughs 
Tears/crying Tears 
Mood  Tone in which speaker expresses herself  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Appendix 6: Group Interview Guide Questions 
1. Set up drawing exercise. Drawing prompt: “This research is about this particular form 
of childlessness. I’d like you to make a drawing about your experience of this?” 
2. In this group we can explore differences and similarities in your experiences. There is 
no name for this particular experience of childlessness, which suggests a kind of social 
invisibility about it.  What is your experience of this? 
3. What would you say to younger women in their early 30s about having, or not having 
children? 
4. In an ideal world, what would you want people to know about your experience 
(without having to be told)? 
5. What has it been like to talk to others in a group today about this?  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Appendix 7: Individual Interview Questions Guide 
1. How did you see yourself in terms of having a child or being a mother as you were 
growing up? 
2. Why, or why not, was being a mother or having a child important to you?  
3. How did things work out for you? How come it hasn’t happened? 
4. How have you seen yourself as being a mother or having a child as time has passed? 
5. Can you talk about any factors or times that have made this difficult for you?  
6. How have you seen yourself as having or making choices about having a child as time 
went by? 
7. How have other people responded to your not having children? How do you feel about 
that? 
8. How do you see attitudes to women not having children changing? 
9. Some women have talked about a sense of loss about not having a child or being a 
mother. Is that something you relate to? 
10. People talk a lot about a “biological clock” ticking, and of time “running out”. How 
have you thought about time in relation to having a child or not over these years? 
11. How has this experience shaped your feelings about your body or your sense of 
yourself as a woman? 
12. How would your life be different if you were a mother? 
13. What does it mean to you, not to have a child? 
14. Can you describe the feelings associated with not having a child? Can you think of 
specific instances? 
15. What does being a mother mean to you? 
16. How do you see the child/parent relationship? 
17. How do you see the future? 
18. What kinds of other ways are there of “having children”? 
19. Why were you interested in being part of this research? What are you hoping might 
come out of it?  
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Appendix 8: “I Forgot” Mug 
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Appendix 9: Ethics Approval 
 
216 
Reference List 
Abram, J. 2013, ‘The evolution of Winnicott’s theoretical matrix: A brief outline’, in J. 
Abram (ed.), Donald Winnicott today, Routledge, Hove.  
Adam, B. 1990, Time and social theory, Polity Press, Cambridge.  
Allison, J.  2010, ‘Grieving conceptions: Making motherhood in the wake of infertility in 
Ireland’, Journal of the Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community 
Involvement, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 219-231.  
Aron, E.N. 2002, The highly sensitive child: Helping our children thrive when the world 
overwhelms them, Broadway Books, New York.  
Aron, E.N. 1997, The highly sensitive person, Broadway Books, New York.  
Attig, T. 1996, How we grieve: Relearning the world, Oxford University Press, New York.  
Attig, T. 2001, ‘Relearning the world: Making and finding meanings’, in R. Neimeyer (ed.), 
Meaning reconstruction and the experience of loss, American Psychological 
Association, Washington, DC.  
Bagnoli, A.  2009, ‘Beyond the standard interview: The use of graphic elicitation and arts-
based methods’, Qualitative Research, vol. 9, pp. 547-570.  
Balint, E. 1992, Before I was I: Psychoanalysis and the imagination, Free Association Books, 
London.  
Balint, E.  1987, ‘Memory and consciousness’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 
68, pp. 475-483.  
Baraitser, L.  2010, ‘On giving and taking offence’, Psychology, Culture & Society, vol. 13, 
pp. 423-427.  
Baraitser, L. 2009, Maternal encounters: The ethics of interruption, Routledge, Hove.  
Baraitser, L.  2006, ‘Oi Mother, keep ye’ hair on! : Impossible transformations of maternal 
subjectivity’, Studies in Gender and Sexuality, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 217-238.  
Barnett, S. 2010, ‘A mother of a dilemma’, in Listener, Auckland.  
Bartlett, J. 1994, Will you be mother?: Women who choose to say no, Virago, London.  
Bauman, Z. 2008, The art of life, Polity Press, Cambridge.  
Beck-Gernsheim, E. 2002, Reinventing the family: in search of new lifestyles, Polity, 
Cambridge.  
Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim, E. 1995, The normal chaos of love, Polity Press, Cambridge.  
Becker, G. & Nachtigall, R.  1994, ‘Eager for medicalization: The social production of 
infertility as a disease’, Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 14, pp. 456-471.  
217 
Benjamin, J. 1998, Shadow of the other: Intersubjectivity and gender in psychoanalysis, 
Routledge, New York.  
Berger, R. & Quinney, R. (eds.) 2005, Storytelling sociology: Narrative as social inquiry, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder. 
Bertaux, D. & Bertaux-Wiame, I. 2003, ‘Heritage and its lineage: A case history of 
transmission and social mobility over five generations’, in D. Bertaux & P. Thompson 
(eds.), Pathways to social class: A qualitative approach to social mobility, 2nd edn., 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 62-97.  
Birch, M. & Miller, T.  2000, ‘Inviting intimacy: The interview as therapeutic opportunity’, 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, vol. 3, pp. 189-202.  
Blackman, L. 2012, Immaterial bodies: Affect, embodiment, mediation, Sage, London.  
Boddington, B. & Didham, R. 2007, Busy making other plans: Increases in childlessness in 
New Zealand, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington.  
Bollas, C. 2007, The Freudian moment, Karnac, London.  
Bollas, C. 1987, The shadow of the unknown: Psychoanalysis of the unthought known, Free 
Association Books, London.  
Bondi, L.  2003, ‘Meaning-making and its framings: A response to Stuart Oliver’, Social & 
Cultural Geography vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 323-327.  
Bonanno, G. 2009, The other side of sadness: What the new science of bereavement tells us 
about life after loss, Basic Books, New York.  
Boyne, R.  2004, ‘Uterine self-understanding and the indispensable other: Editorial reflections 
on the work of Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 21, no. 
1, pp. 1-3.  
Brabant, S. 2002, ‘A closer look at Doka’s grieving rules’, in K. Doka (ed.), Disenfranchised 
grief: new directions, challenges and strategies for practice, Research Press, 
Champaign.  
Braun, V. & Clarke, V.  2006, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, vol. 3, no. 77-101.  
Britzman, D. 1991, Practice makes perfect: A critical study of learning to teach, State 
University of New York Press, Albany.  
Brown, L.M. & Gilligan, C. 1992, Meeting at the crossroads: Women’s psychology and girls’ 
development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.  
Budgeon, S. 2003, Choosing a self: Young women and the individualization of identity, 
Praeger, Westport CT.  
Burman, E. & MacLure, M. 2005, ‘Deconstruction as a method of research’, in B. Somekh & 
C. Lewin (eds.), Research methods in the social sciences, Sage, London.  
218 
Bute, J.,Harter, L.,Kirby, E. & Thompson, M. 2010, ‘Politicizing personal choices? : The 
storying of age-related infertility in public discourses’, in S. Hayden & D. O’Brien 
Hallstein (eds.), Contemplating maternity in an era of choice: Explorations into 
discourses of reproduction, Lexington Books, Lanham.  
Butler, J. 2004, Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence, Verso, London, New 
York.  
Cameron, J. 1997, Without issue: New Zealanders who choose not to have children, 
University of Canterbury Press, Christchurch.  
Cannold, L. 2005, What, no baby?: Why women are losing the freedom to mother, and how 
they can get it back, Curtis University Books, Fremantle.  
Cannold, L. 2000, Who’s crying now? Chosen childlessness, circumstantial childlessness and 
the irrationality of motherhood, University of Melbourne. 
Cassell, P. (ed.) 1993, The Giddens reader, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Charmaz, K. 2006, Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative 
analysis, Sage, London.  
Chodorow, N.  2003, ‘“Too late”: Ambivalence about motherhood, choice, and time’, Journal 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 51, no. 4, pp.1181-1198.  
Chodorow, N. 1999, The power of feelings: Personal meaning in psychoanalysis, gender, and 
culture, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.  
Chodorow, N. 1986, ‘Towards a relational individualism: The mediation of self through 
psychoanalysis’, in T. Heller, M. Sosna & D. Wellbery (eds.), Autonomy, 
individuality, and the self in Western thought, Stanford University Press, Stanford.  
Clarke, S.  2006, ‘Theory and practice: Psychoanalytic sociology as psycho-social studies’, 
Sociology of Health & Illness, vol. 40, pp. 1153-1169.  
Cole, A. & Knowles, J.G. 2001, Lives in context: The art of life history research, Alta Mira 
Press, Oxford.  
Corr, C. 2002, ‘Revisiting the concept of disenfranchised grief’, in K. Doka (ed.), 
Disenfranchised Grief: New directions, challenges and strategies for practice, 
Research Press, Champaign.  
Corr, C.,Corr, D. & Nabe, C. 1997, Death and dying, life and living, Brooks/Cole, Pacific 
Grove CA.  
Craib, I. 1994, The importance of disappointment, Routledge, London. 
Craib, I.  1995, ‘Some comments on the sociology of the emotions’, Sociology, vol. 29, pp. 
151-158.  
Cussins, C. 1998, ‘Producing reproduction: Techniques of normalization and naturalization in 
infertility clinics’, in S. Franklin & H. Ragone (eds.), Reproducing reproduction: 
Kinship, power and technological innovation, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia.  
219 
de Marneffe, D.  2006a, ‘What exactly is the transformation of motherhood? Commentary on 
Lisa Baraitser’s paper’, Studies in Gender and Sexuality, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 239-248.  
de Marneffe, The Mothers’ Movement Online  2006b, Maternal desire: An interview with 
Daphne de Marneffe, www.mothersmovement.org.  Retrieved: February 14, 2013. 
de Marneffe, D. 2004, Maternal desire: On children, love, and the inner life, Little, Brown 
and Company, New York.  
Diamond, N. & Marrone, M. 2003, Attachment and intersubjectivity, Whurr Publishers Ltd, 
London.  
DiQuinzio, P.2102, ‘Book review: ‘Confronting postmaternal thinking: Feminism, memory 
and care’, by Julie Stephens, Studies in the Maternal, vol. 4, no. 2.  
DiQuinzio, P. 1999, The impossibility of motherhood: femininism, individualism, and the 
problem of mothering, Routledge, New York, London.  
Doka, K. (ed.) 1989, Disenfranchised grief: Recognising hidden sorrow, Lexington, 
Lexington MA. 
Doka, K. (ed.) 2002, Disenfranchised grief: New directions, challenges, and strategies for 
practice, Research Press, Champaign, Illinois. 
Doucet, A. & Mauthner, N.  2008, ‘What can be known and how? Narrated subjects and the 
Listening Guide’, Qualitative Research, vol. 8, pp. 399-409.  
Eisner, E. 2008, ‘Art and knowledge’, in J. Knowles & A. Cole (eds.), Handbook of the arts 
in qualitative research, Sage, Los Angeles, pp. 3-12.  
Emerson, P. & Frosh, S.  2005, ‘Interpretation and over-interpretation: Disputing the meaning 
of texts’, Qualitative Research, vol. 5, p. 307.  
Eng, D. & Kazanjian, D. (eds.) 2003, Loss: The politics of mourning, University of California 
Press, Berkeley. 
Erikson, E. 1963, Childhood and society, 2nd edn., Norton, New York.  
Ettinger, B.L.  2010, ‘(M)Other re-spect: Maternal subjectivity, the Ready-made mother-
monster and the ethics of respecting’, Studies in the Maternal, vol. 2, nos.1&2.  
Ettinger, B.L.  2009, ‘The feminine/prenatal weaving in matrixial subjectivity-as-encounter’, 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives, vol. 
7, no. 3, pp. 367-405.  
Ettinger, B.L. 2006a, The matrixial borderspace, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.  
Ettinger, B.L.  2006b, ‘Matrixial trans-subjectivity’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, no. 2-
3, pp. 218-222.  
Ettinger, B.L.  2004, ‘Weaving a woman artist with-in the matrixial encounter-event’, Theory, 
Culture & Society, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 69-93.  
Ettinger, B.L. 1996, ‘Metramorphic borderlinks and matrixial borderspace’, in J. Welchman 
(ed.), Rethinking borders, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, pp. 125-159.  
220 
Ettinger, B.L. 1994, ‘The becoming threshold of matrixial borderlines’, in G. Robertson, M. 
Mash, L. Tickner, J. Bird Robertson, B. Curtis & T. Putnam (eds.), Travellers’ tales: 
Narratives of home and displacement, Routledge, London, pp. 38-62.  
Fakhry Davids, M. 2002, ‘Fathers in the internal world” From boy to man to father’, in J. 
Trowell & A. Atchegoyen (eds.), The importance of fathers: A psychoanalytic 
reevaluation, Brunner-Routledge, Hove.  
Finch, J.  2007, ‘Displaying families’, Sociology, vol. 41, no. 65, pp. 65-81.  
Frank, A. 2010, ‘Letting stories breathe: A socio-narratology’. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 15 May 2013. 
Frank, A.  2001, ‘Can we research suffering?’, Qualitative Health Research, vol. 11, pp. 353-
362.  
Franklin, S. 1990, ‘Deconstructing ‘desperateness’: The social construction of infertility in 
popular representations of new reproductive technologies ‘, in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & 
S. Yearley (eds.), The new reproductive technologies, MacMillan Press, London.  
Frers, L.  2013, ‘The matter of absence’, Cultural Geographies, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 431-445.  
Freud, S. 1917/1954, Mourning and melancholia The Hogarth Press, London.  
Froggett, L. & Wengraf, T.  2004, ‘Interpreting interviews in the light of reserach team 
dynamics: a study of Nila’s biographic narrative’, International Journal of Critical 
Psychology, vol. 10, pp. 94-122.  
Frosh, S. 2010, Psychoanalysis outside the clinic: Interventions in psychosocial studies, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London.  
Frosh, S.  2007, ‘Disintegrating qualitative research’, Theory & Psychology, vol. 17, no. 5, 
pp. 635-653.  
Frosh, S.  2003, ‘Psychosocial studies and psychology: Is a critical approach emerging?’, 
Human Relations, vol. 56, pp. 1545-1567.  
Frosh, S. 2002, Key concepts in psychoanalysis, The British Library Board, London.  
Frosh, S. & Roseneil, S. (eds.) 2012, Social research after the cultural turn, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Frosh, S. & Baraitser, L.  2008, ‘Psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies’, Psychoanalysis, 
Culture & Society, vol. 13, pp. 346-365.  
Frost, L. & Hoggett, P.2008, ‘Human agency and social suffering’, Critical Social Policy, vol. 
28, pp. 438-460.  
Gadd, D. & Jefferson, T. 2007, Psychosocial criminology, Sage, London.  
Gatrell, C. 2005, Hard labour: the sociology of parenthood, Open University Press, 
Maidenhead.  
Gauntlett, D. 2007, Creative explorations: New approaches to identities and audiences, 
Routledge, Oxford.  
221 
Giddens, A. 2006, ‘Modernity and self-identity revisited’, in ESRC Identities and Social 
Action Research Programme Public Launch London, November 20, 2011. 
Giddens, A. 1991, Modernity and self identity: Self and society in late modern age, Polity, 
Cambridge.  
Gillespie, R.  2000, ‘When no means no: Disbelief, disregard and deviance as discourses of 
voluntary childlessness’, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
223-234.  
Gilligan, C.,Spencer, R.,Weinberg, K. & Bertsch, T. 2005, ‘On the Listening Guide: A voice-
centred relational method’, in S. Hesse-Biber & P. Leavy (eds.), Emergent methods in 
social research, Sage, Thousand Oaks.  
Gordon, A. 1997, Ghostly matters: Haunting and the sociological imagination, The 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.  
Greil, A.,Slausin-Blevins, K. & McQuillan, J.  2010, ‘The experience of infertility: A review 
of recent literature’, Sociology of Health and Illness, vol. 32, no. 1.  
Gross, N.  2005, ‘The detraditionalization of intimacy reconsidered’, Sociological Theory, 
vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 286-311.  
Gubrium, J. & Holstein, J. (eds.) 2003, Postmodern interviewing, Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Guillemin, M.  2004, ‘Understanding Illness: Using Drawings as a Research Method’, 
Qualitative Health Research, vol. 14, p. 272.  
Guthrie, G.  2012, ‘Put a stop now to mother of all insults’, Sydney Morning Herald.  
Guthrie, G. 2012, Childlessness: Reflections on life’s longing for itself, Short Stop Press, 
Sydney.  
Hadfield, L.,Rudoe, N. & Sanderson-Mann, J.  2007, ‘Motherhood, choice and the British 
media: a time to reflect’, Gender and Education, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 255-263.  
Hinshelwood, R.D. 1991, A dictionary of Kleinian thought, 2nd edn., Free Association Books, 
London.  
Hird, M.  2003, ‘Vacant wombs: Femininist challenges to psychoanalytic theories of childless 
women’, Feminist Review, vol. 75, pp. 5-33.  
Hoggett, P.2008, ‘What’s in a hyphen? Reconstructing psychosocial studies’, Psychoanalysis, 
Culture and Society, vol. 13, pp. 379-184.  
Hollway, W.  2012a, ‘Rereading Winnicott’s ‘Primary maternal preoccupation’, Feminism & 
Psychology, vol. 22, no. 1.  
Hollway, W.  2012b, ‘Review of Stone’s (2011) ‘Feminism, psychoanalysis, and maternal 
subjectivity’’, Feminism & Psychology, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 547-552.  
Hollway, W.  2011, ‘In between external and internal worlds: Imagination in transitional 
space’, Methodological Innovations Online, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 50-60.  
222 
Hollway, W.  2010, ‘Conflict in the transitions to becoming a mother: A psycho-social 
approach’, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 136-155.  
Hollway, W.  2009a, ‘Maternal Studies: The why and wherefore’, Studies in the Maternal, 
vol. 1, no. 1.  
Hollway, W.  2009b, ‘Applying the ‘experience-near’ principle to research: 
psychoanalytically informed methods’, Journal of Social Work Practice.  
Hollway, W. 2008a, ‘The importance of relational thinking in the practice of psycho-social 
research: Ontology, epistemology, methodology, and ethics’, in S. Clarke, H. Hahn & 
P. Hoggett (eds.), Object relations and social relations: The implications of the 
relational turn in psychoanalysis, Karnac, London.  
Hollway, W.  2008b, ‘Doing intellectual disagreement differently’, Psychoanalysis, Culture & 
Society, vol. 13, pp. 385-396.  
Hollway, W. 2006, The capacity to care: Gender and ethical subjectivity, Routledge, Hove.  
Hollway, W. & Jefferson, T. 2013, Doing qualitative research differently, 2nd edition, Sage, 
London.  
Hollway, W. & Jefferson, T.  2005, ‘Panic and perjury: A psychosocial exploration of 
agency’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 44, pp. 147-163.  
Hollway, W. & Jefferson, T. 2000, Doing qualitative research differently: Free association, 
narrative and the interview method, Sage, London.  
Irvine, W.B. 2007, On desire: Why we want what we want, Oxford University Press, New 
York.  
Jackson, A.  2003, ‘Rhizovocality’, Qualitative Studies in Education, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 693-
710.  
Jackson, A. & Mazzei, L. 2009, Voice in qualitative inquiry: Challenging conventional, 
interpretive, and critical conceptions in qualitative research, New York, Routledge.  
Jervis, S. 2009, ‘The use of the self as a research tool’, in S. Clarke & P. Hoggett (eds.), 
Researching Beneath the Surface: Psycho-Social Research Methods in Practice, 
Karnac, London.  
Josselson, R.  2004, ‘The hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion’, Narrative 
Inquiry, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-28.  
Kanter, J. (ed.) 2004, Face to face with children: The life and work of Clare Winnicott, 
Karnac, London. 
Kauffman, J. 2002, ‘The psychology of disenfranchised grief: liberation, shame, and self-
disenfranchisement’, in K. Doka (ed.), Disenfranchised grief: New directions, 
challenges and strategies for practice, Research Press, Champaign.  
Kearney, K. & Hyle, A.  2004, ‘Drawing out emotions: The use of participant-produced 
drawings in qualitative inquiry’, Qualitative Research, vol. 4, p. 361.  
223 
Kelly, M.  2009, ‘Women’s voluntary childlessness: A radical rejection of motherhood?’, 
Women’s Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3-4, pp. 157-172.  
Ketokivi, K.  2009, ‘Sharing the same fate’, European Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 391-410.  
Klass, D. 2001, ‘The inner representation of the dead child in the psychic and social narratives 
of bereaved parents’, in R. Neimeyer (ed.), Meaning reconstruction and the 
experience of loss, American Psychological Association, Washington.  
Klass, D. & Walter, T. 2001, ‘Processes of grieving: How bonds are continued’, in Handbook 
of bereavement research: Consequences, coping and care, American Psychological 
Association, Washington.  
Klass, D.,Nickman, S. & Silverman, P. (eds.) 1996, Continuing bonds: New understandings 
of grief, Taylor & Francis, Washington DC. 
Klass, D. & Silverman, P. 1996, ‘Introduction: What’s the problem?’, in D. Klass, S. 
Nickman & P.Silverman (eds.), Continuing bonds: New understandings of grief, 
Taylor&Francis, Washington.  
Klein, M. 1959/1975, ‘Our adult world and its roots in infancy’, in M. Masud & R. Khan 
(eds.), Envy and gratitude and other works, Hogarth Press, London.  
Klein, M. 1956/1986, ‘A study of envy and gratitude’, in J. Mitchell (ed.), The selected 
Melanie Klein, Penguin, London.  
Klein, M. 1940/1986, ‘Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states’, in J. Mitchell 
(ed.), The selected Melanie Klein, Penguin, London.  
Klein, M. 1935/1986, ‘A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states’, in J. 
Mitchell (ed.), The selected Melanie Klein, Penguin, London.  
Kress, G. 2001, ‘Sociolinguistics and social semiotics’, in P. Cobley (ed.), The Routledge 
companion to semiotics and linguistics, Routledge, Oxford.  
Kristeva, J. 2005, ‘Motherhood today’, in Colloque Gypsy V, Grand Amphitheartre du 
Museum National D’Histoire Naturelle, Paris.  
Kristeva, J. 1979, ‘Women’s time’, in T. Moi (ed.), The Kristeva reader, Columbia University 
Press, New York.  
Kubler Ross, E. 1969, On death and dying, Scribner, New York.  
Lang, S. 2009, ‘Generation maybe’, in Next, Auckland, pp. 38-40.  
Laslett, B.  1998, ‘Personal narratives as sociology’, Contemporary Sociology, vol. 28, no. 4, 
pp. 391-401.  
Law, J. 2004, After method: Mess in social science research, Routledge, Abingdon.  
Lax, R. 2006, ‘Motherhood is unending’, in A. Alizade (ed.), Motherhood in the twenty-first 
century, Karnac, London.  
224 
Letherby, G. 2012, ‘‘Infertility’ and ‘involuntary childlessness’: Losses, ambivalences and 
resolutions’, in S. Earle, C. Komaromy & L. Layne (eds.), Understanding 
reproductive loss: Perspectives on life, death and fertility, Ashgate Publications Ltd, 
Farnham.  
Letherby, G.  1999, ‘Other than mother and mothers as others: the experience of motherhood 
and non-motherhood in relation to ‘infertility’ and ‘involuntary childlessness’’, 
Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 359-372.  
Letherby, G.  1994, ‘“Mother or not, mother or what? Problems of definition and identity ‘, 
Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 525-532.  
Levinson, D.J. 1996, The seasons of a woman’s life, Ballentine Books, New York.  
Lichtenberg-Ettinger, B.  1997, ‘The feminine/prenatal weaving in matrixial subjectivity-as-
encounter’, Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational 
Perspectives, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 367-405.  
MacLure, M. 2009, ‘Broken voices, dirty words’, in A. Jackson & L. Mazzei (eds.), Voice in 
qualitative inquiry: Challenging conventional, interpretive, and critical conceptions in 
qualitative research, Routledge, London.  
MacLure, M.,Holmes, R.,Jones, L. & MacRae, C.  2010, ‘Silence as resistance to analysis: 
Or, on not opening one’s mouth properly’, Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 16, no. 6, pp. 492-
500.  
Mantell, H. 2003, Giving up the ghost: A memoir, Fourth Estate, London.  
Marris, P. 1974, Loss and change, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.  
Massumi, B. 2006, ‘Painting: The voice of the grain’, in B. Massumi (ed.), The matrixial 
borderspace, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.  
Mauthner, N. 2009, ‘Introducing the Listening Guide: Theory, method and practice’, in The 
Listening Guide, University of Canterbury, June 22, 2009. 
Mauthner, N. 2002, The darkest days of my life: Stories of postpartum depression, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA.  
Mauthner, N. & Doucet, A.  2003, ‘Reflexive accounts and accounts of reflexivity in 
qualitative data analysis’, Sociology vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 413-431.  
Mauthner, N. & Doucet, A. 1998, ‘Reflections of a voice-centred relational method’, in J. 
Ribbens & R. Edwards (eds.), Feminist dilemmas in qualitative research, Sage, 
London.  
McAdam, D. & de St. Aubin, E.  1992, ‘A theory of generativity and its assessment through 
self-report, behavioral acts, and narrative themes in autobiography’, Journal of 
personality and social psychology, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 1003-1015.  
McAllister, F. & Clarke, L. 1998, Choosing Childlessness, Family Policy Centre, Joseph 
Roundtree Foundation, York.  
225 
McLeod, J. & Thomson, R. 2009, Researching social change: Qualitative approaches, Sage, 
London.  
Mazzei, L. 2009, ‘An impossibly full voice’, in L. Mazzei & A. Jackson (eds.), Voice in 
qualitative inquiry, Routledge, London and New York.  
Meier, L.,Frers, L. & Sigvardsdotter, E.  2013, ‘The importance of absence in the present: 
Practices of remembrance and the contestation of absences’, Cultural Geographies, 
vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 423-430.  
Metge, J. 1995, New growth from old: The whanau in the modern world, Victoria University 
Press, Wellington.  
Miller, T. 2005, Making sense of motherhood: A narrative approach, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
Mitchell, J. (ed.) 1986, The selected Melanie Klein, Penguin, London. 
Morgan, D.  2011, ‘Locating ‘family practices’’, Sociological Research Online, vol. 16, no. 4.  
Morgan, D. 1996, Family connections, Polity Press, Cambridge.  
Mulvey, L. 1988, ‘Visual pleasure and narrative cinema’, in C. Penley (ed.), Feminism and 
film theory, BFI, London.  
Neimeyer, R. (ed.) 2001, Meaning reconstruction and the experience of loss, American 
Psychological Association, Washington. 
Neimeyer, R. 1998, ‘Can there be a psychology of loss?’, in J. Harvey (ed.), Perspectives on 
loss: A sourcebook, Taylor and Francis, Philadelphia.  
Neimeyer, R. & Anderson, A. 2002, ‘Meaning reconstruction theory’, in N. Thompson (ed.), 
Loss and grief: A guide for human services practitioners, Palgrave, Basingstoke.  
Neimeyer, R. & Stewart, A.  1996, ‘Trauma, healing, and the narrative employment of loss’, 
Families in Society, vol. 77, pp. 360-375.  
Nicholson, V. 2007, Singled out, Penguin, London.  
Ochs, E. & Capps, L.  1996, ‘Narrating the self’, Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 25, pp. 
19-43.  
Ogden, T.  2002, ‘A new reading of the origins of object relations theory’, International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 83, pp. 767-782.  
Olshansky, S.  1962, ‘Chronic sorrow: A response to having a mentally defective child’, 
Social Casework, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 190-193.  
Orbach, S. 2009, Bodies, New York, Picador.  
O’Reilly, A. 2010, ‘Introduction’, in A. O’Reilly (ed.), 21st Century motherhood: Experience, 
identity, policy, agency, Columbia University Press, New York.  
Orr, D.  2010, ‘The sexual politics of lone mums’, The Guardian Weekly.  
226 
Parker, I.  2010, ‘The place of transference in psychosocial research’, Journal of Theoretical 
and Philosophical Psychology, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 17-31.  
Parker, R. 2005, Torn in two: The experience of maternal ambivalence, Virago, London.  
Parkes, C. 2001, ‘A historical overview of the scientific study of bereavement’, in M. Stroebe, 
R. Hansson, W. Stroebe & H. Schut (eds.), Handbook of bereavement research: 
consequences, coping, and care, American Psychological Association, Washington.  
Parkes, C.M.  1998, ‘Traditional models and theories of grief’, Bereavement Care, vol. 17, 
no. 2, pp. 21-23.  
Phillips, A. 2005, Going sane, Penguin, London.  
Phillips, A. 2007, Winnicott, Penguin, London.  
Phillips, A. 2012, Missing out: In praise of the unlived life, Hamish Hamilton, London.  
Pollock, G.  2009, ‘Mother trouble: The maternal-feminine in phallic and feminist theory in 
relation to Bracha Ettinger’s elaboration of matrixial ethics/aesthetics’, Studies in the 
Maternal, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-31.  
Pollock, G. 2006, ‘Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or sexual difference?’, in  The matrixial 
borderspace, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London.  
Prager, J. 2009, ‘Melancholic identity: Post-traumatic loss, memory and identity formation’, 
in A. Elliot & P. du Gay (eds.), Identity in question, Sage, London.  
Raphael-Leff, J.  2009, ‘Maternal subjectivity’, Studies in the Maternal, vol. 1, no. 1.  
Redman, P.2005, ‘Narrative construction of identity revisited’, Narrative Inquiry, vol. 15, no. 
1, pp. 25-44.  
Ribbens McCarthy, J. & Edwards, R. 2002, ‘The individual in public and private: The 
significance of mothers and children’, in A. Carling, S. Duncan & R. Edwards (eds.), 
Analysing families: Morality and rationality in policy and practice, Routledge, 
London.  
Rich, A. 1976, Of woman born, Norton, New York.  
Riessman, C.K. 2008, Narrative methods for the human sciences, Sage, London.  
Riley, H.  2004, ‘Perceptual modes, semiotic codes, social mores: A contribution towards a 
social semiotics of drawing’, Visual Communication, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 294-315.  
Roos, S. 2002, Chronic sorrow: A living loss, Brunner-Routledge, New York.  
Rose, G. 2007, Visual Methodologies: An introduction to the interpretation of visual 
materials 2nd ed., London, Sage.  
Rose, J. 1996, States of fantasy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Rosen, A. 2005, ‘Facts and fantasies about Infertility’, in S. Feig Brown (ed.), What do 
women want? Developmental perspectives, and clinical challenges, The Analytic 
Press, London.  
227 
Roseneil, S. 2010, ‘Doing qualitative research methods differently: Challenging sociology’, in 
Oxford Research Methods Festival, Oxford, July 5. 
Roseneil, S.  2009, ‘Haunting in an age of individualization’, European Societies, vol. 11, no. 
3, pp. 411-430.  
Roseneil, S.  2006, ‘The ambivalences of Angel’s ‘arrangement’: A psychosocial lens on the 
contemporary condition of personal life’, The Sociological Review, vol. 54, no. 4.  
Ruddick, S. 1995, Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace, 2nd edn., Beacon Press, 
Boston.  
Ruddick, S. 1989, Maternal thinking: Toward a politics of peace, 1st edn., The Women’s 
Press Ltd, Boston.  
Salecl, R. 2011, The tyranny of choice, Profile Books, London.  
Segal, L. & Baraitser, L.  2009, ‘Lynne Segal in conversation with Lisa Baraitser’, Studies in 
the Maternal, vol. 1, no. 1.  
Seligmann-Silva, M.  2006, ‘Contingency’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, no. 135, pp. 
135-138.  
Shute, N. 2010, ‘Beyond birth: A child’s cells may help or harm the mother long after 
delivery’, in Scientific American.  
Somers, M.  1994, ‘The narrative constitution of Identity: A relational and network approach’, 
Theory and Society, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 605-649.  
Spears, R.  2005, ‘Where did Vincent’s van go?’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 
44, no. 2, pp. 165-168.  
Smart, C. 2007, Personal life: New directions in sociological thinking, Polity Press, 
Cambridge.  
Smith, B. & Sparkes, A.  2008, ‘Contrasting perspectives on narrating selves and identities: 
An invitation to dialogue’, Qualitative Research, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 5-35.  
Spigel, S.  2009, ‘Lynne Segal in conversation with Lisa Baraitser’, Studies in the Maternal, 
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-19.  
Stephens, J. 2011, Confronting postmaternal thinking: Feminism, memory, and care, New 
York, Colombia University Press.  
Stern, D. 1999, The interpersonal world of the infant: A unified view of parent-infant 
psychotherapy, Karnac, London.  
Stirling, A. 2012, ‘Tick Tock: At 34, Abbey Stirling is in a race against her biological clock’, 
in Sunday, Auckland.  
Stone, A. 2011, Feminism, psychoanalysis, and maternal subjectivity, Routledge, London.  
Stone, A.  2012, ‘Maternal memory and lived time’, Studies in the Maternal, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 
1-27.  
228 
Stroebe, M.  1992-93, ‘Coping with bereavement: A review of the grief work hypothesis’, 
Omega:Journal of Death and Dying, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 19-42.  
Szewczuk, E.  2011, ‘Age-related infertility: A tale of two technologies’, Sociology of Health 
and Illness, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 429-443.  
Taylor, C. 2003, Modern social imaginaries, Duke University Press, Durham.  
Thompson, C. 2002, ‘Fertile Ground: Feminists theorize infertility’, in F. Van Balen & M. 
Inhorn (eds.), Infertility around the globe: New thinking on childlessness, gender, and 
reproductive technologies, University of California Press, Berkeley.  
Thompson, N. 2002, Loss and grief: A guide for human services practitioners, Palgrave, New 
York.  
Thomson, R. 2010, ‘Doing qualitative research differently - an incite-ful intervention’, in 
Oxford Research Methods Festival, Oxford, July 5. 
Thomson, R. 2007, ‘Thinking intergenerationally: Motherhood, relations and relationality’, in 
Thinking through relationality: Relationships, connectedness and social Distance, 
Morgan Centre for the Study of Relationships and Personal Life, University of 
Manchester. 
Thomson, R.,Kehily, M.J.,Hadfield, L., & Sharpe, S., 2011, Making modern mothers, Policy 
Press, Bristol.  
Tonkin, L. 2014 (forthcoming), ‘Caught in the margins: Childlessness as an unexpected 
consequence of life choices’, in J. Jones, M. Porter & L. Raith (eds.), Mothers at the 
margins, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle.  
Tonkin, L.  2012, ‘Haunted by a ‘present absence’’, Studies in the Maternal, vol. 4, no. 1.  
Tonkin, L.  2010, ‘Making sense of loss: The disenfranchised grief of women who are 
‘contingently childless’’, Journal of the Motherhood Initiative for Research and 
Community Involvement, vol. 1, no. 2.  
Tonkin, L. 1998, Still Life: Hidden stories of stillbirth and forbidden grief, Hazard Press, 
Christchurch.  
Trimberger, E.K. 2005, The new single woman, Beacon Press, Boston.  
Tyler, I.  2007, ‘The selfish feminist: Public images of women’s liberation’, Australian 
Feminist Studies, vol. 22, no. 53, pp. 173-189.  
Van Balen, F. & Inhorn, M. 2002, ‘Interpreting infertility: A view from the social sciences’, 
in F. Van Balen & M. Inhorn (eds.), Infertility Around the Globe: New thinking on 
childlessness, gender, and reproductive technologies, University of California Press, 
Los Angeles and Berkeley.  
Wager, M.  2000, ‘Childless by choice? Ambivalence and the female identity’, Feminism and 
Psychology, vol. 10, pp. 389-395.  
Walkerdine, V.  2008, ‘Contextualizing debates about psychosocial studies’, Psychoanalysis, 
Culture & Society, vol. 13, pp. 341-345.  
229 
Walkerdine, V.,Lucey, H. & Melody, J. 2001, Growing up girl: Psychosocial explorations of 
gender and class, New York University Press, New York.  
Walter, T.  1996, ‘A new model of grief: Bereavement and biography’, Mortality, vol. 1, no. 
1, pp. 7-25.  
Weber, S. & Mitchell, C. 1995, ‘That’s funny, you don’t look like a teacher’: Interrogating 
images and identity in popular culture, The Falmer Press, London.  
Welldon, E. 2006, ‘Why do you want to have a child?’, in A. Alizade (ed.), Motherhood in 
the twenty-first century, Karnac, London.  
Whiteford, L. & Gonzalez, L.  1994, ‘Stigma: The hidden burden of infertility’, Social 
Science & Medicine, vol. 40, no. 27-36.  
Williams, Z.  2013, ‘There may be five million IVF success stories, but for many millions 
more women, the treatments have failed. So why do we never hear from them?’, The 
Guardian.  
Winnicott, D. 1988, Human nature, Free Association Books, London.  
Winnicott, D. 1971, Playing and reality, Tavistock Publications Ltd, London.  
Winnicott, D. 1965, ‘A personal view of the Kleinian contribution’, in M. Khan (ed.), The 
maturational processes and the facilitating environment, Hogarth Press, London.  
Winnicott, D. 1964, ‘Group influences and the maladjusted child’, in The family and 
individual development, Tavistock, London.  
Winnicott, D. 1963, ‘The development of the capacity for concern’, in M. Khan (ed.), The 
maturational processes and the facilitating environment, The Hogarth Press, London.  
Winnicott, D. 1958, ‘Through paediatrics to psychoanalysis’, in  Collected papers, Tavistock, 
London.  
Wortman, C. & Silver, R. 2001, ‘The myths of coping with loss revisited’, in M. Stroebe, R. 
Hansson, W. Stroebe & H. Schut (eds.), Handbook of Bereavement Research: 
Consequences, coping and care, American Psychological Association, Washington.  
Wortman, C. & Silver, R.  1989, ‘The myths of coping with loss’, Journal of consulting and 
clinical psychology, vol. 57, pp. 349-357.  
Wright Mills, C. 1959, The sociological imagination, Oxford University Press, New York.  
Zanobini, L. 2009, Reproductive ambivalence: A Levinsonian study, Wright Institute 
Graduate School of Psychology. 
Zoll, M. 2013, Cracked open: Liberty, fertility, and the pursuit of high-tech babies, Interlink Books, 
Northhampton.   
